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The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference,
subversion or coercion; Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
Effective cooperation among themselves.
95As mentioned earlier, facing the looming Cold War threats ASEAN was seen as a strategic move; it also served as a major vehicle to manage territorial conflicts among the member states that allowed them to focus on nation-building and national development.
“ASEAN thus provided the environment for regional resilience that enabled member
countries to pursue national resilience”
.96ASEAN at that time was regarded as a bulwark against Communism, encouraged by Japan and the United States and European countries. Although they formed the Association, the member states had not solved the territorial disputes with one another; hence ASEAN acted essentially as a confidence-building mechanism.
Internally speaking, all the members had different reasons for wanting an effective regional organization. Indonesia sought to repair its relations in the region and ASEAN could serve as an opportunity to exercise regional leadership. Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines saw ASEAN as a way to constrain Jakarta’s aspirations. All of nations were still suspicious about each other, so ASEAN, apart from enhancing national prestige, was seen as a mean to restrain each other’s intensions. Thailand hoped that ASEAN would become the basis for the “collective political defence” of the region, forming an organization that could supplement and perhaps eventually replace its own security relationship with the United States.97
As a result of security concerns, the members accomplished the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), signed in November 27th 1971 in Kuala Lumpur.
95 Art. 2 of the ASEAN, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," (1976)., available online:
http://www.aseansec.org/TAC-KnowledgeKit.pdf (last retrieved on Oct. 18th, 2011).
96Morada, "ASEAN at 40: Prospects for Community Building in Southeast Asia.". P. 37
97Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN : regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
P. 15
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The Declaration was a broad statement of intentions that in fact imposed no legal obligations on its signatories. It stated: (1) Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers; (2) South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and close relationship98. As a matter of fact, ZOPFAN was evaluated as “ASEAN’s most prominent and
important diplomatic accomplishment before 1975”.
993.1.2.2. The second phase (1977-1987)
This phase was named conflict phase because the organization engaged into tussle with Vietnam following the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict.
This phase remained largely a period of consolidation as a political community in the case of external security challenges, notwithstanding the louder statements on promoting and initiating economic cooperation activities. ASEAN was indirectly involved into the armed confrontation between Vietnam and Cambodian Khmer Rouge, but took diplomatic position in the UN while opposed to the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. Vietnam and its history played a significant role for shaping the region, as for almost a decade, the situation in Vietnam preoccupied ASEAN’s institutional activities.
The US withdrawal from Vietnam left “a power vacuum in Southeast Asia that the Soviet
Union and Chinese tried to fill”
100. The border conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea turned into Hanoi’s offensive to cut back Pol Pot’s hostile practices, and later escalated to China’s intervention punishing Vietnamese wilfulness. All those incidents had tremendous impact on the Association. Under the pressure of Thailand, who was the most directly threatened by the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict, ASEAN responded to the incident disapprovingly. With China threatening entrance in the picture, Indonesia and Malaysia supported ASEAN’s collective98ASEAN, "Zone of Peace and Neutrality Declaration, ," (Kuala Lumpur1971). November 27th, 1971, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Text available online: http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm (last retrieved on Oct. 20th, 2011).
99Narine, Explaining ASEAN : regionalism in Southeast Asia. P. 22
100Ibid. P.43.
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decision. It was for the first time that ASEAN101 spoke with one voice in the international forum and made its appearance as a significant international and regional actor. Many consider the reaction as a high-water mark in the organization’s diplomatic history showing-off intra-ASEAN unity.
In terms of economic development the following factors had impact on the ASEAN growth. The Vietnam War benefited the development of Thailand and Singapore, receiving US economic support. Moreover, Japan started to invest and providing official development assistance (ODA) in the region starting from early 1970s. In 1985 the Plaza Accord propounded on Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) and agreed on depreciating the dollar and appreciating the yen. Intensification of relations with Japan significantly increased the ASEAN manufacture and trade102.
With the end of Cambodian conflict, ASEAN became bereft of a clear common goal or a common enemy. Perhaps it was that lack of external threat that made ASEAN turn its focus on organization’s structure that led to ASEAN’s enlargement.
3.1.2.3. The third period (1988-1997)
The stage was marked with major transformations in ASEAN brought by membership enlargement. With the end of Cold War and collapse of Soviet Union created environment for the change on the global scale. The communist versus non-communist ideological divide started to fade away, generating conditions for more practical mode of international relations. ASEAN began to push for deeper economic cooperation among its members by adopting a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme in 1992, which initiated movement towards ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
On the security field, ASEAN formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 engaging ASEAN’s Dialogue partners (such as China, Vietnam, Russia, the US, EU) into the dialogue on regional and global security matters. The ARF has been an important figure in
101 ASEAN had at that time 6 members, as it was joined by Brunei in 1984 immediately after gaining independence.
102 Narine, Explaining ASEAN : regionalism in Southeast Asia.
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ASEAN’s external relations, as it is ASEAN-led process that reaches out to the entire region. It is the only body that reaches out to entire Asia-Pacific region, and exists to discuss political and security issues, providing a forum for its members to address common security challenges.
In the following year of 1995 the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was signed. Successively, Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) accessed the Association. Among all enlargement of ASEAN, Vietnamese accession was the most carried great weight, as it marked total abandonment of Cold War ideological groupings. Myanmar’s entrance caused the biggest controversy and had its implication to ASEAN external relations, namely with the EU that objected to the idea of continuing dialogue with such an abusive, in terms of human rights, regime. However, ASEAN insisted on the “constructive engagement”103 policy, thanks to which it now embraces the entire Southeast Asian sub-region.
Externally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations geopolitically “gained on weight”;
but internally, new members increased organization’s political, economic, cultural, and historical diversity and the complexity of ASEAN’s decision-making processes. Original anti-communist orientation got diluted with the enlargement to the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). According to Shaun Narine, the expansion was a result of competition between Thailand and Indonesia over the regional leadership. Thailand hoped that after rapprochement with Vietnam, the mainland Southeast Asia would be under its influence.
As a matter of fact, the expansion created the two-tier ASEAN, marking an evident gap between the wealthier old members and poorer new members. This has been a continuous challenge for the Association when developing a common foreign policy. It is also why the so-called “ASEAN Way” has been favoured as a cooperation style, accommodating the diversity of the members. As the Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar phrased: “the ASEAN Way
stresses informality, organization minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to
103 Th m “c s c v m ” s c by h M ys D p y M s A Ib h m 1997 s a reaction of the events in Cambodia. As an alternative to non-i v “c s c v m ” s p p s s p c v p cy v v m ss s c “S h s As ’s s p v h c ps ” S S m S C T y “I s s P c ss s D mm s P ss b s” in: Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, Hadi Soesastro eds. Reinventing ASEAN, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publication, Singapore, 2001. P. 253