Concept of Representedness

According to the aggregative view of democracy, representatives are supposed to

translate citizens’ preferences into public policies. Whether being responsive to voters’ immediate preferences is consistent with the long-term, general public interests is less a concern (Setälä, 2006). In contrast, the liberal view—the view this paper subscribes to—treats the capacities, skills, and judgments of representatives as crucial elements of democratic representation (Sartori, 1987: 170, 384–385). If

‘representation means acting in the best interests of the public’, (Pitkin, 1967; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999a), then representedness can be defined as ‘the degree to which public policies reflect the interests of the governed’. At which level the public policies are made is less a concern than the degree to which these policies represent citizens’ interests. Since public interests are notoriously difficult to define, measuring representedness becomes problematic. One can, however, identify mechanisms /conditions that have been widely taken as making representation—however difficult to measure—work in modern democracies and use them as a tool in assessing representedness. In general, the more strongly present these mechanisms and conditions are the higher the level of representedness would be. Such an approach allows us to compare the representedness of citizens under different institutional settings and decision-making levels.

This approach recognizes that citizens’ interests are necessarily modified or constrained by the broader international environment, with globalization and regionalization being the most notable constraints. When globalization/regionalization result in problems that can only be solved internationally/supranationally, the form of democratic representation necessarily becomes less direct. Less direct representation, however, does not automatically translate into decreased representedness. If delegating power to international/supranational institutions for the purpose of enhancing transnational problem-solving capacity serves the interests of the citizens, then the representedness of the citizens is maintained. In other words, with the presence of efficient supranational institutions, where citizens lose in relatively direct representation/participation, they gain it back by being served by an albeit distant but more capable problem-solving policy-making body. This trade-off relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1. The Pareto front line denotes a perfectly efficient regional integration in terms of democratic legitimacy: each loss at the front of relatively direct democratic representation is accounted for at the front of problem-solving capacity.

When forsaken representation is not compensated by gains in problem-solving capacity, the representedness of the citizens can be said to have decreased. Efforts are then called for to either increase citizen involvement or increase supranational problem-solving capacity in order to meet the Pareto front line.

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Figure 1: Trade-off Relationship between Relatively Direct Representation and

Transnational/Supranational Problem-Solving Capacity

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One of the advantages of applying the subject/citizen-centered representedness approach to probe democratic representation in the EU is that, without placing the blame on either decision-making level, the approach simply helps to sort out whether there is need/room for improvement. Debates on democratic deficit too often slip into a quarrel over whether there is or there isn’t a democratic deficit; and if there is, the newly constructed edifice—the EU—has to take most of the blame. With a citizen-centered approach, the focus is shifted away from the macro-level to the individual joints and linkages in the overall governing system. Since the ultimate task of each joint and linkage in the system is to help bringing the final policy output as close to the interests of citizens as possible, the focal point of investigation would center on: If an individual joint/linkage has succeeded (or failed) in fulfilling its task?

If an individual joint/linkage has helped to ensure that citizens are well represented or has it caused a blockage in the representative channels?

Ⅱ Institution Design and Loss of Representedness

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For Pitkin, a representative is someone ‘who is held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does’ (Pitkin, 1967: 55). Hence, for any political system—whether parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential—a necessary condition for citizens to be well represented is working chains of accountability inherent to the system. Only with the presence of working chains of accountability can voters be assured that representatives are motivated to take actions that affect voters positively because voters will be able to sanction unqualified representatives retrospectively in elections. Figure 2 depicts how accountability generally works in

problem-solving capacity (direct) representation

representedness

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Figure 2: Chains of Accountability Worked through Representative Institutions in Democratic States.

When public policies are made at the European level, accountability is supposed to work according to Figure 3.

election/

delegation policy making feedback

policy output

independent agencies

executive parliament

voters

A B

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Figure 3: Chains of Accountability and Representative Institutions under EU Governance in Theory

A detailed and in-depth comparison of the red (election/delegation) arrows in the two figures reveals that the chains of accountability work significantly less effectively when policies are made at the European level.

The institutional design of a democratic system needs to meet several conditions in order for the chains of accountability to work well (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999b: 47-49):

(1) Voters must be able to assign the responsibility for policy outcomes.

(2) Voters must be empowered to throw out the rascals.

(3) Politicians must want to be reelected.

(4) Presence of the opposition that can monitor policy-making and inform citizens.

(5) Presence of the media that can monitor policy-making and inform citizens.

(6) Presence of instruments for voters to reward and punish those in charge of policy-making.

Whereas no democratic country was ever able to establish political institutions that meet all these conditions, it is at least possible to compare the

degree to which these conditions are satisfied in different contexts.

Before supranational institutions took over policy-making power in an issue area, citizens determine who the policy makers—and hence the likely direction of policies based on past experiences—should be through elections (arrows A and B

election/

delegation policy making feedback

policy output

European Parliament The Council Commission

national executives national parliaments

voters a

b

e c

d

in Figure 2). Once the decision-making power is shifted into the hands of supranational institutions, as arrows a-e in Figure 3 demonstrate, it becomes extremely difficult for citizens to throw out the rascals because it becomes impossible to identify the persons or parties responsible for bad policies even if voters understand policy implications. If representatives are motivated to make good policies because voters posses the power to sanction unqualified representatives retrospectively in elections, then a close look at arrows a to e in Figure 3 would demonstrate that unqualified representatives have nothing to worry about when they are incapable of making good policies, since voters will not know whom to throw out even when they understand and dislike the policies that came out of the EU.