Graduate Institute of Religious Studies National Chengchi University
Association for the Sociology of Religion 2012 Annual Meeting
August 17-18, Denver, Colorado
(Draft only, please do not cite)
* I would like to thank Professor Ping-yin Kuan for sharing with me his insights about ancestor worship and, as well, providing me with his statistical dexterity. All the errors in the paper are of course mine.
Introduction
The Secularization Thesis advocates that along the process of modernization, religion irreversibly declines both at the social level and in the individual
consciousness. This thesis has caused much controversy in the past two or three decades (De Vriese 2010; Fox 2005; Hanson 1997). Scholars involved in the debate are sharply divided, with one side upholding its validity by citing historical and empirical evidence primarily from West Europe (Bruce 1996a, 1996b, 2002, 2006;
Wilson 1987), whilst with the other side proving its falsity by giving abundant examples that testify to the continuous flourishing of religious groups and activities throughout many parts of the world (Berger 1999; Davie 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). The recent development of most scholars’ opinions seemed to declare the Secularization Thesis obsolete. Stark and Finke, in particular, adamantly called us to abandon our “social scientific faith in the theory of
secularization” and to “carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper, ‘Requiescat in pace’” (Stark and Finke 2000, 78, 79).
That be the case, their pronouncement was by no means conclusive. Quite a few scholars of religion have continued to maintain that modernization does exert a
negative influence on human religiosity and that secularism and the decline of religion are still positively correlated. What some sociologists of religion have researched on the relationship between education and religion in Taiwan may serve as a good example.
Based on the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS, 1983-85), Hei-yuan Chiu concluded that the rise of educational level in Taiwan accelerated the tendency of secularization, the consequences of which were the decrease of folk religion population and the increase of the non-religious (Chiu 1997, 1-40). Continuing this line of inquiry and based on the new TSCS data (1994, 1999, 2004), Hsing-kuang Chao and Ping-yin Kuan found that pluralism and the rationalistic philosophy manifested in and observed by Taiwan’s higher education during 1986-2006
substantially reduced people’s faith in religion (Chao and Kuan 2010). The rate of the non-religious increased from 13% in 1994 to 21% in 2004 (see Table 1). David Voas, also based on the TSCS as well as the Religious Experience Survey in Taiwan (REST, 2009), asserted that “education has been the vehicle for ideological modernization in Taiwan to a greater extent than in other industrial and post-industrial societies” (Voas 2011, 5). The more educated a Taiwanese is, the less he or she would get involved in religion, although this person might “more likely to express an interest in mystical or supernatural things, and to report experiencing extraordinary powers beyond human control” (Voas 2011, 2). Education here highlighted in Taiwan’s socio-historical
context is closely linked to the pervasive influence of Confucian tradition.
How then do we view the Taiwan case in relation to the Secularization Thesis? It is inappropriate, in my opinion, to treat it as another example of exceptionism as some proposed West Europe to be in the heated debate of secularization. However, although I generally agree that education or secularization affects people’s faith in religion, I am cautious about the complicated relationship between these two variables. My previous study, similarly drawing on the REST, resonated with Voas’s finding that the Confucian rationalistic culture “has exerted a tremendous impact on Taiwanese
people, … shaping their worldviews, ways of life, and particular religious experiences.
This influence has not waned as Taiwan has grown into a democratic and pluralistic society. Rather, it still guides the younger and the more educated in the new era” (Tsai 2011, 179-180). In this sense, it is instructive that we look into some details to explain the relationship between modernization and secularization on the one hand, and, on the other, education and Confucian culture in contemporary Taiwan. What follows is my attempt to engage in the issue.
Data and Method
The data on which I base for my analysis and discussion in this paper is derived from the Religious Experience Survey in Taiwan (2009). It is a project I and my colleagues conducted to explore Taiwanese people’s religious experiences nationwide according to random sampling. Through a rigorous process, we collected 1714 valid samples. The survey questionnaire comprises 121 questions in six sections, in addition to the respondent’s personal details, with thematic titles including Power, Life, Dreams, Mysterious Feelings and Visions, Conception and Behavior, and Ideas and Beliefs. Centering on “ancestor worship”, a core belief and practice in Confucian societies, I choose those questions that are related to it for analytical purposes.
Supplementary data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) is also used when needed.57
Methodologically, I adopt the three-tiered division of “behavior, belonging, and belief” (Marshall 2002) and include additionally the experience of power and
understanding of life as my analytical framework. That is, I will analyze five groups of questions that are respectively and sequentially attributed to religious identity, behavior, belief, experience of power, and understanding of life. By so doing, I will
then examine how education fares in these proposed questions or thematic categories.
Analysis and Findings
57 For more information about TSCS, see its website at http://srda.sinica.edu.tw.
Religious Identity
Table 1 shows the different religious identities among the residents in Taiwan from 1994 to 2009. One finds that most Taiwanese belong to traditional Chinese religions, i. e., either Folk Religion, Buddhism, Daoism, I-Kuan Tao, or
Buddho-Daoism. The numbers of followers of these religions might fluctuate in the past fifteen years, but if we treat these religions as a whole, their total percentages have remained between 75% and 80%. It means that the Chinese traditional religious followers have not changed much as far as their total number is concerned and that Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism combined, has been the most
heterogeneous religion in Taiwan. The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people still opt for Chinese religions as their faith identity although these religions may be taxonomically labeled with different names.
More noteworthy is the category of the non-religious. Chao and Kuan observed that this cohort increased gradually during 1994 and 2004 (Chao and Kuan 2010). If we include the TSCS 2009 and REST 2009 data for more longitudinal comparison, however, statistics shows that it dropped after 2004. It seems that modernization or secularization has not obviously reduced Taiwanese people’s religiosity. If we simply focus on the REST 2009 data and analyze the cohort of the non-religious, we find another aspect of Taiwan’s religious configuration.58 As Table 2 indicates, the less educated constitute a smaller portion of the non-religious, whereas the more educated take up a larger part of this group of population. The percentages from the least educated group of primary school and below (7.4%) progressively increase all the way up to the group of graduate and above (32.5%). It shows that the more one is educated, the more one tends to deny one’s religious affiliation. Deriving from this observation, we may easily side with the position that education plays an important role in facilitating the effect of secularization. This conclusion, however, should be examined further by the following analyses.
Religious Behavior
Question no. 63 of the REST asks the respondents if they have ever worshiped or prayed to any of the listed supernatural beings, including ancestors and a host of deities related to Chinese religions and Christianity. As Table 3.1 reveals, those who have never worshiped any of them are few, regardless of the different educational
58 More information is needed with respect to detailed comparison between different groups of educational level in TSCS 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, besides REST 2009.
levels. Except for the group of graduate and above that reaches 5.2%, the percentages of all other groups are below 3%. Those who answered that they had worshiped ancestors only are also few, all below 4%. In contrast, those who did not worship ancestors but, instead, worshiped god or gods only are relatively more. Education seems not to function influentially in this regard. This is because the group of the primary school and below, the least educated, and the college group appear almost equal in percentage (12.6% and 13%). The group of the graduate and above may have the lowest percentage (3.9%), the percentage of the university group is higher (8.8%) than that of the junior high school group (5.9%). This finding can be verified by the responses with respect to the worshipping behavior of most Taiwanese people.
According to the statistics, 84.4% of Taiwanese worshiped both ancestors and deities of various sorts. Different educational levels seem not to matter much. While the worshipers among least educated may reach 81.6%, in contrast to 87% in the most educated group, the junior high group and the university group are close to each other, with 88.7% and 86.4% respectively.
Question no. 64, following up no. 63, further asks which one among the
aforementioned supernatural beings the respondents worshiped most frequently. The choice of “ancestors” ranks the first (32.3% / 28/8%?), far surpassing the second-top deity, Bodhisattva (14.1%?).59 If we look into the educational backgrounds of those respondents who chose “ancestors” according to Table 3.2, we find that the university group takes up the first position (38%), followed by the junior high school (37.3%), primary school and below (33.6%), college (30.4%), graduate and above (27.9%), and senior high school (25.8%). All in all, about one-third of Taiwanese people consider the practice of ancestor worship to be most important, as far as worshiping is
concerned. The rise of educational level has not negatively affected this behavior, as the less educated (those with the levels of senior high school and below) and the more educated (those with the levels of senior high school and above) equally take this religious act very seriously (32%).
Religious Belief
Question no. 61 of the REST asks the respondents if they believe a series of statements provided, among which two are directly related to ancestor worship:
“Timely offerings to our ancestors will reap blessings and protection from them” and
“The dead without offerings will become ghosts.”
72.2% of Taiwanese people believe that timely offerings to their ancestors will
59 The statistics given here is different from that supplied by Prof. Ping-yin Kuan due to different sample populations; ref. Tsai 2010, 205.
be blessed by them. The least educated take this most seriously (76.4%), whereas the most educated believe it the least (58.4%). Although the percentage of the college group (73.5%) is a bit higher than that of the junior high school group (71.5%), in general, as shown in Table 4, one tends not to believe it if one gets higher education.
This indicates that the educated are more rationalized. Their understanding of the Confucian tradition is somehow different from that of the less educated. What they received from Confucianism leans toward moral or ethical dimension more than the promise of rewards or threat of punishments. They are aware of the importance of being reverent toward their ancestors, but to incur their blessings should not be the sole motivation of their worship.
Ancient Chinese believed that people had two souls. After death, one soul, called
hun, would ascend to heaven and the other soul, called po, would enter underground
(Loewe 1994; Yü 1987). This concept of afterlife has gradually evolved andtransformed especially when encountering the impacts of the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration. In Taiwan today, the popular belief occurs that a person has three souls. When a person dies, his or her first soul stays at the graveyard. The second soul finds its abode at the ancestral tablet in the family or in the clan’s temple, grouping itself with the deceased forebears. The third soul finds its deserved place in the Buddhist hell according to how this person behaved during his or her lifetime. Thus it is crucial for the offspring to set the three souls properly for their ancestors or
deceased relatives according to rightly prescribed rituals (Chen 2012).
Given this cultural or religious context, when it comes to the belief that “The dead without offerings will become ghosts,” one discerns different responses among people with different educational levels. As Table 4 discloses, the less educated tend to accept this “superstitious” belief, whereas the more educated tend to dismiss it.
While filial piety is pervasively emphasized and it is important to worship one’s ancestors, according to the Confucian tradition, the more educated would understand it in a more rational way.
Experience of Power
Question no. 8 of the REST asks if the respondents have experienced
extraordinary powers that are beyond human control. Choices provided include the mandate or will of heaven; the Buddha or Bodhisattva; karma; God, Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Virgin Mary; ancestors; ghosts or spirits; fate or fortune; Dao or the heavenly Dao; qi; other deities. These named powers basically cover the supreme beings that are worshiped in the major religious traditions in Taiwan. Related to Confucianism are mandate or will of heaven, ancestors, and fate or fortune.
Table 5 indicates that over one-third of the Taiwanese population have
experienced the power of ancestors, in whatever way they might have respectively encountered. The six educational groups responded to this power differently. It seems clear that education and this type of experience are positively correlated: the less one is educated, the less one experiences this power, and, reversely, the more one is
educated, the more one experiences this power. Although the percentage of the college group (41.5%) is a little higher than that of the university group (40.4%), their
discrepancy is not too significant. The overall increase of experience from the least educated to the most educated testifies to the power of Confucianism. If one receives more education, even though it is a modern or secular type, the more one is imbued with Confucian ideology of filial reverence, hence one’s experience of the power of ancestors.
This observation is verified by two other choices that are closely related to the choice of ancestors. Table 5 shows that along the elevation of education, one
experiences more the power of the mandate or will of heaven. The percentages of the six groups of different educational levels progressively increase from 23.4% to 58.4%.
The power of the mandate or will of heaven is abstract in nature and often resorts to one’s noetic comprehension. As it is part and parcel of Confucian philosophy, those well-versed in Confucianism should be better qualified to experience it. Likewise, a parallelism is found in the responses to the power of fate or fortune. 36.2% of the least educated group has experienced it. The ratio gets steadily higher along the rise of educational level, all the way up to 72.7% that belongs to the group of graduate and above. Again, fate or fortune is an abstract power and not infrequently smacks of fatalism. It is, nonetheless, couched in Confucian philosophy. Therefore one sees its power widely experienced by over half of the Taiwanese people, and the higher education one receives, the more chances one encounters its power.
Understanding of Life
Question no. 21 of the REST asks if the respondents “have had the experience of acquiring in a flash new understanding of or feeling for life.” Eight statements are listed for them to choose from. At least two of them, “We must study or work hard to bring honor to our family and forebears” and “Life and death are matters of fate and heaven disposes fame and fortune” are ideologically associated with Confucianism.
With respect to the first statement, Table 6 shows that about 50% of Taiwanese people had a feeling for it. Here to study or work hard is understood as an expression of one’s filial piety. As a Confucian virtue, it is widely shared in Taiwanese society. If we look into the educational background of those who consent to it, we find that percentages
do not progressively increase along the levels of education. In general, however, those with higher education (college level and above) tend to understand it more readily. In contrast, those with less education (senior school and below) have a less feeling for it.
The second statement is akin to one’s experience of the power of fate or fortune, which we analyzed in the preceding section, in its philosophical orientation. The great majority of Taiwanese (73.3%) subscribe to it. It appears that the least educated group has had the least understanding of it (57.1%), and the most educated group, on the other hand, has had a much higher feeling for it (81.8%). The college group (76.5%) might be somehow lower than the senior high school group (79.6%) and about equal to the junior high school group (76.9%), the general tendency, nevertheless, tells that the more education one gets, the more understanding one would have about it.
Discussion
Taiwan has progressed into a democratic and post-industrial society in the process of modernization. Thanks to her Confucian culture, education has played a key role behind this development. According to TSCS 1985-2009 and REST 2009, the number of university graduates has risen from 6 % to 26% among the adult population in the past twenty years. More remarkably, 60% among those born in the 1980s have achieved the level of university education (Voas 2011, 2). The rise of educational level in general has affected some people’s faith in religion. While this may be the case, what Taiwanese have manifested does not entirely tally with the Secularization Thesis that religion would decline both at the social level and in the individual consciousness. Our previous analyses centering about ancestor worship have already disclosed the complicated relationship between education and religion in Taiwan.
With respect to religious identity, most Taiwanese claim that they are affiliated with a religion. Only 15% or so of the adult population in Taiwan disavow any religious connection. Given the overall high educational level in Taiwan, this wide interest in religion is impressive. However, among those non-religious, the rate of the more educated is higher than that of the less educated. It means that the more
educated tend to be more secularized and that they dissociate themselves from religious traditions or groups based on their rational choice.
On the level of religious behavior, it seems that education does not fare influentially. Most Taiwanese do not worship ancestors or a deity or deities only.
Rather, they worship both. One finds little discrepancy between groups of different educational levels. Among those who claim to worship ancestors most frequently, the number of the less educated and that of the more educated appear equal. Secular education does not decrease one’s religious behavior in this regard.
When it comes to religious belief, there are differences between the less educated and the more educated. People with higher education tend to be more discreet or discriminating about religious concepts. They may consent to the practice of offering to their ancestors as a token of filial reverence, but they may not necessarily expect concrete rewards from them as a result of this ritual performance. They would not even think that without offerings, the dead will become ghosts, a “superstition”
circulating more prominently in the circle of the less educated. At this point, one senses the rationalistic aspect of the more educated. Under the influence of Confucian education, they tend to emphasize the moral and ethical side of religion.
With regard to experience of power, differences occur between the less educated
With regard to experience of power, differences occur between the less educated