Chun Doo Hwan’s New Military Regime and Media

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was met with defiance and the petition movement continued into the new year. Jailing of several dozen of the petition's initiators swiftly followed, along with outspoken church and intellectual leaders, until, within a few short weeks, several dozen of the country's most prominent civil libertarians were behind bars. The trials were swift,

"justice" peremptory and sentences severe. With most of its leaders in prison, the petition movement quickly fizzled out.

The next crisis came in March with the students' return to the campuses. As early as January, one observer had written: "The start of the long winter recess and a cold spell saved Korea from mass student demonstrations Given the lack of genuine reforms, the crucial test facing the government win be what to do when the students return to the campuses next spring and threaten to take to the streets again. Without a new wave of KCIA counterattacks, it seems unlikely that sporadic rallies by student and other groups for more freedom and reforms will subside." By March rumors were rampant that the students had been putting their long vacation to good use and that flash-in-the-pan rampages were a thing of the past. This time they were organizing -and nationwide.

4.2.3. Chun Doo Hwan’s New Military Regime and Media

The 5^th Republic of Korea was the government of Korea from 1979 to 1987, replacing the 4^th Republic of Korea. Throughout this period, the government was controlled by Chun Doo-hwan, a military colleague of the assassinated president Park Chung-hee. This period saw extensive efforts at reform. It laid the foundations for the relatively stable democratic system of the subsequent Sixth Republic in 1987.

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After the assassination of Park by Director of KCIA Kim Jae-kyu in 1979, a vocal civil society emerged that led to strong protests against authoritarian rule. Composed primarily of university students and labor unions, protests reached a climax after Major General Chun Doo-hwan's 1979 Coup d'état of December Twelfth and declaration of martial law on May 17. The expanded martial law closed universities, banned political activities and further curtailed the press. The event of May 17 means the beginning of another military authoritarianism.

On May 18, 1980, a confrontation broke out in the city of Kwangju between civilians and armed forces, with the military forces winning out nine days later on May 27. Immediate estimates of the civilian death toll ranged from a few dozen to 2000, with a later full investigation by the civilian government finding 606 deaths.

During the Chun Doo-hwan’s junta, the Korean media were again controlled by harsh media policies and laws similar to those of the Park Chung-hee’s regime. In 1980, the of the Republic(the 5^th Republic Constitution) prescribed in No.1 of Article 20 that every person shall enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly and freedom of association(Joo et al., 1997: 187.8).

However, in practice this did not occur. There were conditions in No.1 of Article 20 as follows: the press and a publication could not violate others’ reputation or rights : Also, they could not violate public morals or social ethics; If the press or a publication damaged someone’s reputation or rights, the person could sue for damages (Kim, O-J. 2005, p 10).

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These conditions were used and abused generally as a means to restrict the media’s ability to criticize the government or powerful people and to maintain the dictatorial regime, which used daily ‘press guidelines’ regulated the media coverage of news events.

Furthermore, the Chun junta proclaimed the notorious Basic Press Act in 1980.

Youm (1996, p. 59) explains this law as follows: “One of the most restrictive and comprehensive laws in capitalistic societies, providing specifically for the rights and restrictions of the press.” In relating to its registration the Minister of Culture and Information (MOCI, almost likes Government Information Office, GIO in Taiwan) had the power to cancel publications and to suspend them for various reasons, one of which was “When they repeatedly and flagrantly violate the law in encouraging or praising violence or other illegal acts disrupting public order” (Youm, 1996, p. 60).

During the 5^th republic, the social crisis steadily decreased because of the economic recovery, and the capitalist groups became even more powerful in society (Kim, 1994). N-S. Kim argues, in the 1980s, the newspaper industry grew in excess of the newspaper market. Also, during this period, newspaper industry management was restricted in regard to its business profit (Kim, 1994). Kim stresses, policy had less influence on the newspaper industry, then the economy and the political activity of citizens. A major power group within the newspaper industry was established (Kim, 1994).

The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone of Chun's system of media control and provided for censorship and control of newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast media. It also set the professional qualifications for journalists. Media

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censorship was coordinated with intelligence officials, representatives of various government agencies, and the presidential staff by the Office of Public Information Policy within the Ministry of Culture and Information using daily "reporting guidelines" sent to newspaper editors. The guidelines dealt exhaustively with questions of emphasis, topics to be covered or avoided, the use of government press releases, and even the size of headlines. Enforcement methods ranged from telephone calls to editors to more serious forms of intimidation, including interrogations and beatings by police. One former Ministry of Culture and Information official told a National Assembly hearing in 1988 that compliance during his tenure from 1980 to 1982 reached about 70 per cent.

By the mid-1980s, censorship of print and broadcast media had become one of the most widely and publicly criticised practices of the Chun government. Even the government-controlled Yonhap(United) News Agency noted in 1989 that "TV companies, scarcely worse than other media, were the main target of bitter public criticism for their distorted reporting for the government in the early 1980s."

Editorials called for abolition of the Basic Press Act and related practices, a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the National Assembly to the same end, and a public campaign to withhold compulsory viewers' fees in protest against censorship by the KBS network received widespread press attention. By the summer of 1986, even the ruling party was responding to public opinion.

The political liberalization of the late 1980s brought a loosening of press restraints and a new generation of journalists more willing to investigate sensitive subjects, such as the May 1980 Kwangju massacre. Roh's declaration of June 29, 1987, provided for "a free press, including allowing newspapers to base

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correspondents in provincial cities and withdrawing security officials from newspaper offices(Kang 2002)." The Korean media began a rapid expansion. Seoul papers expanded their coverage and resumed the practice of stationing correspondents in provincial cities. Although temporarily still under the management of a former Blue House press spokesman, the MBC television network, a commercial network that had been under control of the state-managed KBS since 1980, resumed independent broadcasting. The number of radio broadcast stations grew from 74 in 1985 to 111 (including both AM and FM stations) by late 1988 and 125 by late 1989. The number of periodicals rose as the government removed restrictions on the publishing industry(Kang 2002).

Chun Doo-hwan rose to power in 1980, after a series of political upheavals and a military coup, the Korean news media quickly reverted to their position of so-called

“social responsibility” and, unabashedly curried favor with the new government.

During the notorious overhaul of the media industry in 1980, more than 800 journalists were dismissed from their jobs on charges of incompetence or unethical conduct (Lee, 1997; Yang, 1999).

In the broadcasting industry alone, KBS and MBC fired 135 and 111 employees respectively (Kim, 2001c). The authoritarian governments used “carrot and stick”

strategies with the Korean news media; the ruling elite promised various favors ranging from massive tax-breaks and business opportunities to cooperative news media owners. Similar privileges in the forms of long-term low-interest bank loans and rights of apartment ownership were given to acquiescent journalists as well.

An ambiguous slogan of social responsibility replaced the idea of the press as a watch

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dog. Adjusting itself to the changed political situation, rather than insisting on its free dom, the Korean press accepted its role as a “voluntary servant” of the ruling govern ment.