Chapter 4: The Narratives and Historical Examples
4.1.4 Historical Examples of the American Narrative
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The focus on commonalities, and the optimism for the future of the relationship are key elements here that make this statement an example of non-narrative. Non-narrative is used to emphasize cooperation and the forward-moving direction of the U.S.-China relationship. While some may point to these focuses as parts of other narratives, this research takes the position that not everything is narrative, and that the material described above constitutes non-narrative.
4.1.4 Historical Examples of the American Narrative
Since the first Americans went to China in the late 18th century, interactions between the two countries have exemplified this American narrative. This section includes some of the more prominent moments and issues in the U.S.-China relationship that demonstrate the American narrative.
One of the earliest important issues in the U.S.-China relationship was the opium trade.
While most often associated with the British, the opium trade in China was not limited to just one country. In the 1820s American merchants were also bringing opium into China, and increased the amount they were trading in the mid-1820s and again in the 1830s by the same proportion as the British traders (Downs J. , 1968). Traditionally, American and other Western historians have characterized this period as one of U.S. support for the opening of China (Downs J. M., 1991). The U.S. often acknowledges the negative effects the opium trade, and subsequent Opium Wars, had on China only as the direct results of British actions. Part of the American view on the history of U.S.-China relations involves a sense of pride at this distinction from the British and other Western countries, a view that paints the U.S. as a friend to China instead of a European foe. Vice President Mike Pence’s remarks on China in October 2018 illustrate this perspective: “When China suffered through indignities and exploitations during her so-called
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‘Century of Humiliation,’ America refused to join in, and advocated the ‘Open Door’ policy, so that we could have freer trade with China, and preserve their sovereignty” (Pence, Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China, 2018). This view allows the U.S. to see itself as a benevolent actor during this part of history and abdicate any responsibility for the losses China suffered during this period. By focusing on the positive aspect of opening up China, the U.S. contributes to the narrative of American benevolence and goodwill toward China.
The first Opium War ended in 1842 with China being forced to grant Britain special privileges and the use of its ports. In order not to miss out on this opportunity to access the Chinese market, the U.S. sent Caleb Cushing on a mission to obtain the same rights that had been given to the British. Before embarking on the mission, Cushing spoke at a dinner at Faneuil Hall, addressing the significance of his China mission. He spoke of the superior advancement of the West, saying, “We have become the teacher of our teachers. I go to China…in behalf of civilization” (Haddad J. R., 2008). This patronizing tone is found in many of Cushing’s formal communications with China (Haddad J. , 2013). Although here Cushing acknowledges China’s historical prowess, he also makes it clear that the U.S. has far surpassed China and possesses superior knowledge and values. This assumption that all the U.S. has to offer is beneficial and will bring China into civilization demonstrates the idea of American exceptionalism; American values, systems, and norms are immediately thought to be universal. The sense of duty that the words, “I go to China in behalf of civilization” convey illustrates the benevolence aspect of the unappreciated benevolence narrative. These words portray an America that is not only
responsible for bringing its superior models to the backwards parts of the world, like China, but one that is also eager to do so. Cushing’s mission resulted in the signing of the Treaty of
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Wanghsia in 1844. It was the first treaty between the U.S. and China, and awarded the U.S. all the advantages given to the British and assured that any new gains for the British would also apply to the Americans (Hunt, 1983). The U.S. has long promoted the idea that it was Europe alone who was responsible for the humiliation of China, but its eager acceptance of the treaty system and the advantages to be gained were certainly part of China’s humiliation. John
Fairbank writes, “This was an accident of history: that we Americans could enjoy the East Asian treaty privileges, the fruits of European aggression, without the moral burden of ourselves committing aggression. It gave us a holier-than-thou attitude, a righteous self-esteem, an undeserved moral grandeur in our own eyes” (Fairbank, 1970). Here, Fairbank succinctly explains how the U.S.’s tendency to distance itself from the injuries perpetuated by Europe against China is a self-deception that contributes to the American narrative of benevolence without wrongdoing.
The Open Door policy was a statement of principles initiated by the U.S. in 1899 and 1900. It was intended to preserve equal trade privileges among China’s trade partners and Chinese sovereignty (Hay, The Open Door Note, 1899). The policy looked to control the scramble for spheres of influence in China and prevent the country from being divided up into colonies by ensuring that the different powers would have equal access to open trade ports.
Secretary of State John Hay issued two notes, called the Open Door Notes, to other foreign powers interested in staking a claim in China. The second note, issued in July of 1900, defined the purpose of the Open Door Policy as to “bring permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire” (Hay, 1900). This framing of the Open Door Policy
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supports the perception the U.S. had of itself as a benevolent country; there is a clear focus on supporting and protecting China instead of on the motivating benefits this set of policies would bring the U.S. In 1900, President McKinley reiterated this in his annual message to Congress. In stating the U.S.’s approach to China and the Open Door Policy, he said:
The United States from the earliest days of foreign intercourse with China had followed a policy of peace, omitting no occasions to testify good will, to further the extension of lawful trade, to respect the sovereignty of its Government, and to insure by all legitimate and kindly but earnest means the fullest measure of protection for the lives and property of out law-abiding citizens and for the exercise of their beneficent callings among the Chinese people (McKinley, 1900).
President McKinley’s words depict the U.S. as a benevolent hegemon that acts out of a sense of kindness and concern for the Chinese that stems from the American people themselves. His statement also focuses much more on an innate American interest in Chinese success than on American commercial interests, despite the latter being a crucial part of the Open Door Policy. In order to build up support for the Open Door policy among the American public, the Asiatic Association and the Journal of Commerce started a campaign to push the merits of the policy.
This campaign involved emphasizing the importance of the Chinese market for U.S. commercial interests and the idea that the U.S. government and the American people had responsibilities to the Chinese (Campbell, 1941). This appeal to obligation serves as another example of the benevolent hegemon narrative; it illustrates both the American paternalistic sentiment toward China and the conviction that China would undoubtedly benefit from American involvement.
Finally, even the use of the phrase “open door” as the title of the policy contributes to this narrative. Eric Blanchard (2013) takes a constructivist and cognitive approach to understand how
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the use of an “open door” as a metaphor impacted the U.S.-China relationship. He finds that this metaphor helped strengthen a paradigm of the U.S. and the West as the bringers of civilization and China as a place both stagnantly backwards and full of potential. He also argues that the imagery of the open door implies a reality where the U.S. must step in to hold open the door for China because China is incapable of doing so on its own, or being its own doorkeeper. Finally, he points out that the American charity implicit in this metaphor acts as a statement of an anti-imperialist American identity, even as some of the U.S.’s actions proved otherwise (Blanchard E.
M., 2013). Thus, Blanchard’s analysis of the open door metaphor contributes to the idea of the benevolent hegemon narrative by demonstrating how the U.S. truly saw, and continues to see, itself as a generous global leader eager to usher China into civilization. All of the above examples highlight the ways in which the U.S. saw itself as genuinely helping China out of paternalistic kindness and friendship. The narrative’s impact on the American view of China and American obligations to China helped encourage the U.S. to pursue the Open Door policy instead of following along with a potential partitioning of China by European powers.
In 1946, the U.S. and China signed a five-year Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. This treaty affirmed peace, friendship, and cooperation between the two parties by establishing trade rights for both countries. On paper, it established reciprocal rights for an equal trading relationship. While the U.S. was by far the principle beneficiary of the treaty, its
technical fairness allowed it to be considered an equal agreement in the U.S. In the
Congressional hearing regarding this treaty in 1946, the treaty was repeatedly referred to as being based on the “principle of mutuality” (Congressional Hearing, 1948). Furthermore, Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey raised concerns regarding the actual equality of the treaty, asserting that while the U.S. would certainly want more freedom to explore China, it would not
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welcome similar exploration of its own resources. The subsequent discussion easily dismisses these concerns as unlikely to happen in the actual situation (Congressional Hearing, 1948). This reveals a core American assumption; that even behind an emphasis on mutuality, there is an underlying notion that other countries are not the equal of the U.S., and that the U.S. is not beholden to the standards and expectations it has of others. This sentiment is echoed through the many exclusionary immigration policies the U.S. put in place to keep the Chinese out, despite a strong American interest in, and assumed right to, exploration in China.
Alongside merchants and traders, missionaries also made up a large portion of the early Americans in China. Where merchants claimed to be interested in opening and modernizing China, missionaries looked to transform the Chinese nation into one of the Christian faith.
Beginning in the 1830s, American Christian missionaries began to arrive in China with the hopes of bringing their faith and values to the Chinese people. Most missionary work took the form of medical assistance and education; through these Western techniques missionaries hoped to access the spirit of the Chinese and convert them to the Christian faith (Hunt, 1983). This desire to educate and convert the Chinese people demonstrates both the benevolent paternalism and blatant superiority America felt for towards China. Furthermore, in his book Chinese
Characteristics, Arthur H. Smith wrote that despite a handful of potential similarities, and in
addition to numerous flaws, the U.S. and China were completely different, with “the face of China…always and everywhere towards the darkness of the remote past” (Smith, 1890). Thus, there was a prevailing idea that Americans went to China to affect change, not to change
themselves. Carol Chin refers to the missionaries as beneficent imperialists who were “secure in the superiority of their American-ness and the magnanimity of their Christianity…they did not pause to consider the possibility that Chinese culture might have some value” (Chin, 2003).
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China, then, was a place to be saved from itself by the generosity of the U.S., a platform upon which American benevolence could be demonstrated.
The Boxer Rebellion was a large reaction against the foreign presence in China, and in particular the Christian missionary presence, that took place from 1899 and 1901. Growing frustration among the Chinese regarding the perceived foreign invasion of their country
intensified into violent anti-foreign, anti-Christian outbreaks in northern China. The Boxers, as they came to be known, were strongly anti-Christian and went after Chinese Christians and missionaries in an effort to push the foreign presence out of China (Plante, 1999). The American reaction to the Boxer Rebellion came in two parts. First, there was shock and outrage at the violence, and Western media used this to paint a demonizing picture of the Chinese. Jane Elliott (1996) analyzed the coverage of the Boxer Rebellion in many British, American, and English-language newspapers in China. Elliott’s research found that there was a high rate of emotional adjectives used to describe the Chinese in American newspapers, such as words like “cruel,”
“decayed,” “murderous,” “sinister,” and so forth (Elliott, 1996).
The second face of the American reaction was one of perseverance in the face of adversity. There was an intentional decision not to give up on China, a decision that China’s potential was not gone, despite the demonizing way it was described and viewed by many. This doubling-down, so to speak, is evident in an article by John Barrett. In 1900, John Barrett (1900) wrote an article entitled “America’s Duty in China” that begins, “Christendom is staggered by the crisis in China. But America’s duty is definite; her path is plain.” With this, and the rest of the article, Barrett tasked the U.S. with rising to meet the daunting China challenge with Christian and moral heroism. He reinforced the idea of China both as an unprecedented
challenge for American Christians and as a place that desperately needed America’s assistance.
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He wrote that despite anti-missionary sentiment in China, “the forces of Christianity…cannot consider now for a moment the possibility of retreat and defeat” (Barrett, 1900). These
statements, and his article as a whole, illustrate the paternal attitude the U.S. held toward China and the uniquely strong pull it felt to improve China by remaking it in its own image. They also show that even in moments of disappointment, the U.S. still senses and acknowledges a dogged faith that China can be saved. Here, the narrative helps reinforce this American desire to remain engaged with China, as opposed to cutting ties.
I skip through history now to what was perhaps one of the greatest disappointments for the U.S. in the U.S.-China relationship: the events at Tiananmen Square in June of 1989. In the month and a half leading up to June 4, student protesters had begun to gather at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to call for democratic reforms. For a while, the peaceful protests were allowed to continue, bolstering hope among the student protesters and the spectating world that political change in China would occur. This optimism gained confidence as the protests gained public support and received extensive media coverage thanks to the large international media presence in Beijing preparing for the Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Some officials did go to the square to meet with students, further fueling the domestic and international belief that reform was on the way. In the U.S., the media presented a cheery picture, which raised American hopes for China’s chances of democratizing (Suettinger, 2003). However, the widespread attention and high hopes proved futile when the Chinese government declared martial law and ordered troops to clear the square early on the morning of June 4, 1989. The actual number of casualties is unknown, but many believe it to be in the thousands (Nathan, 2001).
The American reaction was one of grave disappointment and outrage. The public decried the CCP’s handling of the situation, and protests took place around the country (Suettinger,
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2003). Members of Congress called for punitive measures to be taken against China, such as tariffs, cessation of support for World Bank loans, the withdrawal of the American ambassador, and a cessation of military cooperation, among others. Some members, such as Senator Jesse Helms, even called for a full reconsideration of the U.S.-China relationship (Suettinger, 2003).
Some punitive measures were taken, such as the suspension of military sales, various sanctions, and loan restrictions, but they were weak and temporary; most of the sanctions had been
removed or weakened within a year (Skidmore & Gates, 1997). Moral outrage and bitter disappointment that the Chinese government had chosen not to embrace democracy and other Western values fueled Congress and the public to call for swift and harsh action against China.
The president, however, took a more conciliatory approach and emphasized continuing to nurture the U.S.-China relationship. President H.W. Bush issued a statement on June 5, 1989 condemning the CCP’s actions, but also reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the bilateral relationship. He said, “The United States cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequences for our relationship with China, which has been built on a foundation of broad support by the American people” (Bush G. H., 1989). Yet even as he condemned China, he continued on to emphasize the importance of maintaining an American relationship with China.
The president’s journal entries during this period revealed his struggle to balance defending what were seen as American values with preserving trade and other interests, in one moment
emphasizing the necessity of standing up for human rights, and in the next stressing the
importance of maintaining a strong bilateral relationship (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998). He appealed to the American sense of responsibility for China, arguing, “When you see these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadership that might decide to crackdown further” (Bush
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G. H., 1989). With this, he directly appealed to that paternalistic, benevolent American self-perception that is part of the unappreciated benevolence narrative. Thus, the narrative again helped reinforce and justify the American commitment to engaging with China, as opposed to enacting harsher punishments or cutting ties.
Another event that exemplifies the narratives is the collision of two planes over the South China Sea in 2001. On April 1, 2001 an American E-P3 surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 jet fighter collided over the South China Sea, resulting in the crashing of the Chinese jet and the death of the Chinese pilot, while the American plane was able to land on Hainan Island, where the crew members were detained by the Chinese. Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, and Spokesman Zhu Bangzao all called upon the U.S. to take full
responsibility for the accident and make a formal apology to the Chinese government and people (Gries & Peng, 2002). American refusal to do so on the grounds that they were not responsible for the collision led to days of gridlock and negotiation as the U.S. tried to get its crew home.
China continued to demand an official apology, and while the U.S. expressed regret for the situation and the death of the Chinese pilot, it did not acquiesce, and voiced its belief that the
China continued to demand an official apology, and while the U.S. expressed regret for the situation and the death of the Chinese pilot, it did not acquiesce, and voiced its belief that the