金磚國家與上海合作組織對中印關係之影響 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. 政治大 The Impact立of the BRICS and SCO. ‧ 國. 學. on Sino-Indian Relations ‧. 金磚國家與上海合作組織對中印關係之影響 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 唐霓 Marie Tartinville Advisor: Yung-Fang Lin, Ph.D.. June, 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(2) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Yung-Fang Lin for his patience and dedication into helping me writing this master thesis. Indeed he always steered me in the right the direction whenever he thought I needed it. I also benefited from his deep knowledges and advisory to achieve this work, and for that I am grateful. Secondly I would like to thank my committee members Professor Tsai and Professor Lu for their interesting suggestions on this topic and advisory for my future academic researches. It will allow me to improve my writing and research skills making me a better. 政治大. researcher in the future.. 立. Finally, I would also like to acknowledge the faculty members of the IMPIS Program. ‧ 國. 學. at the National Chengchi University for their instruction the past two years which has prepared me to write this master thesis.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(3) ABSTRACT This Master Thesis explores Sino-Indian relations through the Neoliberal Institutionalist theory. More precisely, the author is trying to respond to the actual economic and political tensions remaining between China and India despite a growing economic interaction since the 1990’s. In fact, long-standing territorial disputes and unbalanced trade leads to protectionist behavior (in the case of the Indian Industry) and to frequent military actions at borders between the two countries. The author argues that dispute management on a multilateral level through International Organization could improve Sino-Indian Relations. Indeed International Organizations, according to the Neoliberal Institutionalist Theory, play a role in IR as conflict manager. As such, the author chose to analyze the case of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as conflict manager between China and India. As a result, it appears that the BRICS have a limited impact on their relationship due to its low level of institutions and its lack of experiences in dispute management. On the contrary, the SCO seems to offer a greater perspective in terms of territorial dispute settlements thanks to its former experiences in stabilizing Central Asia. However, both organizations need to be improved in order to play a role in stabilizing Sino-Indian relations in the future. The author suggests that the BRICS establishes a commission focused on member state economic interdependence and lead feasibility studies to address unbalanced trade. The SCO should elaborate an official process for territorial dispute settlement in order to serve as an agreement platform. Therefore, after analysis, the author thinks Sino-Indian relations could be improved in the future thanks to International Organizations such as the BRICS and the SCO which could contribute to better bilateral cooperation and trust building.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. 本篇碩士論文透過新自由制度主義的觀點探討中印之間的關係。更準確地說，儘管自 1990 年代以來，中國與印度的經濟交流不斷增加，中國和印度之間仍實際存在著經濟和政治緊張局勢，作者試圖探討此一現象。事實上，長期存在的領土糾紛和貿易不平衡導致保護主義行為（以印度工業為例）以及兩國邊界頻繁的軍事行動。作者認為透過國際組織進行多方的爭端管理可以改善中印關係。根據新自由制度主義，國. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 際組織確實在國際關係中擔任衝突管理者的角色。因此，作者選擇分析金磚國家和上海合作組織作為中印之衝突管理者的案例。由於金磚國家的機構級別低下，而且在糾紛管理方面缺乏經驗，看起來金磚五國對其關係的影響有限。相反地，由於以往在穩定中亞局勢的經驗，上海合作組織似乎在中印的領土爭端方面提供了更重要的視角。然而，這兩個國際組織仍有進步空間，才能在未來穩定中印關係方面發揮作用。作者建議金磚國家建立一個以成員國經濟相互依存為重點的委員會，並負責開展可行性研究以解決不平衡的貿易問題。上海合作組織應該制定領土爭端解決的官方程序，以作為協議平台。因此，分析過後，作者認為，由於金磚國家、上海合作組織等國際組織的共同努力，有助於中印雙方更進一步的合作與信任，未來中印關係得以改善。. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(4) TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... 1 List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... 2 Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3 2.1. Research Motivation and Purpose ........................................................................................... 3. 2.2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 5. Literature Review on Sino-Indian Relations ................................................................................... 5 Litterature on the BRICS ............................................................................................................... 11 Literature on SCO ......................................................................................................................... 15 2.3. Research Theory and Method ................................................................................................ 19. 政治大 Research Method ........................................................................................................................... 22 立 Research Theory ............................................................................................................................ 19. ‧ 國. 2.1. 學. Chapter 2: The Neoliberal Institutionalist Theory................................................................................. 25 International Institutions and peace promotion ..................................................................... 25. The choice to cooperate via Institutions ........................................................................................ 25. ‧. International Organizations and Conflict Management Process ................................................... 26. y. Nat. 2.2 International Institutions and their impact on states behavior ..................................................... 28. sit. Compliance Mechanism ................................................................................................................ 29. 2.4 2.5. al. iv n C Rational Design ..................................................................................................................... 33 hengchi U Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 35 n. 2.3. er. io. Conditions for IOs to be successful ............................................................................................... 30 The Theory of shared IO membership................................................................................... 31. Chapter 3: The Sino-Indian Relations ................................................................................................... 36 3.1 Sino-Indian Relations in Historical Perspective .......................................................................... 36 Economic ties ................................................................................................................................ 36 Political ties ................................................................................................................................... 39 Military issues ............................................................................................................................... 40 3.2. The Complex Interdependence .............................................................................................. 42. Concept and Challenges ................................................................................................................ 42 Complex Interdependence and Conflict ........................................................................................ 44 3.3 Complex Interdependence Impacts in the case of Sino-Indian Relations ................................... 45 Asymmetry in Sino-Indian relations ............................................................................................. 45 The Economics-Security Nexus .................................................................................................... 46. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(5) Bargaining Process Failure ............................................................................................................ 47 Low intensity conflict(Morrow 1994) ........................................................................................... 48 3.4 Possible solutions ........................................................................................................................ 48 3.5 Assessment of Complex Interdependence and Sino-Indian Relations ........................................ 49 Chapter 4: The BRICS potential Role in Appeasing Sino-Indian Tensions.......................................... 51 4.1. The BRICS as an International Institution ............................................................................ 52. The formation of the BRICS ......................................................................................................... 52 Level of Institutionalization .......................................................................................................... 55 Rational Design ............................................................................................................................. 56 4.2. Achievements and limitations of the BRICS ......................................................................... 58. State Compliance and BRICS governance effectiveness .............................................................. 58 Mechanism of dispute resolution/sanctions enforcement .............................................................. 61 4.3. 政治大. BRICS impact on member states foreign policy ................................................................... 62. Assessment of the BRICS present and future role ........................................................................ 62. 立. Political recommendation .............................................................................................................. 64. ‧ 國. 學. 4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 65 Chapter 5: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Potential Impact on Sino-Indian Security Cooperation ........................................................................................................................................... 66. ‧. 5.1 The SCO as an International Institution ...................................................................................... 67. y. Nat. The Institutional Development ...................................................................................................... 67. sit. Structure ........................................................................................................................................ 68. al. er. io. Rational Design ............................................................................................................................. 70. n. iv n C Achievements ................................................................................................................................ 72 hengchi U Impact on the region’s security and stability ................................................................................. 74. 5.2 The achievements and limitations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ........................... 72. Limitations..................................................................................................................................... 76 5.3. SCO potential impact on China and India foreign policies ................................................... 78. The potential effect of the Indian membership .............................................................................. 78 Possible development and impact in the future ............................................................................. 79 5.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 81. Chapter 6: Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 83 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 90. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(6) List of Figures Figure 3.1: Increasing Membership in Peace Brokering Institutions and the Predicted Probability of a third Party settlement Attempt .............................................................................................................. 32 Figure 4.1: BRICS Priorities 2008-2014, share of characters in % ....................................................... 57 Figure 4.2: BRICS Compliance performance from 2011 to 2013 ......................................................... 60 Figure 4.3: Dynamics of global governance functions in BRICS documents and commitments adopted by the leaders, 2008-2014 ..................................................................................................................... 63 Figure 5.1: Organizational Structure of the SCO ................................................................................. 70. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(7) List of Abbreviations ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa FTA: Free Trade Agreements IGOs: Inter-governmental Organizations IR: International Relations RATS: Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization UN: United Nations. 立. 政治大. UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. ‧ 國. 學. USA: United States of America. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(8) Chapter 1: Introduction 2.1 Research Motivation and Purpose As rising global powers, China and India are challenging each other. Together, China and India accounted for 36.41% of the total world population in 2014 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). These two countries are seen as the world’s emerging powers that could change the international order. In addition, China and India are both frustrated about their treatment in the current global system. Both countries are expected to be powerful actors for the Global South and bring beneficial change. Both also. 政治大. benefit from the process of globalization and interdependence with the West. As such, the. 立. term “Chindia” appeared in the 2000s in reference to their increasing economic growth.. ‧ 國. 學. Sino-Indian relations have experienced a complex evolution over the past five. ‧. decades. The 1950s was characterized by a benign warmth, followed by hypertensions in the 1960s and 1970s, and rapprochement in the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout history, this. sit. y. Nat. io. er. relationship has been extremely volatile. However, the two countries have achieved tremendous cooperation and engage in informal governance and institutions, such as BRICS. al. n. iv n C (Brazil, Russia, India, China and SouthhAfrica) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization engchi U (SCO). While initiating these joint projects, India and China overcame strategic rivalry and. successfully institutionalized mutual cooperation. The two states have also successfully coordinated policies related to non-traditional security areas. The New Development Bank is their greatest achievement so far. Nevertheless, as the two countries seek status attribution, their capacity for mutual cooperation seems limited. Numerous scholars analyzed their relations through the “rivalry theory” and describe their different perspectives in terms of strategies and policies as a real obstacle to further cooperation. On the contrary, pragmatic policy analysts believe that despite 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(9) divergent security perceptions and competitive interests, China and India can take the opportunity to establish a strategic partnership and promote mutual interests on concerns such as human rights, counter-terrorism and promoting a non-discriminatory trade regime. Their first mutual interest is a world shift to multipolarity (Jain 2003). To the author’s mind, China and India consistently surprise the international community. Despite their long-standing border issues, differing global and regional strategies, and pursuit of power, both India and China’s foreign policies tend to promote mutual cooperation. According to the neoliberal institutionalist theory, international institutions and. 政治大 fact that China and India successfully settled their most recent conflict during the 2017 立 organizations are a platform for dialogue thus assumed to be improving state relations. The. ‧ 國. 學. Xiamen BRICS Summit proves the credibility of neo-institutionalist theory in Sino-Indian relations. The Doklam dispute, in which China and India had a military face off for two. ‧. months at their respective borders, was resolved one week before the BRICS summit. Since. sit. y. Nat. the next summit was scheduled to be held in China, the two powers rushed to resolve the. n. al. er. io. conflict so they could enter the summit without tension and facilitate cooperation. This event. i Un. v. shows the importance of the BRICS institution for China and India and its role in promoting. Ch. engchi. peace and cooperation. The successful aspects of BRICS may also be applied to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as other China-led institutions. This research will focus on the evolution of Sino-Indian relations as members of international institutions. More specifically, the author will choose international institutions where the two countries maintain state-to-state contact and pursue common goals, as defined by neoliberal institutionalist theory. The purpose of this research is to prove that international institutions could play a role in improving Sino-Indian relations. This is because international institutions provide a joint project platform and incentive framework. The author will emphasize, as the neoliberal institutionalist tradition explains, that thanks to international 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(10) institutions, Sino-Indian relations could become more stable and tend towards cooperation rather than conflictual relations. As such, research questions are as follows: How do international institutions impact Sino-Indian relations? How could international institutions shape the foreign policies of India and China toward each other? How could BRICS and SCO improve Sino-Indian intra-institutional and extra-institutional relations? As the resolution of the Doklam dispute has shown, BRICS is promoting peace among its members. The SCO has also focused on other regional issues, such as non-traditional. 政治大. security. The recent admission of India into the SCO could mean more joint cooperation. 立. between India and China. This will be a prospective study based on the BRICS experience. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. and findings.. Hence, this academic research will shed light on Sino-Indian relations from a neoliberal. sit. n. al. er. io. 2.2 Literature Review. y. Nat. institutionalist perspective.. Ch. Literature Review on Sino-Indian Relations. engchi. i Un. v. There is an abundance of realist literature on Sino-Indian Relations. The pessimistic and the competition-based ideas regarding the rise of China and India with the Asia-Pacific region and the world stage are very common. Chietigj Bajpaee (2010), who works for Control Risk (a political-risk-analysis company) as a senior analyst and used to work for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), belongs to this school of thought. He claims that despite their recent cooperation, China and India will always see each other as competitors and will feel threatened by each other. To him, the coming years will increase tensions between the two 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(11) countries. As their economic and political capabilities increase, so will their resources for competition. Their rivalry will then be projected on the world stage. He also declares that their relations have a low chance of improvement because there remains some significant obstacles to complete trust, such as long-standing territorial dispute, trade imbalances, the role of third parties, and the competition for influence within Asia. However, he also explains that there is a propensity for misunderstanding because of limited people to people contact. The author disagrees with this statement because the latest BRICS summit led India and China to ease tensions concerning the Doklam borders dispute. The fact that this article was written in 2010 also contributes to this pessimistic perspective, even using the term “Soft Cold War” to. 政治大. describe Sino-India relations. Although he considers conflict inevitable, he did acknowledge. 立. the fact that the two countries will push for further cooperation, such as military or diplomatic. ‧ 國. 學. joint projects. They will even collaborate on Indian Ocean issues to protect the transportation. ‧. of energy and resources against traditional security threats. Regarding economic policy, India and China will strengthen their cooperation and integration to build stronger bilateral. y. Nat. er. io. sit. relations. He even mentions strengthened cooperation through the BRICS economies. However, he thinks that economic interdependence will not be enough to overcome all. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. challenges. Mutual interests will coexist with mutual mistrust on regional issues. He also. engchi. recommends that China and India strengthen people to people contact and deepen mutual projects where interests are shared. This last statement is open to more optimistic scenarios as the contact between China and India has increased through institutions. (Bajpaee 2010b) In this way, this research on Sino-Indian relations within institutions will provide useful mechanisms for understanding the different obstacles that remain between the two countries, from the geopolitical to the economic. Realist perceptions on the issue will help the author to understand the challenges that China and India still have to face and how we can respond to these criticisms through research and within the liberal institutionalist framework. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(12) The strength of this article is the complete analysis of these issues, but it failed to provide concrete political recommendations. Amb Saurabh Kumar (2014), an Indian scholar working at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore and the former Ambassador of India to the United Nations, wrote an analysis of Sino-Indian Relations. His work differs from others as he provides an insight into the Indian perspective of these relations. Overall, his reflection is highly negative about the development of Sino-Indian relations since their declaration of war in 1962. He first highlights the extreme volatility of this relationship over the years and the creation of. 政治大 According to him, the Chinese diplomatic template has not been successful until 立. instability in Asia. Moreover, he argues the mistakes and dysfunctions of this relationship until now.. ‧ 國. 學. recently. This is part of the global issue between the two countries. According to him, China is imposing its design to India. He described this as : "Design disposed towards generalities. ‧. and formulations long on lofty rhetoric and abstraction, that invariably lend themselves to. sit. y. Nat. conflicting interpretation and short on unambiguous specifics." (Kumar Amb 2014, p. 1) The. n. al. er. io. second part of this article focuses on two agreements, both of which the author considers. i Un. v. useless. The Panchsheel signed in 1954 and the Strategic and Cooperative partnership of 2005. Ch. engchi. did not help China and India to develop further their cooperation on concrete actions. He is very skeptical as he said that these agreements serve China’s interests and not India’s. He criticizes the Five Principle as follows: "The Five Principles continue to be paid obeisance together with China, as if the nation's territorial integrity had never been violated."(Kumar Amb 2014, p. 12) To him, these agreements, such as the Strategic Partnership, are all about symbolism, but have no real content and concrete actions. He claims that Chinese strategists are satisfied as they were “locking India in a diplomatic embrace” to retard the emergence of India. However, he is also accusing the Indian government of failing to assume a proper position against China and establish a better partnership intensively and internally. Moreover, 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(13) he is calling for a legitimate border dispute resolution to appease tensions. As a former ambassador, he strongly disapproves of Sino-Pakistan regarding Sino-Indian Relations. Lastly, he criticizes the lack of balance in Sino-Indian relations and calls for new policies to counter this trend. He also provides solutions to the framework between the two countries concerning the “boundary talks” and the “three stage road map”. He says that the top-down approach has to be reversed and that a bottom-up approach would be more suitable. To sum up his argument, the last agreements China and India signed, as well as their partnership, is an “empty shell.”. 政治大 as it shows us their relationship from a more skeptical and critical point of view. He does not 立 The article of Amb Saurabh Kumar is relevant for understanding Sino-Indian relations,. ‧ 國. 學. claim to assume a realist or liberalist point of view, but he has relevant field experience which provides a different perspective. However, this introspection does not discuss recent. ‧. agreement and cooperation development between India and China within the non-traditional. sit. y. Nat. security or economic fields. The two agreements he chose to discuss, the Panchsheel and the. n. al. er. io. “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” were signed sixty-two years and eleven years ago. i Un. v. respectively. The fact that he criticizes the templates applied and denounces the imbalance in. Ch. engchi. their partnership is relevant for this research.. On the contrary, neoliberalist scholars such as B.M. Jain are responding to realists’ analysis on Sino-Indian Relations. In his article, “India-China: issues, trends and emerging scenarios”, B.M. Jain (2003) analyses the improvements the two countries have made since 1950. Despite the fact that this analysis was written in 2003, his thoughts are still relevant to my research. B.M. Jain is Professor and Research scientist in Political Science at the South Asia Studies Centre in Jaipur. His historical analysis leads to the same conclusion as the other authors: the extreme volatility of the relations between the two countries. His study is based on neoliberalist theory as it suggests different scenarios for the “future” which is related to the 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(14) interdependence theory. He also mentions new fields where China and India can cooperate according to their mutual interests. He denounces the instability of the Sino-Indian relations, but acknowledges differing opinions on the issues and the trends of scholars to turn toward “rivalry analysis”. However, he claims that despite their divergent interests in security and the competition that still occurs, China and India can still establish a strategic partnership. To him, their primary mutual interests are countering terrorism, promoting a non-discriminatory trade regime, and having a greater voice in international politics. (Jain 2003) Furthermore, he explains the issues at stakes in contemporary Sino-Indian relations, such as the balance of power in Asia, the problem of third parties, such as India and China’s. 政治大 involvement in Asia, the Tibet issue, or the Sino-Pakistan partnership. However, he highlights 立. ‧ 國. 學. the fact that this ambiguous partnership was never intended to be a threat to India, but rather as a Chinese strategy to help resolve issues between India and Pakistan. According to B.M.. ‧. Jain, it is not necessary to have a complete convergence of perspectives on every global or. sit. y. Nat. regional issue. Despite these differences, China and India can promote sustainable bilateral. n. al. er. io. cooperation. He also supports his arguments with the example of agriculture-based countries.. i Un. v. Therefore, cooperating on food security would be a great solution to increasing industrial and. Ch. engchi. economic growth. Additionally, India and China have common concerns and mutual interests in the energy sector of Central Asia. As an assessment, he is providing an interesting neoliberal analysis on this complex issue. He is also providing policy recommendations on important issues to improve Indian and Chinese relations. He acknowledges their competitive behavior, but he also believes that competition and cooperation can be inclusive (Jain 2003). In addition to B.M Jain, the articles written by Zhang Li (2010 a) “China and India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges” and “India China Relations: How can they be Improved” show similarities on the neoliberalist perspective. This piece of literature provides an analysis of the progress toward cooperation as well as their remaining discords 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(15) inherited from the past. In this article, Zhang Li expresses a very important argument, explaining that Beijing and New Delhi lead their policies in a “global politico-economic structure”. He also highlights that both countries are supportive of a new international order based on equal status and a multipolar world. China and India want to prioritize economic growth in order to achieve social development (Zhang 2010a, p. 10). He belongs to the liberalist, and therefore optimistic, view on the subject. In fact, he emphasizes that neither of them will consider the other as a threat. According to him, even though there is plenty of disagreement and that they are still divided on many issues, such as the economics, their political will to cooperate is stronger. Furthermore, the author sees the military interaction to. 政治大. nurture mutual trust and this will facilitate mutual security concerns as well as the joint. 立. combat against terrorism. As a policy recommendation, he firstly calls for a border settlement. ‧ 國. 學. in order to develop further and ease their bilateral relations. Secondly, both countries have to. ‧. agree on their regional strategies to build trust. More dialogue between the two countries is. sit. io. n. al. (Zhang 2010b). er. Nat. and cooperation”. (Zhang 2010a). y. necessary. He emphasizes the need for an “institutionalized regime of strategic engagement. i Un. v. As an assessment of the neoliberalist literature, the scholars agree on the fact that past. Ch. engchi. and present issues between India and China are playing a minor role in their ties. Indeed, these authors all argue that the willingness for a further partnership is stronger. Therefore, as they all call for more dialogue, we can suggest that international institutions, such as the BRICS or the SCO, can be a platform for better dialogue and lead to deepened cooperation. This neoliberalist literature is relevant to this research as scholars are not discussing SinoIndia relations within international institutions.. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(16) Litterature on the BRICS The literature on the BRICS focuses mainly on the different positions of its members and how these members react to internal challenges. The growing leadership role of China is one of the main topics of scholarship. Additionally, the BRICS’s goals to balance power and give voice to emerging countries, is often analyzed. In the article, “The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or Competitive Behavior,” Andrew F. Cooper and Asif B. Farooq (2016) analyze the respective role of China and India and how they react to each other’s’ foreign policies. This article has a. 政治大. skeptical view on Sino-Indian cooperation within the BRICS and other institutional contexts,. 立. such as the G20. It explains that even though China and India successfully cooperated to. ‧ 國. 學. institutionalize the creation of the New Development Bank and to improve non-traditional security, their cooperation is based on public rhetoric to satisfy the audience. Analyzing their. ‧. behavior within both BRICS and G20, these authors explain that China and India have to be. y. Nat. io. sit. seen as both cooperation partners and competitors. Their approaches have some similarities,. n. al. er. but also have a lot of differences on a number of concerns which lead to a lack of influence in. Ch. i Un. v. the international sphere. However, Cooper and Farooq explain that the BRICS institution is. engchi. promoting partnership between the two countries despite their rivalry. He finds that China behaves according to the West, especially in regards to US foreign policy. On the contrary, India reacts to China’s foreign policies. India has a defensive position against China within institutions. China has a leadership position in the BRICS and the G20. In addition, its position at the United Nations Security Council makes China a more powerful country in the international arena. Indian commitments to the BRICS and the G20 are weaker. Moreover, they explain how China is using the BRICS to counterbalance the power of the US. India fears that the BRICS could become like other institutions and that more powerful countries. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(17) will undermine the opinion of smaller members. As China is willing to take the lead within these institutions, this seems to be a valid possibility.(Cooper, Farooq 2016) This article will be useful for this research as it directly targets Sino-Indian relations within institutions. As an assessment, the growing power of China favors India’s defensive and rival policies. However, this article does not provide a deep insight of the evolution of the Sino-Indian ties since the BRICS was created. It only analyzes their behaviors toward each other within the institutions. This research will correlate their behavior within BRICS institutions but more importantly the evolution of their external relations since then.. 政治大. While learning about the BRICS, it is important to understand the growing leadership. 立. role of China and its purposes. The article of Michael A. Glosny, “China and the BRICS: A. ‧ 國. 學. real (but limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World” enables us to better understand the objectives of the BRICS and the China’s goals towards it. According to Glosny, the BRICS. ‧. cooperation should not be seen as a new institution that seeks a new international order but. y. Nat. io. sit. rather as an institution which aims to stabilize economic and political relations within. n. al. er. emerging powers. More precisely, China wants to encourage the development of countries. Ch. i Un. v. and strengthen its identity as the leader of the emerging block to avoid negative attention.. engchi. Other than overthrowing the current international order, the BRICS and especially China wants to use the openness of western countries to develop their own economies. As he highlights, the BRICS goal is not to overthrow the international order but rather improve it. On the other hand, having China as a partner has raised the status and profile of the other BRICS countries. Glosny also emphasizes that participating in the BRICS building is risky and costly. BRICS is a way for China to control Russia and India’s emergence. Therefore, it helps China to stabilize the international environment. Moreover, since the BRICS have known and will face similar experiences, they can share solutions and ideas. They can also face problems together by cooperating and expanding South-South Cooperation. Thanks to 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(18) the BRICS, these nations can improve their bargaining position with Western Countries. The development of a unified vision is essential and leads to opportunities. Coordination of position then leads to an increase in leverage. He also claims that the unipolarity of the world is a constraint for developing cooperation. As such, they will try to limit their dependence on the dollar or to give more funds to the IMF to help other developing countries and break the traditional North/South flow. There is plenty of limitation to BRICS cooperation. First, their difference among institutions, such as political and economic systems, and different perspectives on global issues, such as free trade or energy pricing, is an obstacle to cooperation. Moreover, Glosny explains the importance of the US position and how risky it is. 政治大. to the BRICS to oppose this hegemony, as their economy and development could suffer.. 立. Additionally, he also talks about China and India’s challenging behavior within the. ‧ 國. 學. institution. The intra-BRICS behavior is mostly about mistrust and competition. The fact that. ‧. they still see each other as a threat is blocking them from efficient cooperation. Glosny explicitly expands his opinion by citing the Sino-Indian case. On top of the remaining issue. y. Nat. er. io. sit. from their past relations or the Sino-Pakistan partnership, India is also afraid of an encirclement policy from China. The Indian “Look East” foreign policy is a threat to China’s. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. interests. Therefore, mistrust and competition still envenoms the institution and will impose a. engchi. limit on cooperation. Glosny also shares the pessimistic perspective on the BRICS countries behavior within the institutions. However, it is also essential to understand why countries with such hostile attitudes toward each other are also willing to try to cooperate together. In the article, “How the BRICS got here” from Alyssa Ayres (2017), the Sino-Indian relations and its meaning for the BRICS cooperation is somewhat evaluated. It mentions the recent territorial disputes between China and India and explains the difficulties that these disputes pose for the BRICS. Therefore, it is hard for the institution to formulate a unified 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(19) agenda beyond noncontroversial subjects. Indeed, the long-standing dispute between China and India occasionally disturbs it. The common governance of these two countries has some limits. The fact that China is still not endorsing India as a United Nations Security Council permanent member shows the remaining hostilities, despite intra-institutional cooperation. Moreover, India urged the BRICS to engage in counter terrorism, but China declined account for terrorism emerging from Pakistan. This is offensive to India. Thanks to the coming Xiamen Summit, the world perceives that the cooperation between the BRICS members truly evolved over the past eight years. With the New Development Bank, they showed their capabilities and increased their credibility. Nevertheless, according to Alyssa Ayres, Sino-. 政治大. Indian tensions will drive the next steps of cooperation. The question of whether the BRICS. 立. can evolve toward a deeper cooperation with the different perspectives of China and India as a. ‧ 國. 學. burden has been realized. He says that the next BRICS summit in Xiamen will be very. ‧. important in answering that question. (Ayres 2017). sit. y. Nat. This article converges toward Glosny, Cooper Andrew F. and Asif B. Farooq as it. n. al. er. io. emphasizes that the Sino-Indian relations are constraining, or will constraint, the BRICS. i Un. v. evolution. However, all of these articles do not evaluate the improvement or deterioration of. Ch. engchi. Sino-Indian relations thanks to the BRICS. Their argument about Sino-Indian Relations only focuses on the obvious problems caused by the differences between the two countries. The BRICS literature is seems highly one sided. Nevertheless, it is evident that the opinion convergence of scholars on this issue strongly demonstrates the challenges of the Sino-Indian relations related to Institutions.. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(20) Literature on SCO Literature on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is rather new. The SCO is a recent organization, which implies that research has not been adequately explored. Until now, scholars have focused on China and its capacity to expand its cooperation in Central Asia and the consequences for the Central Asian countries. Moreover, they also focus on the relations between Russia and China and the implications of the recent addition of India and Pakistan to the SCO. Chien Pen Chung (2006) wrote the article, “China and the institutionalization of the. 政治大. Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” analyzing the main goal of the Shanghai Cooperation. 立. Organization. He pointed out that China wants to rule regional cooperation development. Its. ‧ 國. 學. main interest is the potential control on its neighbors’ emergence. As for the BRICS, the main goal for China is to stabilize its international environment and to promote its interests as a. ‧. regional leader. China wants to accelerate regional integration and cooperation with its post-. y. Nat. io. sit. communist Eurasian neighbors. China also aspires to raise its positive image on the. n. al. er. international arena, as well as increase its economic and military power. The SCO aims to. Ch. i Un. v. solve the issue faced by Russia, China, and the central Asian states regarding traditional and. engchi. non-traditional security threats. Russia is highly supportive of the SCO. Beijing’s primary goal for the SCO is to obtain help from the Central Asian states to reduce the threat of the Muslim community in Xinjiang. The SCO countries share the same interest in gaining international attention and recognition and ensuring support in fighting against local radical Islamist terrorist groups. Moreover, Central Asian countries are too dependent on the Russian economy. Thus, the SCO represents a great opportunity for them to develop and to diversify their partners. Chien Peng Chung analyzed the level of institutionalization of the SCO as well as the motives for such cooperation. He thinks that at the beginning, the SCO was seen as a non-viable project. However, it overcame systemic change in country members, which makes 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(21) it stronger and optimistic of the idea that the SCO may be the next viable international institution. (Chung 2006) P.Stobdan (2016) analyses the recent membership of India to the SCO from an Indian perspective. His article was published by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. The new membership of India in the SCO gives a new angle and a new dimension to the organization. China tried to keep India away by stating special requirements for entry. Now, Beijing sees in India and Pakistan an opportunity for the SCO that it did not see before, and wants to keep the organization in its sphere of influence. The Chinese President Xi. 政治大 initiative, which aims to strengthen cooperation. However, P. Stobdan emphasizes the rivalry 立 Jinping is also leading a new vision in Central Asia, especially with the One Belt One Road. ‧ 國. 學. that still exists between Russia and China within the SCO despite their cooperative achievements. Bringing in India and developing trilateral relations is a challenge for Beijing.. ‧. However, he thinks that there is little hope for Sino-Indian relations, or even Indian-Pakistani. sit. y. Nat. relations, to improve within the SCO. In my opinion, these arguments about the possibility of. n. al. er. io. improving relations between China and India within the SCO are not well argued. There are no clear explanations. (Stobdan 2016). Ch. engchi. i Un. v. On the other hand, William Pieko and Elysabeth C. (2015) analyze the risks and opportunities of the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They first acknowledge that the expanded membership will confer greater legitimacy to the SCO and it will be an opportunity in terms of economic, and security benefits. Concretely, Russia suggested connecting the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Belt. There is also an increase in investment, mostly business deals involving natural resources. The SCO wants to develop its cooperation in tackling infrastructure issues, transnational water issues, transportation projects, and increasing cultural exchanges. The scholars also analyze new membership issues in terms of international relations. In their opinion, the membership of 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(22) India assumes that the SCO will never support anti-India activities. It is a neutral arena for New Delhi and Islamabad. They also think that India will feel less encircled by China, thus appeasing Sino-Indian hostilities. It is interesting because William Pieko and Elysabeth C. are the first scholars to assume a positive scenario related to Sino-Indian relations within institutions. However, they do not provide an in-depth analysis of how these relations could be improved. Moreover, they think that an expanded organization brings advantages to the organization. Expansion means greater international influence. Therefore, it represents an economic and political boost. In addition, the integration of India as the largest democracy in the world brings a positive image and more legitimacy for the SCO in the Western world. The. 政治大. expansion of membership also risks inefficiency. According to them, the SCO will favor the. 立. emergence of a “polycentric world order”. Lastly, they mention that the Indian Pakistan issues. ‧ 國. 學. could spread among SCO decision making process, hence be a cause for inefficiency. Their. ‧. long-term animosity could force Russia and China to choose sides. It would fragment the organization. On top of this, India’s ties with the US bring novelty to the SCO as it differs. y. Nat. er. io. sit. from the other members which are authoritarian states. Hence, this article has a pessimistic perspective of Sino-Indian relations and of the entry of India and Pakistan to the SCO, even. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. though it discusses the possible benefits in terms of economy and political image. However,. engchi. in their perspective, the challenge of integrating these two countries is too great. (Piekos, Elysabeth 2015) In the article, “China will regret India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Derek Grossman (2017) emphasizes the potential risk of such an expansion. The fact that China and India have different approaches to global issues, such as countering terrorism, will be a challenge to overcome within the SCO as this organization is firstly dedicated to fighting against terrorism. He also states that China did not want India to join the SCO in the first place, but Russia pushed through the application of India to the organization. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(23) Indeed, Russia was looking forward to countering the growing influence of China in Central Asia. It would strengthen Russia’s hand to oppose or slow down Chinese decisions. Moreover, he is convinced that India will use the SCO to bring back the Indo-Pakistani issues. New Delhi will continue to criticize the Sino-Pakistan Corridor within the organization, using the right of SCO members to criticize when decisions are targeted against one member’s interests. On the other hand, China aso wanted the SCO to provide a platform for dialogue between India and Pakistan. Therefore, the organization is aiming to promote India-Pakistan reconciliation. In addition, the issue of Sino-Indian relations is likely to impact the SCO discussions. In fact, the relationship between the two countries has tensed in many areas, such. 政治大. as the recent Doklam dispute, the long-standing border disputes, the geostrategic competition. 立. in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. The mutual mistrust present in their relations could. ‧ 國. 學. have an unpredictable impact on SCO outcomes. (Grossman 2017)After analyzing the. ‧. existing literature on the Sino-Indian relations, the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the author has a better understanding of the complexity of inter-states relations. y. Nat. er. io. sit. and the different issues within the institutions. However, it appears that most literature does not directly focus on Sino-Indian relations while analyzing the BRICS or the SCO. They. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. briefly mention the challenge of how their hostile political ties have or will affect the. engchi. development of the organizations. Therefore, this thesis will explore a new field of research and provide a deeper analysis of how institutions could shape Sino-Indian relations. More precisely the choice of the BRICS and the SCO is new. Indeed, these fields are still underresearched in the academic world. This is why it is relevant to deeply explore the liberalist perspective of International Relations, as the current literature tends to have pessimistic scenario regarding the Sino-Indian issues. This is where this Master’s thesis will be relevant for the academic world.. 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(24) 2.3 Research Theory and Method Research Theory The Liberalism Movement is a multidimensional tradition beginning in the seventeeneighteenth centuries. It represents one of the most important political ideologies within the Western Political Philosophy. Knud Erik Jorgensen (2010) in “International Relations Theory: A New Introduction,” explains the pillars of the liberalist tradition: a strong faith in human reason, a belief in historical progress, a focus on state and society relation as well as international politics, and economic interdependence theory, which claims that the likelihood. 政治大 based on David Ricardo’s assumption of comparative advantages. Liberalist thought aims to 立 of conflict is reduced when states are economically interdependent. Interdependence theory is. ‧ 國. 學. promote peace and institutionalize international relations. A network of international organizations and agreements will prevent wars. “Anarchy can be molded,” explains. ‧. Jorgensen (2010). The liberalist school of thought provides a counter argument to the realist. Nat. io. sit. y. perspective of international relations. (Jorgensen 2010). n. al. er. Among several branches of thought within the liberalist tradition, Neoliberalist. Ch. i Un. v. Institutionalism has a peculiar perspective on International Relations. This theory will be. engchi. further explored in this thesis. R. Keohane and J. Nye developed and contributed to the core ideas of neoliberal institutionalist theory. As such, Keohane (1989) defined this new trend. “Neoliberalism Institutionalism asks question about the impact of institutions on state action and about the causes of institutional change: it assumes that states are key actors and examine both the material forces of world politics and the subjectives self understanding of human beings” (Keohane 1989) The liberal institutional theory truly expanded its assumptions on the benefit of interdependence in the 1970s. After the First World War, neoliberalists sought peace. The creation of the “League of Nations” was supposed to launch a new liberal order against realist power politics. Although its failure was a disappointment, neoliberalists aimed to improve 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(25) institutionalist theory. After the Second World War, the emergence of institutions was a chance for neo-institutionalist to further explore their assumptions. The goal was to “establish cooperation habits that would gradually moderate the conflicts that would otherwise lead to war.” Nevertheless, the particularity of the neo-Institutionalist theory is that neoinstitutionalist scholars accept some features of the neo-realist perspective and argue beyond. Therefore, the two schools of thought share ideas, such as that states pursue self-interested goals in terms of security and material, but Keohane (Keohane 1989, pp. 1-20; 101-31) argues that that competition can be solved by institutions. Furthermore, to go beyond the simple fact that state decisions are driven by self-interests, neo-liberalists developed a framework. The. 政治大. so-called “utilitarianism” framework explains that states cooperate to pursue their interest in a. 立. more positive way within institutions. Indeed, Institutions provides a platform where states. ‧ 國. 學. can maximize their gains and minimizes losses through cooperation. This enlightened. ‧. argument seeks to refute realist theory (Richardson 2008).. sit. y. Nat. To better understand the core ideas of this school of thought, it is important to define what. n. al. international institutions (Viotti, Kauppi 2010, p. 133) :   . Ch. engchi. er. io. institutions really are. According to Neo-Institutionalism, there are three forms of. i Un. v. Formal Inter-governmental or cross-national, non-governmental organization: those are entities with bureaucratic organization, explicit rules and defined missions International Regimes: institutionalized rules agreed by states regarding certain issues Conventions: informal institutions with implicit rules and understanding. Institutions also vary in number of membership and size. They can be regional, international, narrow-issued, wide-issued, etc. They also vary in degree of enforcement, as well as provide a mechanism for dispute resolution and react to states’ noncompliance. They have different collective decision-making processes. All these different features of institutions contribute to institutional design (Stein 2008).. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(26) Neoliberal Institutionalists see institutions as a solution to the dilemma of the nature of state self-interest. In fact, the heart of the neoliberal institutionalist theory is the perception of international institutions as the self-interested creation of states. International institutions are also a solution to coordination problems and the so-called "equilibirium selection." If there is little conflict of interest, the institution will be easy to establish. On the other hand, if there are conflicts of interest, the institution will be harder to establish, but will provide a platform to overcome these issues. The neo-institutionalist theory can base its argument on the Prisoner Dilemma in which autonomy results in poorer outcome. Moreover, Institutions allow states to overcome the collective action problem. By grouping together, the participation cost. 政治大. regarding a certain issue is lower. In addition, states engage themselves in institutions. 立. knowing that they cede some of their freedom of action in order to achieve greater outcome. It. ‧ 國. 學. opposes the state of nature as defined by realists. This statement can relate to Modern Game. ‧. Theory. Moreover, by creating institutions, states reduce the cost of governance, which autonomous decision-making tends to generate (Stein 2008, pp. 202–221).. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. On the other hand, it is important to mention the main critics of this theory. Some. i Un. v. scholars point out the problem of relative gains. In international institutions, there is a. Ch. engchi. distributional issue, and not simply welfare maximizing ones. If other states gain more from cooperation than others, the unbalanced gain distribution will generate rivalry. There is also a problem of coercion within Institutions. The “coercion for the powerful” defines a situation where a coercive perspective from certain states leads mutual interests thus overshadowing some members. Thirdly, the “Power of Clubs” analysis assumes that states are pressured to enter institutions to avoid isolation thus excluding other alternatives (Stein 2008). To respond to these critics, neoliberalists think that despite economic integration favoring some states more than other, states are willing to accept asymmetric distribution of absolute gains. Obviously, this statement is applicable in conditions where mutual gains can be achieved and 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(27) where there is no threat of the use of force. Hence, states agree to collaborate and to broad the scope of their "short-term" interests". Absolute gains for all are possible (Viotti, Kauppi 2010, p. 135). While exploring the neoliberal Institutionalist theory, it is worth mentioning that international institutions shape state behaviors and change the nature of world politics. In most of the cases, states respect agreements signed within institutions but compliance depends on the Institution design as well. (Chayes, Chayes A.H 1993, pp. 175–205) Additionally, according to Young, O.R., hegemonic powers establish institutions hence providing a proper. 政治大. structure and leadership. (Young, 1982, pp. 277–297). 立. In this thesis, the fact that neo-Institutionalism in the liberalist tradition emphasizes. ‧ 國. 學. that international institutions affect domestic politics is extremely relevant. In fact, according to Skalnes (1998, pp. 44–87) it shapes internal political arrangements. Arthur Stein (2008). ‧. also mentions the fact that this topic requires further academic research. This is where this. y. Nat. io. sit. Master thesis will be relevant for academic discovery, as the author will explore more about. n. al. er. Institutions shaping domestic politics and how international institutions shape foreign policies among members.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Research Method In this Master thesis, the author will focus on the interplay between states and international organizations, between China and India and their complex relations within the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Using the neo-institutionalism theory, it will be assumed that international organization matters in international relations and especially plays a role for Sino-Indian relations. Indeed, China and India are pursuing selfinterested goals in terms of security and material, but this can be solved through institutions such as the BRICS and SCO. Concerning the operationalization, the author will use the 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(28) utilitarianism framework which stipulates that India and China pursue their interest in a more positive way within these institutions. The BRICS and SCO represent a platform where both countries can maximize their gains and minimizes their losses through cooperation. To properly analyze how the relations between China and India evolve around common membership to institutions, my research will be focused on bottom-up (states to institutions) and top-down (institution to state) approaches. The author will analyze the level of institutionalization, the degree of enforcement and the mechanism of dispute resolution and reaction to state non-compliance of the BRICS and SCO. The author will also explore if these. 政治大 two institutions are recent, I will also try to provide policy recommendation for further 立. two Organizations will have an impact or not on Sino-Indian relations in the future. As these. ‧ 國. 學. development in order to avoid cooperation issues due to Sino-Indian tensions, as well as the future and possible positive impact of both institutions on China and India foreign policies.. ‧. As scholars mostly focus on how states shape international institutions, the reverse. y. Nat. io. sit. concept of how international institutions shape states domestic politics is still under-. n. al. er. researched. More precisely, the author is interested in how international institutions impact member state foreign policy.. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. In order to conduct my research, the author will use qualitative research and more precisely, the case study methodology. To evaluate whether or not international institutions have an impact on Sino-Indian relations, the cases of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be used. Indeed, the BRICS is a small size member institution so India and China have to directly interact with each other. The evolution of the BRICS provides an angle of the BRICS impact on the Sino-Indian relations. Therefore, the case study of the BRICS will help to answer the research questions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a special case as the membership of India was just recently accepted. The. 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(29) analysis of the Sino-Indian relations within this organization will be a prediction of possible scenarios of how their relations evolve within the SCO. The author will answer precise research questions according to each case.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(30) Chapter 2: The Neoliberal Institutionalist Theory 2.1 International Institutions and peace promotion Even though some of the realist theory features are acknowledged in the Liberal Institutionalist theory, the fact that International Institutions are promoting peace among members is important and assumed. Indeed, Institutions are known for overcoming the Prisoners dilemma and fostering cooperation. Global and Regional International Organization numbers have dramatically increased since the last century. In fact since 1909, Inter-Governmental Organizations have increased. 政治大. from 37 IGOs to 6400 in 2006 (Mitchell, 2006). International Institutions have gained. 立. legitimacy as non-state actors on the international arena. But questions remain; how IO can. ‧ 國. 學. really promote peace among its members? Why states would decide to join or not. ‧. International Organizations?. io. sit. y. Nat. The choice to cooperate via Institutions. n. al. er. Nowadays, the Liberal Institutionalist Theory also acknowledged some realist features. Ch. i Un. v. such as interest driven action of states and gain maximization will. As such, the Liberal. engchi. Institutionalist Theory appears as a less naïve and a more balanced IR theory. Keohane, one of the most important scholars of the field, declares that international agreements are not easy to make or keep and that neo-institutionalist scholars recognize the difficulty in monitoring agreement and International Institutions sovereignty over states. Moreover, the theory explains that cooperation can exist only if relative gains importance is reduced. States should more focus on absolute gains that can be achieved via International Institutions. As the main argument to support the perspective that IOs promote peace, Keohane declares that IOs increase the flow of information between states therefore decreasing 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(31) uncertainty; enhancing legal liability; raising the reputational stakes for reneging agreements. Hence IOs play a role in conflict management. Indeed, International Organization appear as mediators or adjudicators to help member countries to resolve international conflicts (Abbott, and Duncan Snidal 1998). However, there is a diversity of theories among the literature regarding IO conflict resolution. As an example, Pevehouse (2002) thinks that International Institutions promote democracy among its members. This would lead to pacification. Additionally, Megan Shannon (2009) empirically shows that Institutions play a role in conflict management but better promotes third party dispute settlements over bilateral bargaining. (Pevehouse 2002). 政治大 According to James Fearon (1998), there are two stages in international cooperation. 立. ‧ 國. 學. First negotiation also called a “bargaining game” where IOs need to provide information on party’s preferences. Second the “enforcement stage” also called the Prisoner Dilemma Game. ‧. where IOs need to provide information on compliance behavior. This represents the. sit. n. al. er. io. agreements. (Fearon 1998). y. Nat. centerpiece of the Neo Institutionalist theory as IOs facilitate compliance with International. Ch. i Un. International Organizations and Conflict Management Process. engchi. v. International Institutions provide a platform for conflict resolution. How so? Firstly, they provide a third-party solution. This is really helpful for mitigating the security dilemma. They increase the guarantee of agreements. Therefore, IOs raise the decision to compliance of states on a given issue and raise the cost of non-compliance. IOs help resolve conflict directly as third parties under the forms of good offices, mediation, conciliation as well as arbitration (Abbott, and Duncan Snidal 1998). According to Keohane (1984), agreements that are concluded within an institutional framework have more values. They are superior to bilateral agreements because reputation costs are higher. 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(32) IOs also influence the interstate bargaining more passively. They exert a significant amount of pressure onto member states to settle their agreements in a peaceful process. This actually decreases the so called “shadow of the future” thus reducing the uncertainty. According to the literature, there is evidence that IOs decrease the probability of a dispute breaking out (Megan 2009). Boehmer (2004) states that IOs have the ability to promote members to pursue pacific conflict management. (Boehmer et al. 2004) IOs seek to provide collective goods to members. If a dispute breaks out among its ranks, it constrains their utility. Hence IOs have the duty to help members to resolve their. 政治大 the Strasbourg Convention stipulates that members have the duty to resolve by peaceful 立. disputes. Generally, IOs incorporate dispute settlement mechanisms in their charters. As such,. ‧ 國. 學. means any disputes which may arise between them. The Convention also specifies that judicial settlement, conciliation, arbitration as viable means for managing disputes. To give. ‧. another example, the Organization of American States also declares in Article 3 the conflict. io. sit. y. Nat. management process of members (Megan 2009).. n. al. er. However, IOs are not equally motivated or equipped to encourage dispute settlement.. Ch. i Un. v. Not every International Institution specifies peaceful settlement in their charters. Indeed, some. engchi. IOs are only functional institutions and do not have the strength to settle territorial disputes and just deal with “low politics”. According to Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004), IOs best promote cooperation between members when they defined security actions scope, strong internal member cohesion and strong institutional mechanisms (sanctions/enforcement). They argue that the information asymmetries are reduced by IOs thus reducing the possible mistrust between disputants. Therefore, IOs play an important role as peace makers. According to Sara Mitchell (2006), they have an active IO involvement and a passive one. Regarding their active involvement, Mitchell highlights that IOs collect independent. 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(33) information about a disputed issue. Hence the flow of unbiased information is increased. IOs provide also binding procedures that have sophisticated administrative and intelligence gathering capabilities. Moreover, IOs decrease commitment problems in the conflict resolution process. They actually show a higher number of settlements as well as a higher rate of compliance. Therefore it is evident that IOs offer greater legitimacy as third party mediator (Pevehouse 2002). They are helpful in mitigating security dilemma as they provide a source for monitoring and enforcement capabilities. According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), they are “tying aid decisions to compliance” and they raise the cost of non-compliance. (Abbott, and Duncan Snidal 1998). 政治大 International Organizations have also a passive involvement. IOs raise the interaction 立. ‧ 國. 學. opportunities and decrease uncertainty, align member states preferences, encourage empathy, teach reciprocity and improve recognition abilities (Axelrod 1984). They promote long term. ‧. thinking process. Lastly, Mitchell (2006) exposes that IOs are better equipped than any other. sit. y. Nat. third-party conflict managers “to reduce the deleterious effect of private information,. n. al. er. io. commitment problem, and reputation cost in the bargaining process.” She claims that the. i Un. v. International Community should focus more on promoting IOs membership and empowering. Ch. engchi. these institutions. This is a virtuous circle that will reduce conflicts.. 2.2 International Institutions and their impact on states behavior They affect states behavior because they facilitate the maximization of states gains. Institutions promote “persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal). They prescribe behavioral role and constrain activity and shape expectations. Sara Mitchell (2006) in her research paper “Cooperation in World Politics: The Constraining and Constitutive Effects of International Organizations”, explores the constraining effects of International Organization. She explains that realist and 28. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(34) institutionalists treat states preferences as fixed but that IOs help to organize relationship in mutually beneficial ways. To fulfill their duty as Information provider, IOs manage and provide contracts, conventions and agreement. This generates patterns of transaction costs. In fact, the cost of reneging on commitment is increased. On the contrary, the costs of operating within these frameworks are reduced (Keohane 1984). Moreover, Ronald Mitchell (1994) highlights that “other forces such as transparency, reciprocity accountability and regime mindedness” are actually imposing significant constrains on international behavior under the right conditions. (Mitchell 1994). Compliance Mechanism. 立. 政治大. In his book “International Institutions and National Policies”, Xinyuan Dai (2007). ‧ 國. 學. explores how International Institutions can successfully monitor arrangements. He explains that national compliance reflects the political leverage and monitoring ability of domestic. ‧. er. io. sit. Nat. is achieved by a participating country. (Dai 2007). y. constituencies. Compliance can be defined as the degree to which the explicit treaty provision. al. iv n C U There are two factors; first the constraints design monitoring arrangement h einnpredictable g c h i ways. n. He highlights how compliance works domestically. In fact, state interests and resource. interest between victims of non-compliance and their states; second the presence or absence of these victims as low-cost monitors. The question of whether states have the incentives for protecting the potential victim of non-compliance is important. The interest of the victim and the state should be aligned to comply and shape how states design monitoring arrangements. However, this could be different according to the regimes. He states that resources and capabilities influence the extent to which states can overcome collective action problems in devising potentially, costly, and centralized monitoring agreement. Powerful states can design strong institutions if they have a strong interest in it; it also allows states to spend resources on 29. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

(35) monitoring. Overall, state compliance is linked with the perception of the cost of noncompliance. To respond to the realist challenge, scholars of the Liberal Institutionalist Theory demonstrate the direct effect of International Institutions on state behavior. Indeed, there is a significant domestic leverage from the victim of non-compliance on the government. The leverage is about national leaders that want to stay in office therefore leading policies that support constituents. As a result, competing constituencies (interest groups) influence government’s compliance decision (Ibid, 2007).. 政治大. In addition, when states comply it reinforces tendency of other states to comply. 立. (Duffield 1992). As such states will go further into cooperation and International Institutions. ‧ 國. 學. offer legitimacy to agreements. Government reputation can be at stake if they do not comply or cheat. IOs help government to assess others reputation. “It imposes significant constraint. ‧. on international behavior under the right conditions” (Mitchell, 1994, p.429).. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. Conditions for IOs to be successful. i Un. v. International Organizations that want to promote dispute resolution should have. Ch. engchi. significant resources as well as a strong diplomatic leverage on country members. However, few institutions succeed in forcing country members to comply. The sovereignty of the Institution itself can be put into question. If International Institutions members meet infrequently and that there is no permanent secretariat, it increases the transaction cost of cooperation and there is no repeat interaction. Therefore, only strong institutions are able to succeed. It also depends on the Institutionalization scale. If an IO is highly institutionalized it influences state behavior (Megan 2009, p. 149).. 30. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.001.2018.A06.

金磚國家與上海合作組織對中印關係 之影響 - 政大學術集成

金磚國家與上海合作組織對中印關係之影響 - 政大學術集成