政治態度、社會信任與移民政策偏好: 來自東亞三國之調查資料檢證 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Political Attitudes, Social Trust, 治 and Support for 政 Immigration: Evidence 大立 East Asian Countries from Three ‧ 國. 學. 政治態度、社會信任與移民政策偏好： ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 來自東亞三國之調查資料檢證 Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Pauline Joyce Gonzalvo 葛佳琪 Advisor: Wen-Chin Wu, PhD.. July 2019. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(2) Acknowledgements The past two years had been a blur, filled with new and exciting experiences – from living on my own for the first time in another country and studying a different academic field, to meeting people from all over the world and learning so much more than one page can hold. Finishing this master’s thesis feels like but a topping on an already delicious cold bowl of dòuhuā 豆花 (tofu pudding), and my heart is full. To my family – thank you for always having my back, for always believing in me even in trying times. I never thought that distance would bring us even closer to each other, but it did.. 政治大 enough for your mentorship. I never thought I would ever dabble in quantitative research, but here is 立 a start. Numbers have always been my weakest suit, yet you still took me in as graduate teaching To my thesis advisor, Dr. Wen-chin Wu 吳文欽 of Academia Sinica – I cannot thank you. ‧ 國. 學. assistant for your statistics class and trusted me all the way. Your kindness and your principles have inspired me to strive better for this thesis and also in life.. ‧. To my IMPIS and NCCU classmates – thank you so much for all the memories. I never thought that someday I will have friends from so many different countries, but now I do. You have. y. Nat. sit. opened my eyes and made me feel like I have already travelled the world through your stories.. io. er. Wherever life may take us, jiāyóu 加油, everyone!. To my Bread of Life International family – thank you for always giving a ready prayer and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. word of encouragement as I went through my season of being a student. I never thought I would feel. engchi. at home in any church here, but you have welcomed me and nurtured my growth. My heartfelt gratitude goes out to the people of Taiwan and the Ministry of Education’s scholarship program, without which I will not even have a chance of studying here. I have never thought of Taiwan as a dream destination before, but it is truly the kind of place that makes strangers fall in love with it. To my second home – xièxiè 謝謝 (thank you), and cheers to more night market strolls, zhà píng gū 炸平菇 and chòu dòufu 臭豆腐 (deep-fried mushrooms and stinky tofu). May you be as free as the freedom you had given me. Finally, to the King of My Heart – thank You for making me brave and calling me out beyond the shore into the waves. I never thought You would go this far for someone like me, but You did.. iv. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(3) Abstract International migration more than tripled in size from 77 million in 1960 to almost 258 million in 2017, with Asia recently overtaking Europe as the region with the largest movements in both inward and outward migration. Migrant inflows can potentially influence countries’ policymaking processes and escalate societal conflicts, as well as impact the labor market, education system and health sector. But whether it profoundly affects domestic politics, and how exactly it does, hinges importantly on the attitudes of native-born groups toward immigrants and immigration itself. Relevant research is ever-expanding, especially now more than ever that migration has become. 政治大 studies are concentrated on ‘immigrant nations’, such as the US and Canada, Australia and New 立 Zealand, and more recently, European states.. a pressing social, economic and political issue for governments all over the world. However, most. ‧ 國. 學. In an attempt to bridge existing literature on the ‘Western’ realm of economically advanced countries with its Asian counterparts, this study focuses on an empirical analysis of political factors. ‧. and immigration attitudes using individual-level survey data from the Asian Barometer Wave 4 in three democratic and newly-industrialized East Asian countries. Compared to traditional settler. Nat. sit. y. societies, immigration policies are said to be more constrained by public opinion in East Asia, whose. io. er. governments have been slow to turn to immigration despite having consistently low fertility rates, a rapidly aging population, and a declining labor force. The main question being asked is: do political. al. n. iv n C such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan?hResults i Udefensive nationalism and social e n gsuggest c h that. and ideological attitudes influence support for immigration in nontraditional immigrant destinations. traditionalism are significant predictors of immigration views across all three countries. Social trust is significant in Japan, but overall, seems to have a weak positive relationship with immigration views in East Asia. The outcome of this study supports previous works in contending that in East Asia, the concept of cultural threat is more significant than economic threat. In addition to addressing the research gap between traditional and nontraditional immigrant societies, the topic of this study may also be vital in informing current immigration policies in East Asian countries. Keywords: Political Attitudes, Defensive Nationalism, Social Traditionalism, Social Trust, Support for Immigration, East Asia. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(4) Abstract 摘要. 國際移民以超過三倍的成長速度，從1960年的7700萬人增加到2017年的近2.58億，其中亞洲最近首次超過歐洲，成為向內和向外移民增幅最大的地區。移民的湧入可能會影響各國的政策制定且可能加深社會衝突，並連帶影響勞動力市場，教育體系和衛生相關問題。但移民是否會深切地影響國內政治，以及如何影響，很大程度取決於土生土長的龐大族群對移民和移民議題本身的態度。移民的相關研究正不斷擴大，特別是現在比以往任何時候更受重視，移民儼然成為全世界政府所需面臨的緊急社會、經濟和政治問題。然而，多數研究都. 政治大. 聚焦在「移民國家」，譬如美國和加拿大，澳洲和紐西蘭，以及近日最受討論的歐洲國家。. 立. 為了將經濟發達國家的「西方」領域與亞洲國家現有的文獻連接起來，本研究側重於. ‧ 國. 學. 使用亞洲動態調查第4波，以對三個民主及新興工業化東亞國家進行研究，對其政治因素和移民態度進行實證分析。與傳統的定居社會相比，移民政策據說更受東亞公眾輿論的制約，儘. ‧. 管當地生育率一直很低，也面臨人口迅速老化以及勞動力下降等問題，政府也沒有馬上從移民身上尋求解決之道。此論文的主要提問是：政治意向和意識形態是否會影響非傳統移民地. Nat. sit. y. 如日本、韓國和台灣當地人民對移民的支持？結果顯示，伴隨教育，居住地和收入，民族主. er. io. 義和傳統主義是預測三個國家對移民看法的重要因素。社會信任在日本很受重視，但總體來. al. 說，與移民看法的關聯相當薄弱。. n. iv n C 就其本質而言，移民與公民身份和世界主義都是相關聯的，它定義了誰是這個國家的 hengchi U. 人，且法律也標示了界線，清楚劃分「我們」和「他們」的區別。此論文的研究結果證實了之前的看法，認為在東亞，文化威脅被視為比經濟威脅更嚴重。除了解決傳統和非傳統移民社會之間的研究差距，此論文的主題對於東亞國家目前的移民政策也是相當重要，期待能引出一條道路或給予啟發。. 關鍵詞: 政治態度, 民族主義, 墨守傳統, 社會信任, 與移民政策偏好, 東亞. vi. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(5) Table of Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iv Abstract (English) ............................................................................................................................v Abstract (Chinese) ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... viii List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ ix Chapter 1. Introduction.................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2. Immigration in East Asia ...........................................................................................5 2.1. Brief History of Immigration Control ...................................................................................6 2.2. Trends in International Migration ......................................................................................16 2.3. Trends in International Marriages .....................................................................................19. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 3. Literature Review .....................................................................................................23 3.1. Public Opinion towards Immigrants and Immigration .......................................................25 3.2. Political Factors and Immigration Attitudes ......................................................................33 3.3. Social Trust and Immigration Attitudes .............................................................................35 3.4. Immigration Attitudes in East Asia ....................................................................................37. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Chapter 4. Theoretical Framework............................................................................................41 4.1. Social Identity Theory .........................................................................................................42 4.2. Symbolic Politics Theory ....................................................................................................43 4.3. Right-Wing Authoritarianism .............................................................................................44 4.4. Social Trust .........................................................................................................................45 4.5. The Hypotheses ...................................................................................................................46. al. n. iv n C Chapter 5. Research Design ........................................................................................................47 hengchi U 5.1. The Data..............................................................................................................................47 5.2. The Variables ......................................................................................................................48 5.3. Graphical Analyses .............................................................................................................53 5.4. Empirical Analyses..............................................................................................................57 Chapter 6. Results and Discussion .............................................................................................62 6.1. Binary Logistic Regression .................................................................................................62 6.2. Ordered Logistic Regression ..............................................................................................66 6.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression ........................................................................................69 Chapter 7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................71 References .....................................................................................................................................73 Appendix .......................................................................................................................................85. vii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(6) List of Tables Table 1. Summary of Literature: Theoretical Perspectives on Immigration Attitudes ..................27 Table 2. Summary of Literature: Determinants of Immigration Attitudes.....................................30 Table 3. Background Information on ABS Wave 4 ........................................................................47 Table 4. Summary Statistics ...........................................................................................................54 Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Study Variables ............................................................................60 Table 6. Determinants of Support for Immigration .......................................................................64 Table 7. Determinants of Support for Immigration (Ordered) ......................................................68 Table 8. Determinants of Support for Immigration (Ordered) [Multinomial Regression] ...........70. 政治大. Table A. Operationalization of Variables ......................................................................................70. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. viii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(7) List of Figures Figure 1. International Migrants in East Asian Countries and the World (1995-2017) ...............17 Figure 2. International Migrants in Japan (1995-2017) ...............................................................17 Figure 3. International Migrants in Korea (1995-2017) ...............................................................18 Figure 4. International Migrants in Taiwan (1995-2017) .............................................................18 Figure 5. Japanese International Marriages (1965-2017) ............................................................20 Figure 6. Korean International Marriages (2000-2017)...............................................................20 Figure 7. Taiwanese International Marriages (1965-2017)..........................................................21 Figure 8. Support for Immigration in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan ................................................49. 治政 Figure 10. Social Traditionalism in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 大...................................................51 立Korea, and Taiwan ..................................................................52 Figure 11. Social Trust in Japan, Figure 9. Defensive Nationalism in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan ...................................................50. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 12. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Three Countries ..............55 Figure 13. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Japan ..............................56. ‧. Figure 14. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Korea ..............................56 Figure 15. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Taiwan ............................57. Nat. sit. y. Figure 16. Defensive Nationalism and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration ......66 Figure 17. Social Traditionalism and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration .......67. io. n. al. er. Figure 18. Social Trust and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration ......................67. Ch. engchi. ix. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(8) Chapter 1. Introduction International migration has risen dramatically over the past half century, more than tripling in size from 77 million in 1960 to almost 258 million in 2017 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2017). In turn, this global phenomenon of people crossing national borders has increasingly become a pressing social, economic and political issue for governments all over the world – as evidenced by Brexit and the ongoing migration crisis in Europe, large-scale displacement of refugees in Southeast Asia and Africa, and the hot-button immigration policy debates under the Trump administration in the United States.. 政治大 migrant inflows can potentially 立 influence countries’ policy-making processes, escalate societal With the ushering of a demographic transformation in many developed democracies,. ‧ 國. 學. conflicts, raise questions on welfare and redistribution, as well as impact the labor market, education system and health sector. Coupled with ideological discourses, immigration issues may be used by politicians as a powerful but asymmetrical tool for voter mobilization (Brooks,. ‧. Manza, & Cohen, 2016; Harteveld, Kokkonen, & Dahlberg, 2017). But whether it profoundly. y. Nat. affects domestic politics, and how exactly it does, hinges importantly on the attitudes of native-. sit. born groups toward immigrants and immigration itself (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).. er. io. By its nature, immigration lies at the nexus of citizenship and cosmopolitanism, and is. al. n. iv n C draws the line between ‘us’ and ‘them’. h In contrast to other U i salient national concerns that may go e h n c g unnoticed by the masses because of the amount of technical knowledge needed to understand also a legal concept that defines who belongs within the boundaries of a state and where the law. them, immigrants are very visible as people whom one can encounter in daily life. Thus, immigration is a concern wherein the public feels it has much at stake, especially once it intersects with other contentious issues such as race, multiculturalism, crime, terrorism, and negative impacts of globalization. Over the past decades, studies have shown the two-way relationship between public opinion and policy, and how they can shape and reshape each other (Campbell, 2012; Page & Shapiro, 1983). In the case of the US, conventionally dubbed as a ‘nation built on immigrants’, public policy on immigration followed public opinion up to the mid-1960s. However, after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 – which abolished ethnocentric national origin quotas. 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(9) and set up the family reunification principle – opposition to immigration suddenly spiked up. At least in the U.S., after 1965 and in recent years, public policy has rarely reflected public opinion on immigration (Lee, 1998; Thompson, 2018). On the contrary, the UK’s Brexit, in which immigration played a central role, demonstrated how a government might implement the results of a national referendum against its preferred option. These examples, among others, illustrate the enduring relevance of public opinion on immigration to public policy, and consequently, to both domestic and international politics. To understand public opinion better, it is necessary not just to study its implications, but to also flip the coin and look into how attitudes and preferences on immigration are formed. The extent of research previously done on this broad and ever-expanding question is reflected in. 政治大 most studies are concentrated on settler societies or ‘immigrant nations’, such as the US and 立. recent reviews (eg. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Predictably,. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and more recently, Western European states. What may. ‧ 國. 學. come as surprising is how this formidable body of literature consisting of largely economic and psychosocial explanations has tended to overlook the importance of political factors such as. ‧. ideology (Brooks et al., 2016; Hlavac, 2011; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Medeiros, Figueiredo, Batista, Campos, Rosendo, & Coêlho, 2011).. y. Nat. sit. In an attempt to address these gaps, the main questions being asked in this proposal are:. al. n. immigrants and immigration in East Asia?. Ch. er. io. 1. Is there a relationship between political factors and public opinion toward. i n U. v. 2. More specifically: do ideological and political attitudes such as defensive. engchi. nationalism, social traditionalism, and social trust influence support for immigration in nontraditional immigrant destinations such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan? It seems fit to study these three because they are the newly-industrialized, democratic countries in East Asia. They are often put together by other scholars because of their interrelated immigration histories and similar policy trajectories. While they have already transitioned from being emigrant senders to immigrant receivers, other countries, especially in Southeast Asia (with the exception of Singapore and Malaysia), send more of their people abroad. In addition, they also have shared narratives of early civilizations and overlapping cultural norms. As nationalism can be a complicated, multidimensional concept, this study adopts a narrower definition from literature, termed here ‘defensive nationalism’ – uncritical support for. 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(10) the nation that leads to a feeling of superiority and contempt for foreigners, as well as their way of life (Jeong, 2013; Latcheva, 2010). Social traditionalism refers to a set of values that uphold agreement to norms and the status quo, resisting liberal thoughts and lifestyles that may disrupt harmony in society (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). Distinct from political trust, which involves vertical trust in elites or institutions, social trust is a horizontal or interpersonal trust in others – faith in people – that they can put others’ interests at heart and not willingly harm another person. It is at the core of social capital, often theorized as the secret ingredient for a society’s rise and fall in many aspects. The purpose of this study is threefold: first, to contribute to the development of current discussions by focusing on the impact of political factors on the formation of immigration. 政治大 economically advanced countries with its East Asian counterparts; and third, to see if patterns of 立 preferences and support; second, to bridge existing research on the ‘Western’ realm of. similarities and differences between the three countries in focus exist, especially with their. ‧ 國. 學. intersecting histories and economies.. Contrary to most of the previous research on political factors, this study will not use the. ‧. widely-accepted conceptualization of ideology along a single ‘left’ to ‘right’ dimension. Instead, it will focus on certain ideological attitudes, namely: defensive nationalism and social. y. Nat. sit. traditionalism, as well as social trust. Logistic regression will be applied to data from the fourth. al. er. io. wave of the Asian Barometer Survey conducted between 2014 and 2016 to find the relationship. v. n. between political attitudes and support for immigration in the three East Asian countries under. Ch. i n U. analysis. The hypotheses are that: individuals who agree more with defensive nationalism and. engchi. social traditionalism will be less supportive of immigration, while those who are more inclined to trust most people, even strangers, will also be more supportive of immigration. The significance and relevance of this study is underscored by the fact that Asia has recently overtaken Europe as the region with the largest flows in both inward (80 million) and outward (110 million) migration (UN DESA, 2017). Additionally, East Asian countries in particular, are slowly turning to immigration-related solutions to the combined demographic problems of consistently low fertility rates, a rapidly aging population, and a declining labor force. Compared to traditional settler societies in the West, however, immigration policies are much more constrained by public opinion in East Asia (Staedicke, Batalova, & Zong, 2016).. 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(11) This study is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a brief background on the immigration situation in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In chapter three, the literature on public opinion towards immigration is surveyed, further discussing the influence of political factors on immigration preference, as well as the East Asian perspective. Chapter four focuses on the theoretical bases and assumptions underpinning this study; while chapter five details the research design to be implemented, including the source of data, variables, and the choice of regression technique. Chapter six discusses the results of empirical analyses, and finally, the last chapter concludes the study.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 4. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(12) Chapter 2. Immigration in East Asia While low fertility rates and longevity are among the indicators of economic development, it can also lead to a shrinking work force, which in turn, can inhibit economic growth. Among the fastest-aging regions in the world, East Asia’s demographic transition is one of the most pressing issues the region is facing today (Chung, 2010; Gaynor, 2016; Kim & Torres-Gil, 2008; Staedicke et al., 2016; Takenaka, 2012, Takenoshita, 2016). Following what has been happening in other parts of the world, immigration seems to be the most immediate solution to this problem, but it is also one of the hardest to sell to the public, due to the ideology of cultural homogeneity or ethnic and national purity prevalent among East Asian countries. 政治大 2015; Staedicke et al., 2016; Takenoshita, 立 2016). Even though East Asia’s experience with. (Bélanger, 2010; Bélanger, Lee, & Wang, 2010; Chung, 2010; Ku & Kironska, 2016; Nagy,. ‧ 國. 學. immigration per se is limited compared to Western counterparts – with Japan and South Korea (henceforth, Korea) being characterized as “latecomers to immigration” (Chung, 2014) – both outward and inward migration flows have taken place in the region for the past few decades.. ‧. During the latter half of the 20th century, post-colonial Asian migration flows were. y. Nat. mostly directed towards Western countries or the Middle East. In the 1990s, however, migration. sit. of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole started to grow, with the trend mainly defined by. er. io. movement from less developed countries to fast-growing newly industrialized countries (NICs).. al. n. iv n C countries, while the ones receiving themhwere Brunei, Singapore i U and the rest of East Asia (Hong e h n c g Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). Although there are also cultural, environmental, and Those who were sending people included China, as well as most South and Southeast Asian. political push and pull factors, migration is still mostly motivated by economic reasons (Ku & Kironska, 2016). One explanation for this shift is the widening of the income gap with other less developed countries (Abella, 2019). Likewise, according to Seol and Skrentny (2009), “As countries develop economically, they typically transition from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration” (p. 578). Japan and Korea have been sending their citizens abroad for centuries, and not until the late 1980s have they started to host a growing number of low-skilled migrant workers. But although scholars note a rapid increase in immigration in the past decade (eg. Takenoshita, 2016), Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue that they remain countries of “migrant worker sojourn. 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(13) and not true immigration” (p. 579). Labor importation has a clear net positive for NICs; they contribute to the economy and impose no cost to the state if workers do not bring their dependents to settle down in their host country. Taiwan shares this feature of hosting a large migrant worker population with Japan and Korea, although in contrast, it has long been a nation based on migration. Except for aborigines, most Taiwanese are descended from Mainland China, whom cannot be considered ‘foreigners’ even more so because of the enduring political struggle between the two nations. As per Ogawa (2017), “Taiwan’s migration regime is shaped by its geo-political position in the international community, influenced by longstanding tension in the cross-strait relationship with the People’s Republic of China…lack of presence and isolation from the international arena…” (p. 10).. 政治大 heritage society, characterized by the values of collectivism, social harmony, fulfillment of 立. Although separated from China by history and ruling ideology, Taiwan is similarly a Confucian-. responsibilities, and conservatism (Ku & Kironska, 2016). In consequence, Taiwanese people. ‧ 國. 學. have continually grappled with a ‘Chinese-oriented’ identity heavily influenced by politics.. ‧. 2.1. Brief History of Immigration Control. y. Nat. Although there are important distinctions from one country to another, immigration. sit. history in the three East Asian countries and the evolution of their policies over time also bear. 2.1.1. Japan. al. n. subsections.. er. io. many similarities. Their brief histories of immigration control will be discussed in the following. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. For more than two centuries during its Edo period (1603-1868) under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan had isolationist foreign policies that closed the doors for immigration and kept the population stable. Inward and outward migration only picked up after the Meiji Revolution in 1868, when Japan sent thousands of researchers, military personnel, and students of different disciplines abroad for its modernization and Westernization program. This large emigration was further aggravated by the collapse of the Edo class system, which restricted the free movement of the Japanese people not just geographically, but also socioeconomically; as well as traditional agricultural workers migrating to the US after being rendered unemployed by accelerated industrialization. Meanwhile, colonial immigration ushered people in with the annexation of. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(14) Taiwan in 1895 and South Korea in 1915. Colonial subjects were put to work in Japanese factories and mines to support economic and military expansion (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017). After the second world war and during the economic miracle of the 1950s to 70s, Japan was in dire need of a larger labor force to sustain its growth (Mędrzycki, 2017). Despite this requirement, it was a time of fewer immigrants in Japan, largely due to four interrelated reasons discussed by Kajita in Kondo (2002). First, there was an upshot in internal migration of farmersturned-laborers from rural to urban areas; second, greater automation and improvement of manufacturing led to less demand for unskilled workers; third, labor unions were weak and citizens who were previously not included in the labor force (eg. students, housewives, elderly. 政治大 hours among developed countries, which made it relatively unattractive as a labor destination 立. people) became involved in part-time work; and finally, Japan had one of the longest working. compared to its Western counterparts.. ‧ 國. 學. In addition, the Immigration Control Law of 1952, patterned after the US model, was explicitly designed to ‘control’ resident aliens, not to boost immigration or increase foreigner. ‧. naturalization. In fact, no one ever entered Japan under the category ‘immigrant’ until a new law was passed in the 1980s. Koreans and Taiwanese who immigrated during their colonial periods. y. Nat. sit. were officially labelled ‘foreigners’. Subsequently, Japan put up an alien registration system so. al. er. io. the government can observe and monitor outsiders. Among the public, there was little support for. n. immigration, coinciding with an ideology of the ethnic nation-state (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki,. Ch. i n U. v. 2017). Kuroda in Kondo (2012) cites a former Ministry of Justice official stating that Japan. engchi. “…constitutes a ‘monoethnic state’, therefore, there is much anxiety about admitting foreigners’ settlement, and generally, people consider it as contrary to the national interest” (p. 2). It is important to note that the internal migration previously mentioned was pushed by Japanese officials, under the guise of nationalism and keeping the country unified. In connection, although the colonial laborers were also crucial to sustaining Japan’s economic growth and military prowess, they were not given full privileges after Japan gained its independence from post-war US occupation. The Koreans who came over during the last years of the Japanese empire eventually became the biggest foreign community, but lacking citizenship, they did not have access to many social rights and were discriminated in both private and public sectors. At. 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(15) that time, those seeking naturalization were required to have Japanese surnames, a rule linked to the patrilineal jus sanguinis principle. (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017). In the 1980s, some reformative measures were taken by the Japanese government regarding citizenship laws in response to the following: the ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, as well as the UN Refugee Convention in 1981; the rise of migration movements; and the growing number of illegals and overstaying visitors due to restrictive migration regulations. In the 1985 Citizenship Act, the requirement of having a Japanese surname was removed, while the citizenship requirements for the National Pension Act and the Child Allowance Act, among others, were also eliminated. However, national initiatives. 政治大 of symbiosis and living together were endorsed (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017). 立. for alien rights protection were still weak, and it was only among local governments that policies. The 1990s saw a period of still relatively strict immigration, albeit coupled with the. ‧ 國. 學. opening of several doors. Starting from 1991, Japanese descendants in different countries such as the US, Brazil, and Peru, were permitted a quasi-permanent resident status. Also called Nikkeijin,. ‧. these ethnic Japanese were legally allowed to work without restrictions, subject to periodic renewals of their status. This was the ‘front door’, and the primary solution (although not. y. Nat. sit. explicitly stated by the national government) to labor shortage and the problem of illegal. al. er. io. workers. The ‘side door’ was opened in 1993, with the establishment of the Technical Internship. v. n. Trainee Program (TITP) that took in economic migrants. It was officially meant to facilitate. Ch. i n U. technology and skills transfer to less developed countries, but it also became an avenue for. engchi. exploitation of cheap, unskilled labor. Participants’ passports were often kept by their bosses to restrict them from moving from one company to another. However, this often led to the ‘back door’, which referred to irregular workers and tourists who overstayed and started working illegally. The 2000s marked a decade of noticeable developments on paper, but Akashi (2014) argues that the effect of various laws and agreements with regards to foreign labor and immigration were actually minimal, and suggest that in Japan, “…it is still a long way to an open-door policy” (p. 183). The Guidelines about the Permission for Permanent Residence released in 2006 basically just made official what is already happening on the ground, and did not improve the conditions for permanent residents, nor increased their number. In 2008, the. 8. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(16) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) concerning the acceptance of care and nursing staff from Indonesia, the Philippines, and later on, Vietnam, were primarily based on foreign policy, but opposed by domestic institutions governing Japanese health and welfare. The Japanese Nursing Association and its political counterpart, the Japan Nursing Federation, were strictly against loosening restrictions for immigration, and upholds that all foreigners in the care industry must have the same skills and qualifications as required from Japanese citizens, even passing the national exam. In 2010, Japan agreed to start a pilot program on accepting refugees, but the purpose might have been simply to dispel criticism about being a closed country (Akashi, 2014). Although the number of asylum seekers accepted had gradually increased since 2014, it does not. 政治大 of almost 20,000 were approved; while in 2018, the applications plunged to 10,493, out of which 立 even amount to one percent of the total applications received. In 2017, for example, only 20 out. only 42 were granted asylum (Japan Today, 2018, 2019).. ‧ 國. 學. After a decade of informal discussions, a point-system for high-skilled foreign professionals was introduced in 2012, wherein those accepted will be able to bring family. ‧. members abroad, as well as attain permanent resident status after five years. However, the hurdles were high, and the program also suffered from a fair amount of institutional constraints.. y. Nat. sit. During this time, Japan simultaneously promoted academic exchange by trying to increase the. al. er. io. number of international students in Japan, while also sending Japanese students abroad. This was. v. n. one of the strategies in making the country more open and diverse, without moving away from. Ch. i n U. the idea of Japanese people as more superior. Chinese students compose almost half of the. engchi. international student population, but students from Vietnam and Nepal have also increased in recent years (Mędrzycki, 2017). In reality, Japan did not and still does not use the term ‘immigration policies’ (immin seisaku) to refer to frameworks and regulations on accepting foreigners, although recent developments have implied a slow turn towards such a system (Akashi, 2014). Instead, the national government use ‘immigration control’, while officials use ‘alien policy’. In the 1980s, what would have been ‘integration policies’ were called ‘internationalization policies’, especially since there were external calls for immigration reform (Kondo, 2002). Although the TITP has functioned over the years as a de-facto guest worker program, it has also become notorious for violations and abuses. In 2017, the Japanese government increased. 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(17) protection for the trainees and interns, but all these might very well go against the most recent framework development in the context of foreign labor. Just last December 2018, Japan has passed an amendment to the latest version of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which finally allowed lower-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the country starting April 2019. This comes as a response to escalating demographic pressure, with a population that currently drops at about 400,000 people each year. The new legislation is projected to attract 345,000 foreign workers within the next five years, across industries with the most severe shortages such as construction, leisure, cleaning, and elderly care. Depending on the visa category, they can stay for more than five years and even attain permanent resident status. However, opposition parties, critics, and migration activists. 政治大 how Japan will deal with issues of social inclusion and labor rights (Denyer & Kashiwagi, 2018; 立 claim that the law has been hastily planned, is not comprehensive enough, and fails to address. Toshihiro, 2019).. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1.2. South Korea. ‧. Until recent years, it has been widely-accepted that Koreans had only one common. y. Nat. ancestor – Dangun, who founded the first state in the Korean peninsula in 2333 BC. For 5,000. sit. years, Koreans believed they have maintained an ethnically homogenous, ‘one-blood’, ‘one-race’. al. er. io. nation state, losing its independence only once between 1910 and 1945 during the Japanese. v. n. annexation, before being divided into north and south after World War II (Oh, Kang, Shin, Lee,. Ch. i n U. Lee, & Chung, 2012; Park, 2017). In fact, the Chosun or Yi dynasty, which had ruled a unified. engchi. Korea since 1392, has often been called ‘Hermit Kingdom’ (similar to how North Korea is now nicknamed the same), because contact with foreigners and travel outside the state were strictly prohibited (Strand, 2004). Some scholars have doubted this mono-ethnic narrative, as historical evidence shows that Korea had been invaded countless times before by China (Manchurian Dynasty) and Japan, as well as made contact with various ethnicities through trade and commerce. The Manchurian invasion (1627-1636) in particular, led to a lasting cultural and political proximity with China. Many Koreans who migrated to China throughout the decades gave birth to the distinct social category of the Joseonjok (Lim, 2009). In modern times, South Korea had become religiously diverse, but as the governing principle of the Chosun Dynasty, Confucianism planted the seed for. 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(18) paternalism and the traditional clannish family system still embedded in contemporary society (Kim, 2014; Strand, 2004). Thus, it has been argued that the idea of a Korean national identity based on the myth of Dangun was a modern invention which had only been around since the late 19 th and early 20th centuries. This ethnic nationalism has since been mobilized by authorities for various political purposes – from fighting Japanese colonialism and soothing the wounds of a divided Korea, to dealing with experiences of rapid economic growth and intense competition with North Korea, all the way to the democratization movement in the 1970s and 80s. Consequently, Korean ethnic identity has been fused with conceptions of modern nationalism (Oh, et al., 2012; Park, 2017) and citizenship (Choo, 2016; Kondo, 2002).. 政治大 century, Korea under Japanese rule had supplied workers. South Korea had long been known as an emigration country. As discussed in the previous. 立. subsection, at the beginning of the 20th. to support Japan’s economic and military expansion. Those who stayed in Japan pre-1945, along. ‧ 國. 學. with their descendants, are called Zainichi Koreans. Although by itself, the Japanese term implies ‘temporary residence’ for a foreigner staying in Japan, it has come to refer to those who. ‧. refused to give up their Korean ‘nationality’ in favor of being a naturalized Japanese citizen (Kondo, 2002). Other Koreans went to China and Russia during the colonial period (Kim, 2009).. y. Nat. sit. During the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, sudden population upheaval was. al. er. io. brought about by ten million people moving from the communist north to the south. For a. v. n. decade, post-war South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Unsurprisingly,. Ch. i n U. when the US opened its door to non-Europeans in 1965, South Koreans started to migrate there. engchi. to study or seek greener pastures. Through the help of foreign aid and largely protectionist economic policies, it entered the phase of rapid industrialization between the 1960s and 80s, and also began sending workers to different parts of the world (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017). Complementary to the Emigration Law enacted in 1962 was the Immigration Control Act established in 1963 (Oh, et al., 2012). From the 1960s to 70s, thousands of Korean workers went to Germany to be miners and nurses. During the construction boom of the 1970s and 80s, millions went to the Middle East to be construction workers under Korean contractors, although most returned home after several years. They lived in a highly restrictive environment and were not exposed much to the culture of receiving countries. Travelling abroad was still strictly regulated until the 1980s, after which. 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(19) outward migration picked up, with Koreans going to live in other countries such as Japan, China, and Canada. Consequently, those who stayed had limited exposure to foreign cultures until South Korea hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games (Kim, 2009; Oh, et al., 2012; Park, 2017). As a result of better education and a growing economy in the 1990s, many Koreans started to refuse low-paying and less prestigious jobs, sparking shortage in unskilled, manual labor. Thus, the Industrial Training System (ITS) was introduced by the government in 1994, wherein foreign workers were given two-year work permits after the completion of a one-year training program. In its first year, more than 30,000 people arrived from less developed Asian countries to take part in the scheme within the main sectors of manufacturing, construction,. 政治大 associations, trainees were paid barely above the minimum wage and more often than not were 立 agriculture, and fisheries. However, primarily due to operations in the hands of business. victims of exploitation. Countless ran away from their trainee programs and companies,. ‧ 國. 學. becoming undocumented workers as they sought for higher-paying jobs elsewhere in the country. Due to the discrepancy between labor requirements and migration laws, the number of. ‧. illegals rose year by year. This situation persisted until the next decade, when a more effective legal framework for foreign labor was developed (Kim, 2009).. y. Nat. sit. In 2002, the Employment Management System (EMS) was put in place, but it was. al. er. io. limited to temporary foreign workers of Korean descent, notably the children of those who. v. n. migrated to China, Russia and Japan during the colonial period. The 2003 Employment Permit. Ch. i n U. System (EPS) was more comprehensive, essentially a guest worker scheme meant for all. engchi. foreigners. Many unauthorized workers were given a chance to apply for a permit, while those who were ineligible were allowed to return to their home countries without paying fines. In contrast to the ITS, the EPS was strictly regulated by government agencies. In 2004, the EMS was merged with the EPS, such that the General EPS referred to workers from sending countries with whom Korea has signed agreements with, while the Special Case EPS governed workers with Korean ancestry. Although laborers from both categories can only stay for a maximum of three years, those governed by the Special EPS can work in more service sectors and have no reentry restrictions. Under the Sincere Worker Re-Entry System in 2012, employers can request to extend any worker’s stay for another one year and ten months. After being implemented side by side with the EPS for several years, the ITS was scrapped in 2007. (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).. 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(20) The EPS gained international recognition in 2011 when Korea received a United Nations Public Service Award for combating corruption in Asia. Among the meaningful contributions the framework has brought about include solving labor shortages, reducing the number of unauthorized workers, lowering the costs of coming to Korea, ensuring that labor laws are equally applied to migrant workers, and in general, introducing transparency and legality to the employment process. Despite these seeming breakthroughs, occupational accidents, unfair treatment, discrimination and exploitation of workers still abound, and there has been continuous clamor for the implementation of more human rights protection policies. Ultimately, the EPS has also successfully deterred the long-term settlement of foreign workers in Korea (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).. 政治大 a rare pathway to permanent residence different from the two traditional routes of ethnicity and 立. In 2010, the government had unveiled a points-based system for highly-skilled migrants,. marriage. In the same year, they also offered five-year residency visas for investors in designated. ‧ 國. 學. real estate and public projects. Another business-related means is the dedicated start-up visa introduced in 2013 (Power, 2019).. ‧. Still the easiest ways to acquire Korean citizenship is either having at least one Korean parent (by ethnicity) or getting married to a Korean citizen. Imbalance in men to women ratio. y. Nat. sit. due to son preference, coupled with more women leaving the countryside to have better. al. er. io. education and job opportunities had resulted to rural Korean men seeking out brides from other. v. n. countries. Meanwhile, foreign women (predominantly Chinese and Vietnamese) also looking for. Ch. i n U. a better life meet their future husbands through marriage brokers. Consequently, thousands of. engchi. international marriages still happen in Korea each year (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017). Despite expectations that Korea is already emerging as a multicultural society, and amidst official efforts to bring about policies on integration, negative sentiments toward foreigners and immigration is still widespread (Power, 2019).. 2.1.3. Taiwan Since 16th century Dutch occupation up to the 20th century Japanese colonization, Taiwan has historically been a migrant-receiving society. Although Chinese peoples have been coming over the island when the Dutch opened up its labor market, it was not until after the Japanese turned over Taiwan to China that cross-strait migration really picked up. After the Chinese civil. 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(21) war between 1949 and the early 1950s, more than two million citizens and soldiers from thenRepublic of China (ROC) came over to take refuge in the island (Cheng, 2008; Ku & Kironska, 2016; Wang, 2011). According to Wang’s (2011) study of immigration trends and policy changes in Taiwan, population movements were strictly controlled during the Cold War era to prevent communist infiltration. The legacy of Japanese colonial population control infrastructures such as household registration, personal identification systems, as well as community-based crime prevention systems, remained long after they had gone and well into present-day Taiwan. When Taiwan lost official United Nations representation in 1971, many Taiwanese citizens left the country for political security in the United States or elsewhere. Coupled with globalization trends in the late. 政治大 mobile. On the contrary, migration into Taiwan remained somewhat restricted. 立. 1980s, travel restrictions were relaxed and the Taiwanese population became increasingly Since 1949, Taiwan’s immigration policies have been largely shaped and reshaped by its. ‧ 國. 學. political relationship with China, as well as the political party currently in power. The policies have been criticized for not being comprehensive despite containing many rules and regulations.. ‧. Liao (2008) contends that the main reason immigrants – especially foreign spouses – were very concerned about naturalization and citizenship, was because “under Taiwan’s social and legal. y. Nat. sit. context, resident aliens, no matter how long they lived on the island, are subjected to. al. er. io. immigration authorities’ interrogation, raid, deportation or threat of deportation, detention and so. n. forth” (p. 39). Additionally, they were “ineligible to most government/social benefit”, such that. Ch. i n U. v. “they can’t be a full-fledged respectable person living in Taiwan without the [National ID Card]” (Liao, 2008, p. 39).. engchi. Before some amendments to the Immigration Act were passed in 2007, Liao (2008) detailed how “exclusionary” Taiwan’s immigration laws were, which denied family union rights, implemented deportation and detention without due process, imposed labor restrictions on immigrant spouses, required unreasonable documents and financial certifications prior to naturalization (p. 39). And even after being naturalized, the legal system still treated ‘foreigners’ as ‘second-class citizens’. He argued that policymakers cannot ban international marriages directly, in order to back up Taiwan’s claim of being a ‘liberal democracy’ that supports ‘human rights’, ‘freedom of marriage’, and ‘equal opportunity for everyone’; instead, they just “made every direct and indirect effort in ‘discouraging’ [immigrants’] arrival” (Liao, 2008, p. 45). It. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(22) was only in 2016, a decade after Liao’s writing, that the parliament amended and revoked the rule on foreign spouses having to provide a certificate of worth or assets as evidence of their financial strength (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2016). The mentality described by Liao (2008) has to come from somewhere, and Lan (2008) argues: “The anxiety about miscegenation and interethnic marriage rests upon a false premise that Taiwanese make up a discrete biological and social entity with common cultural roots and a pure gene pool despite the fact that the Taiwanese are ethnically heterogeneous and the boundaries of the community have been fluid, permeable, and subject to historical change and political disputes” (p. 843).. 政治大. In connection, Wang (2011) identifies three ideologies governing the Taiwanese perspective on immigration. The first is the ‘jus sanguinis’ priniciple – considered patriarchal. 立. because only the descendants of ROC males can apply for naturalization prior to 1999 revisions. ‧ 國. 學. of the Nationality Law. Then, foreign wives and daughters had to leave the country when their temporary resident permits expire.. The second is the concept of renkou suzhi or ‘population quality’, a class-based ideology. ‧. of categorizing migrants as either ‘high’ or ‘low quality’ to prevent contamination of a. y. Nat. predominantly Chinese society. Those not considered as high quality include the blue-collar. io. sit. worker, foreign spouses and their children, as well as lesser-educated migrants. This is reflected. er. in the rhetoric of government officials and policy makers alike. In a national education. al. n. iv n C “low quality” of immigrants and said that should not have so many children” h“foreign e n g brides chi U. conference in 2004, Vice Minister of Education Chou Tsan-Te “expressed his worry about the. (Yiu in Lan, 2008, p. 842). A couple of years after, Liao (2008) narrates how Chen-Chi Wu, the Director General of the National Immigration Agency, told them that “he respects [their] effort in advancing immigrants’ human rights”, while reminding them that “the quality of Taiwanese population must be paramount” (p. 45). The third principle is Taiwan’s emphasis on ‘national security’, borne out of its antagonistic relations with Mainland China. Thus, stricter policies toward Chinese foreign spouses and workers were put in place to control threats to the Taiwanese nation. This rationale is illustrated in one of the comments made by a scholar drafting the 2007 Whitebook of Population Policy, wherein Chinese spouses “hold a national identity that does not prioritize the interest of Taiwan” (Lin in Lan, 2008, p. 838). Ironically, and in comparison with the ‘othering’. 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(23) of Southeast Asians and other foreigners, the ethnic and cultural proximity of Chinese immigrants is viewed as threatening. In the past two years, there have been some plans and gestures made towards reforming Taiwan’s “outdated, slow, and inhibitive immigration policy” (Prowse, 2016, par. 1). Due to the concern over its population decline, relevant government agencies have been directed to evaluate policymaking, including the area of immigration. As the political tides shifted power to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016, the administration had since unveiled the New Southbound Policy (NSP) and the NDC’s Plan for Retention of Talent as two measures meant to address the disincentives foreigners have in living and working on the island. The NSP is a revival of former president Lee Teng-hui’s “Going South” policy in the 1990s, which. 政治大 Asia, particularly Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia (Ogawa, 2017). 立. endeavored to reduce dependency on Mainland China and enhance economic ties with Southeast. Last year, bills have been drafted to encourage the stay of high-skilled and mid-level. ‧ 國. 學. labor, as well as international students (Mercene, 2018; Focus Taiwan, 2018). Additional amendments to the Immigration Act are also underway (Prowse, 2016; Taipei Times, 2018).. ‧. However, some issues that are still yet to be addressed include providing work permission for spouses of permanent residents (different form the ‘citizen’ category) and the requirement of. y. Nat. er. io. sit. renouncing original nationality for non-high skilled workers (Prowse, 2016).. 2.2. Trends in International a Migration. n. iv l n C Figure below comparatively shows h e ntheginternational i U migration trends in Japan, Korea, h c and Taiwan, relative to the aggregate migrant stock in the world. So far, Japan has the most 11. number of international migrants among the three countries, with a total of 2.3 million in 2017. Korea currently has 1.5 million, while Taiwan, which has not yet breached the one million mark, has 717,736. Although in Japan and Korea, the numbers have increased throughout the years, it seems to be slowing down since the mid-2000s. For Taiwan, migration peaked in the early 2000s, dipped in 2010, and began to climb steadily since then. Within a decade, migrants in the world have multiplied from 160 million in 1995 to almost 258 million in 2017.. Data for Japan, South Korea, and the world were sourced from the UN DESA’s (2017) migrant stock statistics, while data for Taiwan was sourced from the Ministry of the Interior’s National Immigration Agency (2017), as the number of foreign residents. 1. 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(24) Figure 1. International Migrants in East Asian Countries and the World (1995-2017). 政治大 Figures 2 to 4 show the increase of international migrants for each country from 2005 to 立 2017, along with their share of the total population . Here, it can be seen more clearly that the 2. ‧ 國. 學. number of international migrants has indeed increased throughout the last decade in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. However, if migrants as a share of the country’s total population is. ‧. accounted for (less than four percent for all three), it is a different story, and incomparable to Western countries with one fourth or more of the population coming from overseas.. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Figure 2. International Migrants in Japan (1995-2017). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2. Population data for Japan and Korea were sourced from the UN DESA (2017), while data for Taiwan was sourced from the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (2017). Share of the total population was computed by the researcher.. 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(25) Figure 3. International Migrants in South Korea (1995-2017). 政治大 Although Japan has the largest number of migrants, it is also the one with the lowest as a 立 share of its population in 2017 (1.82%). Conversely, Taiwan has the lowest number of migrants,. ‧ 國. 學. but has the most as a share of its population (3.04%). Among the three, Korea experienced the fastest increase in migration growth in line with its own population growth, jumping ten times. ‧. from almost only 124,000 migrants in 1995 (1.03%), to over one million in 2017 (2.26%).. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. Figure 4. International Migrants in Taiwan (1995-2017). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In terms of the migrants’ gender, Japan started out with around a similar proportion, but since 2000, females have increasingly outnumbered males. The opposite is true for Korea, with the number of males outstripping females since 1995. In Taiwan, the gender proportion is more. 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(26) unstable. There were more males in 1995, with the number of females growing since the mid2000s, and males closing in again in 2017.. 2.3. Trends in International Marriages Aside from labor migration, marriage-based settlement also intensified flows into Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Bélanger, 2010). The number of international marriages has been growing since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, mainly as a result of greater gender equality in education and employment, which led to: 1) more educated women becoming part of the labor force; 2) fewer women wanting to marry and take care of the elderly (especially their husbands’ parents); 2) the domestic marriage crisis, and men being forced to seek more ‘traditional’ brides. 政治大 The subsequent popularity 立of international matchmaking is both a consequence and. overseas, whom they view as desirable (Bélanger et al., 2010).. ‧ 國. 學. continuing cause of the increase in foreign spouses. Because they come from less developed countries, commercial agencies specifically market Chinese and Southeast Asian brides as more conventional, feminine, and submissive, according to the needs of potential grooms from East. ‧. Asia (Bélanger et al., 2010; Lin, 2016). Thus, there are a lot more female foreign spouses than. y. Nat. males. They are viewed negatively and even called ‘gold diggers’ who are only interested in the. sit. males’ economic support, especially since they send back money to their home countries in. er. io. support of their relatives. No different from migrant workers, they are perceived as an intrusion. al. iv n C (eg. Chan, 1999; Hsia, 2007; Kim, 2009;hNho & Lee, 2016;U i Shipper, 2008; Tierney, 2008, 2011; e h n c g Wang & Bélanger, 2008). The level of prejudice may also depend on their ethnicity and country n. to their host nations’ cultural homogeneity, and are often the object of discrimination and racism. of origin (Lee, Seol, & Cho, 2006). Figures 5 to 7 show the trends in East Asian international marriages, as well as a comparison between the proportion of spouses by gender. 3 Since data collection began in 1965 4, there has been a steady increase in marriages between a Japanese groom and a foreign bride each year, peaking around 20,000 in the 1990s, and again in 2005, at about 33,000. With Japanese brides and foreign grooms, there was a slight dip in the 1980s, followed by a gradual increase 3. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2017), Statistics Korea (2017), Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (2017). 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(27) until around 8,300 in 2005. In 2006, however, international marriages started to decline after revisions to immigration laws were enacted, cracking down on women working with entertainment visas in hostess clubs and fake marriages aimed at obtaining Japanese citizenship (Nippon Communications Foundation, 2018).. Figure 5. Japanese International Marriages (1965-2015). 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. In Korea, although marriages between native males and foreign females far outnumber. y. Nat. sit. those between native females and foreign males, there was a significant increase in both. al. er. io. categories from the early to the mid-2000s. After a record high of 30,719 (Korean males and. n. foreign females) and 11,637 (Korean females and foreign males) marriages in 2005, the numbers. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 6. Korean International Marriages (2000-2017). 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(28) gradually leveled off. The South Korean government initially encouraged the matchmaking industry as a solution for unmarried men and low fertility rates in rural areas (Bélanger et al., 2010), but reports of violence against foreign wives prompted legislation against both offenders and illegal brokers in the late 2000s (AFP, 2014). Annual number of marriages hit the lowest point in 2017 since statistics began in 1970, mainly due to the emerging trend of late marriage, high rent and unstable job conditions (Park, 2017). In Taiwan, data for international marriages is divided into two broad categories: the first encompasses statistics concerning Mainland China, with separate numbers for Hong Kong and Macau; the second concerns ‘foreign’ nationalities, mostly Southeast Asian spouses – which. 政治大 marriages between Taiwanese females and both Chinese and foreign males has mostly remained 立 make up a significant proportion – and those from other countries. While the number of. constant since 2008 until 2018, there was a significant and very noticeable drop in marriages. ‧ 國. 學. between Taiwanese males and Chinese females in the same decade. The decrease is such that annual marriages between Taiwanese males and foreign females had overtaken it by 2016.. ‧. Figure 7. Taiwanese International Marriages (2008-2018). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Unlike migrant workers, foreign spouses immigrate to East Asian countries with their husbands or wives. The women give birth to a new generation of biracial children who will impact cultural norms and national identifications later on. This makes the phenomenon of international marriages an important issue for ordinary citizens and policy makers alike. As it is,. 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(29) foreign spouses face a host of issues, ranging from strict citizenship laws, inaccessible systems of social benefits, domestic violence, and their threats to their general well-being (eg. Nho & Lee, 2016). Scholars argue that the continuing rise in international migration and marriages inevitably contribute to ethnic diversity and the emergence of multicultural societies in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (eg. Bélanger, et al., 2010). These demographic transformations, in the long run, can challenge their dominant ideologies of nationalism, cultural homogeneity, and native citizenship. But given the ample evidence of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and racial discrimination, strong public opposition to immigration can still be expected from their native-born population in the coming years.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 22. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(30) Chapter 3. Literature Review As international migration levels rose, research on public opinion regarding immigrants and immigration also expanded. The puzzle of which factors have a stronger hand in shaping attitudes and preferences has been approached by different disciplines in the social sciences, reflecting the wide-ranging potential causes and effects of public opinion. For the purposes of clarifying concepts and terminologies, this section begins with a brief discussion of definitions. The term ‘public opinion’ has been used to mean different things at different points in time – from the ancient Greek citizens’ individual display of rhetoric and oratory, to a 1940s argument that it was a purely collective phenomenon (Berinsky, 2012). In 1961, Key provided a. 政治大 persons which governments find立 it prudent to heed (p. 8)” (as cited in Berinsky, 2012, p. 2). This useful and expansive working definition of public opinion: “Those opinions held by private. ‧ 國. 學. suggests that even though these opinions are owned by individuals, it derives its power in the public sphere. Although there are other measurement techniques, polls and surveys have emerged as the most prevalent in gauging the public will (Berinsky, 2012).. ‧. Traditionally, ‘migration’ is the movement of people within national boundaries, such as. y. Nat. the population flows from rural to urban areas, while ‘immigration’ is the movement of people. sit. across national boundaries (Gottdiener & Budd, 2005). However, the term ‘migrant’ has been. er. io. recently associated with refugees, workers shifting from job to job by the season, and those. al. iv n C specifically, is a person without government whoU h eprotection i has been forced to leave his or her h n c g own home country to escape persecution, political and/or armed conflict, or both. On the other n. moving temporarily from one country to another for economic reasons. A ‘refugee’, more. hand, an ‘immigrant’ is someone who has willingly moved to a foreign country with the intention of settling down and living there (Vore, 2015). In this regard, an immigrant is also an ‘international migrant’: “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (UN DESA, 1998, p. 9). Under these umbrella concepts is a list of other terms and subcategories, like ‘migrant worker’, ‘asylum seeker’, or the adjectives ‘illegal’, ‘undocumented’, and ‘unauthorized’. All of these terms may be enclosed within domestic and international laws, and meanings have changed and can change over time. Problems can arise when the media and the public interchange terms. 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(31) without further clarification of what they are actually referring to, and as such, even the choice of words can politically frame a particular event. Furthermore, in academic contexts, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) argue the need to differentiate between ‘attitudes toward immigrants’ and ‘attitudes toward immigration’, as the public can have positive views of immigrants and still be opposed to immigration. They also point out the issue of terminological ambiguity in this very broad research area, which renders reported findings not always directly comparable. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze how survey questionnaires are structured and worded, immigration attitudes have been proven to vary depending on the questions asked (Segovia & Defever, 2010). This is critical issue that needs to be acknowledged and addressed in the field of public opinion polling. 政治大 Also included here are some notes on the term ‘settler society’, a theoretical concept in 立. and research, as well as in communication and any kind of reportage.. early modern and modern history used for comparative analysis of predominantly European. ‧ 國. 學. civilizations settling somewhere else from their original habitat to new destinations. Prominent examples of modern settler societies would be the British colonies in North America, New. ‧. Zealand, Australia, and South Africa; the Dutch colony in South Africa; the French colonies in North Africa and the Pacific; as well as the Spanish colonies in South America. This concept is. y. Nat. sit. intimately linked with ‘settler colonization’, patterns of settlement where the settlers have. al. er. io. replaced aboriginals/indigenous peoples as rulers of a territory – a historical phenomenon that. n. can be traced back to tribe expansion in the 13th and 12th centuries BC, as well as Chinese. Ch. i n U. v. colonization from the Yellow River southwards in the 9th century BC (Lloyd & Metzer, 2013).. engchi. Thus, traditional settler societies refer to non-European countries where Europeans have mainly settled down centuries ago. Given similar characteristics of being ‘closed’ to groups of other racial, linguistic, and ethnic origins, it is appropriate to call the East Asian countries studied here as non-traditional settler societies. Moving on to the literature itself, the sheer volume of work previously done on this topic cannot be understated. To narrow down the discussion, this survey is further subdivided into three subsections: an overview of research traditions, a summary of studies focusing on political factors, and a closer look at East Asian views of immigration.. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.

(32) 3.1. Public Opinion towards Immigrants and Immigration As such, primarily referenced here are two comprehensive reviews within the past decade, as well as some of the studies completed in more recent years. Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) emphasize the importance of probing the relationship between individual and societal processes through a clear micro-macro categorization of theories and determinants identified in the literature. While they explicitly come from a sociological perspective, most of the research in their review inevitably cross social science disciplines. Four years after, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) reviewed some 100 studies of immigration attitudes from more than two dozen countries in the past two decades. Although the field has been previously dominated by cross-sectional research and country analyses, it has. 政治大 the opinion of majority groups and 立covering quantitative research in Northern America and. gradually evolved to include innovative research designs and experimental studies. Focusing on. ‧ 國. 學. Western Europe, they draw out works central to political science debates and divide them into two traditions. The first, political economy, directly corresponds with Ceobanu and Escandell’s (2010) individual-level theories of socioeconomic correlates and self-interests; while everything. ‧. else falls into the second, or what they termed ‘sociopsychological’ approaches. Presented in the. sit. y. Nat. next paragraphs and the following tables is a combined summary of their reviews.5. er. io. 3.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Attitudes towards Immigrants and Immigration. al. n. iv n C socioeconomic correlates and self-interests called political h e(also i U economy), 2) identities and h n c g values, and 3) contact with out-group members.. Individual Level. On the individual level, three theories have emerged as prominent: 1). Political Economy. The first strand is influenced by one’s social position, rational calculations, material interests, and fear of competition; wherein results from various studies (see Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Olzak, 1992; Pettigrew, 2000; Sides and Citrin, 2007) point to a predictive consistency of negative attitudes. Similarly, Hainmueller and Hopkins’ (2014) political economy perspective examines this conflict between natives and immigrants in two areas: the 1) labor market, and for 2) government spending and services.. 5. Studies and sources mentioned in this subsection and review summary were originally cited by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), as well as Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014).. 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900888.