4. Politicized reefs
4.4. Democratization and the environment
Democratization in Taiwan engendered both opportunities and challenges for environmental development. To gain a better understanding of the extensive paradigm shift that occurred within the Taiwanese society after martial law was lifted, a brief overview of three pre-1987 interest groups will be covered: workers, students, and farmers. Then, the effects of democratization on the environment will be examined, including the emergence of interest groups and a dominant sector at the expense of more marginalized groups. Finally, a briefly overview of the influence of political parties in Taiwan on environmental development will be provided in order to gain a better holistic view of the present-day state of environmental affairs and the options available for institutions and stakeholders alike. This analysis of the context of democratization will facilitate the following section on coastal protection.
The KMT’s authoritarian grip extensively penetrated associational life. Puppet interest groups at the workplace, within the educational realm, and within farmer
associations exemplify this control. The formation of trade unions at the workplace was encouraged in state-owned enterprises and large private firms.199 Labour strikes and the establishment of independent unions were outlawed. Instead, these ‘vehicles of KMT control’ were concentrated at two levels:
At the workplace, individual labor unions were closely monitored and manipulated by Kuomintang (KMT) party branches. The latter made sure that only KMT loyalists were elected as union officers so that the state and management could effectively control the unions. At the national level, the KMT pre-emptively recognized one federation of trade unions as the only legitimate representative of Taiwan’s labor. The Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL, quanguo zonggonghui) was patronized, finance and staffed by the KMT, and as a result, labor unions became mere extensions of state rule.200
Moreover, the KMT intensified their authority in a twofold way: by ensuring the position of a union officer was lucrative (and thus competitive, with promotion dependent on one’s loyalty to the party) whilst at the same time granting the unions power to control the distribution of workers’ welfare benefits.201
A similar power play was visible in the education system. Every campus had a KMT branch office and the China Youth Corps, a quasi-political organization with close ties to the party that brought a range of benefits to its members. Furthermore, as most universities were state-owned, courses such as in Sun Yat-sen Thought were commonplace under the heavily politicized curriculum, campus democracy was non-existent, with approval for posters and campus publications was required from KMT dominated committees, and class spies worked alongside military officers in keeping an eye out on student behaviours and beliefs.202
Finally, famers’ associations were yet another medium through which the ruling regime exerted influence. As a key constituent of the traditional patron-client relationship, farmer associations served an important purpose during elections as the KMT’s primary support base. Indeed, as KMT representatives were found at all levels of the farmers associations, the “overriding function” of this interest group “was to draw
199 Fell 2012:173
200 Ming-sho Ho, 2006, ‘Challenging State Corporatism: The Politics of Taiwan’s Labor Federation Movement,’ The China Journal 56, July 2006, p. 107.
201 Fell 2012:174.
202 Ibid.
millions into KMT controlled networks,”203 boosting the party’s legitimacy to rule even well into the democratic era.
As can be observed, the KMT’s rigid control over and penetration into associational life was intensive in scale and scope. The rapid rise of social movements after the lifting of martial law transformed the face of civil society, accelerating and enriching Taiwan’s democracy. Yet, with the change in regime came new challenges before the bourgeoning environmental movement.
As previously mentioned, the 1980s was a turning point in Taiwan’s modern history: international pressure for Taiwan to liberalize politically increased significantly, especially from Washington; social movements became more prominent;
the nation experienced its first multi-party elections the same year the DPP was [technically illegally] founded in 1986; finally, the KMT’s transition away from authoritarianism with the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo a year later rapidly hastened the pace of democratization.
The environmental momentum surged in post-martial law Taiwan. New institutional channels were established that permitted environmental concerns to be presented within the political system. This included the formation of the EPA as well as a system for routinizing environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, the National Council for Sustainable Development, initially set up to meet global environmental regulations, had become the top advisory organ of environmental policy and another access point for environmentalists, with members proportionately selected from among government agencies, scholars, and civil groups.204 Activists also attained progress in the legislative field, with hundreds of laws and regulations related to environmental protection successfully pushed through; this ‘green triumph’
undermined the traditional supremacy of economic bureaucrats as new interest groups were included in the process of policy negotiation. From this perspective, the democratic forces swept the nation empowered environmentalists “by restructuring the
203 Ibid, p. 175.
204 ‘Country Profiles,’ GNNCSDS. Accessed 29 May 2017.
http://www.ncsds.org/index.php/sustainable-development-councils/country-profiles/86-country-profiles/profiles/128-taiwan
relationship between state and civil society in the latter’s favor.”205 Accordingly, the democratic transition created many political opportunities for environmental lobbying.
For example, environmentalists urged the government to both limit its support (i.e.
protection and subsidies) of polluting industries and to have more state intervention to prevent pollution (i.e. regulatory systems, penalty implementation).206 Moreover, public awareness of disputes and controversies concerning environmental issues further materialized with the liberalization of the mass media, while the freedom of association unlocked opportunities for people to mobilize along shared goals and establish non-governmental organizations and membership-based societies. A large degree of success has been visible in such projects as the clean-up of Kaohsiung’s Love River, mandatory recycling, curbing air pollution, and the ban on free plastic bags being supplied by retailers. Furthermore, decades of social activism have made it difficult to ignore environmental issues on the political level, prompting politicians from all parties to espouse green rhetoric in one way or another. Finally, scholars purport that one positive outcome of the controversy regarding the fourth nuclear power plant is that the establishment of a fifth NPP seems inconceivable.207 Overall, there have been positive strides in environmental progress at the wake of democratization.
As mentioned before, environmental advocacy in the 1980s was beginning to gain more attention in the governmental sphere, such as the political criticism targeted at the KMT by the tangwai against the construction of the fourth NPP as well as the anti-DuPont grassroots campaign. Both protests received support from politicians of the later-established DPP, a party which would henceforth be regarded as the environmental movement’s traditional ally. This historical alliance would also stimulate the umbrella terms ‘Green’ and ‘Blue,’ led by the DPP and KMT, respectively, that still divide the main axis of political conflict in Taiwan. 208 In general, democratization and intense structural politicization contributed their own sets of challenges for the environmental movement.
205 Ming-Sho Ho, 2005, ‘Weakened State and Social Movement: the paradox of Taiwanese
environmental politics after the power transfer,’ Journal of Contemporary China 14:43, May 2005, p.
341.
206 Ibid.
207 Fell 2012:188.
208 Chin-Hao Huang and Patrick James, 2014, ‘Blue, Green or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations,’ The China Quarterly 219, Sept. 2014, p. 675.
Democratization paved the way for the development of interest groups. The consequences of the strengthening of interests groups had a twofold effect: firstly, it weakened the state’s autonomy, making it more vulnerable to the vested interests of dominant actors. Secondly, the inherent paradox of liberal associability in democratic regimes becomes apparent, as:
…those groups in civil society that are in greatest need of collective action, i.e.
those with numerous, dispersed and relatively impoverished individuals as potential members, are the least likely to be successful in attracting these members on a rational and voluntary basis. The small, concentrated and privileged groups should have less difficulty in generating resources under democratic conditions.
Not only do they need them less (since their members may have adequate resources to act individually), but they were usually the privileged interlocutors and beneficiaries of the previous autocracy. Left to its own devices, then, the new
»liberal« associability could produce a systematically skewed over-representation of dominant class, sectoral and professional interests. Subordinate groups have, of course, the new resource of voting between competing parties to pursue their general interests, but they may have to rely on the state recognition, licensing and subsidization characteristic of the ancien régime to participate effectively in the democratic game when it comes to advancing their more particular interests.209
These consequences come to the forefront when examining the elevated importance of the economy and state relations. Running campaigns and winning elections are reliant on vote-mobilization and financial resources, which creates opportunities for businesses to step in and gain more political influence and favour.210 The KMT had had already penetrated associational life through extensive alliances with enterprises and unions, and as previously illustrated, their regime had characteristically prioritized economic growth. They thus perpetuated the organizational advantages they enjoyed under the previous era. Owing to the fact that liberal associability favored those with power resources, the economic actors became a dominant class that was inserted into the policy process. In contrast, the underprivileged would find it difficult to pursue their general interests and to compete with the entrenched goals of the dominant class.
209 Philippe C. Schmitter, 1993, ‘Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy,’ in Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 10, September 1993, p. 10.
210 Ho 2015:341.
As a result, the advent of democratization opened up the over-representation of dominant interests, leading to an inevitable class bias in the pluralist pressure politics.211
From this, another paradox emerges. On the one hand, the previously repressed groups had now the chance to organize and voice concerns through the newly established institutional channels. Consequently, the new era of democratic consolidation gave environmentalists new ways to participate and gain access to policy decision-making. On the other hand, however, their actual power was severely circumscribed due to the afore-mentioned class bias. For Ming-Sho Ho, this form of procedural participation without actual policy impact is a result of the weakened state capacity. “Weak states,” Ho writes, “are more easily influenced by the movement claims, but they also lack the institutional power to meet opposition from vested interests.”212 The reliance of the state on dominant groups weakened its autonomy, making it more vulnerable to being captured by particular interests.213 This problem, coupled with the system’s ease of voicing opposition and mobilizing counter-movements, challenged environmental reform and governance. Indeed, although the advent of democratization permitted the environmental movement to become accepted and to even receive sympathy from the public, it did not guarantee its success.214
Moreover, the strength of environmental movements and the extent of citizen participation may experience a decline because individuals are encouraged to “pursue more ‘private-regarding’ interests and to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others.”215 This argument is reinforced by the emergence of the afore-mentioned counter-movements – in this case, opponents to environmental movements. One example of this is the collective action of pig farmers to offset the stricter river preservation and wastewater regulations. At the time, wastewater from swine production was the third largest source of pollution in Taiwan (after sewage and industrial wastewater).216 In response to public demands to improve water quality, the government declared five major water resource
211 E. E. Schattschneider, 1960, The Semisovereign People, Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 34.
212 Ho 2015:351.
213 Ibid, p. 352.
214 Ibid.
215 Schmitter 1993:6.
216 S. Y. Sheen et al., 1994, ‘Swine Waste Treatment in Taiwan,’ Food and Fertilizer Technology Center. Accessed 30 May 2017.
http://www.fftc.agnet.org/library.php?func=view&style=type&id=20110802095125
preservation areas as “not suitable for the pig-raising industry” and encouraged pig farm reallocation through financial compensation,217 a plan that was met with protests as farmers sought to preserve their status quo and private interests. Nevertheless, a consensus was finally found.
Lastly, it is beneficial to briefly examine the influence of political parties in Taiwan on environmental development. This will provide context of the present-day state of environmental affairs and the options available for institutions and stakeholders alike.
Political parties are crucial institutions of democracy and a vehicle through which citizens are given a choice in governance.218 As previously mentioned, the main divide along the axis of power in Taiwan are between the KMT (Blue) and DPP (Green) parties. The presidential election in 2000 marked the first power transfer in Taiwan as the DPP became the ruling party. With the DPP’s political ascension, new expectations concerning the state’s commitment to the environment were raised. Yet, the period was one of continued setbacks and disappointments for the environmentalists. Firstly, from the onset the DPP was unable to win a legislative majority, and without support in the parliament, the limits to what they could achieve were restricted. In this antagonistic political climate, the DPP faced a number of challenges, ranging from securing project budgets, a majority vote for policy proposals, as well as strong ideological conflicts under the ‘new government, old bureaucrats’ phenomenon.219 Environmental issues also became politicized, and many attempts to implement pro-environment measures were defeated while simultaneously ways to undermine environmental institutions were initiated. For instance, the EPA’s budget for 2001 was severely cut, and the Director’s inability to respond demonstrates the weakness of the DPP government vis-à-vis the opposition.220
Moreover, the DPP backtracked on its commitment to halt the fourth NPP, ordering the construction to continue on the backdrop of threats espoused by the KMT and Blue Coalition.221 The promise to hold a national referendum on the fate of the
217 Ho 2005:348.
218 ‘Political Parties,’ NDI. Accessed 30 May 2017. https://www.ndi.org/what-we-do/political-parties
219 Ho 2015:344
220 Ibid, p. 343.
221 Fell 2012:187
fourth NPP was likewise dropped. Furthermore, as the DPP was also reliant on financial contributions, warding off business influences for environmental causes was not an image they sought to embrace. At the same time, the DPP “lacked an efficient coordination mechanism to work with business without budging too much,”222 revealing the structural problem of skewed sectoral interests. Then, the unprecedented recession in 2001 restricted the party’s policy ambitions, compelling the economic issue to be the nation’s top priority. With the return of KMT as the ruling party in 2008 for two consecutive terms and their prevailing economic growth philosophy, environmental affairs took a step back.
To summarize, democratization engendered its own unique set of opportunities and threats for the environmental movement. While institutions such as EPA were established and new regulations for environmental protection and conservation gained legal force, the practical temptations of economic incentives and a pro-business stand severely marginalized the former’s impact. Satisfying dominant interests would frequently come at the expense of environmental progress, a phenomenon that did not seem to substantially change with the election cycles.
Whilst this section analysed the developments in the political and environmental realms under the democratic process in Taiwan, the next part will narrow the scope and focus on coastal protection at the institutional level.
222 Ho 2005:343