Chapter 5: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Potential Impact on Sino-Indian Security
5.2 The achievements and limitations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
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The SCO model of cooperation is an intergovernmental organization but with no sovereign control. Moreover, the member states have equal rights and powers through votes.
SCO decisions are based on consensus. The SCO charter was also established to set up rules for the organization and provide a framework bases. Moreover, the Charter explicitly states that the “SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without votes, and decisions shall be adopted if no member states raised objections during the vote (consensus)” (Aris 2011).
Flexibility
The degree of flexibility of the SCO can be considered as high because of the limited sovereignty the members state are willing to give to the SCO. Thus the development of the SCO agenda is the product of dialogue and agreement between states’ elites and not as other western international institutions: a predetermined plan. This degree of flexibility enables the organization to adapt to new situations and political contexts more quickly. Central Asia is a peculiar region with high political instability. As Zhao Huasheng (2006) mentions, the SCO has “high elasticity of existence”. (Zhao 2006)
5.2 The achievements and limitations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Achievements
Today, according to a Tajik analyst, the SCO has successfully reached the stage of institutional establishment. It has now entered into a phase of active functioning in its various areas of cooperation (Khudaiberdiev 2007, p 31). As such the SCO has more legitimacy than the BRICS as an international institution. It is however worth mentioning that the SCO was initially established to reduce tensions in central Asia through the resolution of border disputes but has now shifted to non-traditional security issues and economic cooperation. The Organization has evolved (Zhao 2005, p 9).
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Regarding economic issues, the development of trade and economic cooperation has become a top priority for the SCO along with security concerns from 2007 on. In 2006, the SCO took action for the resolution of the SCO Program of Multilateral trade and Economic Cooperation. The SCO is now “getting down to a more practical interaction between ministeries and departments responsible for external trade and economic activity such as transport, environmental protection, tackling for emergency situations as well as culture and education or the establishment of a rational financial and budgetary policy for the SCO.” (Aris 2011, p 30) The SCO Business Council aims to facilitate direct contact between institutions and businessmen. The creation of the SCO Interbank Association also shows the willingness of the Organization to take actions in the economic sector. However, according to specialists, there is a lack of economies complementarity between the member states. In 2004, Tolipov declared that in the mid-term there is no prospect for efficient economic cooperation among the SCO members because each state differs greatly as far as their domestic economic and political situations are concerned. (Tolipov 2004).
As a result, the SCO fostered trust-building in the region. According to Aris’s work about Eurasian regionalism and the interviews he conducted, the Organization is successful in implementing cooperation and establishing dialogue and positive diplomacy. The SCO Charter mentions that member states should look for common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest within the Organization but also on the international level. Therefore the SCO seeks to build a common viewpoint for Central Asian countries to get a stronger voice among international politics. This leads to the question of whether or not the SCO could make member states’ interests converge. In fact by stating it, the SCO tries to align member states’ preferences in terms of foreign policy (Ibid 2011, p 31).
Moreover, the SCO provides information on member state policy intentions regarding their foreign policy. By that, the Organization decreases the uncertainty of actions and
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successfully fosters trust building as there is a reciprocal exchange of information. The SCO is an important channel of communication between China and the Central Asian countries and this is where the SCO’s success stands out as it became the main platform of dialogue even between Central Asian countries. Informal discussions during Summits remain the main form of decision-making, and it contributes to bilateral and multilateral cooperation between state elites. Experts state that the level of trust the SCO has built in the region is impressive and do consider its role as conflict manager as the stability and trust were established (Ibid 2011, p 40).
Impact on the region’s security and stability
The SCO since 1996 has been dedicated to resolving border disputes and reducing military tensions. Its nation states have always been confronted to problematic delimitations of borders. In 1996, the “Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area”
was signed. This agreement aims to establish security at borders and build confidence. The member states encourage military disclosure at borders and jointly organized naval exercises.
The agreement therefore reduced military troops in border areas. With this agreement, the SCO decreased the clashes and transgression of border opportunities. In 1997, the “Mutual Reduction of Armed Force in the Border Area” reduced military forces to the minimum level.
By its foundation in 2001, the creation of the SCO aimed to resolve territorial disputes on the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual non-interference. Moreover the well-known Shanghai Spirit played a significant role in appeasing the region. The SCO helped to resolve bilaterally territorial disputes not only in Central Asia but also along the Sino-Russian border which is the 6th longest border (UNAS Model United Nations 2017, p 2). To sum up, the SCO represents a platform for disputing nations to express their perspective about disputed territories as well as negotiation platform. Terms and compromises could be discussed on the SCO agreements initiatives. On its 5th anniversary, the Council of Head
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States declared that “Member states would consult each other on operational joint responses in case of territorial threat”(Ibid 2017, p 3). This was an attempt to establish a form of a mechanism within the SCO to prevent regional conflict.
The question of the effectiveness of the SCO as a conflict manager in the region after ten years of work is essential. Border issues have been settled through the Shanghai Spirit and the SCO has fostered trust and stability. However it failed to provide assistance while internal conflict broke out. In fact in 2010, the SCO was unable to intervene during ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan. There is a capacity for multilateral cooperation with the Organization and the national government agencies but the multinational intervention in cases of crisis is not effective yet. The SCO has never deployed forces in a member state.
Despite a mature structure and organizational achievement, the SCO is a young IO thus has its limitations. In fact some experts say that the security cooperation remains limited. Joint anti-terrorism exercises have built confidence in the region but it did not have any influence on individual suicide bombing or small scale terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, thanks to RATS, 99 terrorist attacks were avoided in Kazakhstan in 2009. Bilateral intelligence sharing remains a weakness as member states prefer to handle these issues outside the IO, especially in sensitive areas. The new memberships also put at stake improvement in this field. In addition, there are some issues such as the diverging vision of Beijing and Moscow on the SCO destiny. China sees the SCO as an economic body whereas Russia considers the SCO as a hope regarding security cooperation (McDermott 2012, p 57-58).
The president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, suggested new objectives for the SCO such as “defeating the global narco-syndicate and placing its leader in the Hague”, establishing a new cybersecurity body like the one based on the Interpol model or even the
“setting up of a conference to settle territorial and regional conflicts which would be capable
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of initiating preventive action in trouble spots in the SCO’s area of responsibility.” (Ibid 2012). This last suggestion would be a positive action in order to prevent and resolve Sino-Indian territorial disputes.
The Chief Researcher Syroezhkin (2011) of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Kazakhstan admits that the SCO role in resolving internal conflict is not really possible even in theory. The SCO has therefore a positive assessment regarding international conflict preventing in Central Asia, with high intra-state confidence-building and a limited vision on domestic intervention. (Syroezhkin 2011)
The SCO is a relevant actor in managing security cooperation in the region. However, regarding border dispute settlement, the Organization did not provide a proper resolution process and member states resolved issues bilaterally.
Limitations
Mechanism of dispute resolution
The SCO does not dispose from a permanent body that is in charge of dispute resolution among its member. According to Al Qahtani Mutlaq (2006), the SCO Charter provides limited means of dispute settlement. In article 22, the Charter specifies that: “In case of disputes or controversies arising of interpretation or application of this Charter, Member States shall settle them through consultation and negotiation” (Ibid 2006, p 139). Therefore the channels of dispute settlement are limited and quiet vague. The question is, if two members disagree and are unable to reach an agreement, what alternative can the SCO provide? Moreover, compared to other IOs, the SCO has no judicial body which aims to secure compliance and IO goals. As such, the SCO should establish a Court of Justice which would have enough power and authority to overcome member state disputes.
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Moreover the SCO has no clear legal stipulation regarding the governance of action of member states in the case of potential border dispute outbreak. The Organization needs to establish a code of conduct which could govern the conflict resolution process for border dispute (UNAS Model United Nations 2017, p 2).
Mechanism of state compliance and sanction enforcement
Enforcement mechanism is an essential instrument for any IO and is needed in international institutional law. Every IO has its own form of enforcement mechanism. In the case of the SCO, this mechanism is incorporated in its Charter. Regarding compliance, the mechanism is not precise, which can lead to a certain freedom of member states to apply decisions that have been voted at SCO Summits. It stipulates that compliance shall be implemented by the member states in accordance with the procedure set out in their national legislation. Nevertheless, if the SCO Body decides that a member state has failed to comply, they can take actions through the Head of State under article 13 of the Charter. This article mentions two kinds of sanctions: the suspension of the membership (temporary or permanent) and the expulsion from the organization. Other sanctions are possible as long as it is the legal framework of the UN Charter and within the doctrine of implied powers. For instance, the Head of State can decide to deny the right to speak to a member state, or benefit of an activity or even financial benefit withdrawal (Ibid, 2006, p 140).
The SCO Charter allows a certain freedom to member states to decide for themselves a way to apply SCO decisions. However there is a lack of effective dispute settlement in case of conflict outbreak which could be problematic for Sino-Indian Relations within this Organization framework. The SCO also needs the establishment of a Court of Justice to solve this problem.
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To sum up, the SCO has no rigid treaty that allows it to enforce decisions and compliance on member states. The main concern about the SCO non-sovereign design is its ability to check if the agreements are realized inside member states countries. Nevertheless, the SCO is strongly institutionalized, which enables the Organization to be effective as conflict manager in the Central Asian Region. The SCO has enough power to promote cooperation.