3.4. Political Rifts and Political Contents of Democratization
3.4.2. Modalities of Democratization Processes
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succeeded in forming the first opposition party under KMT rule, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), during the latter half of the 1980s.
The most remarkable organizational characteristic of the Korean quasi-military authoritarian regime was the political rule of Park Chung-hee’s revolutionary force and their successors (the “new military group,” Chun Doo-hwan).
The democratic movement sought to rectify the distorted political system by compelling the military men who had become the political elite through coups to withdraw from politics.
The major task of the democratic forces was not to form a new opposition party, but to continue to apply effective pressure on the government for democratization, sticking to an unambiguous position of opposition and resisting the carrot and-stick tactics used by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (later, the Agency for National Security Planning) and other agencies of the military government. In this struggle the “two Kims” (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) functioned as the symbols of the Korean democratization movement.
3.4.2.Modalities of Democratization Processes
Korea and Taiwan share the following similarities in the modality of democratization: 1) opposition elite groups grew (in Taiwan) or survived (in Korea) taking advantage of the limited political areas opened up by elections which the authoritarian governments were compelled to hold for various reasons; 2) the opposition elite, in critical periods of regime shifts, succeeded in mobilizing the urban
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population including the middle class into street politics, thus applying effective pressure on the power holders, and 3) in the crises thus generated, the incumbent power holders became split over how to cope with the crises.
But there are notable differences between the two states as to how initiatives of the ruling and opposition elite were displayed. Huntington (1991, chap. 3) identified three types of democratic transition concerning power relationships between the governing coalition and opposition. These are: 1) the governing coalition remains preponderant even when it is shaken by a crisis, 2) the opposition becomes preponderant, and 3) neither side can dominate the other. There are correspondingly three democratization models. The first is the “transformation model” where the governing coalition is preponderant over the opposition. In this model the reformers within the governing coalition start a change by taking the initiative for liberalization, defeating the diehards (who oppose any reform or transition to a new system); then democratic reformers (favoring transition to democracy) take the lead over the liberal reformers (who advocate a certain measure of liberalization and a partial opening of the authoritarian regime in order to maintain the basics of that regime) to complete the transition to a new regime. The second is the “replacement model” where the opposition gains strength vis-a-vis the governing coalition which refuses to accept any reform, and overthrows the regime to bring about a democratic regime. This is a model close to a revolutionary model. The third is the “trans-placement model” where neither side is strong enough to dominate the other so that the democratic reformers and democratic moderates (who aim to achieve only a transition to democracy, unlike revolutionary extremists pursuing goals more radical than transition to democracy) jointly take the lead in arranging negotiations and compromise to facilitate the transition to a new regime.7 Taiwan’s democratization process so far has followed the
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transformation model while Korea’s the trans-placement model. Wakabayashi (1994a) ordered and described the political process of Taiwanese democratization using Huntington’s argument (1991).
In Korea major decisions concerning transition to a democratic regime were made through consultations between the opposition elite and the newly emerging democratic reformer elite in the governing coalition, under pressure from the opposition elite and its mobilized mass action in the streets. In the midst of the popular upsurge in June 1987, the government accepted the direct election of the president as demanded by the opposition. Following the ensuing consultation between the ruling and opposition parties, the constitution was swiftly revised. As early as December of the same year, the direct presidential election took place, normalizing the country’s political system. 4 years later, in 1992, Kim Young-sam, an opposition leader having a long record of confrontation with the authoritarian regime, stood as a presidential candidate from the Democratic Liberal Party, a party established by the merger of the former ruling and opposition parties, and was successfully elected to presidency. Popular demand for a civilian government was thus satisfied.
In Taiwan all the major decisions in favor of transition to a democratic regime were made by the top leader of the government without the direct participation of the opposition elite, though it is true that the decisions were made under pressure from the opposition elite and street action it had organized. Chiang Ching-kuo decided on his own to permit the formation of opposition parties, lift the state of emergency, and let permanent parliament members retire. Likewise, it was Lee Teng-hui who decided to convene the National Affairs Conference in which opposition leaders were invited to participate, to implement a constitutional reform, and to introduce the direct election
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of the president. Because of this formula, reforms in Taiwan’s political systems have made slow progress. In fact, it took about five years before Chiang’s decision on liberalization and permanent parliament reform materialized with the dissolution of the permanent parliament. This period of transition was studded with Chiang’s death, Lee’s succession to power, and the aggravation of KMT factional infighting. After the death of the strongman Chiang whose high prestige had affected all sectors of the state, no important decisions could be made without causing intra-party struggles.
Only as late as the summer of 1994 was the direct presidential election agreed upon.
This was carried out in the spring of 1996. This author once referred to the Taiwanese democratization process as “democratization in installments” (Wakabayashi 1992, p.
17).
Though it had to abandon the political monopoly it held during the party-state period, the KMT could not be forced to give up its struggle to stay in power in competition with other groups. The KMT is trying to successfully meet challenges of elections by relying on its heritage of economic success and social control. Taiwan thus will keep the imprint of its ancient regime for quite a time to come.
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