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Chapter IV: Norm Socialization, Social Media, and Women’s rights in the People’s Republic of China
The following chapter is dedicated to the understanding of norm socialization and women’s rights in the PRC. It will first discuss who are the Chinese actors of norm socialization and their relationship with the state. Then it will explain how the CCP monitors the internet and social media. Finally, it will explore the current situation of women’s rights in Mainland China.
4.1. Norm Socialization in China
As the Chinese civil society remains under the management of the CCP, there is little space available for Chinese social movements to develop. Any form of advocacy and mobilization is likely to be rapidly turned down by the state if they are perceived as threatening the CCP’s legitimacy and social order (Fleay 2012). For instance, groups engaged in activities that could directly challenge the CCP leadership and decisions such as advocacy, legal aid, labor rights, and religion are often closely monitored by the authorities.16 The measures taken by the authorities can aim to undermine an organization’s ability to conduct its work or directly target the activists, who can be harassed, forced to resign, or imprisoned.17
Besides, Chinese advocates’ efficiency is undermined by their lack of organizational capacity. Many Chinese advocacy organizations, such as the environmentalist ones, struggle to mobilize supporters because they do not have skilled professional staff and sufficient funding (Xie 2015). The absence of political and social recognition are also two critical barriers that Chinese social movements have to overcome (Xie 2015).
Furthermore, many Chinese advocacy groups are facing precarity because they do not have legal status. Not having a juridical status such as being recognized as “social organization”
(社會組織) is a significant barrier to the development of an organization because it prevents it from engaging in fundraising activities and being exempted from taxes (Deng 2010). Moreover, according to the PRC’s law, organizations without legal status can be disbanded (Deng 2010).
However, to be legally recognized, organizations must be sponsored by a representative of the government and receive the approval of the local Civil Affairs Bureau ( 民政局) and the
16 “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Mar. 1, 2020
17 Ibid.
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seeking to generate social changes are even less likely to obtain a juridical status as few would like to be affiliated to them, given the fact that they represent a risk of being harassed by the authorities.Moreover, since President Xi Jinping accessed to power in 2013, social movements are squeezed by the government’s effort to promote a “stronger Party and a stronger China.”18 Activists’ actions aiming to address public issues are clashing with the CPP’s attempts to create a “civil society with Chinese characteristics.”19 Since these “Chinese characteristics” are opposed to Western-conceptions of civil society, social movements’ relaying “foreign ideologies” such as human rights are seen as suspicious by the authorities (Deng 2010).
On the other hand, the state encourages organizations that it considers as being useful and whose actions support its own goals.20 However, given the size of Mainland China and the multitude of government agencies and local branches, which all have different visions and objectives, official support to a social movement might vary from one place to another (Xie and Van Der Heijden 2010). Groups providing services such as poverty alleviation or eldercare, like industries, trade organizations, and charities, enjoy more freedom and have access to more resources because their activities can more efficiently serve the government’s objectives. Some of these groups can also be exempted from the dual registration.21 Therefore, convincing the authorities that it offers essential services to the state is also critical to an organization that seeks to have a legal status (Tam and Hasmath 2015).
Besides, a social movement that would, at first, be perceived as a threat can still be able to succeed if its relationship with the authorities is good enough. For example, because it considers religion as a historical threat against the government and a way for foreign powers to infiltrate China, the CCP generally represses religious social movements (Tam and Hasmath 2015). However, some organizations such as Christian religious groups are still capable of prospering due to their ties with local agents and their capacity to link their actions with the state’s agenda (Tam and Hasmath 2015). Other ways of surviving include
18 “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 “China - At Glance.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020
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collaborating with legal organizations such as GONGOs and conducting activities under their name, registering as a commercial organization, or keeping a low profile (Chan 2013).
Nevertheless, none of these solutions are optimal as partners can decide to stop their support if they feel that the actions taken in their name will draw the attention of the state (Chan 2013). In the same manner, commercial organizations can be de-registered if the authorities decide that their activities are off-limits (Chan 2013). On the other hand, the CCP might prefer a social movement that remains public since it is easier to monitor than one that stays hidden (Chan 2013).
Finally, GONGOs such as the ACWF (中華全國婦女聯合會) can also play a role in Chinese social movements. GONGOs are created by the state to support its policies and channel society’s demand (Deng 2010, Wu 2003). However, some of those organizations can become more independent, depending on their ability to attract nongovernmental resources and improve their capacities (Wu 2003). As a GONGO draws more local and international experts as well as retired high-level officials and other public figures, it can increase its aptitudes to develop and carry on its own policies and missions (Wu 2003). For instance, the Center for Environment Education and Communication (生態環境部宣傳教育中心) (CEEC) is a GONGO in charge of raising awareness on environmental issues. Still, the organization extended its mandate and now supports grassroots environmental NGOs and facilitates exchanges with international actors (Wu 2003).
Thus, despite the initial constraints imposed by the state, the number of advocacy groups, GONGOs, and other drivers of social movements has been growing in China, strengthening the possibilities of a successful norm socialization process.22
China and Transnationalism
There are several obstacles preventing INGOs, transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements from being fully operative in the PRC. First, Chinese advocacy groups’ lack of resources directly affects transnational advocacy
22 “China - Introduction.” International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL), Feb. 26, 2020
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networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements’ capacity to be active in China since they rely on local organizations (Fleay 2012, Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002).
Second, since 2017, the Law of People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China (中華人民共 和國境外非政府組織境內活動管理法), raises barriers for INGOs seeking to be active in the PRC. According to the law, foreign NGOs must register with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and find a domestic sponsor (government or government-affiliated organization) before being allowed to operate in China.23 Therefore, the first obstacle that INGOs have to overcome is to establish secure connections with the government.
Besides, INGOs' capacities to advocate a norm are limited. First, the authorities restrict their range of actions to the domains judged as “useful,” which are, according to Article 3, economics, education, science, culture, health, sports, environmental protection, poverty, and disaster relief. Second, the regulation forbids INGOs to engage in activities that could be seen as threatening the social order. Article 5 stipulates that INGOs “shall not threaten China’s national reunification and security or ethnic unity, nor harm China’s national and social interests,” and Article 47 prohibits “inciting resistance to laws and regulations,” “spreading rumors,” and “funding political activities.” This regulation harms INGO’s ability to generate successful norm socialization by undermining their capacity to disrupt the social order, which is a crucial step in the process (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). Therefore, the second major obstacle that INGOs have to overcome is to convince the Chinese authorities that their activities are not damaging the CCP’s leadership.
Finally, the law enables the authorities to monitor and pressure the INGOs that they suspect of being off-limits. Thus, INGOs are never entirely free from potential coercive measures. For example, according to Article 41 of the Law on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations:
“Where public security organs discover behavior they suspect violates the provisions of this Law in the course of performing oversight and supervision, they may adopt the following measures in accordance with the law: (1) Interview the chief representative and other representatives of the representative office of an overseas NGO; (2) Enter the premises or site of the activities of the overseas NGO in the mainland of China to carry out an inspection; (3)
23 “Fact Sheet on China’s Foreign NGO Law.” ChinaFile, Nov.1, 2017
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Question organizations and individuals related to the incident being investigated and require them to clarify matters related to the incident being investigated; (4) Consult and copy documents and materials relevant to the incident being investigated and seal up for safekeeping documents or materials that could otherwise be moved, destroyed, concealed or altered; (5) Shut down premises and facilities, or seize property, suspected of involvement in illegal activities.”
Third, China’s economic power also undermines the efforts of transnational actors. An efficient norm socialization process relies on the national and transnational movements’
abilities to draw the attention of the international community on a state’s misconduct (Risse and Sikkink 1999). However, since the late 1990s, China’s trade partners, excepted the United States, are reluctant to publicly urge the PRC to adopt certain norms such as human rights or Freedom of Expression (Fleay 2006).
Nevertheless, following the same logic as for domestic organization, the CCP would allow transnational actors to operate in China if it considers that their work is serving its interests. Morton’s study of the AIDS prevention campaign in the Yunnan province during the early 2000s shows that the Chinese government started by denying the issue before progressively recognizing it and finally supporting the joint efforts of an INGO, Safe the Children, and grassroots organizations to raise awareness among local populations and create a prevention center (Morton 2005).
Besides, the CCP is not entirely immune to external pressures. The creation of environmental GONGOs was motivated by the globalization of environmental issues and the need to have credible organizations able to represent the PRC during international conferences and summits (Wu 2005). Hosting the Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the affiliated NGOs summits in 1995 forced the CCP to encourage the creation of Chinese women’s rights NGOs to ensure the participation of the PRC to those events (Howell 2003). Therefore, the Chinese government would sometimes prefer to respond to internal and external forces by adopting a pragmatic stance and make some concessions rather than oppose and subjugate a social movement (Fleay 2006).
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The PRC has the largest population of social media users in the world, which is two times larger than the one from the second-ranking country, India.24 In June 2019, China had more than 850 million netizens,25 and 72% of them had an account on a social media platform.26 For instance, in 2019, on average, the Chinese social media Sina Weibo counted 516 million monthly users,27 while WeChat, combined with its Mainland counterpart, Weixin (微信), registered more than 1 billion.28 However, giving the diversity of services offered by WeChat and Weixin, it is difficult to define the part of users that use them solely as social media.
The Chinese regime’s relationship with social media is complicated. On one hand, the authorities have been investing in digital technologies, enhancing access to cyberspace, and building online networks as part of their plan to sustain the economic growth (Deibert 2002, MacKinnon 2011). For instance, the PRC is a leading country in the development of 5G technologies,29 which aims to improve internet access.
On the other hand, to remain in control of the civil society and avoid potential threats to its legitimacy, the Chinese government also invests considerable amounts of resources in monitoring and censoring the internet (Chen and Ang 2011, Marolt 2011, King and al. 2013).
The GFW is a perfect illustration of how the Chinese regime controls the cyberspace and makes sure that netizens cannot access information that could harm its narrative. This tool has been designed to deny access to foreign websites and social media and, therefore, restraining netizens’
access to global content (Marolt 2011). The second aspect of the GFW is the censoring of specific information considered as threatening the official narrative (Marolt 2011). For instance, contents containing keywords related to “Taiwan” or “Tiananmen” are inaccessible for the average Chinese internet user (Marolt 2011).
The GFW is enforced by the Cyber Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中華人民共和國網絡安全法), which stipulates that internet service providers (ISP), which are companies offering access to the web, and internet content provider (ICP), which are
24 “Number of social network users in selected countries in 2018 and 2023” Statista, Dec. 2, 2019
25 “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China.” China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Aug. 2019, p.13
26 “Active social network penetration in selected countries as of January 2020.” Statista, Feb 14, 2020
27 Sina Weibo 2019 Annual Report
28 Tencent 2019 Annual Report
29 China Internet Report 2019
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cannot access prohibited content (Yang 2014, Chen and Ang 2011).The GFW is also coupled with the deployment of an “internet police,” a double-measure that aims to refrain netizens from posting contents that could challenge Beijing’s central power (Chen and Ang 2011, King and al. 2013). Thus, the Chinese cyber police task is to frame online debates and ensure that the authorities remain in control of the cyberspace (Chen and Ang 2011).
In addition to this censoring and policing strategy, the CCP also uses social media to diffuse its propaganda (King and al. 2017, King Pan, and Roberts 2013). For instance, in 2019, there were 139 270 government accounts on Weibo, diffusing both official information and state propaganda.30 Coupled with censorship, online propaganda serves as a way to remain in control of online debates and avoid the rise of an anti-government discourse by creating a counter-movement and generating distractions (King and al. 2017).
This strategy has recently been reinforced with the 2020 Regulations on Ecological Management of Network Information Content ( 網 絡 信 息 內 容 生 態 治 理 規 定 ), which encourage Chinese netizens to use social media to promote the regime and its policies. For example, according to Article 5 of the Regulations on Ecological Management of Network Information Content:
“Online information content producers are encouraged to make, reproduce, and publish information containing the following content: (1) Content publicizing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; and complete, correct, and vivid exposition of the path, theory, system, and culture of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
(2) Content publicizing the Party's theoretical path, directives and policies, and major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee; (3) Content presenting highlights in economic and social development, reflecting the people's great struggle and fervent lives; (4) Content promoting the Core Socialist Values, publicizing exceptional moral culture and zeitgeist, fully presenting the uplifting spirit of the Chinese people; (5) Effective responses to social concerns, resolving doubts and clearly analyzing, helping to guide the public in forming agreement;(6) Content that helps increase the international influence of Chinese culture, presenting the world with the true, three-dimensional, and complete China; (7) Other content that teaches taste, style, and responsibility; that praises truth, goodness, and beauty; and that promotes unity and stability”
30 “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China.” China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Aug. 2019, pp.66-68
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Chinese Social Media and Social Movements
Like in other authoritarian countries, the internet is an important space where civil society can express its opinion and anger regarding specific social issues (Li and al. 2016).
Cyberactivism and online social movements started in China at the end of the 1990s with the increasing popularization of the internet in urban centers and the first bulletin board systems (BBS), which are online forums (Yang 2009). For instance, online forums were used by netizens to protest against the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in former Yugoslavia and to oppose the construction of a chemical factory in Xiamen, Fujian province, in 2007 (Yang 2009). With the creation of the social media Weibo in 2009, the platform rapidly became a privileged tool for activists (Liu 2015).
Chinese activists, especially those belonging to grassroots movements, are among the most active social media users (Yang 2014). In their study on Chinese netizens online collective behaviors, Qiu, Lin, Chiu, and Liu have demonstrated that cyber social movements focusing on political and social issues are the ones that attract the most participants (Qiu and al. 2015, Yang 2009). Inequalities, corruption, or power abuse are among the topics that generate the most responses from netizens (Qiu and al. 2015).
Therefore, despite the control of the government, social media remain an efficient way for Chinese advocacy groups to circulate information and creating a community of like-minded persons willing to discuss a common issue (Liu 2015, Yang 2003). For instance, the internet and social media favored the development of the Chinese LGBTQ movement by connecting individuals who were previously ostracized together (Cao and Lu 2014, Yang 2014). Besides, online forums and debates partially compensate for the lack of possibility to organize offline events and offer a space where LGBTQ members can openly express themselves (Cao and Lu 2014). Chinese NGOs are also using the cyberspace to reach more supporters and publish information related to the cause they are advocating, including content coming from abroad (Yang 2003). Finally, social media also favor Chinese social movements by facilitating the organization of events such as protests (Liu 2015, Yang 2003). By exchanging on social media, militants can form groups and easily organize a demonstration (Yang 2003). Furthermore, the fact that activists can have some guarantee that they will share the risks linked to their engagement with other members reinforces their willingness to participate (Yang 2003).
However, in China, online social movements usually fail to promote long-term social changes as they end once the participants are satisfied by the measures taken by the authorities
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to address the issue (Qiu and al. 2015). Furthermore, Chinese NGOs and advocacy groups are not using social media to oppose the authorities directly and prefer to engage in activities that reinforce their legitimacy, such as organizing charity events, raising funds, and promote awareness (Yang 2014). Finally, online communities generally remain social support groups where people can find comfort and feel free to express their opinion, but they do not provoke change within society (Yang 2014). For instance, LGBTQ online groups cannot counterbalance the fact that the community is lacking recognition and rights (Cao and Lu 2014).
Moreover, social media are also space where other groups evolve. Cyberactivists are also acting under the spotlight, which makes them the targets of individuals who, for personal and ideological reasons, are strongly opposed to the values they are promoting (Qiu and al.
2015). Thus, social movements that are trying to address some social matters such as inequalities are attacked by crowds of netizens who try to discredit their cause by minimizing the issue (Qiu and al. 2015).
Regarding social media and transnationalism, Chinese cyberactivists’ capacity to either generate or join a transnational movement is undermined by several factors: their lack of access to global content, the GFW, the state’s control over social media, and the absence of clear leadership, guiding and organizing the movement (Liu 2015). On the other hand, the exclusion of foreign social media, such as Twitter, and the censorship of local social media makes it difficult for transnational movement based outside of the PRC to reach a Chinese audience.
Regarding social media and transnationalism, Chinese cyberactivists’ capacity to either generate or join a transnational movement is undermined by several factors: their lack of access to global content, the GFW, the state’s control over social media, and the absence of clear leadership, guiding and organizing the movement (Liu 2015). On the other hand, the exclusion of foreign social media, such as Twitter, and the censorship of local social media makes it difficult for transnational movement based outside of the PRC to reach a Chinese audience.