Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.3 Overview of CARICOM-Asia-Pacific Relations
2.3.2 CARICOM-Japan Relations
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ethno-historic narrative, in addition to the presence of Indo-Caribbean and Javanese-Surinamese (that also resulted from indentured labour in the Caribbean) highlight the often overlooked, yet deeply-rooted connections between the Caribbean region and the Asia-Pacific.
In recent years, Japan, China and Taiwan have been expanding their diplomatic relations sphere to the lesser developed states in the Western hemisphere. The following section provides a brief insight into Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese foreign policy and diplomacy and how their policies relate to CARICOM.
2.3.2 CARICOM-Japan Relations
The history of Japanese diplomacy stems from the post-World War II era in an attempt to salvage and to subsequently change its national image (Potter, 2009). It has since gone through several transformations and revisions. Throughout the periods of transformation, Japan’s diplomacy strategies were tailored to suit regional, bilateral and multilateral environments. With specific regard to its approach to small-island developing states, Japan, as a significant international player, has been able to cement relations with island nations on an individual and collective basis.
Japan’s relationship with CARICOM states spans decades. The earliest of these relations was established in 1964 with Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica (MOFA Japan, 2014).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan documented that the total population of CARICOM nationals living in the country as of July 2014 was 714. The population of Jamaican nationals in Japan by July 2014 alone had already exceeded the total population of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan by April 2015. Formal relations between Japan and CARICOM (as a collective) began in 1994 and have since 2002 been elevated to a more official level with the commencement of the Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Conferences.
The Fourth Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Conference in November 2014 came on the heels of the first Japan-CARICOM Summit in July 2014 which was held in Trinidad and
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Tobago. Prior to 2014, Japan's bilateral assistance to the region focused mostly on capacity building and institutional building in fisheries. In return, countries in the OECS sub-region in particular supported Japan's position within the International Whaling Commission. Co-chaired by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe it was at this summit that the three pillars of Japan’s CARICOM Policies were introduced (MOFA Japan, 2014).
Japan’s CARICOM Policies according to these three pillars are (i) Cooperation towards sustainable development, including overcoming the vulnerabilities particular to small island states, (ii) Deepening and expanding fraternal bonds of cooperation and friendship and (iii) Cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community (MOFA Japan, 2014).
The second pillar in particular takes into consideration the role of multi-level cultural and educational exchanges that involve the public and private sectors with the important goal of “enhance[ing] mutual understanding and strengthen[ing] the bonds of
friendship”(MOFA Japan, 2014). Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, reiterated the importance of such measures; pledging the Japanese government’s support for further cooperation in several areas which include (but are not limited to) continued assistance in, and promotion of Japanese language education at the University of the West Indies, sports, tourism, business and ICT ventures, and the continued funding and promotion of the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme (which aims at promoting and fostering grass-roots international exchanges between Japan and other nations).
Prime Minister Abe also noted the need to establish more embassies throughout CARICOM states which would allow individual relations between Japan and its CARICOM partners to be more fruitful and uninhibited by distance. At present, only 3 out of the 15 CARICOM member states have diplomatic missions and consulates in Japan.
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China’s foreign policy approach to small-island states and other developing states
includes assisting in the advancement of lesser developed countries in a spirit of goodwill and continued cooperation. Added to the political agenda explicitly expressed via the
‘One China Policy’, China’s interest in the lesser developed states of the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean region has increased.
The People’s Republic of China has established diplomatic relations with nine CARICOM countries namely Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Dominica, Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda and The Bahamas. The earliest of these ties was established in 1972 between China and Guyana. China has similarly provided monetary assistance to various developmental projects across educational, economic, agricultural and technological categories. The Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance estimates that China has provided close to US$86 billion dollars in
development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean from 2005 to the first half of 2013 (China-Caribbean Relationship, CCMF, 2013). China is also a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank6.
The three main goals of relations between China, Latin America and the Caribbean were stated by former Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2004. These goals include: (i)
strengthening strategic ties and enhancing mutual political trust, (ii) taking practical and creative steps to tap the potential for economic cooperation, (3) attaching greater
importance to cultural exchanges to deepen mutual understanding (Bliss, 2010).
Cultural Diplomacy as a facet of China’s foreign policy gained particular relevance in 2012 and 2013 as it constituted the third pillar of Chinese Diplomacy. “Cultural diplomacy and soft power are important strategies for the Chinese leadership in developing benign impressions about China and securing strategic dividends through
6Thompson, Fontaine, China Invests billions in the Caribbean while Washington looks on,
(TheDominican.net), 2013 http://thedominican.net/2013/06/china-invests-billions-in-caribbean.html
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‘virtuous’ policies of engagement”(Palit, 2014). The establishment of Confucius Institutes have aided in promoting China’s cultural diplomacy by bridging academic components and the urge for international dialogue among its neighbours. As of July 2015, all campuses of The University of the West Indies house a Confucius Institute where the curriculum comprises Mandarin Chinese, Chinese calligraphy, Tai chi and Chinese film.
2.3.4 CARICOM and Taiwan Relations
Taiwan has established diplomatic relations with 5 CARICOM nations namely, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Belize. Haiti was the first country to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1956.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on Taiwan refers to Article 141 of the Constitution of Taiwan as a summary of its foreign policy goals:
“…in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, cultivate good-neighborliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the Charter of the United Nations, in order to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace.” (MOFA Taiwan, Article 141)
Under the Ma Ying Jiu Administration, Taiwan’s Diplomatic approach to its neighbours in the international community centers round the concept of viable diplomacy or flexible diplomacy. Viable Diplomacy is defined as a compromise that allows Taiwan to continue its diplomatic efforts, while still retaining and maintaining ties with China. It continues to observe the status-quo “while adhering to the principles of dignity, autonomy,
pragmatism, and flexibility. This policy has enabled Taiwan to consolidate relations with its diplomatic allies, strengthen substantive ties with countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations, expand its international participation, and obtain visa-waiver treatment.” (MOFA Taiwan, 2014).
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Viable Diplomacy forms part of the R.O.C.’s foreign policy towards Cross-strait affairs and international relations.
Though the Republic of China has also provided assistance with similar projects to countries, Taiwan's strategic approach has more of a soft power undertone. This was especially effective in its rapid relief effort in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Ong, 2010).
Moreover, CARICOM countries have benefited from the presence of the Taiwan Cultural Youth Ambassadors program that has since 2009 given CARICOM countries the
opportunity to enhance their international awareness of Taiwan’s many roles in the world as peacemaker, provider of humanitarian aid, promoter of cultural exchanges, creator of new technologies and business opportunities, and standard bearer of Chinese culture (Taiwan Today, 2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Education and the International Cultural and Development Fund (ICDF) have also issued scholarships to CARICOM nationals for undergraduate, graduate and doctorate level programs in fields ranging from civil engineering to agriculture.
2.4 The Diaspora, Brain Drain and Monetary Gain
Gamlen (2008) defines a diaspora as having the following characteristics: “[the]
dispersion to two or more locations; ongoing orientation towards a homeland; and group boundary maintenance over time. (Butler; Brubaker 2001)” Thus (1) the host
country(ies) (2) the country of origin and the (3) the foreign community within that host country comprise a current consensus of the definition used in diaspora research. This sentiment is echoed by Makumi Mwagiru (2012) who notes that debate on a universally accepted definition of diaspora has led to emergent consensus on three specific criteria:
dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance:
“The first refers to any form of dispersion as long as territorial borders are crossed. It has
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been argued that ethnic communities divided by territorial borders also constitute a diaspora (Brubaker 2005:5). Homeland orientation requires some loyalty to, or
recognition of, a real or imagined homeland from which flow value, identity and loyalty.
Boundary maintenance involves maintaining an identity distinct from that of the host society, which can be done by resisting assimilation into the host society through self-segregation, or can be an unintended consequence of social exclusion (Brubaker 2005:6)”(Mwagiru, 2012) .
This leads to several common characteristics of diaspora communities, of which retention of collective memory, relation to homeland identity and the desire to use skills acquired in their host countries for the development of their own homeland are a few.
Reasons for the movement and relocation of communities from their countries of origin to new environments are primarily based on factors that Henry (2010) quotes Everett S.
Lee as attributing to the negative environments of the homeland versus the positive environments of countries of destination (Frazier: Harvey, 2010). Additionally, personal motivations and intervening obstacles (immigration laws and physical distance) are also determining factors. Asylum seekers, refugees of war and natural disasters, economic migrants can constitute types of diasporic communities.
2.4.1 Small-Island States amidst the Waves of Emigration.
Migration has produced positive and negative impacts on nations and regions. The mass movement of peoples to more developed countries has led to a depletion of much needed talent and human capital. However, with increased diaspora communities abroad,
countries have also benefited from their contributions from their host countries. By sending money to relatives back in their native countries, diaspora communities fuel the development of their homelands by injecting foreign currencies into their economies.
Remittances serve as the main and most profitable link between SIDS and their diaspora abroad. According to the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American
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Development Bank (IDB) remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean region exceeded US$60billion in 2013. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the total amount of remittances was sent from the United States of America, with Spain contributing the second largest flow of capital to the region (Inter-American Development Bank, 2014).
Remittances to the Caribbean increased by 3 percent in 2013 compared to 2012, capping at US$8.5 billion. In 2005, at US$6.4million, the transmittals had already become the second largest source of capital for the region. But as early as 2002, the Caribbean region was already listed as the largest recipient of remittances globally (Roberts, 2006). It is evident that diaspora communities aid in the economic development of their home countries through remittances and additional capital flows of foreign currencies.
Additionally, the diaspora have caused local Caribbean businesses to enter into extra-regional niche markets due to the diaspora’s noticeable presence and their demand for local products. These statistics underscore the importance of capital flows to the region through the diaspora abroad.
Conversely, diaspora communities can also serve the purpose of enhancing the global awareness and cultural sensitivity of their host countries. Their presence and innate need for cultural expression have produced outlets for fostered people-to-people interactions, activism and engagement.
2.4.2 Diaspora Diplomacy: Utilizing Nationals Abroad
Diaspora Diplomacy represents one of ten types of state diplomacy approaches of small island states (Henrikson, 2008). Though an old concept in definition, literature on diaspora studies has gone through several phases; all of which expand and transform the classical perceptions of the term and how it applies to the present. The role and
involvement of diaspora in national policy and international relations has become a recent topic of discourse, particularly as a result of increased globalization and the mass
movement of peoples that have followed.
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The International Organization of Migration (IOM) reiterates the role of the diaspora as one that has the potential to reach “significant levels7. On a financial level, diaspora communities can make contributions to direct business investments, capital market investments and charity in addition to regular channels of remittances. However, the diaspora can also be involved in knowledge and skill transfers, creation of job markets and linkages, advocacy and developing civil society (Ionescu, 2006). :
With regards to diaspora-centered policy formation, the IOM alludes to effective diaspora policies as having:
(i) Enabling roles: whereby the focus is on attempting to find solutions to the hindrances that prevent diaspora communities from fully being able to contribute to the development of their home countries. Ministries would also need to be equipped with the necessary capacities to cater to diaspora affairs.
(ii) Inclusionary roles: recognizing and validating diaspora communities as full citizens, their input, potential and their contributions; increasing trust-building between the home-front and their diaspora through institutional change that makes allowances for nationals abroad.
(iii) Partnership roles: connecting the diaspora by creating opportunities for cooperation in between associations, regions, municipalities, public enterprises and the like.
(iv) Catalytic roles: whereby change is incited for the purpose of identifying and addressing issues facing diaspora communities8.
2.4.3 Diaspora Affairs: Where Does It Fit?
The brain drain has been an issue faced by both developed and developing nations.
However, transforming migration into a source of innovation, change and sustainability
7 Engaging the Diaspora for Development: IOM Policy-Oriented Research, International Organization on Migration, ,http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/
policy_documents/iom_research.pdf
8 Engaging the Diaspora for Development: IOM Policy-Oriented Research, International Organization on Migration,http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/p olicy_documents/iom_research.pdf
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had been observed by countries as a means of turning a handicap into an advantage.
Diaspora Affairs has thus become an important area of investment whereby governments and international organizations seek to maximize on the present contributions and
potential contributions of their respective diaspora.
In a survey issued by The Global Forum on Migration and Development, a total of 400 institutions across 56 countries have mechanisms of in place to connect and engage their diaspora communities. These institutions are present in the home and host countries. Out of this number, 77 were formally established with the specific function of focusing on diaspora engagement. Aguinas and Newland (2011) in analyzing the aforementioned data described such diaspora institutions as falling under six main categories:
(i) Ministry level: the establishment of separate ministries solely responsible for diaspora affairs,
(ii) Sub-ministry level: creation of offices or directorates as the subsidiaries of certain ministries (usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor), (iii) National level: institutions that although are not officially ministry of sub
ministry institutions still interact with the local government by reporting to the highest executive body (i.e. Presidential offices, state councils and legislative branches),
(iv) Local level: specified to particular local regions or territories within a county where diaspora communities still retain ties and possess a strong degree of familiarity, especially if the country is considerably large (ex. India:
Department of Non-resident Keralite's Affairs),
(v) Consular-related: utilizing the presence of overseas missions to take on diaspora related functions,
(vi) Quasi-governmental: under the guise of foundations, commissions and councils, countries are able to avoid possible accusations of intrusion into the affairs of host countries while still maintaining a relatively significant
presence in said country.
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From Nigeria to the Netherlands, Chile to China, and Guatemala to Georgia the presence of diaspora engagement institutions at the ascribed levels shows the increasing
importance, inclusion and utilization of the diaspora in practical areas. Inspiration can thus be derived from these more developed countries as they give insight into what a potential CARICOM-tailored diaspora initiative would involve and at what levels it could be employed.
For the Caribbean region, such avenues for policy formulation are vital for spurring incentive among its diaspora to continue to contribute and invest in their home countries and the region. Mortley (2014) notes that Caribbean migrants are interested in investing in their countries, providing that favorable policy conditions, incentives and benefits are given. Additionally, by consulting the national and regional associations abroad in the policy-making process, the effectiveness of policy implementation is more guaranteed and it also promotes greater transparency.
Though the collective diaspora engagement institutions of specific regional hubs like CARICOM were not included in the survey, it does not diminish the significance of the presence of these individual institutions. Countries such as Jamaica and Haiti have been able to develop diaspora engagement institutions and implement policies to effectively utilize the Diaspora's contributions abroad for their own national development.
2.4.4 Engaging the Diaspora
Mendoza and Newland (2012) provide in-depth suggestions for engagement strategies that hone in on the ways in which the diaspora can be effective in their countries of destination and countries of origin, and how governments of both the home and host countries can collaborate to ensure the success of such strategies and reap mutual
benefits. However, there must be mutual understanding and involvement from all partners as governments of destination countries (for instance) can only follow through with cooperating with diaspora communities by assisting in projects on the home-front unless the corresponding governments in the countries of origin recognize and are willing to include that diaspora in its development projects.
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The IOM also notes that for diaspora engagement to be incorporated into national (and regional) policy, the process should involve, diaspora mapping, stakeholder mobilization and confidence building. The IOM and the Migration Policy Institute have been
instrumental in assisting countries with such practices. Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname have established partnerships with the International Organization of Migration to assist in this regard by staging workshops and training seminars that focus on the fundamental aspects of diaspora research (IOM, 2013).
Kilduff and Corley (1999) noted that although people leave their homeland, they are not severed from its culture. Not only has technology allowed expatriate communities to keep in contact with relatives in their respective countries, “…they often create communities of the displaced to help retain their sense of attachment and identity.” In this way diaspora communities can aspire to two different ways of cultural identity which would either (i) focus on the collective selves or (2) reflects the known similarities and
differences which “constitute ‘what we really are’ or rather since history has intervened”
differences which “constitute ‘what we really are’ or rather since history has intervened”