國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter V: Chinese Feminists Movements and Social Media
To answer the research questions, this study concentrates on three case studies illustrating women’s rights online campaigns that it examines using both quantitative and qualitative approaches.
After having briefly exposed the case and its primary outcomes using media reports and other pertinent documentation, each analysis first focuses on the content posted by the selected Chinese feminist accounts to establish significant trends. To define which posts are relevant, this study only picked those that have been published during the predefined periods, contain keywords or pictures related to the observed event.
In a second time, to unfold the relationship between social media and norm socialization, the study uses the logic of the “boomerang pattern” to establish three conditions that women’s rights activists should be satisfying to generate a norm socialization process:
A. Advocating and Circulating Information
Because engaging in advocacy and “information politics” are critical components of the process (Risse and Sikkink 1999), Chinese feminist groups should be publishing content aiming to inform their followers on the observed event.
B. Pictures and Symbols
“Symbolic politics” are essential to the norm socialization process (Risse and Sikkink 1999); therefore, women’s rights activists are expected to use them in their online campaigns.
C. Connecting with Other Advocacy Groups
When facing opposition from the state, norm-entrepreneurs must find support among their peers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Keck and Sikkink 1999), either at the national or international level if they want to promote their norm. Thus, Chinese feminists are supposed to engage with like-minded groups within and outside Mainland China.
Based on the posted content, this study analyses to which extent Chinese Women’s right groups and activists fulfilled these conditions.
‧
Finally, using the tool FreeWeibo and the relevant literature, each case study analysis concludes with observations of the measures taken by the Chinese authorities.
5.1. The “Feminist Five”
Case Summary
The first case study is a worldwide online advocacy campaign for the release of five Chinese women’s rights activists.
Between the 6 and 7 of March, at least ten women’s rights activists are arrested by the police in different Chinese cities.60 Five of them, Li Tingting (李婷婷), Wei Tingting (韋婷婷), Zheng Churan (鄭楚然), Wu Rongrong (武嶸嶸), and Wang Man (王曼), remain in custody.61 They are already known by the Chinese authorities for their previous actions and were planning to distribute stickers warning against unwelcome sexual behaviors in public transportation during the International Women’s Day on March 8. Accused of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” they are all transferred and formally detained in the Haidian district of Beijing on March 12.62
In the days following their arrest, Chinese women’s rights advocacy groups, transnational advocacy networks, and transnational social movements urge the Chinese regime to free the five women, renamed the “Feminist Five” in the meantime. As their detention continues, foreign media publish articles regarding their arrest as well as on the situation of women’s rights and NGOs in China. Governments such as the British Foreign Office63 and the US Secretary of State,64 political figures like Hillary Clinton,65 and international institutions66 also publicly urge the Chinese authorities to release the five women’s rights activists.
On April 13, the Chinese regime, after having answered negatively to international and national calls, finally “release on guarantee pending further investigation,”67 the five activists.
The procedure, called “qubao houshen” (取保候審) in Chinese, means that they remained
60 Sophie Beach, “Progress and Setbacks for Women’s rights Activists,” China Digital Times, Mar. 09, 2015
61 Ibid.
62 Sophie Beach, “Five Women’s rights Activists Criminally Detained,” China Digital Times, Mar. 13, 2015
63 Foreign & Commonwealth Office. “Foreign Office concerned by detention of Women’s rights activists in China.”
Mar. 24, 2015
64 Edouard Wong, “China Releases 5 Women’s rights Activists Detained for Weeks,” New York Times, Apr. 16, 2015
65 Hillary Clinton’s post on Twitter https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/585235055078940673
66 Tania Branigan, “China rejects international pleas to release five feminists from jail,” The Guardian, Mar. 25, 2015
67 “HRIC Law Note: Five Detained Women Released On “Guarantee Pending Further Investigation.” Human rights in China, Apr. 13, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
“criminal suspects,” were restricted in their movements, and subject to investigation for one year.68
General observations
The following observations are based on the study of the Weibo accounts of the advocacy groups Bcome 小组, Women Awakening, and the women’s rights’ activists Zhang Leilei and Xiao Meili. They also include the publication of one INGOs and one NGO specialized in human rights (Amnesty International and the Chinese Human Rights Defenders), and three women’s rights organizations based outside of the PRC (the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, Femen Sweden, and Feminist Majority), as well as two public figures (Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden).
The analysis of the social media revealed that, between March 8, 2015, and April 13, 2015, 61 of the 129 aggregated posts published by the five accounts were directly related to the
“Feminist Five” (Figure I). Xiao Meili’s account “有点田园” (Youdian tianyuan) was the most active with 23 publications, followed by Bcome 小组 with 21 posts (Figure I).
A. Advocating and Circulating Information
Regarding advocacy, an observation of Weibo, Twitter, and Facebook, determines that, during the whole detention period of the five feminists, both Chinese and global women’s rights organizations repeatedly used social media to gather support from the public and urge the Chinese authorities to release the five detainees.
Overall, 35 out of 61 posts were messages urging the government to free the activists (Figure II). Besides, the majority of publications contained the hashtag #free5 or #自由个头 (Ziyou getou), a pun insisting on the absence of freedom for the “heads” (头) in reference to the publications displaying pictures of supporters wearing masks bearing the jailed activists’
heads (Figure III).
68 Josh Rudolph, “China Free Five Women Activists on Bail after Outcry,” China Digital Times, Apr. 13, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Concerning the circulation of information, the analysis of the feminist Weibo accounts shows that the majority of the published content aimed to deliver information related to the arrest and detention of the five activists (Figure II).
Besides, with 38 out of 61 publications containing a link to another post or an article related to the “Feminist Five,” it can be seen that women’s rights organizations used their account to circulate information and keep people updated on the activists’ whereabouts (Figure III). Finally, to overcome censorship, Chinese advocacy groups share information under the form of screenshots of text. It can be observed that Chinese activists also used this strategy to spread the news about the development of the case (Figure III).
Social media played this informant and relay role once again when the five women were released on April 13, rapidly circulating the information on both Chinese and international social media.
B. Pictures and Symbols
One noticeable characteristic of the online campaign to free the “Feminist Five” is the repeated use of masks bearing the jailed activists’ faces. The trend was initiated in China by some friends of the five women’s rights activists (Tan 2017) who posted pictures of themselves wearing the masks in casual places (Picture 1).
In total, 31 out the 61 posts related to the “Feminist Five” published on Weibo by the observed accounts displayed such pictures (Figure III).
C. Connecting with Other Advocacy Groups
At the domestic level, it can be seen that Chinese feminists engaged with each other, sharing other publications but also local actions (Picture 2). For instance, 38 out of 61 publications were mentioning other local women’s rights groups or activists (Figure III).
One example of the connection between Chinese women’s rights groups and transnational advocacy networks and transnational social movements is the use of the above-mentioned pictures by organizations based outside of the PRC (Pictures 3 and 4). Outside Mainland China, transnational advocacy networks and transnational social movements also multiplied online petitions to ensure the backing of foreign supporters.
‧
For example, Amnesty International launched an international petition under the hashtag
#FreeTheFive campaign, echoing the Chinese hashtag #free5. At the same time, in Hong Kong, the Association for the Advancement of Feminism (新婦女協進會) collected more than 2,000 signatures with its Facebook “Signature Campaign to demand the China Government to release Feminist Activists” (關於敦促中國政府釋放女權活動家的聲明), between March 8 and 21.69
Social media were also used by international media and public figures to express their sympathy toward the five activists and urge the Chinese regime to free them. For instance, on April 7, in reaction to an editorial issued by the American newspaper The New York Times, 70 the American political personality Hillary Clinton71 asked for their release on the social media platform Twitter. Four days later, on April 11, the US Vice-President, Joe Biden,72 urged the Chinese authorities on Twitter to free the activists.
It is relevant to note this utilization of social media by public figures because it translates a form of external pressure on the Chinese authorities, who have publicly reacted to Hillary Clinton’s publication through a declaration of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying (華春瑩):
“China is a country ruled by law. Relevant departments will handle the relevant case according to law. We hope that public figures in other countries can respect China’s judicial sovereignty and independence.” 73
Besides, social media enabled the transfer of information from China to the outside and from the outside to China. For instance, immediately after their arrest, the news started to spread over Chinese social media, through alerts posted by Chinese feminist organizations and other activists or supporters. Meanwhile, transnational advocacy networks and transnational social movements successfully relayed the information on international social media at almost the same time as the Chinese ones (Picture 5).
On the other hand, social media enabled the NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders to report on foreign support (Picture 6). For instance, the Beijing-based feminist network Bcome 小组 was able to inform its audience that Hillary Clinton’s publicly asked for the release
69 According to the association Facebook’s event https://www.facebook.com/events/892417467447737/?active_tab=about
70 Andrew Jacobs, “Taking Feminist Battle to China’s Streets, and Landing in Jail,” The New York Times, Apr. 05, 2015
71 Hillary Clinton’s post on Twitter https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/585235055078940673
72 Joe Biden’s post on Twitter https://twitter.com/VP44/status/586704350543659008
73 Wee Sui-Lee and Martina Michael Martina, “China peeved as Hillary Clinton denounces women's detention,” Reuters, Apr. 07, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
of the five women (Picture 7). Given the fact that Twitter is blocked in Mainland China, social media enabled these groups and activists to establish a canal between local and foreign groups Finally, the observations also highlight the fact that social media enabled a certain level of harmonization between advocacy networks. For example, on Twitter and Facebook, the hashtags #FreeTheFive and #FreeBeijing20Five (in reference to the 20 years of the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women) were used as slogan branding the numerous demands.
For instance, both Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden’s posts were accompanied by the hashtag
#FreeBeijing20Five.
The Response of the Chinese Authorities
A study of the regime’s mouthpiece, China Daily, reveals that during the detention period of the activists, no references to the five women or Chinese women facing sexual harassment were made. Besides, the study of the ACWF’s Weibo account reveals that the organization did not mention the five jailed activists either show any support to them during the period of their detention.
Overall, the articles published by the propaganda outlet for the entire year 2015 mentioning the term “sexual harassment” are either focusing on foreign countries or on the government’s successful efforts in fighting the issue in China. Therefore, it can be assumed that the authorities demonstrated little interest in discussing the issue at the domestic level.
Regarding the authorities’ response to the utilization of social media by local and international advocacy groups, it appears that they were opposed to it. They used censorship to mute their demands and undermine their capacity to reach out to potential supporters.
First, the authorities purely withdraw some content related to the five feminists’
detention, forbidding netizens to share information. For instance, some publications mentioning their arrest were censored on Weibo (Picture 8). Besides, this censorship was not limited to content published by Chinese individuals or organizations. Foreign institutions, such as the international newspapers Financial Times, the British Embassy in China, and the European Union in China (Picture 9), who used their Weibo account to urge the authorities to release the jailed activists, were censored as well.
Second, the authorities tried to make information less visible to Chinese netizens by undermining their capacity to find them. Indeed, as long as they were in detention, four of the
‧
activists’ names were unsearchable on Weibo if followed by the term “taken away” (被带走), according to China Digital Times’ data.74 Besides, during the same period, the combination
“take away” + “women’s rights” (带走＋女权) was blocked as well.75 The same occurred, after their release as their names could not be searched on Weibo, if followed by the term “release”
(释放) or the terms “women’s rights” + “person” (韦婷婷＋女权＋人).76 The authorities also harassed some of the five activists’ supporters. For instance, on March 26, in Beijing, the Yirenping Center (北京益仁平中心), an-antidiscrimination NGO, which also promotes the defense of the rights of disadvantaged groups, was raided by the police.77 According to the organization’s co-founder, the raid was a response to Yirenpig’s repeated advocacies for the release of the five women, who all had personal ties with the organization.78
Finally, the Chinese government, despite being unable to prevent foreign actors from publishing information on international social media, still publicly opposed to those who relied on these platforms to claim the release of the five activists, as shown by the Foreign Ministry response to Hillary Clinton’s post on Twitter.
Conclusions
The “Feminist Five” case underlines the fact that the Chinese regime does not tolerate that netizens use social media to contest the arrest of activists. However, it also reveals that the Chinese authorities are not able to entirely prevent Chinese organizations from posting information on Weibo and cannot remove all the content. Furthermore, the authorities cannot prevent the information flows between Chinese advocacy groups and international ones.
Therefore, the analysis of the “Feminist Five” case supports the assumption that social media provide a space where norm-entrepreneurs can contest the authorities and promote their norm.
It also supports the hypothesis that social media facilitate the interactions between local and international advocacy networks.
Nevertheless, the fact that the five women were finally released should not be counted as proof that social media are an efficient way of pressuring the state. The reasons behind this decision remain unknown and could have nothing to do with the actions conducted by the
74 Anne Henochowicz, “Sensitive Words: Women’s rights Activists Detained,” China Digital Times, Mar. 18, 2015
75 Ibid.
76 Sophie Beach, “Sensitive Words: Release of the ‘Feminist Five’,” China Digital Times, Apr. 16, 2015
77 Sui-Lee Wee, “Chinese police raid office of prominent NGO: co-founder,” Reuters, Mar. 26, 2015
78 Sophie Beach, “Supporters of Feminists Activists Under Pressure,” China Digital Times, Mar. 26, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
advocacy networks. Besides, the five activists continued to face pressures and control from the authorities, and the overall situation regarding women’s rights did not improve. Thus, there are not enough elements to support the assumption that the state is sensitive to social media’s pressure.
‧
Figure 5. 1: Proportion of Weibo posts related to the “Feminist Five”
Account Posts published between March 8 and April 13
Figure 5.2: Objectives of the publications related to the “Feminist Five”
11
Posts calling for action Posts delivering information
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Figure 5.3: Characteristics of the publications related to the “Feminist Five”
6
38 43 6
31 38
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Mention to foreign supporters Link to another publication or an article
#自由个头 and/or #free5 hasthag Screenshots of text Pictures or videos Mention to other Chinese advocacy groups
Number of posts
Type of content displayed in the post
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Picture 1 – Xiao Meili sharing on her account “有点
田园,” photos taken by members
of Feminist Activists, on March
30, 2015
Picture 2 –Weibo post from Bcome 小组 sharing
a local poster campaign on April 8, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Picture 3 – The feminist organization Femen Sweden sharing one of the photos taken by
the Chinese feminist activists on Twitter on April 9, 2015.
Picture 4 – The American organization Feminist
Majority Foundation sharing a protest in New
Delhi during which demonstrators used masks bearing the
“Feminist Five’s” faces on Twitter on April 12,
2015
Picture 5 – The NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders posting a warning concerning the arrest of the women’s rights activists on its Twitter account on March 7, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Picture 6 – Xiao Meili posting photos of supporters in New York
on her personal account on March 9, 2015.
Picture 7 Weibo post from BCome 小组 concerning Hillary Clinton’s support to the five women’s rights activists posted on April 07, 2015
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Picture 8 – Censored Weibo post from the feminist network Women Awakening concerning the arrest of the women’s rights activists posted on March 10, 2015, retrieved on
FreeWeibo.com (courtesy of Greatfire.org)
Picture 9 – Censored Weibo post from European Union in China (欧盟在中国) concerning the release of the women’s rights posted on March 13, 2015, retrieved on FreeWeibo.com
(courtesy of Greatfire.org)
‧
5.2. The Guangzhou’s Billboard Campaign Case Summary
The second case study is an anti-sexual harassment awareness campaign launched on Weibo by a feminist organization from Guangzhou, which brought together a hundred participants from all around China.
On March 8, 2016, to celebrate Women’s Day, F Feminist, launched an online crowdfunding campaign to finance the placing of anti-sexual harassment advertisements in the Guangzhou’s Kecun subway station.79 Their initial goal was to have the ad placed in May 2016.
Within two months, the group successfully received more than 5 800 USD from more than 1,200 people, enough to engage an advertisement agency and pay for the placement.80
However, the Guangzhou Administration for Industry and Commerce keep rejecting the different templates proposed by F Feminist, pretexting that the ad would “disturb the public and cause anxiety.”81 By January 2017, the organization had to abandon its initial project, which was showing a hand grabbing another one, as the authorities told them it was “too sensitive for a commercial ad” to display body parts.82 F Feminist decided to switch for a billboard depicting animals (Picture 10). Nevertheless, the authorities finally concluded that such a project should be categorized as “public service advertising,” which requires an affiliation with a governmental institution.83
More than one year after the beginning of its campaign, unable to find a government-affiliated partner, the group decided to use social media to bypass the interdiction. On May 1, 2017, in collaboration with the women’s rights network Women Awakening, F Feminist replaced its subway advertisement campaign by an online one called “I am a Billboard Walking Against Harassment” (我是廣告牌，行走反騷擾).84
Every day, Zhang Leilei, who is also one of the founders of F Feminist, planned to post pictures of her holding the anti-harassment billboard in different locations around the city of Guangzhou on her Weibo account accompanied with the hashtag #我是广告牌，行走反骚扰 (#IamABillboardWalkingAgainstHarassment).
79Tony Lin, “End of the Line for Subway Ad Against Sexual Harassment,” Sixth Tone. Apr. 28, 2017.
80 Ibid.
81 Tony Lin, “End of the Line for Subway Ad Against Sexual Harassment,” Sixth Tone. Apr. 28, 2017.
82 Ibid.
82 Ibid.