II. Literature Review
2.2 Semantics-Pragmatics Interface Approach
2.2.3 Context-derived Approach
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
the systematic relation between root and epistemic uses of modal expressions, this
approach still confronts some problems as indicated by Papafragou (2000). First, the
semantics of perception terms, e.g. see and view, includes a metaphorical mapping
which relates two independent and distinct senses. However, in the case of modals,
these senses linked through metaphor are not so distinct as we have demonstrated in
(26). Consequently, even if we assure there exists transparent metaphorical mapping
in the case of perception verbs, the same mapping applied to modals is not very
straightforward. Second, the historical development of modal verbs cited by Sweetser
(1990), namely the precedence of the root over the epistemic sense, is not all
unquestionable (Goossens, 1982). Some other researches also find the opposite data
which show that the epistemic uses have already existed in Old English (Shepherd,
1982).
2.2.3 Context-derived Approach
This approach adopts a common core for the meaning of each modal, and uses it
as a basis for deriving the vast range of possible interpretations which the modal’s
meaning may contextually receive. Modality, in such an approach, generally allows us
to compare the real world with hypothetical versions of it. Deontic modals propose a
match between an ideal moral or a legal situation and the real world of behavior
whereas epistemic modals express different strengths of prediction of their match
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
between hypothetical situations and the real world. Recent researchers, Papafragou
(2000) for example, adopting a similar approach but further, taking a pragmatic
perspective, claims that the range of different interpretations of modals can be derived
in context. In other words, this view regards modals as context-dependent expression
in that they depend on inferential pragmatic processes to complement the information
they need. In what follows we will first introduce Relevance theory developed by
Sperber and Wilson (1986) and then Klinge’s (1993) framework upon context-derived
approach.
Relevance Theory
Sperber and Wilson (1986) assume that linguistic semantics of a sentence
represents a coded stimulus that gives access to and activates a determinate set of
concepts. Generally, the concepts activated are used by an addressee as an assumption
schema to arrive at a full propositional form capable of mental representation that can
be subject to further processing. This means an informative stimulus is relevant to an
individual to the extent that it causes cognitive effects for that individual. Such
cognitive effects can be generated into three types: (a) the stimulus may interact with
previously held assumptions to yield new implication (contextual implications); (b)
the stimulus may contradict an existing assumption and result in its elimination from
the addressee’s space; (c) the stimulus may offer support for an existing assumption
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
and result in its strengthening in the addressee’s mental space. Thus, during the
process of understanding an utterance, the addressee is often faced with a choice
between several interpretations (SITUATION REPRESENTATION as Klinge (1993) call
it), all of which are compatible with the linguistically encoded content of the utterance
(PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT which Klinge (1993) refers to in his work). In the
framework of Relevance theory, therefore, the hearer is justified in treating as the
correct interpretation that satisfies his/her expectation of relevance. This is exactly an
interpretation which the speaker has expected to be best relevant to the addressee. So
the whole process of utterance comprehension can be illustrated as follows: once
hearing an utterance, the addressee starts to construct sets of mentally representative
assumptions which might interact with his/her mental representation of the utterance.
The set of representative assumptions constitute what Sperber and Wilson call the
context and will be processed together with the mental representation of the utterance
to yield tentative interpretive hypotheses. These hypotheses then will be examined by
the hearer’s expectation of relevance.
Klinge (1993)
Adopting Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance theory upon utterance
comprehension, Klinge (1993) aims to propose a unified account of how these five
typical English modals- can, may, will, shall and must - derive various multiple modal
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
senses respectively. The basic assumption Klinge (1993) takes is that the linguistic
semantics of a sentence is accessed and activated by a set of concepts. Generally,
sentences can be arranged based on two different types of linguistic semantic
information:
(32) OPERATORS [PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT]
What we have is a place for one or more OPERATORS and the other place for
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT. The relationship between these two is that the
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT is governed, or modified, by the OPERATOR while the
OPERATOR is not part of the PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT. This can be captured by saying that the OPERATORS have SCOPE over the PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT. These
two different concepts also contain different linguistic semantics. The
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT encodes “conceptual information” that is capable of representing the concepts that go into a SITUATION type. In other words, the linguistic
semantics of the constituents of the sentences provides an input to the formation of an
idea about one SITUATION. On the other hand, OPERATOR encodes what we may call
“procedural information” specifying how the conceptual information carried by the
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT is to be processed. That is to say, this part is secondary to the completion of a sentence and signifies how the speaker wants to process the
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT by means of tense, aspect, sentence types or modality.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Klinge (1993) also reminds that linguistic semantics is severely “underspecified”.
What this implies is that the PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT of a sentence is determinate
and remains constant, but the ideas of a SITUATION evoked from the PROPOSITIONAL
CONTENT are not constant. A SITUATION is inconstant because it is subject to the inferential process taken by the addressee. The addressee derives the optimal
explanation of a given sentence by combining the conceptual information of the
PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT and assumptions inferred from the SITUATION. Klinge (1993) calls this inferential situation a WORLDSITUATION. The modal’s contribution
to the interpretation of an utterance is thereby to provide correspondence between the
proposition expressed (what Klinge (1993) calls the SITUATION REPRESENTATION)
and an actual state of affairs (what he calls a WORLDSITUATION).
Back to modal expression, modal, being an operator, provides the PROPOSITIONAL
CONTENT with necessary procedural information. Klinge (1993) assumes that a modal doesn’t report a focus event per se but only the relation of that event so that modals
share commonly the semantic meaning of POTENTIALITY. The elements of
POTENTIALITY work as follows: the POTENTIAL is an assumption about a WORLD
SITUATION which is not verified. One resolution of the POTENTIAL is that the WORLD
SITUATION turns out to be the case while the other resolution is that the WORLD
SITUATION turns out not to be the case. This can be demonstrated as follows:
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
(33) Processing Model toward Utterances Containing Modals
Based on the principles mentioned above, we can borrow MODAL to stand for any
modals and use the following example as illustration:
(34) a. John MODAL buy Mary’s ticket.
b. MODAL [JOHN BUY MARY’S TICKET]
The MODAL represents POTENTIALITY and gives PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT
procedural information. Since the PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT provides input to the
SITUATION REPRESENTATION, the elements of POTENTIALITY are applied to the
SITUATION REPRESENTATION. The role POTENTIALITY that plays is to assume that the
SIUTATION REPRESENTATION is not asserted to be true of a WORLDSITUATION. In other words, it only signals that there is a POTENTIAL that the SITUATION
REPRESENTATION turns out to be a true description of a WORLDSITUATION. Consequently, this leads to two logical resolutions: whether it turns out that the
SIUTATION REPRESENTATION is a true description of a WORLDSITUATION, or it turns out that the SIUTATION REPRESENTATION is not a true description of a WORLD
SITUATION. “It is this potential correspondence between the SITUATION POTENTIAL
WORLD SITUATION
~WORLD SITUATION
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
REPRESENTATION and a WORLDSITUATION that is the shared semantic field of the modals as OPERATORS (Klinge, 1993: 325).” In short, Modal has the PROPOSITIONAL
CONTENT and thereby the SITUATION REPRESENTATION in its SCOPE and the correspondence between the SITUATION REPRESENTATION and a WORLDSITUATION
as its semantic field.