Chapter 5: Analysis of PLA Army Strategic Goals and Military Reform
5.4. Research Development in PLA: Combat RDT&E and Defense Industrial Base
After analyzing PLAA military capabilities, it is useful to directly compare the PLAA with their greatest military threat, the U.S. Army:
Figure 16 - Comparison between U.S. Army and PLAA Capabilities
United States Army PLA Army
Budget $158,353,823,000 (2018) $174,500,000,000 (2018 for entire PLA) Unknown breakdown for PLAA Manpower Total Army End Strength: 1,042,000
Active Soldiers: 490,000
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, senior military colleges, R.O.T.C in majority of U.S. universities, U.S. Army war colleges, Government sponsored think tanks
Development of 依托国民教育 – use of top Chinese universities and decreasing the amount of military academies, many military think tanks such as PLAAMS (see below sections)
Initiatives such as SASTIND to build up civil-military integration (see below sections)
Warfighting Inventory
1,872 UH-60 Black Hawks, 596 AH-64 Apaches, 435 CH-47 Chinooks, 44 OH-58A Kiowas, 5,884 M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams, 35,275 Armored Fighting Vehicles, 963 Self-Propelled Artillery, 1242 Towed Artillery, and 600 Multiple Rocket Launchers
7,390 tanks (50% modern), 9520 armored vehicles, 13,000+ artillery items, 1872 MRL, 6140 Towed Artillery, 2320 SP Artillery, 240 WZ10/19,351 MR Helicopters, 362 Transport Helicopters.
(much of inventory is older technology)
Organization and Military Infrastructure
72 posts in 33 domestic states, multiple posts all over the world
Restructuring into 5 military region, emulating brigade format in U.S. Army
This figure demonstrates U.S. Army superiority in almost every quantifiable manner possible.
They are better equipped, better manned, have a stronger defense industrial base, and are organized more efficiently. When considering the need for military reform and arms buildup in the PLAA, Chinese military strategists understand that they must develop the PLAA in such a way to be able to balance the overwhelming capabilities of the U.S. Army. With this line of reasoning, the security environment shaped by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region provides a rational justification for continued PLAA reform.
5.4: Research Development in PLA: Combat RDT&E and Defense Industrial Base
Combat research and training institutions provide a valuable resource for the PLA as a
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whole, subsequently benefiting the PLAA. Since Combat RDT&E institutions are not fully separated by to support a specific service organ in particular, this section will only generally refer to how research and development facilities are benefitting the PLA as a whole. Combat RDT&E is the foundational element towards improving technological capabilities in military reform. Over the past decade, President Xi Jinping’s administration has made multiple statements stressing the need to improve China’s defense industrial base and training institutions primarily through civil-military integration. This trend is highlighted by the following excerpts from defense-related white papers:
Figure 17: PLA RDT&E Table
White Paper Excerpts
China’s National Defense 2008: “To meet the needs of weaponry and equipment development, as well as development of the socialist market economy, China is constantly reforming its management system of defense-related science, technology and industry. According to the Plan for Restructuring the State Council passed by the First Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress in 2008, the Science, Technology and Industry Commission for National Defense of the People's Republic of China has been superseded by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 2007, the State Council approved Some Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Investment System of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which explicitly proposes a new investment system featuring effective government regulation and control, participation of social capital, standardized
intermediary services, vigorous supervision and management, and positive military-civilian interaction…is in the initial stage of establishing a new system of defense-related science, technology and industry that features a small core, extensive cooperation and a large military potential reserve among civilians. Structural contradictions in defense-related science, technology and industry have been gradually and fundamentally solved through strategic restructuring and the streamlining of the main body of the defense industry...
Relevant laws and regulations have been improved to standardize and supervise the process of reorganizing the defense industry enterprises and getting them listed on the stock market… Enhancing the basic
capabilities of weaponry and equipment research and production. Defense-related science, technology and industry are striving to enhance the informationization of weaponry and equipment design and development, and to render product design more digitalized, modularized, standardized and reliable… This sector has also increased final assembly and integration capabilities, and a number of key enterprises have realized systems integration of assembly, experimentation and testing. This has substantially raised core manufacturing capabilities by giving priority to resolving processing and technical issues in complex parts processing, precision manufacturing and special welding.”
China’s National Defense 2010: “The PLA is working to improve its capabilities in managing, maintaining and supporting equipment. It widely applies modern management techniques and enhances standardized and meticulous management of equipment. Educational institutions, research institutes and manufacturers are encouraged to recruit and train more experts in new equipment. The PLA works in coordination with R&D institutes and defense industry manufacturers to enhance its maintenance and support for high-tech equipment and develops an integrated civilian-military maintenance and support system. The PLA has developed comprehensive capabilities in equipment maintenance which cover multi-functional testing, mobile rescue and rush repair, and long-distance technical support.”
China’s Military Strategy 2015: “Developing advanced weaponry and equipment. Persevering in information dominance, systems building, independent innovation, sustainable development, overall planning, and emphasis on priorities, China's armed forces will speed up to upgrade weaponry and equipment, and work to develop a weaponry and equipment system which can effectively respond to informationized warfare and help fulfill the missions and tasks.”
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19th Party Congress by President Xi Jinping: “We will speed up implementation of major projects, deepen reform of defense-related science, technology, and industry, achieve greater military-civilian integration, and build integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities.”
The 13th Five-Year Plan (Economic/Social Development of PRC): “We will explore the establishment of a mechanism for funding integrated military-civilian development projects. We will deepen institutional reform of defense-related science and technology industries…We will reform systems and mechanism concerning defense-related research, production, and weapons and equipment procurement, move faster in opening military industries to competition and…guide private businesses with a competitive advantage in entering the fields of research and development, production, and maintenance of military products.
There is a common theme from these white papers: the importance of bringing together military and private sectors to achieve the common task of improving the defense industrial base. Under President Xi Jinping’s guidance, defense industrial leaders have created a number of new initiatives to develop weapon innovation and integrate the private sector. In 2008, the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) was set up to advance military technological capabilities and to carry out defense technological directives from the CCP. Since then, the SASTIND has initiated the 2025 Defense Science and Technology Plan to complement the Made in China 2025 strategic manufacturing plan to bolster domestic high-tech industries. SASTIND has also established a defense S&T Development Strategy Committee to conduct defense research to help advise the government’s strategy on technological development.224 Combined with the PLA’s private research institutions, these organizations have greatly expanded Chinese abilities to collect intelligence, make technological breakthroughs, and provide policy advice to relevant leaders.225
Major steps in civil-military integration include periodic SASTIND Strategic Action
224 Tai Ming Cheung, Eric Anderson, and Fan Yang, EScholarship.org, Series 9, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, February 28, 2017, 2, accessed May 11, 2018, https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt84v3d66k/qt84v3d66k.pdf?t
=om3n7r&v=lg.
225 Bates Gill, and James Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions," The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 617, doi:10.1017/s0009443902000384.
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Plans (SAP) intended to create short-term and attainable goals.226 These actions demonstrate an eventual goal of transitioning traditionally state-owned defense enterprises into a mixed-ownership status to fully leverage the knowledge of civilian technological sectors to achieve military reform goals. The implications of this transition could be far reaching, opening up Chinese defense sectors to be more autonomous and while simultaneous opening up the sector to foreign investment.227 Given the current PLAA need for advanced missile
technologies and greater C4ISR capabilities, a more robust and efficient defense sector could greatly accelerate military reform goals.
Leadership Development Reforms
China’s ambitions to build up technological competence have pushed forth a need for a more professional officer corps and a professional non-commissioned officer corps capable of handling specialized technical knowledge.228 China’s Military Strategy in 2015 called for:
“Cultivating new-type military personnel. China's armed forces will continue with the strategic project for personnel training and perfect the system for military human resources. They will deepen the reform of military educational institutions and improve the triad training system for new-type military personnel - institutional education, unit training and military professional education, so as to pool more talented people and cultivate more personnel who can meet the demands of informationized warfare.”
The PLA and PLAA has traditionally relied on their 100+ military academies to train their
226 Tai Ming Cheung, Eric Anderson, and Fan Yang, EScholarship.org, Series 9, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, February 28, 2017, 2, accessed May 11, 2018, https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt84v3d66k/qt84v3d66k.pdf?t=om3n7r
&v=lg.
227 Ibid., 4.
228 Ibid., 4-5.
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military officers to meet the demands of warfare domains.229 Unfortunately, the military academy system has two significant issues: (1) they divert a large amount of military personnel/technological capital (2) they lack the funding or resources to keep cadets up to speed with the advancements of current technology. By 2007, several of these academies were shut down and the “依托国民教育” was properly implemented. Since then, China’s top universities have graduated thousands of military officers – providing them with a world class education and supporting the PLA’s goal of technically proficient military officers.