中国的陆军：陆基安全威胁和军事改革2007-2018 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 中国的陆军：陆基安全威胁和军事改革 2007-2018. y. Nat. er. io. sit. China’s Army: Land-Based Security Threats. n. and Military Reform 2007-2018 a. iv l C n hengchi U. Student: AMOS LEE 李浩晟 Advisor: PROFESSOR I YUAN. 中華民國. 107 年. 5 月. i. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(2) 中国的陆军：陆基安全威胁和军事改革 2007-2018. China’s Army: Land-Based Security Threats and Military Reform 2007-2018. 研究生：李浩晟. Student: Amos Lee. 指導教授：袁易教授. 政治大. 國立政治大學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位. 學. ‧ 國. 立. Advisor: Professor I Yuan. ‧. 學程碩士論文. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. A Thesis. engchi. i n U. v. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國. 107 年. 5 月. ii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(3) Abstract. What is the relationship between land-based security threats and the objectives of military reform in the PLA Army? After considering this relationship, is the continued advancement of PLA Army capabilities the most optimal policy choice? This thesis attempts to address these questions by examining various land-based security threats and applying this understanding to military reform in PLA Army. The foundation of this research will rely on the analysis of white paper guidance published by the Central Military Commission under the Communist. 政治大 optimal or suboptimal decision.立 The rationale behind the quality of the PLA Army’s decision Party of China. Theoretically, this study displays the question of military reform as either an. ‧ 國. 學. to bolster their military capabilities relies on the state of China’s international security environment. Understanding the advancements of the PLA Army’s reform within this context. ‧. is vital to recognizing the thought process of Central Military Commission and can provide a. sit. y. Nat. more nuanced image of the PLAA. Additionally, countries with an interest in the People’s. n. al. er. io. Republic of China such as the United States will be able to reevaluate their military policies. i n U. v. in the Asia-Pacific region while considering the position of the PLAA.. Ch. engchi. Keywords: land-based security threats, military reform, capacity building, PLA Army, international security environment, arms-building, white papers. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(4) 摘要. 陸基安全威脅與解放軍軍事改革目標之間的關係為何？考慮到這種關係，PLA 陸軍最優先選擇之策略會是持續提升其能力？這篇論文嘗試透過檢視不同的陸基安全威脅並適用解放軍陸軍的軍事改革來回答這些問題。這項研究以中央軍委會出版之白皮書指南分析為基礎。軍事改革包括最優或次優決策。中國人民解放軍陸軍在中國國際安全環境狀況之考量下決定加強其軍事力量。在這種脈絡下理解解放軍改革的進步對於認. 政治大對中華人民共和國利益相關的國家能夠在考慮 PLAA 的立場的同時，重新評估其在亞立識中央軍事委員會的思想過程至關重要，可以為解放軍提供更加細緻的形象。另外，. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 太地區的軍事政策。. 關鍵詞：陸基安全威脅，軍事改革，能力建設，解放軍陸軍，國際安全環境，建軍政. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 策，白皮書. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(5) Acknowledgements. This research project developed out of a desire to better understand the People’s Liberation Army. My curiosity in the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China stems from my cultural background as a Chinese-American and my occupational knowledge as a U.S. Army officer. An acute perception of one another’s military forces can prevent cross-cultural misunderstandings and set the foundation for further cooperation. As a young scholar in this field, I relied on the generous assistance from my professors. I would like to thank my three. 政治大. committee members who have invested so much time and effort into the production of my. 立. research. First off, I would like to thank Professor I Yuan for pointing out some structural. ‧ 國. 學. issues with my thesis and guiding me in the right direction. As both my thesis advisor and professor, I have had the distinct pleasure of being a student under Professor I Yuan, inspiring. ‧. both my personal and professional interest in China studies.. y. Nat. sit. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Ching Chang for guiding me away from an overly. n. al. er. io. ambitious theoretical framework near the beginning of my research. His military expertise. i n U. v. has also been of great assistance in pointing out relevant sources and data. Dr. Wu has also. Ch. engchi. been incredibly supportive in thoroughly reading and examining my thesis for problematic statements. I would also like to thank Dr. Alexander Huang and his staff for bringing me to the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies and providing me with valuable PLA sources. Finally, I am unbelievably thankful to Dr. William Vocke, Fulbright Taiwan, AIT, and all the staff at the Foundation for Scholarly Exchange for providing me the opportunity to pursue my academic interests in Taiwan. I am grateful for all the individuals that have provided me guidance and to my friends and family for supporting me in my studies!. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(6) Acronyms. 2013 SMS AIDC ADA APC ATLA BDCA BDM. 2013 Science of Military Strategy Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation Air Defense Artillery Armored Personnel Carrier Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency Border Defense Cooperation Agreement Border Personnel Mechanism Command, Control, Communications, Computers Intelligence, Surveillance and C4ISR Reconnaissance CCP/CPC Communist Party of China CMC Central Military Commission DDP Indian Department of Defense Production ECM Electronic Countermeasures FAS Federation of America Scientists GDP Gross Domestic Product GSDF Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force HQ Headquarters IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies ISIS The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant LAC Line of Actual Control MAC Military Area Commands MB Main Battle Tanks MR Multiple Rocket Launcher System MRH Multirole Helicopter MO Ministry of Defense NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OMTE Outline for Military Training and Evaluation PAP People's Armed Police PLA People's Liberation Army PLAA People's Liberation Army Army PLAAF People's Liberation Army Air Force PLAAMS People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Science PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy PLARF People's Liberation Army Rocket Force PLASSF People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force PRC People's Republic of China RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Establishment ROC Taiwan, Republic of China SASTI State Administration for Science Technology and Industry for National Defense SP Self-Propelled Artillery SSI Strategic Studies Institute TC Theater Commands THAA Terminal High Altitude Area Defense UN United Nations USD United States Dollar. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. vi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(7) TABLE OF CONTENTS. Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1: The Importance of Understanding Chinese Military Reform ....................................... 2 1.2: Thesis Approach ............................................................................................................. 3 1.3: Thesis Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 1.4: Research Question(s) ...................................................................................................... 6 1.5: Overview of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Reform ................................................. 6 Chapter 2: Literature Review on the Perspectives of China’s Military Growth ........................ 9. 政治大 2.2: Defensive Neorealism and 立Realpolitik Statecraft Beliefs Approach ............................ 15. 2.1: Parabellum Offensive Realism Approach ....................................................................... 9. ‧ 國. 學. 2.3: Confucian-Pacifism Approach ...................................................................................... 19 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methods .................................................................... 22. ‧. 3.1: Do These Approaches Apply to Military Reform? ....................................................... 24 3.2: Theory behind China’s Military “Arms-Buildup” ........................................................ 25. y. Nat. er. io. sit. 3.3: Relationship between Strategic Goals, Land-Based Security Environment, and Ongoing Military Reforms in China .................................................................................... 27. al. 3.4: Research Foundation: Chinese Communist Party White Papers ................................ 30. n. v i n Chapter 4: Analysis of PLA Army Strategic Security Environment C h Goals and Land-Based engchi U. 33. 4.1: Introduction of the PLA Army Organization ................................................................ 33 4.1.1: Historical Background of PLA Army Reform and Role of Landpower ................ 34 4.1.2: Strategic Objectives of PLAA and PLAA Reform ................................................ 37 4.2: Asian Security and Active Defense Concept ................................................................ 39 4.3: What is the Threat Level/Security Environment for the PLAA ................................... 41 4.4: Land Security and Physical Border Concerns .............................................................. 44 4.4.1: Traditional Threat – United States ......................................................................... 48 4.4.2: Traditional Threat - Japan .................................................................................... 53 4.4.3: Traditional Threat - India ....................................................................................... 57 4.4.4: Traditional Threat - Taiwan .................................................................................... 62 vii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(8) 4.4.5: Traditional Threat - Vietnam .................................................................................. 66 4.4.6: Nontraditional Threats – Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Afghanistan,Pakistan,Myanmar 71 Chapter 5: Analysis of PLA Army Strategic Goals and Military Reform................................ 73 5.1. PLA Strategists and White Paper Guidelines................................................................ 73 5.2. Structural and Professional Advances in PLA Army: Manpower ................................. 76 5.3. Technological Advances in PLA Army: Equipment ..................................................... 81 5.4. Research Development in PLA: Combat RDT&E and Defense Industrial Base......... 90 5.5. Combat Experience, Readiness and Doctrine: Training ............................................... 94 Chapter 6: Conclusion on PLA Army Reform ......................................................................... 99 6.1. Future Research .......................................................................................................... 100. 政治大 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 103 立. 6.2. Implications of Research on Relevant Countries ........................................................ 101. ‧ 國. 學. Appendix on U.S. Military Offensive/Defensive Characteristics .......................................... 119. Table of Figures. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Figure 1: Quality of Arming Decisions .................................................................................... 26 Figure 2 - Breakdown of CCP Publications............................................................................. 28 Figure 3 - Theoretical Framework Visual Depiction ............................................................... 29 Figure 4 – White Paper Excerpts on PLA Strategic Objectives on Military Reform .............. 31 Figure 5 - Table of PLAA Organization Structure ................................................................... 34 Figure 6 - White Paper Excerpts for PLAA Reform/Security Concerns ................................. 38 igure 7 - Table of Security Threats ........................................................................................... 46 Figure 8 - VPA Organization Chart from MOD....................................................................... 70 Figure 9 - PLA Manpower Table ............................................................................................. 77 Figure 10 - PLAA Tank Graph ................................................................................................. 82 Figure 11 - PLAA Mechanized Vehicles Graph ....................................................................... 83 Figure 12 - PLAA Artillery Graph ........................................................................................... 85 Figure 13 - PLAA New Generation Artillery Graph ................................................................ 86 Figure 14 - PLAA ADA Graph ................................................................................................ 87 Figure 15 - PLAA Aviation Graph ........................................................................................... 88 Figure 16 - Comparison between U.S. Army and PLAA Capabilities..................................... 90 Figure 17: PLA RDT&E Table ................................................................................................ 91 Figure 18 - White Paper Excerpts on PLAA Training ............................................................. 95. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. viii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(9) 1. Chapter 1: Introduction “The biggest sin results from insatiability, and the biggest disaster originates from endless desires.” 1 President Xi Jinping quoted the Chinese philosopher Laozi to encourage caution to his government during the 2008 meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. For the past two decades, the question of China’s ambitions has weighed heavily on Western nations, especially the United States government. While China regards their nation’s growth as peaceful, western discussion about the rise of China’s military and economy generates warning signs of “potential threats” and a “hostile enemy”.. 政治大. While these kinds of conclusions may provide definitive policy stances for U.S. government. 立. officials, making assumptions based on theoretical speculations and unsupported claims can. ‧ 國. 學. have dangerous implications.. ‧. This thesis will seek to better understand the relationship between land-based security threats and military reform of the People’s Liberation Army “Army” (PLA Army or PLAA),. y. Nat. io. sit. systematically, through theory and doctrine. The first chapter will introduce the purpose and. n. al. er. overview of this analysis, followed by a thorough literature review on the three major. Ch. i n U. v. approaches on Chinese military growth. After explaining the theoretical framework and. engchi. doctrinal definitions in the third chapter, the fourth chapter will introduce the various landbased security threats that the PLA Army faces. The fifth chapter will summarize resulting force modernization trends and the last chapter will conclude the analysis.. 1. "Chinese President Xi Jinping's quotes in a book," China Daily, March 2, 2015, 1, accessed. January 9, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/culture/2015-03/02/content_19695291.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(10) 2. 1.1: The Importance of Understanding Chinese Military Reform As military tensions continue to escalate with China’s bolstering missile defense system and land reclamation initiatives in the South China Sea, China has begun to make significant strides in their attempts to professionalize and reform the PLA. Given these new reforms, China’s changing military necessitates additional attention. As it stands, the official position of U.S. policymakers on PLA military reform has an underlying theme of apprehension. The National Defense Strategy of 2018 put forth by the Trump administration labels China as an aggressive state set on the “displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence. 政治大. in the future.” 2 At the same time, the U.S. defense strategy maintains the belief that the. 立. United States is a nation seeking “transparency and non-aggression.” 3 To Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. policymakers, the U.S. military is the aggressor in the Asia-Pacific region – and if peace is to be realized, the United States should take steps to scale back. In the security environment,. ‧. neither country is willing to take preemptive steps to draw back. Therefore, increasing. Nat. sit. y. understanding of the China’s perception of military reform is crucial to developing more. n. al. er. io. informed policies on the region.. i n U. v. Convincing U.S. policy actors and military strategists to rethink their position on China. Ch. engchi. is an overwhelming task. Thucydides wrote: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” 4 An established power is often uneasy of a rising power. Throughout history, twelve of the last sixteen cases of large power displacements ended in war. 5 Time and technological advancements have altered the modern 2. U.S., The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, by. Donald J. Trump, December 17, 2017, 2, accessed January 15, 2018, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 3. Ibid., 2.. 4. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), vii. 5. Ibid., vii.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(11) 3. security environment, hopefully in such a way that power transitions between nations can be resolved peacefully. In the current “Atomic Age”, war between the nuclear arsenals of China and the United States almost certainly guarantees mutually assured destruction. It is in the best interest of involved parties to conduct their due diligence to empathize with each other’s perspectives and insecurities. Regardless of the outcome, successful diplomacy is premised on the ability to understand the other party. 6. 1.2: Thesis Approach. 政治大. The relationship between PLA reform and the strategic objectives of the Chinese. 立. government is inherently close. Unlike the U.S. military which attempts to separate political. ‧ 國. 學. actors from their tactical and military decisions (except at the highest level of leadership), the PLA is a Party-army: its strategies, regulations, and traditions are all affected by the reality. ‧. that it is devoted to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or CPC). 7 Therefore, it becomes. Nat. sit. y. imperative that researchers direct their analysis to the actions and words of the CCP. I raise. n. al. er. io. this point to draw attention to the traditional battle between rhetoric and reality. Chinese. i n U. v. rhetoric focuses on a defensive, almost pacifist, strategy. Western nations, especially the. Ch. engchi. United States, are often suspicious China’s official policy statements. This thesis does not attempt to characterize PLA reform with labels such as offensive or defensive tendencies. Misinterpreting CCP policy directives based on predetermined negative or positive biases can produce unsubstantiated conclusions. This research will instead focus on the current reality of. 6. Martin Griffiths, "'Diplomacy Is All about Empathy'," European Institute of Peace, accessed. April 21, 2018, http://www.eip.org/en/news-events/diplomacy-all-about-empathy. 7. Mingda Qiu, “China’s Science of Military Strategy: Cross-Domain Concepts in the 2013. Edition,” Deterring Complex Threats, (September 2015), accessed April 20, 2016, http://deterrence.ucsd.edu.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(12) 4. China’s security situation through Chinese white papers and the resulting PLA Army reforms to present a robust argument on the quality of China’s decision to develop their military power. The PLA is a vast organization, but proper analysis requires specificity. This thesis will primarily focus on the land-based service branch of the PLA Army. Despite my focus on land-based troops, it would be remiss to not mention the modernization implications of the PLA Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force. In 2004, China’s National Defense white paper published by the CMC explicitly stated that with regard to reform. 政治大. efforts, “priority [would be] given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force. 立. [renamed the Rocket Force], and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting. ‧ 國. 學. capabilities.” 8 These official statements have given rise to an abundant amount of literature and analysis on the strategic repercussions of China’s maritime security and aircraft carriers,. ‧. their cyberattacks on American interests, and their development of fifth-generation jet. Nat. sit. y. fighters in addition to other studies. Chinese reform of traditional land-based units was and. al. n. the PLA Army to focus on.. er. io. continue to be largely in the background of military research. For this reason, I have chosen. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.3: Thesis Purpose This research seeks to accomplish three major tasks. The first is to examine the various land-based security threats and apply this understanding to military reform in PLA Army. Contrary to popular belief, military advancements do not automatically equate to an offensive leaning agenda. The Chinese military labels its force modernization practices as an attempt to bolster their active defense strategy – a claim that many researchers refute. Rather than. 8. China, State Council Information Office, China's National Defense in 2004, December 27,. 2004, accessed December 12, 2018, http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(13) 5. placing definitive labels such as “offensive” or “defensive”, this thesis will evaluate the relationship between land security threats and PLA Army reforms as a consequence of the China’s current arms buildup in response to external threats. It is important to note that there is no standard for dictating what is considered “enough” to achieve defense. By way of illustration, the United States outspends the combined defense budgets of the next seven largest militaries in the world. Furthermore, the Trump administration intends to increase their military budget by another $54 billion to maintain U.S. security. 9 This leads into the second function of this thesis: to help develop a more robust. 政治大. understanding of the external security threats behind PLAA reform. The phrases: “offensive. 立. strategy” or “defensive strategy” are a matter of perspective. Offensive tasks can be. ‧ 國. 學. conducted under the oversight of a defensive operations. Weapons and soldiers both have offensive and defensive capabilities. 10 In theory, a better understanding of the precipitating. ‧. reasons behind Chinese military reform might help eliminate instinctive negative perceptions. Nat. sit. y. of Western and U.S. researchers.. n. al. er. io. The last function of this research is to use these findings to reevaluate the current. i n U. v. strategy in dealing with Chinese military reform. China is on the forefront of many active and. Ch. engchi. dangerous international security issues. Continued violence in the Middle East, the threat of North Korea, dictatorship and terrorism in Africa – there are no shortage of problems that must be addressed by the international community. Despite their differences, relevant AsiaPacific countries, China, and especially the United States, must find common ground to pursue a peaceful future.. 9. Michael D. Shear and Jennifer Steinhauer, "Trump to Seek $54 Billion Increase in Military. Spending," The New York Times, February 27, 2017, 1, accessed February 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-budget-military.html. 10. See U.S. Army doctrinal definitions listed in Appendices for offensive/defensive operations.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(14) 6. 1.4: Research Question(s) This research will seek to answer the following questions: What is the relationship between land-based security threats and the objectives of military reform in the PLA Army? After considering this relationship, is the continued advancement of PLA Army capabilities the most optimal policy choice?. 1.5: Overview of the People’s Liberation Army Reform What is the PLA – the People’s Liberation Army? This name is a slight misnomer,. 政治大. because the People’s Liberation Army includes five professional service branches, not just. 立. the Army. These service branches include the Army (PLAA), the Navy (PLAN), the Air force. ‧ 國. 學. (PLAAF), the recently renamed Rocket Force (PLARF), and the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). It is the fastest modernizing and largest military force in the world with an. ‧. estimated 2 million active duty soldiers. 11 As a gauge of comparison, the next largest force is. Nat. sit. y. the U.S. military with roughly 1.3 million active duty soldiers. 12. n. al. er. io. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has implemented vast organizational and. i n U. v. technological reforms that aim to rearrange the entire military complex. The PLA is in the. Ch. engchi. midst of a new and ambitious military modernization phase under the leadership of President Xi Jinping’s statements in 2013, the goal of which is to create a more “professional force” on the similar scale to Western superpowers, namely, the U.S. military. 13 However, military. 11. "CMC Issues Guideline on Deepening the Reform of National Defense and Armed Forces,". International College of Defense Studies, May 16, 2016, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.cdsndu. org/html_en/to_articleContent_article.id=40288a8553c564450154ec08fb690409.html. 12. "2018 U.S. Military Strength," GlobalFirepower.com, accessed March 10, 2018, https://www.. globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id= united-states-of-america. 13. "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces," Ministry of National Defense of the. People's Republic of China, April 2013, accessed April 20, 2018, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/ 2016-07/13/content_4768293.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(15) 7. reform is not a new concept in China. Under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, the PLA was firmly put under civilian control and separated from major political arenas. 14 These reforms continued to 1987, when the PLA began several force reductions that have cut PLA manpower from 4.238 million to 2.285 million.15 These reductions centralized warfighting capability and helped streamline the “operational, logistics, and administrative chains of command.” Instead of controlling a large and unwieldy organization, these reductions were meant to make the PLA a more efficient organization. Along with efficiency, China’s ambitions to combat cyber warfare and win technology arms races have pushed forth a need. 政治大. for a more professional officer corps and a professional non-commissioned officer corps. 立. capable of handling specialized technical knowledge. 16. ‧ 國. 學. The professionalization of armed forces can be described as an attempt to reconstruct the organization structure of the military to create a less polarized and politicized establishment:. ‧. Military leaders attempt to initiate professionalization under the premise of strengthening the. Nat. sit. y. military institution as a whole through resource management, modern technology, and. n. al. er. io. decreases in factionalism. 17 There has a been a trend towards increasing professionalism and. i n U. v. expert knowledge in the Chinese military. Part of the downsizing efforts in the PLA. Ch. engchi. modernization goals was to emphasize quality over quantity. With the consolidation of space and cyber branches into the PLA Strategic Support force, there has been an increased demand. 14. Thomas J. Bickford, "A Retrospective on the Study of Chinese Civil-Military Relations Since. 1979: What Have We Learned? Where Do We Go?" Semantic Scholar, accessed April 15, 2018, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0a4b/b111210f3f6540d13849d63dc89e00baadb9.pdf. 15. "PLA Reductions," November 19, 2015, accessed December 23, 2017, http://www.global. security.org/military/world/china/pla-reductions.htm. 16. Ibid.. 17. "Military Measures," Toolbox, accessed January 2, 2017, https://extranet.creative. worldwide.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/resou rces/ghai/toolbox6.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(16) 8. for high levels of technical skills to bring China to the forefront of modern military combat. 18 The PLA is also beginning to require professional military education for certain officers to be promoted to “general officer.” 19 Though many in China laud these military reform efforts, many outside disapprove. The following literature review examine the major trends of perspectives on China’s military growth and the main theories behind these viewpoints.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 18. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Hui Zhao Dong, "China upgrades missile force, adds space and cyber war forces," Global. Times, January 1, 2016, accessed December 20, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn /news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/01/content_6840097.htm. 19. Michael Kiselycznyk and Philip C. Saunders, "Civil-Military Relations in China:. Assessing the PLA's Role in Elite Politics," China Strategic Perspectives 2 (August 2010), accessed January 2, 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/China Perspectives-2.pdf., 13.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(17) 9. Chapter 2: Literature Review on the Perspectives of Chinese Military Growth When reviewing the field of literature on Chinese military growth, it is readily apparent there are a wide range of perspectives and opinions. This literature can be broadly separated into three major areas of assessment: the parabellum offensive neorealist, the defensive neorealist/statecraft beliefs framework, and the Confucian-Pacifist approach. Instead of focusing on any one theoretical approach, this thesis aspires to analyze the base concept of. 政治大 It is easiest to begin with the most common and widespread approach, parabellum 立. arms building which is present in all three major approaches.. ‧ 國. 學. “prepare for war” offensive realism. This international relations theory was coined in 2001 by John J. Mearsheimer, a renowned American political scientist and a member of West Point’s. ‧. Long Gray Line. In his writings, Mearsheimer offers a pessimistic opinion on how he. sit. y. Nat. believes great powers think and act. By arguing that the ultimate aim of any strong nation is. io. al. er. to be the only great power of the world and contending that nations will always seek power at the expense of others, Mearsheimer condemns the policy of engagement with China and. n. v i n C h the United StatesUand China. predicts a conflict-driven future between engchi. 20. Following his lead,. many policymakers in the current Trump administration and current Department of Defense have issued statements that label China as a threat that must be dealt with.. 2.1: Parabellum Offensive Neorealism Approach Established by Mearsheimer in his book, the Tragedy of Great Power Politics, the. 20. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton &. Company, 2001), 2.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(18) 10. offensive realist approach relies strongly on five major assumptions. 21 The first assumption states that there is not an overarching government that regulates all the nations of the world. This state of being is called anarchy. The second assumption is that the significant great powers all have offensive military capability. In this manner, these different nations have the capability to harm one another. The third assumption declares that states are constantly uncertain about each other’s intentions. While some uncertainty about intentions can be reduced, there is always the possibility that a state will act out of ordinary. The fourth assumption is that states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their. 政治大. political state. Mearsheimer asserts that survival and the preservation of security is the. 立. primary concern for every nation. The last assumption maintains that all states are rational. ‧ 國. 學. actors that are aware of their external environment and think strategically how to survive in it. 22 These states constantly consider the differing intentions of other states and how other. ‧. state behaviors might affect their strategy for survival. In considering the responses of other. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. actions.. y. nations, a state must pay attention to both long and short-term consequences for all their. i n U. v. These five assumptions create a predictable pattern of behavior through fear, self-. Ch. engchi. help, and finally power maximization through arms building. 23 With great powers, there is a constant fear with the uncertainty of another state’s intentions. Offensive military capabilities and technology make it possible for states to attack one another with little or no warning. As a result, each individual nation must rely on its own capabilities. In this self-help system, states 21. John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," in International Politics:. Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Scott P. Handler (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2013), 51. 22. Peter Toft, "John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,". Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 5, doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065. 23. John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," in International Politics:. Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Scott P. Handler (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2013), 52.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(19) 11. realize the best way to maintain their security is to become the most powerful state. The state will then rationally decide how it will go about maximizing its own power in the pursuit of creating a global hegemony. 24 In this context, hegemony is defined as a nation that exercises a predominant influence over all others. It should be noted that Mearsheimer concedes that a global hegemony is highly improbable due to the stopping power of oceans. A regional hegemony then becomes the primary goal for great powers. 25 The offensive realism model sets the independent variable as the amount of power being sought by the state. States will then pursue regional hegemony by reducing another. 政治大. nations’ security while increasing its own. The dependent variable is then either conflict or. 立. cooperation. In order to increase their own security, the state will logically have to engage the. ‧ 國. 學. dependent variable through war or peaceful negotiations. The principle strategy in gaining more power is through conflict and war. Still, this does not mean that states will engage all its. ‧. surrounding nations in reckless abandon. Mearsheimer hypothesizes that if a great power. Nat. sit. y. perceives a significant military advantage over its rivals, it will utilize conflict as a means of. n. al. er. io. maximizing power relative to other powers until it reaches regional hegemony. 26 The model. i n U. v. mentions that cooperation instead of conflict between nations may occasionally occur, but. Ch. engchi. there are two major issues with cooperation. In cooperation, there must be some division of power. As with any nation that is trying to maximize its power, there will be strong disagreements about which nations gain more security. Even if they mutually compromise on some sort of division, there is a strong incentive for rational actors to cheat on one another in. 24. Peter Toft, "John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,". Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 6, doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065. 25. Ibid., 6-7.. 26. John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," in International Politics:. Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Scott P. Handler (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2013), 53.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(20) 12. order to gain an advantage over the other. 27 Overall, offensive realism reasons that in a selfhelp world, there are more advantages and incentives to seek conflict rather than cooperation. Mearsheimer uses his offensive realist theory to draw threatening conclusions about the future of U.S. – China relations. He argues that their rapidly modernizing economy and military will be a catalyst to China’s pursuit of regional hegemony and the dominance of Japan, Korea, as well as other Asia-Pacific actors. 28 In opposition to the defensive realist theory, Mearsheimer argues that China will not be content with staying a status quo power. Rather, China will adopt an aggressive strategic agenda to consolidate and expand their. 政治大. power. 29 Mearsheimer’s logic is sound but presents a few theoretical exaggerations that lack. 立. relevance in the modern world. His opinion on the crippling uncertainty of China’s objectives. ‧ 國. 學. ignores the diplomacy and cooperation approaches that could ease the amount of doubt by both nations. In addition, Mearsheimer glosses over the effect of nuclear deterrence and does. ‧. not explain how China or any other security-seeking state, transition into aggressive actors.. Nat. sit. y. Under offensive realism, there are a number of supporting sub-theories such as the. n. al. er. io. power transition theory (Organski/Kugler), the hegemonic theory of war (Gilpin), and the. i n U. v. balance of interest theory (Randall Schweller). 30 For the sake of clarity, this literature review. Ch. engchi. focuses on offensive realism as a whole under Mearsheimer’s leadership due to the large number of amalgamated theories presented in scholarly works. Mearsheimer’s perspective seems to be the predominant theme in current Trump Administration and Department of. 27. John J. Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," in International Politics:. Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Scott P. Handler (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2013), 57. 28. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton &. Company, 2001), 102. 29. Ibid., 103.. 30. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,". International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2001): 135, accessed January 17, 2018, doi:10.1162/016228800560543.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(21) 13. Defense as evident by recent governmental publications: the Department of Defense AsiaPacific Maritime Security Strategy of 2015, the National Security Strategy of 2017, and the most recent National Defense Strategy of 2018. In addition to these strategy publications, military researchers and Washington policy think tanks regularly churn out updated reports and analysis on the dangers of expanding PLA capabilities. Some of the leaders in the field of China military growth include (but is not limited to): the Research and Development Corporation (RAND), the Strategic Studies Institute from the U.S. Army War College (SSI), the Institute of National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), the. 政治大. Jamestown Foundation, the Center for Strategic Studies & International Studies (CSIS), and. 立. the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR). The offensive realism rhetoric in the publications. ‧ 國. 學. from these organizations represent the combined beliefs of hundreds of policymakers and leaders at the highest level in government, military, and academia. Rather than individually. ‧. listing out all the think tank journals, this literature will focus on the attitudes of official U.S.. Nat. sit. y. publication that often reflect the policy agenda of the supporting research institutes:. n. al. er. io. “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” 31. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. As evident by the above quote from the summary on the new National Defense Strategy of 2018, and the following quote from the National Security Strategy of 2017, the net result sets the premise for conflict rather than cooperation: “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less. 31. U.S. Department of Defense., Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The. United States of America, January 2018, 2, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.defense. gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(22) 14. free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.” 32 There is also an instance in the 2017 Annual Report of the PRC to Congress that lists one of the China’s strategic objectives to, “secure China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquire regional preeminence.” 33 While this statement may be a valid subjective argument, the reports lists that specific objective among five other objectives that come directly from the CCP Constitution. It is highly likely that a casual reader or a policymaker that has not taken the time to read the Chinese constitution would also assume that power projection and regional hegemony is actually one of the explicit objectives of the CCP. It is readily apparent. 政治大. that in the majority of these writings, China is cast as the enemy. Col. W. Michael Guillot, a. 立. commander in the U.S. Air Force says that the new National Security Strategy, “rests on the. ‧ 國. 學. realist assumption that diplomacy and leadership depend on military power.” 34 By focusing. ‧. American interest on power, competition, and conflict, Col. Guillot reasons that the U.S. has become more “confrontational and coercive while our diplomatic prowess…has been. y. Nat. io. sit. weakened.” 35 In a time period fraught with tension against the rising China, the United. n. al. er. States strategy has turned to brute force. A more tempered approach could be the key to. Ch. swaying nations like China to become better allies.. engchi. i n U. v. Christopher A. Ford, the Chief Legislative Counsel for the U.S. Senate Foreign. 32. U.S., The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, by. Donald J. Trump, December 17, 2017, 4, accessed January 15, 2018, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 33. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security. Development Involving People's Republic of China 2017, May 17, 2017, 37, accessed February 20, 2018. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_ Power_Report.PDF. 34. W. Michael Guillot, 2017 National Security Strategy Perspective, issue brief, Strategic. Studies Quarterly, Air University, 1st ed., vol. 12 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 2018), 22. 35. Ibid., 23.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(23) 15. Relations Committee also maintains his suspicions of CCP peace building statements and uses a unique approach of by analyzing Peter Perdue’s historical literature on Chinese dynasties. He argues that modern day China has a hidden yearning to recreate their historical continental hegemony. 36 Ford backs his argument with strong historical anecdotes and a strategic cultural analysis of Chinese military actions in the 20th century. He suggests that a realist analysis of Chinese strategy may not be enough, researchers must also attempt to comprehend the “Chineseness” of the country’s ancient culture. Agreeing with the logic of Mearsheimer, Ford, the Trump administration and the. 政治大. majority of publications from policy think tanks, the Western and United States media has. 立. whipped up a frenzy of predominantly negative news about China. These stories focus on. ‧ 國. 學. political corruption, pollution, human rights abuses, and more recently – the South China Sea military buildup. 37 “Pack journalism” in Western media has had a major role through in the. ‧. widespread mistrust of China, perpetuating negative stereotypes and increasing the. Nat. sit. y. propensity for the offensive realist perspective to thrive. While this study will not address the. n. al. er. io. specific role of the media in understanding military modernization, it is important to consider. i n U. v. the adverse effects that an incomplete media agenda can have on the perspectives of policy. Ch. makers in government and military.. engchi. 2.2: Defensive Neorealism and Realpolitik Statecraft Beliefs Approach Ford’s analysis of Chinese strategic culture provides a bridge between the offensive realist and defensive realist approach to Chinese military strategy and reform. Both offensive. 36. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia 2016-17:. Understanding Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 29. 37. Daniel Griffiths, The International Media Coverage of China: Too Narrow an Agenda?. report, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford (BBC Global News), 13.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(24) 16. and defensive realism operate under the same basic five assumptions but deduce different conclusions. While offensive realism implies that conflict is unavoidable due to the zero-sum rule, defensive realism proposes that security can be a shared resource and that conflict is preventable since states will be satisfied with a balance of power. In his book, Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz argues that states understand the pitfalls of seeking too much power will force other states to counterbalance, “negating any gains in power”. 38 While defensive realists understand the incentive for nations to pursue power for personal security gain, defensive realists believe in a more optimistic approach compared to offensive. 政治大. realists. The contest for regional security in the Asia-Pacific region is a tense but resolvable. 立. situation.. ‧ 國. 學. From the perspective of offensive realism, there is a simple reason for Chinese military reform. A stronger military force provides a state with more security and maximizes. ‧. the state’s ability to project their power. On the other hand, scholars in defensive realism do. Nat. sit. y. not believe it is that easy. A stronger and more professional military does not necessarily. n. al. er. io. translate to more power. Neither does more power automatically create more security relative. i n U. v. to other states. As mentioned above, Waltz believes that the more power a state accrues, the. Ch. engchi. more fear and insecurity other nations feel. States typically cannot fully trust another state’s intentions. Therefore, if a powerful state as the United States perceives another state such as China building up its military – there is an automatic reaction of danger and suspicion. This occurrence has led to the current security dilemma between the United States and China. Glenn H. Snyder describes the “security dilemma” as a vicious cycle of power accumulation. 39 The security dilemma is a concept that was first explored in 1951 by John H. 38. Baohui Zhang, China's Assertive Nuclear Posture: State Security in an Anarchic. International Order (Routledge, 2015), Chapter 3. 39. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 04. (1984): 461-465, accessed January 14, 2018, doi:10.2307/2010183.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(25) 17. Herz, author of Political Realism and Political Idealism. He defined the security dilemma as a “structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.” 40 The security dilemma has the potential to trigger precarious situations, such as arms races or even war. While this state of uncertainty is present in all literature on Chinese military reform, researchers reach different conclusions based on the individual theoretical perspectives. Offensive realists contend that the security dilemma is an inescapable reality since nations. 政治大. will always seek to expand their power in the anarchic international system since states can. 立. never fully trust one another. Conversely, defensive realists argue that certain states are. ‧ 國. 學. capable of balancing security through alliances to escape the security dilemma. Therefore, modern China should be able to escape the security dilemma because the CCP would. ‧. hypothetically never attempt to infringe upon another country’s security unless actively. sit. y. Nat. provoked. 41. n. al. er. io. Even though there might not be any aggressive intentions by either nation, when one. i n U. v. state assumes or misperceives the other as building up military capabilities for offensive. Ch. engchi. purposes, both states might begin an arms race in the hope of attaining more security than the other state. 42 Scholars that defend the defensive realist perspective of China say that the U.S. misperception of Chinese military build-up is the key problem here. U.S. policymakers and military leaders refuse to accept the possibility that Chinese military modernization might be. 40. Herz, J. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics vol. 2, no. 2. (1950): 157-180, at p. 157 (Published by Cambridge University Press) 41. The case of Taiwan’s sovereignty as a nation is a separate political issue that will not be. discussed in this thesis. 42. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 04. (1984): 461-465, accessed January 14, 2018, doi:10.2307/2010183.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(26) 18. for peaceful and defensive purposes. As long as this perspective holds, China and the United States will remain in a security dilemma even if Chinese military actions are perceived to be defensive. Although a literature search produces only a modest amount of published U.S. scholarship from the defensive realist perspective, there are a number of Australian, European and Chinese academics that have written on the matter. To begin, I would like to acknowledge James Douglas, a postgraduate student who wrote his master’s thesis on defensive realism and Chinese maritime strategy. The PLAN has been at the vanguard of. 政治大. Chinese innovation due to the ever-growing importance of sea power. There have been. 立. countless books, journals, and articles published on the advancement of the Chinese Navy by. ‧ 國. 學. U.S. think tanks. As previously mentioned, this is one reason why I have chosen to focus my attention on the PLA Army to broaden the current scholarly literature available. James. ‧. Douglas uses his knowledge of PLAN modernization, their recent operations and. Nat. sit. y. international territorial disputes to defend his defensive realist argument that China is not. n. al. er. io. seeking overreaching power. 43 He concludes that Chinese incidents at sea and other PLAN. i n U. v. activities were and continue to be attempts to defend their territory to safeguard China’s. Ch. engchi. security. While his argument and evidence are strong, Douglas’ application of theory is slightly limited. He relies mainly on a meticulous case study methodology that provides a substantial amount of information but lacks a thorough theoretical analysis. Another familiar scholar in Chinese strategy and behavior is Huiyen Feng. Christopher Ford believes that her approach lies somewhere between offensive realism and Confucian-. 43. James Douglas, Defensive realism and Chinese maritime strategy: a thesis submitted to the. Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, PhD diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 2012, 3.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(27) 19. pacifist. 44 While she follows some defensive realist principles, Feng contends Chinese strategy is strongly influenced by the “realpolitik statecraft literature of China’s preunification Warring States period…and Confucian ethical-moral traditions.” 45 Even though Feng calls her view realist, it should be noted that her evidence of Chinese peacebuilding is taken straight from CCP publications. 46 Therein lies one of the major issues of her arguments. As a nation that deeply mistrusts Chinese rhetoric, United States policymakers require much more than the synthesis of Chinese statecraft publications. In spite of this shortcoming, Huiyen Feng offers a valuable perspective – the Chinese perspective.. 立. 政治大. 2.3: Confucian-Pacifist Approach. ‧ 國. 學. As mentioned before, the majority of literature on Chinese military strategy comes from the perspective of the neorealist school. Whereas offensive and defensive realism are both. ‧. recognized international sub-theories of modern neorealism, Confucian-Pacifism gives the. Nat. sit. y. impression of a religious creed from a historical perspective. Confucianism is a humanistic. n. al. er. io. belief system defined by the principles of social harmony and peace. Since Pacifism refers to. i n U. v. an opposition of violence, these two terms fit well together. In his article on Confucian. Ch. engchi. Foreign Policy, Feng Zhang defines Confucian Pacifism as the, “belief that Confucianism determined a defensive or accommodationist Chinese grand strategy and a largely peaceful. 44. Christopher A. Ford, "Realpolitik with Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Strategic Culture and. the Modern Communist Party-State," in Understanding strategic cultures in the Asia-Pacific, by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 41. 45. Ibid., 41.. 46. Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making (London:. Routledge, 2007), 4, 26.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(28) 20. foreign policy in China’s imperial era.” 47 Even though the concept of Confucian Pacifism is not a formal theory of international relations, many Chinese historians believe that this peaceful model was prevailing basis of Chinese foreign policy until “the century of humiliation” which started with the First Opium war in 1839. 48 By Chinese accounts, China has had a continuous civilization of several thousand years based on a “peaceful and harmonious” development. 49 In the rest of his article, Feng Zhang quickly dismantles the argument of “peaceful” growth by several violent and war-torn time periods. It would seem that Confucianism and Pacifism do not necessarily go hand in hand when the Chinese are threatened.. 立. 政治大. Aside from Chinese academics and formal CCP statecraft, it is difficult to find scholarly. ‧ 國. 學. work published in English supporting the notion of a modern Confucian-Pacifist China. A more thorough literature review of this perspective would require in depth translation work of. ‧. major Chinese works and history books. To review readily accessible literature on China. Nat. sit. y. from the pacifist perspective, it was necessary to peruse Chinese news sites. The Chinese. n. al. er. io. Ministry of National Defense runs an official English-language website that provides almost. i n U. v. all available and unclassified information on the Chinese PLA. After reading several short. Ch. engchi. articles written in choppy English, it becomes very apparent that most articles are heavily censored to promote two central ideas: that China is peaceful country simply seeking defend 47. F. Zhang, "Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History," The Chinese Journal of. International Politics 8, no. 2 (April 13, 2015): 200, accessed December 17, 2017, doi:10.1093/cjip/pov004. 48. Christopher A. Ford, "Realpolitik with Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Strategic Culture and. the Modern Communist Party-State," in Understanding strategic cultures in the Asia-Pacific, by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 46. 49. F. Zhang, "Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History," The Chinese Journal of. International Politics 8, no. 2 (April 13, 2015): 200, accessed December 17, 2017, doi:10.1093/cjip/pov004.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(29) 21. its sovereignty and the United States is an ignorant aggressor that challenges the status quo. A classic example from the “opinion” sections of the website headlines, “China’s missile deployment in South China Sea completely reasonable: expert”. 50 In this article, a military expert Yin Zhuo explains that the increasing PLAN presence in the South China Sea is a very obvious response to the threatening U.S. naval force in the region. He then goes on to discredit specific statements released by Fox News. The author’s statements leave little room for argument – this achieves the desired effect of promoting the official CCP narrative of harmonious peace.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 50. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Yao Jianing, " China's missile deployment in South China Sea completely reasonable:. expert," People's Daily Online, January 4, 2017, 1, accessed November 11, 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2017-01/04/content_4769263.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(30) 22. Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methods The impetus for military advancements in the PLA Army can stem from a number of sectors, including economic, political, military and social domains. The literature review pointed out a wide spectrum of perspectives on PLA growth, this thesis will concentrate on the arguments listed by Chinese Defense White Papers and public CCP statements. The Chinese government splits their external reasons for military reform into two major types of security threats: traditional and non-traditional. 51 Traditional threats can be defined as risks to a country that come from other countries and typically entail a military factor. Non-. 政治大. traditional threats comprise of all other threats outside of the normal sphere of physical. 立. military capabilities and can include anything from terrorism to epidemic outbreaks. 52. ‧ 國. 學. Traditional threats provide a clear depiction of the challenges that the Chinese military. threats.. ‧. specifically faces as well as a more direct comparison between military reform and military. y. Nat. io. sit. The relatively undefined nature and large scope of non-traditional threats makes them a. n. al. er. difficult comparison to military reforms even though PLA Army objectives reference the. Ch. i n U. v. exact risks they anticipate having to face: terrorist sabotage, cross-border sabotage, and. engchi. unstable border/coastal areas. 53 Since the thesis concentration is on the PLA Army, the analytical framework in this thesis will focus on land-based traditional security threats due to ease of comparative appraisal. Referenced nontraditional threats by the PLA will also be 51. Hu Jintao, "Full Text: Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress," China.org.cn,. November 16, 2012, Section IX, accessed March 16, 2018, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_9.htm. 52. Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), vii. 53. "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces," Ministry of National Defense of the. People's Republic of China, April 2013, accessed April 20, 2018, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/ 2016-07/13/content_4768293.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(31) 23. briefly covered. The Chinese government places high emphasis on security and territorial integrity by protecting national borders: “Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China's international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China's modernization drive. China is faced with interwoven problems affecting its survival and development security as well as traditional and non-traditional security threats. To address these problems and threats, we must make major progress in modernizing national defense and the armed forces.” 54 The above excerpt comes from the 18th Party Congress by Hu Jintao and highlights the belief that China faces a myriad of external traditional and non-traditional threats. To ensure the. 政治大. survival of China, these threats provide the Chinese government reasonable justification to. 立. build up their military force through reforms and advancements.. ‧ 國. 學. The main theories of offensive realism and defensive realism have already been explained in the literature review, this section will first explain the issues of associating. ‧. Chinese military advancements with an offensive or defensive military strategy. The. Nat. sit. y. theoretical framework of this thesis will then utilize the optimal arming criteria in arms. n. al. er. io. building to discuss the current threat environment specific to the land-based PLA Army. After. i n U. v. evaluating these threats, this thesis will examine the military reforms in the PLA Army to. Ch. engchi. identify the relationship between “military reforms” and “military threats”. It is hypothesized that analysis of land-based threats in China will provide a rational argument for PLA Army reforms.. 54. Hu Jin Tao, "Full Text: Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress,". China.org.cn, November 16, 2012, Section IX, accessed March 16, 2018, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_9.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(32) 24. 3.1: Does These Approaches Apply to Military Reform? The three major theoretical perspectives referred to in the literature review rely heavily on subjective viewpoints when analyzing PLA military reform. In the literature review, there is a consistent theme of using PLA military reform as a reason to perceive China as a threat. At the most fundamental level, a military threat can be defined as “intent x capabilities”. By defining and researching PLA Army reform, this thesis will be able to objectively identify the “capabilities” of the military organization. CCP white papers are then able to provide the “intent” of these capabilities, hypothetically providing an accurate assessment of China’s. 政治大 CCP white papers seem very clear in stating that these reforms are geared towards defensive 立. “threat level”. However, herein lies the issue – who can accurately say what is China’s intent?. ‧ 國. 學. posturing. Yet offensive realists treat these statements with skepticism and formulate their own predictions for China’s intent. Defensive realists and Confucian-pacifists are criticized. ‧. for taking CCP statements at their word. In this manner, all perspectives are simultaneously. io. al. er. premise of subjective opinions.. sit. y. Nat. “right” and all perspectives are also “wrong” on military reform since intent is argued on the. PLA Army military reform does not provide a clear indication of China’s position as a. n. v i n C h An alternativeUand more productive method of “threat”. It is a measure of their capabilities. engchi studying military reform is through arms and capacity buildup theories. Instead of trying to subjectively determine whether or not PLA Army military reform represents a threat to. external nations, the next chapter will analyze the major external causes of the Chinese arms buildup in their military reform and China’s decision to build arms.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(33) 25. 3.2: The Theory Behind China’s Military “Arms Buildup” It is rather controversial to definitively say there is an enduring arms buildup or race in East Asia. The term “arms race” most often conveys a negative connotation, implying that China is perhaps building up their military for nefarious reasons. Of course, Chinese military officials are quick to denounce the possibility of an arms race against any parties, in particular against the United States. 55 An “arms race” by itself, has little to no definitive bearing on the escalation of conflict between nations. The physical development and buildup of military arms is only a direct reference to military capabilities and does not accurately. 政治大. predict the intentions of the country. The belief that arms races can be delineated between. 立. offensive and defensive strategies is highly subjective at best – as is any attempt to discern. ‧ 國. 學. the intentions of a country. Circumstance, external actors, chance, and any number of immeasurable variables can escalate peaceful intentions into war.. ‧. In an authoritative review on the theories of arms races, Professor Charles Glaser. Nat. sit. y. concludes that arms races are multifaceted affair and provide little concrete evidence on the. n. al. er. io. possibility of war without considering a host of other conditions. He proposes a new. i n U. v. framework for evaluating the rationality of arms buildup by posing two major characteristics:. Ch. engchi. the state’s international security environment along with its decisions and goals on the building arms. 56 For the purpose of his theoretical design, Glaser draws on realist assumptions about the state of anarchy and the security dilemma to develop the foundation of his arms-building framework. This theory focuses on determining if the arms buildup or military reform is the optimal and rational policy choice for the specified country. His. 55. Zhao Lei, "Nation Will Never Engage in Arms Race, PLA Official Asserts," China Aims to. Boost Industries along Yangtze River, March 9, 2018, accessed April 15, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/09/WS5aa1cfdda3106e7dcc14084a.html. 56. Charles L. Glaser, "When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,". International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 45, doi:10.1162/0162288041588313.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(34) 26. conclusion avoids falling in the trap of concluding if the arms buildup is aggressive or defensive against external nations, as that can be an issue independent of military buildup. Glaser believes that arms races and the probability of war could be correlating factors depending on the rationality of the arming decision, since the correlation might be a causal impact of precarious security environments. 57. Figure 1: Quality of Arming Decisions. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. sit. y. This figure demonstrates the quality of arming decisions. 58 Glaser continues his theory by. n. al. er. io. introducing factors of external and internal consequences, as well as the effects of the. i n U. v. offense-defense balance. For this research on external security threats and military reform,. Ch. engchi. analysis will focus on the primary figure listed above. Further research should consider internal factors of China’s arming decision as well as the offense-defense balance between China and other nations. The following outlines how this thesis looks at the PLA Army behavior. If China’s international land-based security environment justifies an arms buildup, then the PLA Army’s current military reform is China’s best and most optimal decision. On the other hand, if China’s decision to build their military does not match their security. 57. Charles L. Glaser, "When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming,". International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 50, doi:10.1162/0162288041588313. 58. Ibid., 48.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(35) 27. environment, these are considered to be suboptimal policy decisions and may result in negative consequences for China. As mentioned in the literature review, most studies refer to Chinese military reform as an arms race through informal terms and through the negative stance of expanding warfighting capabilities. There is an interesting study in which Brittani Wyner and Liquan Xie attempted to answer the question of Chinese military expenditures through the use of quantitative analysis driven by Lewis F. Richardson’s action-reaction theory. According to Lewis F. Richardson’s action-reaction theory, the arms race born out of a security dilemma. 政治大. can be mathematically defined by using the changes in a nation’s defense expenditures as a. 立. function of an opponent’s defense expenditures. 59 Their mathematical analysis was. ‧ 國. 學. unfortunately inconclusive due to the lack of data as well as the omission of Vietnam and the United States as rival nations. Despite the lack of statistical significance, the authors were. ‧. still able to find some relationships that suggests China has a reactive policy to outside. Nat. sit. y. stimuli. In light of previous work done, this thesis will pursue Glaser’s theoretical approach. n. al. er. io. of arms building to understand the rationale of Chinese military reform.. C. i n U. v. h e nGoals, 3.3: Relationship between Strategic Security i g c hLand-Based Environment, and Ongoing Military Reforms in China The general framework has been set up by Glaser’s rational arms-building theory. The key variables affecting the rationality of arms-building are state goals and the international security environment. In the case of the PLAA, these variables are slightly different in the context of China’s armed forces. To begin, since research demonstrates a large body of knowledge of existing and ongoing PLAA capacity building, the variable of “arms-building” will be utilized to validate the strategic goals of PLAA military reform. 59. Xiao Bing Li, Xia Bo Hu, and Yang Zhong, Interpreting U.S.-China-Taiwan relations: China. in the post-Cold War era (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 169, 189.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(36) 28. When reading China’s defense white papers, it is necessary to first pick out the overarching strategic goals of reform for the PLA. This qualitative analysis sets the background for the specific roles of the PLAA. PLAA objectives can be further broken down into the land-based security environment and PLAA military reforms:. 政治大. Figure 2 - Breakdown of CCP Publications. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(37) 29. This research paper qualitatively analyzes CCP publications to break down the major threats that the PLAA envisions facing and the desired military reform goals to develop the PLAA. After comparing these two sets of variables, this thesis seeks to compare the stated objectives with the ongoing threats that the PLAA could potentially face and the military reforms that have been conducted or is ongoing. Referring back to the Glaser’s framework, if the stated goals and military reforms are appropriate for the security environment – then the choice to build arms is a rational and optimal policy choice. This flowchart lists out the major variables and logical reasoning for this thesis’ theoretical framework:. 立. 政治大. Figure 3 - Theoretical Framework Visual Depiction. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.

(38) 30. 3.4: Research Foundation – Chinese Communist Party White Papers Due to the nature of this research, the most important part of the theoretical framework deals with primary sources from official defense white papers published by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) under guidance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since 2007, the CCP has published four major English defense white papers – each one detailing the goals of military reform, the strategic objectives of the PLA, relevant security threats to China, and other general information concerning the direction of the Chinese military. In addition to these white papers, there are publicly available statements from President Xi. 政治大. Jinping’s 19th CPC National Congress and from military strategists in the 2013 edition of the. 立. Science of Military Strategy. The Chinese government also periodically releases military. ‧. ‧ 國. Daily.. 學. news on China Military Online as well as other media outlets such as Xinhua and China. The PLA is very aware of criticisms levied against the military organization about a lack. Nat. sit. y. of transparency and openness on military reform. In response, China’s Ministry of Defense. n. al. er. io. has taken serious steps to make PLA knowledge more accessible and readily available for. i n U. v. public consumption. 60 While military analysts may continue to question the accuracy and. Ch. engchi. candor of Chinese sources, there is a certain degree of consistency between Chinese publications, strategic objectives, and military reforms that provides a strong foundation for the analysis framework of this research. The following figure lists out the major strategic objectives set forth by the CCP and President Xi Jinping. Over the past decade, China’s defense policy has stayed relatively uniform: focusing on the concept of active defense and building a strong military to safeguard Chinese interests and “motherland” integrity.. 60. "Debate: Chinese Military Becoming More Transparent?" China Daily, accessed March 21,. 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/31/content_18232500.htm.. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.001.2018.A07.