Brief History of Immigration Control

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and not true immigration” (p. 579). Labor importation has a clear net positive for NICs; they contribute to the economy and impose no cost to the state if workers do not bring their dependents to settle down in their host country.

Taiwan shares this feature of hosting a large migrant worker population with Japan and Korea, although in contrast, it has long been a nation based on migration. Except for aborigines, most Taiwanese are descended from Mainland China, whom cannot be considered ‘foreigners’

even more so because of the enduring political struggle between the two nations. As per Ogawa (2017), “Taiwan’s migration regime is shaped by its geo-political position in the international community, influenced by longstanding tension in the cross-strait relationship with the People’s Republic of China…lack of presence and isolation from the international arena…” (p. 10).

Although separated from China by history and ruling ideology, Taiwan is similarly a Confucian-heritage society, characterized by the values of collectivism, social harmony, fulfillment of responsibilities, and conservatism (Ku & Kironska, 2016). In consequence, Taiwanese people have continually grappled with a ‘Chinese-oriented’ identity heavily influenced by politics.

2.1. Brief History of Immigration Control

Although there are important distinctions from one country to another, immigration history in the three East Asian countries and the evolution of their policies over time also bear many similarities. Their brief histories of immigration control will be discussed in the following subsections.

2.1.1. Japan

For more than two centuries during its Edo period (1603-1868) under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan had isolationist foreign policies that closed the doors for immigration and kept the population stable. Inward and outward migration only picked up after the Meiji Revolution in 1868, when Japan sent thousands of researchers, military personnel, and students of different disciplines abroad for its modernization and Westernization program. This large emigration was further aggravated by the collapse of the Edo class system, which restricted the free movement of the Japanese people not just geographically, but also socioeconomically; as well as traditional agricultural workers migrating to the US after being rendered unemployed by accelerated industrialization. Meanwhile, colonial immigration ushered people in with the annexation of

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Taiwan in 1895 and South Korea in 1915. Colonial subjects were put to work in Japanese factories and mines to support economic and military expansion (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

After the second world war and during the economic miracle of the 1950s to 70s, Japan was in dire need of a larger labor force to sustain its growth (Mędrzycki, 2017). Despite this requirement, it was a time of fewer immigrants in Japan, largely due to four interrelated reasons discussed by Kajita in Kondo (2002). First, there was an upshot in internal migration of farmers-turned-laborers from rural to urban areas; second, greater automation and improvement of manufacturing led to less demand for unskilled workers; third, labor unions were weak and citizens who were previously not included in the labor force (eg. students, housewives, elderly people) became involved in part-time work; and finally, Japan had one of the longest working hours among developed countries, which made it relatively unattractive as a labor destination compared to its Western counterparts.

In addition, the Immigration Control Law of 1952, patterned after the US model, was explicitly designed to ‘control’ resident aliens, not to boost immigration or increase foreigner naturalization. In fact, no one ever entered Japan under the category ‘immigrant’ until a new law was passed in the 1980s. Koreans and Taiwanese who immigrated during their colonial periods were officially labelled ‘foreigners’. Subsequently, Japan put up an alien registration system so the government can observe and monitor outsiders. Among the public, there was little support for immigration, coinciding with an ideology of the ethnic nation-state (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017). Kuroda in Kondo (2012) cites a former Ministry of Justice official stating that Japan

“…constitutes a ‘monoethnic state’, therefore, there is much anxiety about admitting foreigners’

settlement, and generally, people consider it as contrary to the national interest” (p. 2).

It is important to note that the internal migration previously mentioned was pushed by Japanese officials, under the guise of nationalism and keeping the country unified. In connection, although the colonial laborers were also crucial to sustaining Japan’s economic growth and military prowess, they were not given full privileges after Japan gained its independence from post-war US occupation. The Koreans who came over during the last years of the Japanese empire eventually became the biggest foreign community, but lacking citizenship, they did not have access to many social rights and were discriminated in both private and public sectors. At

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that time, those seeking naturalization were required to have Japanese surnames, a rule linked to the patrilineal jus sanguinis principle. (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

In the 1980s, some reformative measures were taken by the Japanese government regarding citizenship laws in response to the following: the ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women in 1979, as well as the UN Refugee Convention in 1981; the rise of migration movements; and the growing number of illegals and overstaying visitors due to restrictive migration regulations. In the 1985 Citizenship Act, the requirement of having a Japanese surname was removed, while the citizenship requirements for the National Pension Act and the Child Allowance Act, among others, were also eliminated. However, national initiatives for alien rights protection were still weak, and it was only among local governments that policies of symbiosis and living together were endorsed (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

The 1990s saw a period of still relatively strict immigration, albeit coupled with the opening of several doors. Starting from 1991, Japanese descendants in different countries such as the US, Brazil, and Peru, were permitted a quasi-permanent resident status. Also called Nikkeijin, these ethnic Japanese were legally allowed to work without restrictions, subject to periodic renewals of their status. This was the ‘front door’, and the primary solution (although not explicitly stated by the national government) to labor shortage and the problem of illegal

workers. The ‘side door’ was opened in 1993, with the establishment of the Technical Internship Trainee Program (TITP) that took in economic migrants. It was officially meant to facilitate technology and skills transfer to less developed countries, but it also became an avenue for exploitation of cheap, unskilled labor. Participants’ passports were often kept by their bosses to restrict them from moving from one company to another. However, this often led to the ‘back door’, which referred to irregular workers and tourists who overstayed and started working illegally.

The 2000s marked a decade of noticeable developments on paper, but Akashi (2014) argues that the effect of various laws and agreements with regards to foreign labor and immigration were actually minimal, and suggest that in Japan, “…it is still a long way to an open-door policy” (p. 183). The Guidelines about the Permission for Permanent Residence released in 2006 basically just made official what is already happening on the ground, and did not improve the conditions for permanent residents, nor increased their number. In 2008, the

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Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) concerning the acceptance of care and nursing staff from Indonesia, the Philippines, and later on, Vietnam, were primarily based on foreign policy, but opposed by domestic institutions governing Japanese health and welfare. The Japanese Nursing Association and its political counterpart, the Japan Nursing Federation, were strictly against loosening restrictions for immigration, and upholds that all foreigners in the care industry must have the same skills and qualifications as required from Japanese citizens, even passing the national exam.

In 2010, Japan agreed to start a pilot program on accepting refugees, but the purpose might have been simply to dispel criticism about being a closed country (Akashi, 2014).

Although the number of asylum seekers accepted had gradually increased since 2014, it does not even amount to one percent of the total applications received. In 2017, for example, only 20 out of almost 20,000 were approved; while in 2018, the applications plunged to 10,493, out of which only 42 were granted asylum (Japan Today, 2018, 2019).

After a decade of informal discussions, a point-system for high-skilled foreign professionals was introduced in 2012, wherein those accepted will be able to bring family members abroad, as well as attain permanent resident status after five years. However, the hurdles were high, and the program also suffered from a fair amount of institutional constraints.

During this time, Japan simultaneously promoted academic exchange by trying to increase the number of international students in Japan, while also sending Japanese students abroad. This was one of the strategies in making the country more open and diverse, without moving away from the idea of Japanese people as more superior. Chinese students compose almost half of the international student population, but students from Vietnam and Nepal have also increased in recent years (Mędrzycki, 2017).

In reality, Japan did not and still does not use the term ‘immigration policies’ (immin seisaku) to refer to frameworks and regulations on accepting foreigners, although recent developments have implied a slow turn towards such a system (Akashi, 2014). Instead, the national government use ‘immigration control’, while officials use ‘alien policy’. In the 1980s, what would have been ‘integration policies’ were called ‘internationalization policies’, especially since there were external calls for immigration reform (Kondo, 2002).

Although the TITP has functioned over the years as a de-facto guest worker program, it has also become notorious for violations and abuses. In 2017, the Japanese government increased

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protection for the trainees and interns, but all these might very well go against the most recent framework development in the context of foreign labor.

Just last December 2018, Japan has passed an amendment to the latest version of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which finally allowed lower-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the country starting April 2019. This comes as a response to escalating demographic pressure, with a population that currently drops at about 400,000 people each year.

The new legislation is projected to attract 345,000 foreign workers within the next five years, across industries with the most severe shortages such as construction, leisure, cleaning, and elderly care. Depending on the visa category, they can stay for more than five years and even attain permanent resident status. However, opposition parties, critics, and migration activists claim that the law has been hastily planned, is not comprehensive enough, and fails to address how Japan will deal with issues of social inclusion and labor rights (Denyer & Kashiwagi, 2018;

Toshihiro, 2019).

2.1.2. South Korea

Until recent years, it has been widely-accepted that Koreans had only one common ancestor – Dangun, who founded the first state in the Korean peninsula in 2333 BC. For 5,000 years, Koreans believed they have maintained an ethnically homogenous, ‘one-blood’, ‘one-race’

nation state, losing its independence only once between 1910 and 1945 during the Japanese annexation, before being divided into north and south after World War II (Oh, Kang, Shin, Lee, Lee, & Chung, 2012; Park, 2017). In fact, the Chosun or Yi dynasty, which had ruled a unified Korea since 1392, has often been called ‘Hermit Kingdom’ (similar to how North Korea is now nicknamed the same), because contact with foreigners and travel outside the state were strictly prohibited (Strand, 2004).

Some scholars have doubted this mono-ethnic narrative, as historical evidence shows that Korea had been invaded countless times before by China (Manchurian Dynasty) and Japan, as well as made contact with various ethnicities through trade and commerce. The Manchurian invasion (1627-1636) in particular, led to a lasting cultural and political proximity with China.

Many Koreans who migrated to China throughout the decades gave birth to the distinct social category of the Joseonjok (Lim, 2009). In modern times, South Korea had become religiously diverse, but as the governing principle of the Chosun Dynasty, Confucianism planted the seed for

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paternalism and the traditional clannish family system still embedded in contemporary society (Kim, 2014; Strand, 2004).

Thus, it has been argued that the idea of a Korean national identity based on the myth of Dangun was a modern invention which had only been around since the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. This ethnic nationalism has since been mobilized by authorities for various political purposes – from fighting Japanese colonialism and soothing the wounds of a divided Korea, to dealing with experiences of rapid economic growth and intense competition with North Korea, all the way to the democratization movement in the 1970s and 80s. Consequently, Korean ethnic identity has been fused with conceptions of modern nationalism (Oh, et al., 2012; Park, 2017) and citizenship (Choo, 2016; Kondo, 2002).

South Korea had long been known as an emigration country. As discussed in the previous subsection, at the beginning of the 20^th century, Korea under Japanese rule had supplied workers to support Japan’s economic and military expansion. Those who stayed in Japan pre-1945, along with their descendants, are called Zainichi Koreans. Although by itself, the Japanese term

implies ‘temporary residence’ for a foreigner staying in Japan, it has come to refer to those who refused to give up their Korean ‘nationality’ in favor of being a naturalized Japanese citizen (Kondo, 2002). Other Koreans went to China and Russia during the colonial period (Kim, 2009).

During the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, sudden population upheaval was brought about by ten million people moving from the communist north to the south. For a decade, post-war South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Unsurprisingly, when the US opened its door to non-Europeans in 1965, South Koreans started to migrate there to study or seek greener pastures. Through the help of foreign aid and largely protectionist economic policies, it entered the phase of rapid industrialization between the 1960s and 80s, and also began sending workers to different parts of the world (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

Complementary to the Emigration Law enacted in 1962 was the Immigration Control Act established in 1963 (Oh, et al., 2012).

From the 1960s to 70s, thousands of Korean workers went to Germany to be miners and nurses. During the construction boom of the 1970s and 80s, millions went to the Middle East to be construction workers under Korean contractors, although most returned home after several years. They lived in a highly restrictive environment and were not exposed much to the culture of receiving countries. Travelling abroad was still strictly regulated until the 1980s, after which

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outward migration picked up, with Koreans going to live in other countries such as Japan, China, and Canada. Consequently, those who stayed had limited exposure to foreign cultures until South Korea hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games (Kim, 2009; Oh, et al., 2012;

Park, 2017).

As a result of better education and a growing economy in the 1990s, many Koreans started to refuse low-paying and less prestigious jobs, sparking shortage in unskilled, manual labor. Thus, the Industrial Training System (ITS) was introduced by the government in 1994, wherein foreign workers were given two-year work permits after the completion of a one-year training program. In its first year, more than 30,000 people arrived from less developed Asian countries to take part in the scheme within the main sectors of manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and fisheries. However, primarily due to operations in the hands of business associations, trainees were paid barely above the minimum wage and more often than not were victims of exploitation. Countless ran away from their trainee programs and companies,

becoming undocumented workers as they sought for higher-paying jobs elsewhere in the country. Due to the discrepancy between labor requirements and migration laws, the number of illegals rose year by year. This situation persisted until the next decade, when a more effective legal framework for foreign labor was developed (Kim, 2009).

In 2002, the Employment Management System (EMS) was put in place, but it was limited to temporary foreign workers of Korean descent, notably the children of those who migrated to China, Russia and Japan during the colonial period. The 2003 Employment Permit System (EPS) was more comprehensive, essentially a guest worker scheme meant for all foreigners. Many unauthorized workers were given a chance to apply for a permit, while those who were ineligible were allowed to return to their home countries without paying fines. In contrast to the ITS, the EPS was strictly regulated by government agencies. In 2004, the EMS was merged with the EPS, such that the General EPS referred to workers from sending countries with whom Korea has signed agreements with, while the Special Case EPS governed workers with Korean ancestry. Although laborers from both categories can only stay for a maximum of three years, those governed by the Special EPS can work in more service sectors and have no re-entry restrictions. Under the Sincere Worker Re-Entry System in 2012, employers can request to extend any worker’s stay for another one year and ten months. After being implemented side by side with the EPS for several years, the ITS was scrapped in 2007. (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

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The EPS gained international recognition in 2011 when Korea received a United Nations Public Service Award for combating corruption in Asia. Among the meaningful contributions the framework has brought about include solving labor shortages, reducing the number of

unauthorized workers, lowering the costs of coming to Korea, ensuring that labor laws are equally applied to migrant workers, and in general, introducing transparency and legality to the employment process. Despite these seeming breakthroughs, occupational accidents, unfair treatment, discrimination and exploitation of workers still abound, and there has been continuous clamor for the implementation of more human rights protection policies. Ultimately, the EPS has also successfully deterred the long-term settlement of foreign workers in Korea (Kim, 2009;

Park, 2017).

In 2010, the government had unveiled a points-based system for highly-skilled migrants, a rare pathway to permanent residence different from the two traditional routes of ethnicity and marriage. In the same year, they also offered five-year residency visas for investors in designated real estate and public projects. Another business-related means is the dedicated start-up visa introduced in 2013 (Power, 2019).

Still the easiest ways to acquire Korean citizenship is either having at least one Korean parent (by ethnicity) or getting married to a Korean citizen. Imbalance in men to women ratio due to son preference, coupled with more women leaving the countryside to have better

education and job opportunities had resulted to rural Korean men seeking out brides from other countries. Meanwhile, foreign women (predominantly Chinese and Vietnamese) also looking for a better life meet their future husbands through marriage brokers. Consequently, thousands of international marriages still happen in Korea each year (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

Despite expectations that Korea is already emerging as a multicultural society, and amidst official efforts to bring about policies on integration, negative sentiments toward foreigners and immigration is still widespread (Power, 2019).

2.1.3. Taiwan

Since 16^th century Dutch occupation up to the 20^th century Japanese colonization, Taiwan has historically been a migrant-receiving society. Although Chinese peoples have been coming over the island when the Dutch opened up its labor market, it was not until after the Japanese turned over Taiwan to China that cross-strait migration really picked up. After the Chinese civil

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war between 1949 and the early 1950s, more than two million citizens and soldiers from

war between 1949 and the early 1950s, more than two million citizens and soldiers from