Chapter 5: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Potential Impact on Sino-Indian Security
5.3 SCO potential impact on China and India foreign policies
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To sum up, the SCO has no rigid treaty that allows it to enforce decisions and compliance on member states. The main concern about the SCO non-sovereign design is its ability to check if the agreements are realized inside member states countries. Nevertheless, the SCO is strongly institutionalized, which enables the Organization to be effective as conflict manager in the Central Asian Region. The SCO has enough power to promote cooperation.
5.3 SCO potential impact on China and India foreign policies
The potential effect of the Indian membership
The new membership of India could affect the SCO cooperation advancement because of its relationship with Pakistan and also with China. The previous experience of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in failing to reconcile Pakistan and India is in everyone’s mind. In fact the two countries literally blocked the further development of the IO.
Tensions and negative relationships failed the entire organization. Therefore it is important in the case of the SCO to analyze if the Organization has better chances to overcome these new challenges. Experts say that the fact that China, Russia and the Central Asian countries already succeeded in cooperated together ensure great hope. It makes sense to affirm that within the SCO framework, conflict of interest seems to be put aside. As such the SAARC is different from the SCO. Indeed India’s absence succeeded in postponing the Head of State summits. This has led to an issue for the whole organization. India power in the SAARC was significant therefore the unwillingness of India to cooperate put an end to cooperation. On the contrary, in the SCO, China and Russia have already taken the lead as the most influential powers. If India chooses to boycott summits, it won’t affect the SCO. Moreover, in the Charter, there is no legal impediment specified for holding summits in the absence of a member state. If tensions are brought within the Organization, the member states can sanction under the Article 13 of the the SCO Charter, for instance in case of non-respect of territorial sovereignty (violation also from UN principles). The fact that the granting of the membership
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is reversible, if repeated violation, is a guarantee to further development. Therefore, tensions between India and China cannot hijack the SCO. In addition, in Article 1, it is specified that members have an obligation to encourage the efficient regional cooperation. If states put veto or objections at every decision, exclusion can occur (Norling, Swanström 2007, p 439).
The fact that China and India are already cooperating within the BRICS shows the willingness of the two countries to try to institute positive relations and diplomacy. This is a guarantee for the SCO to not consider the Indian membership as a constraint.
According to Surendra Kumar (2013), there will be a clash between Indian and Chinese economic interests within the SCO. This will be linked with the volume and reserve of energy resources in Central Asia. Indeed the interest of India in the region is to reach its energy and economic security goals. Through the SCO, India seeks to expand its trade and to meet energy requirements. However, China and India will share the same interest in fighting Islamist extremism and terrorism. They will share security interests. Moreover there will be an issue with Chinese and Indian different visions of the SCO. China has more a multilateral cooperation approach whereas India seeks bilateral cooperation. (Surendra 2013)
Possible development and impact in the future
The SCO is a strong institution which has the equipment, motivation and tools to deal with territorial disputes. Through its experiences in successfully settling border disputes within Central Asia, the SCO has the potential to handle the Sino-Indian border dispute and to prevent other military escalation at borders in the future.
In order to be effective in resolving border disputes in the future, especially in the case of Sino-Indian relation, the SCO should improve its institutionalization framework. Firstly, the SCO should decide to be an official platform or not for dispute negotiations and agreement instead of letting member states bilaterally resolve issues. Indeed China and India,
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as shown during the Docklam dispute resolution, need transparent channels of diplomacy to avoid miscommunication and mistrust. As such the SCO could provide an official platform for Sino-Indian territorial dispute resolution. The SCO should now decide its modus operandi to gain legitimacy and efficiency in territorial dispute resolution. Secondly, as a solution to prevent military tensions at borders as seen in 2017 in Docklam, the Organization could impose a limit number to military unit on disputed territory. Thirdly, as the SCO has a non-sovereign design and works on the basis of territorial integrity, it is necessary to implement metric systems which would justify SCO intervention in one country in case of conflict escalation. This would foster multilateral cooperation and response to emergency crises that the SCO faces today (UNAS Model United Nations 2017, p 11).
As a result, the SCO represents great hope for China and India to build trust and bring transparency at least in the security cooperation area on military actions. As member states of the SCO, India and China have the obligation to resolve disputes through negotiation and to consult each other to avoid conflict escalation. The SCO has a role to play as conflict manager and preventer regarding Sino-Indian relation. Moreover, if China and India are willing to resolve their long-standing territorial disputes, the SCO could provide third party resolution framework. However, as the Organization is non-sovereign, the outcome depends on the willingness of the two countries to cooperate. In that sense, China and India have made great progress and the author emphasizes the possibility of territorial compromises discussed within the SCO.
The Top-Down impact (SCO to China and India) is possible and could have a great impact on the two countries’ foreign policies. They would finally establish trust in the security area thanks to a more transparent channel of communication.
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5.4 Conclusion
As a result from this analysis, the SCO represents great chances for China and India to resolve firstly their territorial dispute and reduced their military use and secondly a hope to institutionalize their economic ties in the future. The SCO increases the flow of information in terms of security and military actions which decreases uncertainty and increase legal liability.
In that sense, the SCO fulfills the IO theory criterion as conflict preventer as information asymmetry is reduced. It also raises the reputational cost of non-compliance but gives a certain freedom to member states to adapt decisions to domestic situations. The high institutionalization level of the SCO demonstrates its potential to promote cooperation and its potential to influence state behavior. Indeed having a permanent secretariat helps IO legitimacy and goals according to neoliberalist institutionalist theories. However the peculiarity of its high institutionalization but no sovereign-design might be the key of its success among the autocratic Central Asian Republic, Russia and China. In addition, the scope of the SCO is clearly defined in terms of security and we can easily assess the strong member cohesion when working for multilateral cooperation. The SCO installed a long-term thinking process among its members even though national interests remain primordial.
Moreover, the SCO Institutions enable high frequency of meeting thus repeated interactions which are key to effective cooperation.
The SCO successfully managed to establish trust and peace in Central Asia and to avoid international conflict in the region through border dispute settlement. The Organization provided a platform of dialogue which fostered bilateral border dispute resolution. Through its experience in settling historical border disputes, this IO represents a hope for India and China to finally, thanks to third party mediation, agree on compromises on their border issues.
However, the SCO should now establish a real modus operandi and a clear process for border
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dispute settlement to insure effectiveness and have more authority and power in that field. To the author’s mind, the SCO can serve as an official platform for border agreement. In the case of China and India, the two countries need more transparent channels of communication and diplomacy to guarantee compliance and to avoid conflict escalation. Moreover, the two countries have never publicly opposed third party mediation regarding their border issues. As such, the SCO represents a chance to establish peace.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Summary
The Complex Interdependence is a neo-liberalist perspective which stipulates that after growing economic interdependence and high trade flows, military action is reduced. Indeed open conflicts do not appear as an option in the foreign policy agenda whereas economics exchange become priorities. Trust is established and conflict avoided. However, in the case of China and India’s bilateral cooperation, high politics remains important and low politics are not a priority. Moreover, military actions have occurred at Docklam borders as recently as 2017.
Therefore, the author believes that Complex Interdependence has failed in the case of Sino-Indian relations. According to scholars, the distribution of gains can affect relations.
Indeed, India has a growing trade deficit toward China. As its vulnerability is growing, India is looking for alternatives to reduce it. Interdependence has stimulated belligerence between India and China as an unexpected outcome. Their bilateral cooperation leads to greedy behavior and shadowed actions which are obstacle to trust building. It results in asymmetry between China and India where the Indian market is completely vulnerable to Chinese actions. India is thus responding with protectionist measure to counter Chinese actions.
China's trade is perceived as threat in India. In addition, India dependency on China trade is too high. China uses Indian vulnerability as a source of power. In this context, how can trust be established? Trade is powerless to avoid hostilities in this case as Chinese economic policies are considered aggressive and threatening. In the case of Sino-Indian relations, geo-economics has further complicated geopolitics.
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Growing interdependence between the two countries does not allow them to acquire the necessary trust to resolve border issues. In 1988, when leaders decided to initiate cooperation between China and India, they had the border dispute resolution in mind when economic interdependence would have improved the countries perception toward each other.
However this is not the case nowadays. Interdependence fostered low intensity conflict but helped to avoid high open conflict. Border conflicts between China and India are unlikely to escalate primarily due to economic ties.
Research Findings:
As a possible solution to such mistrust in Sino-Indian relation, trade flow should be conditioned by international institutions. This would reduce military tensions and foster dialogue on economic issues and territorial disputes. Border dispute should be resolved first to allow the improvement of economic ties in the future. In this Master’s thesis, the author explores the feasibility of IOs impact on Sino-Indian relations. Therefore, she also recommends increasing the frequency of bilateral meetings between Indian and Chinese leaders to help the Sino-Indian cooperation gain credibility.
Regarding the institutionalization of Sino-Indian cooperation, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appear as perfect candidates to fulfill the role of conflict manager concerning economics and territorial disputes issues. After analyzing the capacity of the two IOs to handle such issues, it seems that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has more potential to resolve territorial disputes and also give directions to economic ties in the near future. The author analyzes the institutional potential in terms of institutionalization level, dispute resolution mechanism, compliance and enforcement mechanism and the IO past experiences as conflict manager. Indeed, in order for an IO to be successful as conflict manager, a high institutionalization level is needed to influence state behaviors and thus
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member state foreign policies. The top-down (IOs to member states) low or high impact depends also on the frequency of meetings, the establishment of permanent headquarter and repeat interactions. A clear defined scope, strong internal member cohesion as well as strong institutional mechanism help IOs to enforce cooperation.
After analysis, the BRICS (which is more focused on economic issues) offers a less optimistic perspective for Sino-Indian relations. Indeed, its lack of legal status as an IO is a constraint to effective cooperation. Despite the willingness of China, India and the other member state to develop the institution, the BRICS institutionalization remains low in order to insure dispute management in the next years. Moreover, the unclear agenda of the IO is an obstacle for Sino-Indian relations improvement. The BRICS is more economics oriented but China and India need a narrower context to resolve cooperation issues. The lack of BRICS’s experiences in security cooperation constraints its role as a conflict manager because the effectiveness responding to regional conflict or terrorism is low. Therefore, there is a limited top-down impact from BRICS on Sino-Indian relations as the institution is too new and remains weak. However, there is an indirect effect on BRICS as China and India are looking to develop the Institution in the near future. Thus cooperation and positive diplomacy is required.
On the contrary, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has high potential to resolve disputes between the two countries. Due to the Shanghai Spirit and the successful territorial dispute settlement between former post-Soviet countries and China, the IO has gained much-needed experience in dispute resolution. The institutionalization level of the SCO is high as it has a well-defined structure consisting of non-permanent and permanent organs (permanent Secretariat in Beijing) as well as high frequency of elites meetings. The Charter of the SCO states that the duty of member state is to resolve dispute through negotiations and collaboration. The SCO appears as a legitimate platform for dialogue and encourages bilateral
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cooperation. Furthermore, according to the author, the fact that the SCO is regionally focused could improve Sino-Indian relations because of its natural legitimacy to handle regional territorial issues. Thus, it can help resolve long standing historical disputes and institutionalize economic ties through its advisory role and prior expertise.
Furthermore, according to the author, the fact that the SCO is regionally focused could improve Sino-Indian relations because of its natural legitimacy to handle regional territorial issues. This could initially help resolve long standing historical disputes and then institutionalize economic ties through advisory and expertise.
Political Recommendations
The author suggests some improvements in order for the BRICS and the SCO to be considered as a legitimate conflict manager for the Sino-Indian case in the future. First, the BRICS should establish a commission that could take advisory decisions on a macroeconomic level and that could evaluate the possible areas of interdependence and re-equilibrate Sino-Indian trade balance. This would help reduce protectionist behaviors and the perception of threat on both sides. Information on states’ preferences and economic actions will be provided, which would reduce the uncertainty. The BRICS should obtain legal IO status to gain the necessary legitimacy to act as a conflict manager and successfully enforce cooperation. Second, the SCO shall serve as an official territorial dispute platform resolution to guarantee the further development of IO success while integrating India and Pakistan in the process. Moreover, the SCO should also establish a clear process as a third party in resolving territorial disputes so the border issues could be resolved on a multilateral level. The SCO would serve as a third party mediator in Sino-Indian disputes.
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Going further: the Theory of the Joint Membership
Last but not least, according to neoliberal institutionalist theories, states who share joint membership of international organizations focused on the promotion of peace have more opportunities to attempt peaceful settlement of claims. As such, the author thinks that shared membership of India and China to the SCO and the BRICS is complementary and would help trust building.
According to Megan Shannon (2009), joint membership increases the chance of dispute settlement by 61%. In the case of India and China being members of both the BRICS and the SCO could influence their relationship. The chances of third parties dispute management increases and either the SCO or the BRICS could serve as an official dialogue platform. In fact, dialogue and frequency of meetings of both IOs generate repeated games, which, according to the Prisoners Dilemma, favors successful cooperation. Sharing IO membership would also lead to more pressure for China and India to manage territorial disputes and to institutionalize their economic ties. The two countries could also decide to use one of these institutions as a mediator. In the case of political willingness from both sides, dispute resolution could be fast managed.
In addition, experts say that trust building within IOs is limited. However, after analyzing the SCO, the author believes that IOs can establish trust through long-term thinking processes and encourage bilateral relations. Indeed the SCO and especially the Shanghai Spirit successfully settled territorial disputes through bilateral means that were encourage by IOs. It should also be mentioned that elites meetings plays a very important role in decision-making in the Organization. This plays a role in their efficiency and in establishing stability.
Nevertheless, in the case of China and India, third parties settlement and bilateral cooperation through official platforms are needed. IOs provide more information about
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disputants’ true bargaining preferences. This is the reason why the author believes that third parties’ territorial dispute settlement is needed to improve Sino-Indian Relations. Moreover, according to Mitchell (2006), shared membership by increasing interactions between member states actually brings state preferences closer. As an example, experts says that the Central Asian Republic has converged their interests regarding security and economic goals in the region thanks to the success of the SCO in establishing stability in the region. This could imply that India and China’s preferences could be aligned in the future after several years of experiencing joint membership in the BRICS and SCO cooperation framework.
To conclude, the author firmly believes that China and India will improve their relations in the near future. International organizations, such as the BRICS and the SCO, have
To conclude, the author firmly believes that China and India will improve their relations in the near future. International organizations, such as the BRICS and the SCO, have