社群媒體規範社會化:以中國現代女性主義為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. 政治大 Social Media立and Norm Socialization: ‧. ‧ 國. 學. the Case of Modern Feminism in China 社群媒體與規範社會化: 以中國現代女性主義為例 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. NICOLAS RAPIN Advisor: PROFESSOR YEH-CHUNG LU. July, 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(3) Abstract Following the Arab Spring, International Relations’ scholars began to debate social media’s capacity to foster social movements and promote the socialization of international norms. Social media are seen by many as a “liberation technology,” allowing citizens to share information, mobilize more efficiently, and interact with a global audience. While these arguments have received considerable attention, they only partially explore the question of social media’s impacts on the prospect of a norm socialization process. Furthermore, many voices have raised to contest social media capacities to defy a state’s power. This thesis explores the strength, weakness, and limitations of social media on the prospect of a norm socialization process in the People’s Republic of China by focusing on Chinese feminist movements and their use of the Chinese social media Sina Weibo as a way of promoting women’s rights.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(4) Table of Contents Chapter I: Introduction. 1. 1.1.. Background and Motivation. 1. 1.2.. Purpose of the Research. 3. 1.3.. Research Questions. 3. 1.3.. Research Methods. 5. Chapter II: Literature Review. 9 9. 2.1.. International Norms and Norm Socialization. 2.2.. Social Media and Norm Socialization. 10. 2.3.. IR Feminist Theories. 14. Chapter III: Women’s rights as International Norms. 3.2.. 17 17 18. Main Challenges to the Spreading and Institutionalization of Women’s rights. 學. 3.3.. ‧ 國. 3.1.. 政治 Emergence and First Waves of Transnational Mobilization 大 Women’s rights as part of立 the UN Norms. Chapter IV: Norm Socialization, Social Media, and Women’s rights in the People’s Republic of China Norm Socialization in China. 4.2. Social Media in China. 4.3.. Women’s rights and Feminist Movements in China. y. Nat. sit. 33. n. er. io. 5.2.. al. i n C U hengchi The Guangzhou’s Billboard Campaign The “Feminist Five”. 23 28. Chapter V: Chinese Feminists Movements and Social Media 5.1.. 23. ‧. 4.1.. 20. 41. v. 42 55. 5.3.. The “Me Too” Movement. 70. 5.4.. Findings. 87. Chapter VI: Conclusion. 89. 6.1.. Main findings. 89. 6.2.. Limitation of the research. 91. 6.3.. Implications for the Inclusion of Social Media in the Norm Socialization Process. 92. References. 93. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(5) List of Figures 5. 1: Proportion of Weibo posts related to the “Feminist Five” ............................................. 49 5.2: Objectives of the publications related to the “Feminist Five” ......................................... 49 5.3: Characteristics of the publications related to the “Feminist Five” ................................. 50 5.4: Proportion of Weibo posts related to the Guangzhou’s Billboard Campaign .................. 62 5.5: Objectives of the publications related to Guangzhou’s Billboard Campaign .................. 62 5.6: Characteristics of the publications related to the Guangzhou’s Billboard Campaign .... 63 5.7: Proportion of Weibo posts related to the “Me Too” Movement ...................................... 79 5.8:Objectives of the publications related to the “Me Too” Movement .................................. 79 5.9: Characteristics of the publications related to the “Me Too” Movement ......................... 80 5.10: Use of symbols related to the “Me Too” Movement ....................................................... 80. 政治大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. List of Abbreviations. All-China Women’s Federation. CCP. Chinese Communist Party. GONGOs. Government-owned NGOs. GFW. Great Firewall. IR. International Relations. IGOs. International Organizations. INGOs. International nongovernmental organizations. NGOs. Nongovernmental Organizations. PRC. People’s Republic of China. ‧. ACW. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(6) Chapter I: Introduction. 1.1.. Background and Motivation. This thesis is motivated by the eagerness to contribute to two theoretical debates: the impacts of social media on activists’ capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes and the prospects of a norm socialization process in the People’s Republic of China. Regarding the first debate, over the past decade, International Relations scholars have been discussing social media’s capacity to support and enhance advocacy groups’ efforts to promote social change in authoritarian regimes (Ray and Tarafdar 2017, Isa and Himelboin 2018).. 政治大 and challenging the social. On one side of this debate are the scholars who praise social media as a “liberation technology,” empowering advocates. order established by 立 authoritarian states. The core of the “liberation technology” argument is that social media. ‧ 國. 學. enhance activists’ capacity to organize actions, recruit supporters, and call the international community attention to their cause (Della Ratta and Valeriani 2014, Thakur and De 2016, Ray. ‧. and Tarafdar 2017, van Dijck and al. 2017, Shen and al. 2019).. sit. y. Nat. On the other side are the scholars who doubt social media’s capacity to improve. io. er. advocacy groups’ ability to promote social change (Shirky 2011). For instance, some researchers pointed out that social media do not escape to the control of authoritarian. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. governments, and do not seem to prevent activists from being repressed (Greitens 2013, Reuter. engchi. and Szakonyi 2015, Rød and Weidmann 2015). Besides, some studies even suggest that authoritarian states can use social media to tighten their grip on civil society (King and al. 2017). This thesis proposes to contribute to this debate by using the concept of norm socialization to explore social media’s impacts on activists’ capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes. Developed by constructivist scholars, the norm socialization process refers to the process by which advocates, also referred to as “norm-entrepreneurs,” transform an international standard, such as human rights, into a domestic norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Sikkink 2005). Successful norm socialization occurs when norm-entrepreneurs manage to convince both civil society and policymakers to adopt a new behavior.. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(7) Because, social media generate information flows, enable users to share videos and pictures as well as engaging with people based in other countries, they are expected to favor a norm socialization process. Indeed, to generate a successful norm socialization process, activists must be able to deliver information to the public, use symbolic content to rally supporters, and reach the international community to obtain its backing (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Therefore, the key to understanding the impacts of social media on activists’ capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes is to observe to which extent they favor the creation of a norm socialization process. This thesis proposes to conduct such an analysis by observing how the new Chinese feminist movement uses social media in its struggle to promote women’s rights in the PRC.. 政治大. The decision to use the Chinese feminist movement as a case study is motivated by two. 立. reasons. First, China fulfilled all the essential criteria to study the impacts of social media on. ‧ 國. 學. activists’ capacity to challenge authoritarian regimes since it is an authoritarian state with the largest population of social media users.1. ‧. Second, over the past years, IR scholars have been discussing the attitude of the PRC. y. Nat. toward international standards. For some academicians, Beijing is a “norm maker” with an. sit. apparent tendency to challenge international norms rather than adopting them (Lanteigne 2020).. er. io. They base their argument on the fact that, for the past years, China has been promoting a. al. n. iv n C U Consensus” to highlights its rights (Milanovic 2020). Sometimes referred h e ntogascthe h i“Beijing political and economic model based on economic growth and restrictions on political and civic opposition to the “Washington Consensus” and Western neoliberalism (Kennedy 2010, Dirlik 2006), the “Chinese model” claims that economic development can be achieved without democratic institutions. Nevertheless, few have been considering the possibility that China might integrate international norms rather than fighting them. Therefore, by focusing on Chinese feminist movements and their use of the Chinese social media as a way of promoting women’s rights, not only this study contributes to the debate regarding social media’s impact on advocacy groups, but it also proposes to evaluate the prospect of a norm socialization process in Mainland China.. 1. “Number of social network users in selected countries in 2018 and 2023.” Statista, Dec. 2, 2019. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(8) 1.2.. Purpose of the Research. Through the study of the use of social media by Chinese feminist groups in their struggle to implement women’s rights norms, this thesis proposes to enrich two theoretical discussions: the impacts of social media on activism and the prospect of a norm socialization process in the PRC. From a broader point of view, the purpose of this research is to contribute to the literature on norm socialization and Chinese social movements. Expectantly, this thesis’ findings could help to guide future studies on these topics.. 1.3.. Research Questions. 治政大subsequently, the prospects of a social media’s impact on the norm socialization process and, 立 norm socialization process in the PRC. Stemming from this topic, the research questions of this. This research focuses on the use of social media by Chinese feminist activists to understand. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. study are:. A. What is the impact of social media on the norm socialization process? Since this thesis is based on the constructivist approach and focused on Mainland China, any. y. Nat. sit. answer to this question should include the following elements: a) how social media facilitate. er. io. (or not) Chinese women’s rights movements to engage with transnational actors, b) how social. al. n. iv n C what would be the consequences for Chinese women’s rights movements if they were deprived hen hi U c g of their social media accounts. media enable Chinese feminist movements to address and prevent sexual harassment, and c). B. Are social media supporting the spreading and adoption of international norms, or, on the contrary, are they restraining them? Any answer to this question should include the following elements: a) how do Chinese authorities respond to advocacy groups when they use social media, and b) what are the factors that generate a positive change and what are the ones that produce negative ones. Because a study of a norm socialization process must focus on the advocates’ efforts to promote their norm, This research analyses three cases representative to the Chinese feminist movements’ use of social media in their struggle to urge for anti-sexual harassment mechanisms to enforce women’s rights norms in the PRC. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(9) The first case study is the arrest and detention between March and April 2015 of five women’s rights activists, known as the “Feminist Five,”2 by the Chinese police for planning to distribute flyers regarding sexual harassment in public transportation during the International Women’s Day. Their detention was widely discussed on social media both within and outside China and triggered a wave of cyber protests. Thus, this case study would be used to analyze the role of social media as a link between domestic and international networks and as a potential means for activists to pressure a state. The second case study is a 2017 anti-sexual harassment campaign that spread from the city of Guangzhou to more than 20 others across the PRC.3 In March 2016, a group of feminist activists used online crowdfunding to finance the placing of anti-sexual harassment advertisements in Guangzhou’s subway. Despite some initial success, two months after being. 治政大still unable to obtain the right to Besides, regardless of the money collected, the activists were 立 post their advertisement as the authorities keep opposing them. More than one year after the launched, the fundraising campaign was banned from social media (Tsai and Wang 2019). 4. ‧ 國. 學. beginning of its campaign, the group decided to use social media to bypass the interdiction5 and launched a new action called “I am a Billboard Walking Against Harassment” (我是廣告牌，. ‧. 行走反騷擾). With a hundred supporters uploading pictures as a way of participating in the. y. Nat. campaign, the movement spread rapidly from Guangzhou to other cities before the authorities. io. sit. stopped it by harassing one of its organizers. Therefore, this case provides some elements. n. al. er. regarding how the Chinese regime reacts to cyber social movements.. Ch. i Un. v. The last event is the 2018 #MeToo movement. During this year, several women used. engchi. social media platforms to denounce men that have harassed them. Some of the accusations gained enough attention to lead to some concrete actions against the perpetrators. Besides, the same year, institutions such as the Ministry of Education started to adopt guidelines regarding sexual harassment. 6 Moreover, a draft of the civil code proposed that sexual harassment might lead to civil liabilities and that measures should be taken to prevent it in the workplace. 7 The #MeToo case demonstrates social media’s capacity to mobilize domestic attention and provide Sophie Beach, “Five Women’s rights Activists Criminally Detained,” China Digital Times, Mar. 13, 2015 Tony Lin, “End of the Line for Subway Ad Against Sexual Harassment,” Sixth Tone. Apr. 28, 2017 4 Ibid. 5 Yun Zou, “Feminist Activist Ignores Police Advice to Leave City,” Sixth Tone. May 22, 2017 6 Jun Liang, “Chinese Authorities Taking Measures to Prevent Sexual Harassment at Universities,” People’s Daily Online, Jan. 16, 2018 7 Hongyu, “Civil Code Draft Backs the Victims of Sexual Harasser,” People’s Daily Online, Aug. 28, 2018. 2 3. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(10) support to norm-entrepreneurs. The fact that the authorities initiated some reforms also provides some insights regarding their attitude toward social media.. 1.3.. Research Methods This research is a case study analysis of three events representative to the Chinese. feminist movements’ use of social media in their struggle to urge for anti-sexual harassment mechanisms to enforce women’s rights norms in the PRC. An analysis of a norm socialization process relies on two elements: the study of the norm-entrepreneurs’ efforts to advocate their norm and the authority’s reaction to these efforts.. 政治大 must perform in order to generate an effective norm socialization process: inform the public, 立 use symbols to rally supporters, and find support abroad. To link social media and norm The study the first element relies on the three essential tasks that norm-entrepreneurs. ‧ 國. 學. socialization, this research focuses on online publications aiming to fulfill advocating purposes, establishing a connection between Chinese women’s rights defenders and their foreign. ‧. counterparts, and carrying symbolic contents.. sit. y. Nat. Therefore, this research analyses a collection of 374 publications posted by six women’s. io. al. er. rights organizations and feminist activists on the Chinese social media Sina Weibo (新浪微博). n. during four specific periods: from March 7 to April 13, 2015; May 2017; from January to. Ch. i Un. v. February 2018; and from July to August 2018. The observed women’s rights groups and activists are the following:. engchi. ● Bcome 小组 A feminist group based in Beijing and focused on gender and sexual rights. The organization was created in 2012 and is primarily a student drama club. However, the group now conducts awareness-raising campaigns through art and social advocacy. Their Weibo account has been created in 2012, at the same time as the organization, and is currently named “Bcome 小组” and followed by 2653 other accounts.. 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(11) ● F Feminist (F 女权小组) Formed in 2016 and based in Guangzhou, F Feminist is dedicated to promoting and advocating gender equality and women’s right through art, social activities, and workshop. Since November 2016, the group has a Weibo account followed by 229 users; however, it seems inactive since May 2017. ● Women Awakening (新媒体女性) A feminist network founded in 2004 and located in Guangzhou. It is specialized in promoting gender equality and monitor women’s rights in China. The organization has joined Weibo in 2011 and is currently followed by 604.571 other accounts. ● Feminist Activists (女性主義行動派). 治政 Based in Guangzhou, the group Feminist Activists organizes大 activities to advocate for women’s 立 rights and gender equality. The organization started its Weibo account in 2012 under the ‧ 國. 學. nickname “Feminist Action is delicious” (女权行动派很好吃), but was blocked by the platform in March 2016. The group created a new account in April, under the name “The. sit. y. Nat. users.. ‧. Feminist Activists can’t Finish” (女权行动派吃不完), which is currently followed by 10.931. io. er. ● Zhang Leilei (張累累). al. n. iv n C of the broad Chinese feminist movemenththat grew in 2012 e n g c h i Uand participated in many advocacy An activist for gender equality and LGBTQ rights, who is based in Guangzhou. Leilei is part campaigns, including the one who eventually led to the arrest of the “Feminist Five.” Her. activism is known outside of China as she gave several interviews to foreign media over the years. She started using Weibo in 2011 and is currently followed by 2.898 other accounts. ● Tai Feng (邰風) She participated in the creation of a helpline to support women facing gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace in Guangzhou. She also wrote a report on gender discrimination in Guangzhou universities. Her Weibo account was launched in 2015 and is followed by 684 other users.. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(12) ● Xiao Meili (肖美麗) She participated in many feminist campaigns since 2010, including a 2.500km hike between 2013 and 2014, to raise awareness against sexual harassment. She also gave interviews and wrote articles for foreign media on feminism in China and participated in workshops and seminars abroad. She created a Weibo account in 2010, which is currently followed by 22.708 users and another one in 2013, followed by 14.924 other accounts. To study the second element, this research analyses how the Chinese authorities responded to the online campaigns created by feminist groups and organizations by looking at articles published by the CCP’s mouthpieces and the publications released by the All-China Women’s Federation on its Weibo account. It also uses a tool developed by GreatFire.org, an. 治政 authorities’ reactions: FreeWeibo, which allows retrieving大 censored contents. Besides, this 立 study also relies on the reports published by China Digital Times, an organization dedicated to. organization dedicated to the monitoring of internet censorship in China, to monitor the Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. monitoring online censorship in China. Finally, this analysis is also based on relevant information from different academic sources (Chen and Ang 2011, King and al. 2013, King and. ‧. al. 2017), media, and organization reporting on online censorship and feminism in China.. Nat. sit. y. Finally, this research also includes an analysis of the outcomes of each case, especially. io. er. gains and losses made by the domestic society and the state. Are recognized as gains, any change that might potentially lead to the implementation of mechanisms to prevent and. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. condemn sexual harassment. Indeed, such changes can be signs of institutionalization of. engchi. women’s rights by the state. On the contrary, are considered losses, any change that undermines women’s rights activists’ capacity to keep pushing for reforms. Through this approach, this paper observes to which extent Chinese advocacy groups can rely on social media to foster a norm socialization process.. 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(13) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(14) Chapter II: Literature Review The following chapter is dedicated to the conceptualization of norm socialization, social media, and feminism. It will first discuss concepts of international norms and norm socialization from a constructivist point of view, based on the theories developed by Finnemore, Sikkink, Keck, and Risse. Then, it will explore the connection between norm socialization and social media based on previous studies of social media’s influence on social movements and transnationalism. Finally, it will investigate IR feminist theories.. 2.1.. International Norms and Norm Socialization. 政治大 developed by Finnemore and Sikkink through their life-cycle model, which emphasized the role 立 One of the first theories regarding the apparition and diffusion of an international norm was. of international organizations and argued that norms emerge and “cascade” before being. ‧ 國. 學. internalized (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). A norm first emergences, promoted by a norm entrepreneur. During this first stage, the norm is highly contested and competes with other. ‧. norms as well as differing interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Ultimately, the norm. y. Nat. entrepreneur successfully convinces others to adopt his standard, which begins to be diffused. sit. at the international level (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). During this process, described as a. er. io. “cascade,” states decide to follow the norm because they care about their legitimacy and. al. n. iv n C h e n and and widely integrated into practice (Finnemore h i U1998). g cSikkink. reputation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the final stage, the norm is not discussed anymore. In the last decades, the life-cycle model has been criticized for depicting the norm diffusion of a norm as a one-way, global-to-local, diffusion (Krook and True 2012, Roggeband 2016). Another approach based on domestic dynamics has emerged, focusing on the local development of norms and the diversity of actors (Zwingel 2012, Roggeband 2016). Nevertheless, regardless of its origins, to be diffused, a norm has to undergo a norm socialization process before being fully integrated into practice by a state. Because states are not always willing to adopt new standards, domestic norm-entrepreneurs might have to reach out for the support of international advocacy networks (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Keck and Sikkink 1999). This mechanism has been described as a “boomerang pattern” by Keck and Sikkink (Keck and Sikkink 1999). This model argues that, when facing opposition from the 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(15) state, domestic norm-entrepreneurs connect with foreign actors to ask for support. This support can have multiple forms, ranging from official statements condemning the norm violations to direct financial assistance to local organizations (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Therefore, external support reinforces domestic norm-entrepreneurs’ capacities while putting the state under the scrutiny of a global audience. In reaction, authorities have less incentive to use repression against social movements (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Ultimately, the state begins to integrate the norm into practice. Finally, the “boomerang pattern” emphasizes the importance of networking as well as “information politics” and “symbolic politics” (Risse and Sikkink 1999). “Information politics” refer to the flow of information between local and global actors, which is essential to the promotion of norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999). By collecting information and sharing them with. 治政 (Sikkink 2005). “Symbolic politics” concern contents that,大 given their emotional and visual 立 impact, can be used as symbols by both local and international norm-entrepreneurs to rally more. foreign actors, they can put their country under the scrutiny of the international community. ‧ 國. 學. followers to their cause (Risse and Sikkink 1999).. The nature of social media coincides with the logic of the “boomerang pattern.” First,. ‧. social media are based on the notion of networking, which is also a core component of the. sit. y. Nat. model. Second, social media facilitate “information politics” by improving the speed of the information flows vertically, between domestic and international actors, and horizontally,. io. n. al. er. among the local and global societies. Finally, because they have an extraordinary capacity to. i Un. v. put in circulation videos and images rapidly, social media can circulate emotions and, therefore,. Ch. encourage the use of “symbolic politics.”. 2.2.. engchi. Social Media and Norm Socialization. Social media started to be massively used during the first decade of the 21 st century, and have never stopped to grow in both size and importance since. Nowadays, their logos are omnipresent; their users comprise organizations, companies, and governmental institutions. In April 2020, more than 3.8 billion people were using social media.8. 8. “Global digital population as of April 2020.” Statista, Apr. 24, 2020. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(16) From a general point of view, social media can be understood as internet-based services utilized by individuals to communicate with each-others and share opinions and ideas instantly. They are also used by people to build a social network, which is the number of connections established with other users (Boyd and Ellison 2007, Obar and Wildman 2015). What makes these virtual platforms live is the contents created and published by their users (Obar and Wildman 2015). Their forms are diverse and vary from one service to another. Twitter, for example, only authorizes users to post a short text or a link to another website; in comparison, Instagram limits its contents to pictures and brief videos.. Social Media and Social Movements Domestic social movements play a crucial role in the “boomerang pattern” by being the main. 政治大. initiator of an international collective action (Sikkink 2005). Social movements are networks. 立. of organizations and individuals sharing common beliefs that decide to take collective actions. ‧ 國. 學. on conflictual issues (Della Porta 2020, Diani 1992). They arise from preexisting social networks (Taylor and Rupp 2002), rely on informal interactions and solidarity (Diani 1992),. threaten a social order (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).. Nat. y. ‧. and their effectiveness in generating social change depends on their capacity to disrupt or. sit. Many scholars have depicted social media as a “liberation technology,” boosting social. er. io. movements’ capacities and, therefore, having a positive effect on the norm socialization process.. al. n. iv n C U that they serve the interests of media’s impact on social movements is h overstated e n g c hori even However, this point of view is not shared by all the researchers, and some argue that social. authoritarian regimes rather than civil society.. According to John C. Bertot and al., social media, combined with other new technologies such as e-government and mobile technologies, allow citizens to stay informed about government and public officials’ performances, which promotes transparency and social change (Bertot and al. 2010). In their study of several Asian social movements, including the 2009-2010 Iranian “Green Revolution,” the 2014 “Sunflower Protest” in Taiwan, and the 2014 “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong, Thakur and De concluded that social media played a crucial role in the creation of these movements. According to them, social media circulate information on social movements that shape the opinion of users and encourage them to mobilize 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(17) (Thakur and De 2016). Another analysis of the Hong Kong 2014 “Umbrella Movement” supports their statement. According to its authors, individuals’ motivation to take part in the social movement partially depended on the information they received through social media platforms (Shen and al. 2019). An analysis of the utilization of Twitter during protests against violence on women in India in 2012 offers the same findings. According to the study, social media allowed social activists and public figures to raise awareness regarding women’s conditions in India, which created environmental conditions favorable to the rise of a social movement (Ray and Tarafdar 2017). Besides, the authors also point out that social media allowed activists to mobilize the civil society through the rapid share of information regarding incoming protests and the circulation of petitions addressed to the authorities (Ray and Tarafdar 2017). Finally, Twitter. 政治大. hashtags strengthen the movement by bringing together participants under a collective cyber identity (Ray and Tarafdar 2017).. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that the role of social media is overstated. Based on studies of the “civil rights movement” that happened in the United States in the 1960s, Gladwell argues that social media do not turn people into activists (Gladwell 2010). Cyberactivism does. ‧. not require to take part in physical activities, which are the main component of a social. sit. y. Nat. movement (Gladwell 2010). Besides, netizens are unlikely to support each other as their bounds are weak, given the fact that they do not necessarily know each other (Gladwell 2010). Finally,. io. n. al. er. networks are less efficient than hierarchic organizations, which undermines their capacity to. i Un. v. mobilize supporters and resources to conduct actions (Gladwell 2010).. Ch. engchi. Moreover, opponents to the norm, such as governments or interest groups, might also use social media as a tool to push their agenda. First, states can restrain access to the internet and social media’s contents (Rød and Weidmann 2015), which prevents norm-entrepreneurs from reaching a public. In their study of the Russian 2011-2012 election cycle, Reuter and Szakonyi pointed out that Facebook and Twitter users were more aware of electoral frauds because the opposition was very active on those social media (Reuter and Szakonyi 2015). However, overall, only a minority was informed of such misconducts as the majority of Russian netizens use native networking platforms where the authorities are better able to monitor and control the spread of information (Reuter and Szakonyi 2015). In North Korea, the access to the domestic intranet is a privilege reserved to members of the elites who are loyal to the regime (Greitens 2013).. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(18) Second, if advocacy groups can rely on social media to enhance their visibility and engage a public debate, authorities still have access to an extensive set of tools, such as using the police and judiciary system to harass and detain activists (Shirky 2011). Finally, social media can be used by the state as a means to diffuse its propaganda. Therefore, users are more likely to adopt “state-approved” norms and adhere to official narratives rather than opposing them. King and al.’s analysis of China’s “50ct Army” demonstrates that the CCP is investing resources to spread its propaganda on Chinese social media (King and al. 2017). Besides, Chinese propaganda does not only depend on the regimes’ agencies. It also relies on the netizens who are encouraged to express their loyalty toward the CCP (King and al. 2017).. Social Media and Transnationalism. 立. 政治大. Since the mid-1990s, the concept of transnationalism has been widely studied by IR scholars,. ‧ 國. 學. especially among constructivists (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Sikkink 2005). Besides, transnational actors are key actors in the norm socialization process as they provide support to. ‧. domestic norm-entrepreneurs (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).. sit. y. Nat. The main actors of transnationalism are: INGOs, transnational advocacy networks,. io. er. transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). INGOs are defined by the presence of members from at least three different countries in. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. their decision-making structure (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). These organizations plan. engchi. and conduct actions aiming to create social changes in the different countries through their local chapters. Transnational coalitions involve actors from different countries who are advocating the same norm and try to improve their actions by sharing strategies and best practices (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Transnational advocacy networks are less formal and are structured around exchanges of information between actors from different countries sharing similar values (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Compared to INGOs, transnational coalition, and transnational social movements, those networks do not have a high level of coordination (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Finally, transnational social movements are similar to domestic ones with the difference that they can generate and maintain social mobilization in more than one country (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). However, those movements do not coordinate with each other 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(19) (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). Nevertheless, because they can organize actions aiming to disturb the social order such as protests, those movements are supposedly more effective in bringing changes that the other forms of transnationalism (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). With the globalization and the rise of new communication tools, including social media, civil society members became more connected with their foreign counterparts (Perret 2006, Feenstra 2017). Therefore, some scholars have investigated how social media could strengthen transnationalism. In their study of the Egyptian social movement to free Al Jazeera journalists between 2013 and 2015, Daud Isa and Itai Himelboin determined that social media can be used by social activists to reach a broader audience (Isa and Himelboin 2018). Their analysis of Twitter demonstrated that the use of hashtags enables activists to connect and collaborate with other social movements and, therefore, reach and mobilize a higher number of supporters (Isa. 政治大 Researches on the use of立 social media during the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia and Egypt. and Himelboin 2018).. ‧ 國. 學. revealed that activists were successful in drawing international attention by translating and posting information related to their movements on Facebook and Twitter (Della Ratta and Valeriani 2014, van Dijck and al. 2017). In return, encouragements and sympathy from abroad. ‧. displayed on social media motivated and boosted protesters (Eltantawy and Wiest 2011).. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. IR Feminist Theories. io. 2.3.. Ch. i Un. v. This research defines “feminism,” as an ideology promoting gender equality and challenging. engchi. gender-based norms and “women’s rights” as a set of norms, which purpose are to ensure that women enjoy the same civil, political, and economic rights as men. Since it can be assumed that feminist activists advocate women’s rights, this study considers women’s rights activists, groups, movements, and organizations, and feminist activists, groups, movements, and organizations as synonyms. However, it acknowledges the fact that feminist and women’s rights activists also have different agendas and can coexist independently. Feminist theories emphasize the understanding of male-dominated structures and how they discriminate against women and create disparity (Tickner 1997). Therefore, these studies mainly focus on women’s political, social, and economic disadvantages (Tickner 2006).. 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(20) Feminist theories made their entrance into the domain of IR in the 1980s, and empirical feminist studies started to flourish in the mid-1990s (Tickner 2006). Feminist scholars propose an alternative lecture on IR topics. For example, they discuss the role of gender-based hierarchic orders in the uneven distribution of resources and wealth among states (Tickner 1997, Tickner 2006). A feminist lecture of IR also The feminist approach also tries to incorporate gender-based issues in already existing frameworks such as, for instance, the inclusion of gender-based violence in the study of international conflicts (Kirby 2013). The merging of women’s rights into human rights is another example of the feminist attempt to enlarge the scope of the IR field (Bunch 1990). Furthermore, compared to other IR theoretical frameworks, feminism seeks the accomplishment of an objective: the achievement of gender equality (Tickner 1997). Therefore,. 政治大 making processes and a reshape立 of international institutions, policies, and norms to be more. feminist scholars and policymakers are advocating for the inclusion of women in decision-. ‧ 國. 學. inclusive toward gender-based issues and minorities (Ackerly and True 2018). However, this view is not unchallenged, and some IR scholars, such as Francis. ‧. Fukuyama. These academicians do not deny the importance of gender equality but are skeptical regarding what they describe as a feminist utopia (Fukuyama 2012). According to them,. y. Nat. sit. violence and power are rooted in human nature rather than the outcomes of a patriarchal society. er. io. (Fukuyama 2012). Therefore, according to this argument, gender equality is unlikely to resolve. al. some issues such as war and other forms of inter-state conflicts (Fukuyama 2012).. n. iv n C Nevertheless, feminism remains h a significant theoretical i U approach that has inspired and engch. continues to inspire domestic and transnational social movements. At the international level, feminist theories shaped the agenda, vocabulary, and objectives of women’s rights (Moghadam 2005). Feminist transnational advocacy networks try to pressure states that do not observe women’s rights by calling on the international community and the public to push them to apply norms (Moghadam 2005). They also participate in the various IGOs events such as the United Nations assemblies and conventions, during which they lobby to ensure that the organizations take measures to implement women’s rights (Tripp 2006, Moghadam 2005, Friedman 2003). Finally, they participate in the policymaking process of the IGOs by submitting their reports and recommendations to the different bodies in charge of reviewing and establishing global policies (Moghadam 2005).. 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(21) At the domestic level, feminist transnational advocacy networks collaborate with media, local women’s rights organizations, and other advocacy networks sharing similar values such as human rights groups to help them convince the civil society and the authorities to adopt women’s rights norms (Moghadam 2005). In return, local women’s rights aim to address issues mainly faced by women, such as gender-based inequalities. They can also be used to focus attention on problems that affect the entire community, such as rural poverty (Ferree and Mueller 2005). Finally, transnational advocacy networks’ support can be financial, logistics, or in terms of knowledge (Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001).. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(22) Chapter III: Women’s rights as International Norms The following chapter is dedicated to the introduction of women’s rights as international norms. It will first discuss the emergence of the norms and the role played by women’s rights transnational organizations between the end of the 19th century until the end of the Second World War. Then, it will explore how women’s rights were integrated into the United Nations’ framework. Finally, it will discuss the major obstacles encountered by transnational feminist advocacy groups.. 3.1.. Emergence and First Waves of Transnational Mobilization Women’s rights started emerged and spread as international norms during the final. 政治大 During this period were created, for instance, the International Council of Women, the 立 International Alliance of Women, and the Women’s International League for Peace and. decade of the 19th century, with the apparition of the first transnational women organizations.. ‧ 國. 學. Freedom, which compose the first wave of feminist activists (Tripp 2006). All of them sought to generate an international social movement by conducting joint activities in different countries. ‧. and creating local chapters or networks (Taylor and Rupp 2002). By the end of the First World. y. Nat. War, women’s rights activists were active all around the world, organized in INGOs,. er. io. sit. transnational advocacy networks, and transnational coalitions (Tripp 2006). During this period, feminist organizations were mainly focusing on obtaining civil and. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. political rights such as the right to vote, the right to employment, or the right to obtain the. engchi. husband’s nationality (Taylor and Rupp 2002, Tripp 2006). These movements were also advocating for peace before the two World Wars (Taylor and Rupp 2002, Tripp 2006). From the point of view of IR, these organizations also tried to include women’s rights on the agenda of the League of Nations through advocacy actions (Taylor and Rupp 2002, Tripp 2006). From the Feminists’ efforts paid off after the First World War, as women obtained the right to vote in most countries. After having emerged and then cascaded, the norm was at the final stage of its socialization process. However, transnational feminists organizations continued to push forward and began to advocate for a better representation of women in politics, equality of chances, and against gender-based discrimination in the workplace (Paxton and al. 2006). This period also corresponds to the second wave of transnational mobilization, during which feminist 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(23) organizations, started to be more grassroots and more independent from Western ideologies (Tripp 2006). Women’s rights activists also continued to actively participate in international debates to make sure that their cause stays on the agenda of the United Nations and other IGOs. For instance, they worked to ensure the inclusion of the term “equal rights of men and women” in the 1945 United Nations Charter (Paxton and al. 2006). Therefore, women’s rights were progressively adopted and advocated by the UN in the second half of the 20th century.. Women’s rights as part of the UN Norms. 3.2.. The United Nations plays a central role in the ongoing spreading of women’s rights norms at. 政治大. the global level. The IGO organizes venues, offers space for discussion, and provides financial. 立. and logistic supports to women’s rights organizations worldwide (Snyder 2006). The UN is also. ‧ 國. 學. a place were feminist NGOs, and INGOs can lobby governments to ensure that women’s rights stay on the international agenda (Synder 2006).. ‧. Between 1975 and 1995, the United Nations organized four World Conferences on Women (Mexico City, Mexico, 1975, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1980, Nairobi, Kenya, 1985, and. y. Nat. sit. Beijing, China, 1995). In the meantime, the UN established the United Nations Development. al. er. io. Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 1976 and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of. v. n. Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, which has been ratified by 189 countries 9. Ch. i Un. since. The convention also stipulates the creation of the Committee on the Elimination of. engchi. Discrimination against Women, which is in charge of ensuring that parties are implementing the convention. The number of attending NGOs the conferences doubled between 1975 and 1995, reaching 12 000 participants in Beijing. 10 This increase is explained by the proliferation of grassroots organizations in developing countries and resulted in the expansion of the debate to include violence against women, women’s economic issues, women’s rights during wartime, and the conditions of women living in developing countries (Tripp 2006).. UN Human rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women - Status of Ratification,” https://indicators.ohchr.org/ 10 UN Women, “World Conferences on Women” https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/intergovernmentalsupport/world-conferences-on-women 9. 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(24) This enlargement was formally acknowledged during the 1995 UN World Conference on Women with the adoption of the “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,” which recognizes 12 critical areas where gender equality must be achieved: 1. Women and poverty 2. Education and training of women 3. Women and health 4. Violence against women 5. Women and armed conflict 6. Women and the economy 7. Women in power and decision-making 8. Institutional mechanism for the advancement of women 9. Human rights of women 10. Women and the media. 立. 政治大. 11. Women and the environment. ‧ 國. 學. 12. The girl-child. The parties also agreed on reviewing the implementation of the “Beijing Declaration. ‧. and Platform for Action” every five years. In 1996, the UN created the UN Trust Fund to End. y. Nat. Violence against Women. To this date, the institution has funded 462 initiatives in 139 countries. io. sit. and territories for a total of 128 million USD.11 In 1999, the UN General Assembly created the. n. al. er. Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. Parties to the protocol agree to let the Committee on the. i Un. v. Elimination of Discrimination against Women receive and consider complaints from their citizens.. Ch. engchi. In parallel, feminists activists also worked to include women’s rights into the agenda of other UN agendas such as human rights and development policies (Tripp 2006, Moghadam 2005, Friedman 2003). For instance, women’s rights organizations participated in the side events of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the 1993 World Conference on human rights, in Vienna, Austria, and the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, in Cairo, Egypt (Friedman 2003). As those events generally conclude with the adoption of a political agreement like a treaty or a convention, Defenders lobbied the delegates to ensure that the final text includes some dispositions to improve the status of women. For instance, the “Agenda 21” adopted in Rio had a chapter UN Women, “UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women,”https://www.unwomen.org/en/trust-funds/un-trust-fund-toend-violence-against-women 11. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(25) entitled ‘‘Global Action for Women Towards Sustainable and Equitable Development’’ (Friedman 2003). After 2000, the inclusion of women’s rights into the UN framework continued. In 2010, UN Women replaced the UNIFEM, in 2015 of “Gender Equality” was adopted as one of the 17 goals of the “UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”12 In 2020, the 64th Commission on the Status of Women, which also corresponds to Beijing+25, was supposed to be a new occasion to assemble the different women’s rights movements and review the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. A forum, hosted in Mexico City and Paris, was also planned to gather a coalition of stakeholders from IGOs, NGOs, and the private sectors.13 Unfortunately, all the events were postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.. 政治大. Nevertheless, the fact that these events were programed testifies the fact that women’s. 立. rights continue to be part of the international agenda, that transnational feminist advocacy. ‧ 國. ‧. 3.3.. 學. groups pursue their activities, and, therefore, that a norm socialization process is still ongoing.. Main Challenges to the Spreading and Institutionalization of Women’s rights. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. external challenges that slow their progression.. sit. Despite the successes encountered by feminist activists, women’s rights still face internal and. i Un. v. Internal challenges are characterized by tensions between Western women’s rights. Ch. engchi. organizations and their Southern counterparts. These tensions arose during the period of the four World Conferences on Women and were emblematic of the growing divergences between Western and Southern policymakers (Eyler 2015, Tripp 2006). Feminist organizations from developing countries were especially concerned by development policies and critical of their Western correlatives, sometimes depicted as representatives of Western imperialism (Eyler 2015, Tripp 2006). In addition, in some cases, Western TANs feminist support elite of educated women, at the expense of women living in rural areas or belonging to a minority, undermining the capacity of grassroots movements (Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001). Finally, some tensions find their sources in the activities conducted by Western transnational advocacy. UN Sustainable Development Goals, “Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/ 13 Generation Equality Forum https://forum.generationequality.org/about 12. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(26) networks, such as seminars, as they generate a form of hierarchy between the global and Western “educators” and the local organizations in need of being “educated” to the proper women’s rights norms (Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001). However, this internal conflict was eventually partially resolved during the 1990s when a consensus was reached regarding the broad definition of women’s rights and their inclusions in other international norms such as environmental standards and human rights (Tripp 2006). Nevertheless, some feminist advocacy groups continue to consider women’s rights as Western norms related to Western values and do not entirely adopt nor promote them (Zwingel 2012). This issue also points out that the institutionalization of women’s rights norms dramatically varies from one country to another as grassroots organizations’ visions and interests differ from the ones of INGOs and transnational organizations (Zwingel 2012, Levitt and Merry 2009, Friedman 2003).. 立. Besides, women’s rights. 政治大 organizations are challenged. by counter-movements,. ‧ 國. 學. especially religious groups (Chappell 2006, Friedman 2003). Because they consider that women have to fulfill predefined roles and responsibilities and are motivated by religious beliefs, these groups are opposed to a certain aspect of women’s rights, such as the right to have an abortion. ‧. (Chappell 2006, Friedman 2003). For instance, Christian and Muslim organizations attended. y. Nat. the World Conferences on Women and at the other UN events to try to stifle the voices of. io. sit. feminist activists (Chappell 2006, Friedman 2003). The same as women’s rights organizations. n. al. er. enjoy the support of liberal democracies. These groups are backed by religious-based. i Un. v. governments such as Iran or the Vatican, which both actively fought the inclusion of terms that. Ch. engchi. could encourage abortion laws in political agreements (Chappell 2006). Ultimately, feminist organizations focus on urging the authorities to either apply their own regulations in terms of women’s rights or to create new ones to fill the gaps (Levitt and Merry 2009). For example, according to the Hong Kong-based NGO China Labor Bulletin, the PRC’s laws and policies are supposed to ensure women’s access to employment, but, in reality, female job seekers are often victims of discrimination.14 Besides, the government seems to turn a blind eye on the issue. 15 Thus, another critical obstacle that women’s rights activists have to overcome is to convince their government to adopt and implement their norms.. 14 15. China Labor Bulletin, “Workplace discrimination,” Apr. 15, 2019. Ibid.. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(27) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(28) Chapter IV: Norm Socialization, Social Media, and Women’s rights in the People’s Republic of China The following chapter is dedicated to the understanding of norm socialization and women’s rights in the PRC. It will first discuss who are the Chinese actors of norm socialization and their relationship with the state. Then it will explain how the CCP monitors the internet and social media. Finally, it will explore the current situation of women’s rights in Mainland China.. 4.1.. Norm Socialization in China As the Chinese civil society remains under the management of the CCP, there is little. 治政 mobilization is likely to be rapidly turned down by the state 大 if they are perceived as threatening 立 the CCP’s legitimacy and social order (Fleay 2012). For instance, groups engaged in activities space available for Chinese social movements to develop. Any form of advocacy and. ‧ 國. 學. that could directly challenge the CCP leadership and decisions such as advocacy, legal aid, labor rights, and religion are often closely monitored by the authorities. 16 The measures taken. ‧. by the authorities can aim to undermine an organization’s ability to conduct its work or directly target the activists, who can be harassed, forced to resign, or imprisoned.17. sit. y. Nat. io. er. Besides, Chinese advocates’ efficiency is undermined by their lack of organizational capacity. Many Chinese advocacy organizations, such as the environmentalist ones, struggle to. n. al. Ch. i Un. v. mobilize supporters because they do not have skilled professional staff and sufficient funding. engchi. (Xie 2015). The absence of political and social recognition are also two critical barriers that Chinese social movements have to overcome (Xie 2015). Furthermore, many Chinese advocacy groups are facing precarity because they do not have legal status. Not having a juridical status such as being recognized as “social organization” (社會組織) is a significant barrier to the development of an organization because it prevents it from engaging in fundraising activities and being exempted from taxes (Deng 2010). Moreover, according to the PRC’s law, organizations without legal status can be disbanded (Deng 2010). However, to be legally recognized, organizations must be sponsored by a representative of the government and receive the approval of the local Civil Affairs Bureau (民政局) and the. 16 17. “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Mar. 1, 2020 Ibid.. 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(29) Ministry of Civil Affairs (中華人民共和國民政部) (Deng 2010, Chan 2013). These rules penalize Chinese organizations that do not have enough resources and contacts within the state’s administration to find a patron and conduct the dual registration. Advocacy groups seeking to generate social changes are even less likely to obtain a juridical status as few would like to be affiliated to them, given the fact that they represent a risk of being harassed by the authorities. Moreover, since President Xi Jinping accessed to power in 2013, social movements are squeezed by the government’s effort to promote a “stronger Party and a stronger China.” 18 Activists’ actions aiming to address public issues are clashing with the CPP’s attempts to create a “civil society with Chinese characteristics.” 19 Since these “Chinese characteristics” are opposed to Western-conceptions of civil society, social movements’ relaying “foreign. 政治大. ideologies” such as human rights are seen as suspicious by the authorities (Deng 2010).. 立. On the other hand, the state encourages organizations that it considers as being useful. ‧ 國. 學. and whose actions support its own goals.20 However, given the size of Mainland China and the multitude of government agencies and local branches, which all have different visions and. ‧. objectives, official support to a social movement might vary from one place to another (Xie and Van Der Heijden 2010). Groups providing services such as poverty alleviation or eldercare, like. y. Nat. sit. industries, trade organizations, and charities, enjoy more freedom and have access to more. er. io. resources because their activities can more efficiently serve the government’s objectives. Some. al. iv n C authorities that it offers essential serviceshto the state is alsoU e n g c h i critical to an organization that seeks to have a legal status (Tam and Hasmath 2015). n. of these groups can also be exempted from the dual registration.21 Therefore, convincing the. Besides, a social movement that would, at first, be perceived as a threat can still be able to succeed if its relationship with the authorities is good enough. For example, because it considers religion as a historical threat against the government and a way for foreign powers to infiltrate. China,. the. CCP. generally. represses. religious. social. movements. (Tam and Hasmath 2015). However, some organizations such as Christian religious groups are still capable of prospering due to their ties with local agents and their capacity to link their actions with the state’s agenda (Tam and Hasmath 2015). Other ways of surviving include “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 “China - At Glance.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020 18 19. 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(30) collaborating with legal organizations such as GONGOs and conducting activities under their name, registering as a commercial organization, or keeping a low profile (Chan 2013). Nevertheless, none of these solutions are optimal as partners can decide to stop their support if they feel that the actions taken in their name will draw the attention of the state (Chan 2013). In the same manner, commercial organizations can be de-registered if the authorities decide that their activities are off-limits (Chan 2013). On the other hand, the CCP might prefer a social movement that remains public since it is easier to monitor than one that stays hidden (Chan 2013). Finally, GONGOs such as the ACWF (中華全國婦女聯合會) can also play a role in Chinese social movements. GONGOs are created by the state to support its policies and channel. 治政 more independent, depending on their ability to attract nongovernmental resources and improve 大立 their capacities (Wu 2003). As a GONGO draws more local and international experts as well society’s demand (Deng 2010, Wu 2003). However, some of those organizations can become. 學. ‧ 國. as retired high-level officials and other public figures, it can increase its aptitudes to develop and carry on its own policies and missions (Wu 2003). For instance, the Center for Environment. ‧. Education and Communication (生態環境部宣傳教育中心) (CEEC) is a GONGO in charge of raising awareness on environmental issues. Still, the organization extended its mandate and. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. actors (Wu 2003).. sit. now supports grassroots environmental NGOs and facilitates exchanges with international. Ch. i Un. v. Thus, despite the initial constraints imposed by the state, the number of advocacy. engchi. groups, GONGOs, and other drivers of social movements has been growing in China, strengthening the possibilities of a successful norm socialization process.22. China and Transnationalism There are several obstacles preventing INGOs, transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements from being fully operative in the PRC. First, Chinese advocacy groups’ lack of resources directly affects transnational advocacy. 22. “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020. 25 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(31) networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements’ capacity to be active in China since they rely on local organizations (Fleay 2012, Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002). Second, since 2017, the Law of People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China (中華人民共和國境外非政府組織境內活動管理法), raises barriers for INGOs seeking to be active in the PRC. According to the law, foreign NGOs must register with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and find a domestic sponsor (government or government-affiliated organization) before being allowed to operate in China.23 Therefore, the first obstacle that INGOs have to overcome is to establish secure connections with the government. Besides, INGOs' capacities to advocate a norm are limited. First, the authorities restrict their range of actions to the domains judged as “useful,” which are, according to Article 3,. 政治大. economics, education, science, culture, health, sports, environmental protection, poverty, and. 立. disaster relief. Second, the regulation forbids INGOs to engage in activities that could be seen. ‧ 國. 學. as threatening the social order. Article 5 stipulates that INGOs “shall not threaten China’s national reunification and security or ethnic unity, nor harm China’s national and social. ‧. interests,” and Article 47 prohibits “inciting resistance to laws and regulations,” “spreading rumors,” and “funding political activities.” This regulation harms INGO’s ability to generate. Nat. sit. y. successful norm socialization by undermining their capacity to disrupt the social order, which. io. er. is a crucial step in the process (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Therefore, the second major obstacle that INGOs have to overcome is to convince the Chinese authorities that their activities. n. al. Ch. are not damaging the CCP’s leadership.. engchi. i Un. v. Finally, the law enables the authorities to monitor and pressure the INGOs that they suspect of being off-limits. Thus, INGOs are never entirely free from potential coercive measures. For example, according to Article 41 of the Law on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations: “Where public security organs discover behavior they suspect violates the provisions of this Law in the course of performing oversight and supervision, they may adopt the following measures in accordance with the law: (1) Interview the chief representative and other representatives of the representative office of an overseas NGO; (2) Enter the premises or site of the activities of the overseas NGO in the mainland of China to carry out an inspection; (3). 23. “Fact Sheet on China’s Foreign NGO Law.” ChinaFile, Nov.1, 2017. 26 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(32) Question organizations and individuals related to the incident being investigated and require them to clarify matters related to the incident being investigated; (4) Consult and copy documents and materials relevant to the incident being investigated and seal up for safekeeping documents or materials that could otherwise be moved, destroyed, concealed or altered; (5) Shut down premises and facilities, or seize property, suspected of involvement in illegal activities.” Third, China’s economic power also undermines the efforts of transnational actors. An efficient norm socialization process relies on the national and transnational movements’ abilities to draw the attention of the international community on a state’s misconduct (Risse and Sikkink 1999). However, since the late 1990s, China’s trade partners, excepted the United States, are reluctant to publicly urge the PRC to adopt certain norms such as human rights or. 政治大 Nevertheless, following 立 the same logic as for domestic organization, the CCP would. Freedom of Expression (Fleay 2006).. ‧ 國. 學. allow transnational actors to operate in China if it considers that their work is serving its interests. Morton’s study of the AIDS prevention campaign in the Yunnan province during the early 2000s shows that the Chinese government started by denying the issue before. ‧. progressively recognizing it and finally supporting the joint efforts of an INGO, Safe the. sit. y. Nat. Children, and grassroots organizations to raise awareness among local populations and create a. io. al. er. prevention center (Morton 2005).. n. Besides, the CCP is not entirely immune to external pressures. The creation of. Ch. i Un. v. environmental GONGOs was motivated by the globalization of environmental issues and the. engchi. need to have credible organizations able to represent the PRC during international conferences and summits (Wu 2005). Hosting the Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the affiliated NGOs summits in 1995 forced the CCP to encourage the creation of Chinese women’s rights NGOs to ensure the participation of the PRC to those events (Howell 2003). Therefore, the Chinese government would sometimes prefer to respond to internal and external forces by adopting a pragmatic stance and make some concessions rather than oppose and subjugate a social movement (Fleay 2006).. 27 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(33) 4.2. Social Media in China. The PRC has the largest population of social media users in the world, which is two times larger than the one from the second-ranking country, India.24 In June 2019, China had more than 850 million netizens,25 and 72% of them had an account on a social media platform.26 For instance, in 2019, on average, the Chinese social media Sina Weibo counted 516 million monthly users,27 while WeChat, combined with its Mainland counterpart, Weixin (微信), registered more than 1 billion. 28 However, giving the diversity of services offered by WeChat and Weixin, it is difficult to define the part of users that use them solely as social media. The Chinese regime’s relationship with social media is complicated. On one hand, the authorities have been investing in digital technologies, enhancing access to cyberspace, and. 治政 MacKinnon 2011). For instance, the PRC is a leading country 大 in the development of 5G 立 technologies, which aims to improve internet access.. building online networks as part of their plan to sustain the economic growth (Deibert 2002, 29. ‧ 國. 學. On the other hand, to remain in control of the civil society and avoid potential threats to its legitimacy, the Chinese government also invests considerable amounts of resources in. ‧. monitoring and censoring the internet (Chen and Ang 2011, Marolt 2011, King and al. 2013).. y. Nat. The GFW is a perfect illustration of how the Chinese regime controls the cyberspace and makes. sit. sure that netizens cannot access information that could harm its narrative. This tool has been. er. io. designed to deny access to foreign websites and social media and, therefore, restraining netizens’. al. n. iv n C U (Marolt 2011). For instance, h e nthegofficial specific information considered as threatening c h i narrative access to global content (Marolt 2011). The second aspect of the GFW is the censoring of. contents containing keywords related to “Taiwan” or “Tiananmen” are inaccessible for the average Chinese internet user (Marolt 2011). The GFW is enforced by the Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中華人民共和國網絡安全法), which stipulates that internet service providers (ISP), which are companies offering access to the web, and internet content provider (ICP), which are. “Number of social network users in selected countries in 2018 and 2023” Statista, Dec. 2, 2019 “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China.” China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Aug. 2019, p.13 26 “Active social network penetration in selected countries as of January 2020.” Statista, Feb 14, 2020 27 Sina Weibo 2019 Annual Report 28 Tencent 2019 Annual Report 29 China Internet Report 2019 24 25. 28 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(34) websites and other cyber platforms, must install filters and hire staff to ensure that netizens cannot access prohibited content (Yang 2014, Chen and Ang 2011). The GFW is also coupled with the deployment of an “internet police,” a double-measure that aims to refrain netizens from posting contents that could challenge Beijing’s central power (Chen and Ang 2011, King and al. 2013). Thus, the Chinese cyber police task is to frame online debates and ensure that the authorities remain in control of the cyberspace (Chen and Ang 2011). In addition to this censoring and policing strategy, the CCP also uses social media to diffuse its propaganda (King and al. 2017, King Pan, and Roberts 2013). For instance, in 2019, there were 139 270 government accounts on Weibo, diffusing both official information and state propaganda.30 Coupled with censorship, online propaganda serves as a way to remain in control of online debates and avoid the rise of an anti-government discourse by creating a. 政治大. counter-movement and generating distractions (King and al. 2017).. 立. This strategy has recently been reinforced with the 2020 Regulations on Ecological. ‧ 國. 學. Management of Network Information Content ( 網絡信息內容生態治理規定 ), which encourage Chinese netizens to use social media to promote the regime and its policies. For. Information Content:. ‧. example, according to Article 5 of the Regulations on Ecological Management of Network. y. Nat. io. sit. “Online information content producers are encouraged to make, reproduce, and publish. er. information containing the following content: (1) Content publicizing Xi Jinping Thought on. al. n. iv n C h eculture exposition of the path, theory, system, and i U with Chinese Characteristics. n g cofhSocialism Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; and complete, correct, and vivid. (2) Content publicizing the Party's theoretical path, directives and policies, and major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee; (3) Content presenting highlights in economic and social development, reflecting the people's great struggle and fervent lives; (4) Content promoting the Core Socialist Values, publicizing exceptional moral culture and zeitgeist, fully presenting the uplifting spirit of the Chinese people; (5) Effective responses to social concerns, resolving doubts and clearly analyzing, helping to guide the public in forming agreement;(6) Content that helps increase the international influence of Chinese culture, presenting the world with the true, three-dimensional, and complete China; (7) Other content that teaches taste, style, and responsibility; that praises truth, goodness, and beauty; and that promotes unity and stability”. “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China.” China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Aug. 2019, pp.66-68 30. 29 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.

(35) Chinese Social Media and Social Movements Like in other authoritarian countries, the internet is an important space where civil society can express its opinion and anger regarding specific social issues (Li and al. 2016). Cyberactivism and online social movements started in China at the end of the 1990s with the increasing popularization of the internet in urban centers and the first bulletin board systems (BBS), which are online forums (Yang 2009). For instance, online forums were used by netizens to protest against the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in former Yugoslavia and to oppose the construction of a chemical factory in Xiamen, Fujian province, in 2007 (Yang 2009). With the creation of the social media Weibo in 2009, the platform rapidly became a privileged tool for activists (Liu 2015).. 政治大. Chinese activists, especially those belonging to grassroots movements, are among the most active social media users (Yang 2014). In their study on Chinese netizens online collective. 立. behaviors, Qiu, Lin, Chiu, and Liu have demonstrated that cyber social movements focusing on. ‧ 國. 學. political and social issues are the ones that attract the most participants (Qiu and al. 2015, Yang 2009). Inequalities, corruption, or power abuse are among the topics that generate the most. ‧. responses from netizens (Qiu and al. 2015).. y. Nat. Therefore, despite the control of the government, social media remain an efficient way. io. sit. for Chinese advocacy groups to circulate information and creating a community of like-minded. er. persons willing to discuss a common issue (Liu 2015, Yang 2003). For instance, the internet. al. n. iv n C h etogether individuals who were previously ostracized and Lu 2014, Yang 2014). Besides, i U n g c h(Cao. and social media favored the development of the Chinese LGBTQ movement by connecting. online forums and debates partially compensate for the lack of possibility to organize offline events and offer a space where LGBTQ members can openly express themselves (Cao and Lu 2014). Chinese NGOs are also using the cyberspace to reach more supporters and publish information related to the cause they are advocating, including content coming from abroad (Yang 2003). Finally, social media also favor Chinese social movements by facilitating the organization of events such as protests (Liu 2015, Yang 2003). By exchanging on social media, militants can form groups and easily organize a demonstration (Yang 2003). Furthermore, the fact that activists can have some guarantee that they will share the risks linked to their engagement with other members reinforces their willingness to participate (Yang 2003). However, in China, online social movements usually fail to promote long-term social changes as they end once the participants are satisfied by the measures taken by the authorities 30 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001229.