Chapter 4: The Narratives and Historical Examples
4.2.4 Historical Examples of the Chinese Narrative
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non-narrative, Chinese non-narrative avoids mentioning sensitive topics or issues in the relationship, focusing instead on positive people-to-people sentiments and messages of
friendship. At the same state dinner that was mentioned earlier as an example of American non-narrative, President Xi said the following:
It is my firm conviction that China-U.S. relations face limited challenges, but boundless potential for growth. With perseverance, we can surely write a new chapter in the history of China-U.S. relations. With perseverance, our two great nations will definitely make new contributions to mankind. (The White House, 2017)
This statement embodies non-narrative through its “boundless” optimism for the future of the relationship.
4.2.4 Historical Examples of the Chinese Narrative
This section covers some of the same historical events previously mentioned in the section on historical examples of the American narrative, now showing the Chinese perspective and how the same events can support multiple narratives. Many of the instances the U.S. points to in order to demonstrate its benevolence and long history of friendship toward China are also used to prove national humiliation in the Chinese perspective.
In the early interactions between the West and China, the Chinese did not differentiate between European nations and the U.S. Chinese accounts from this period tend to refer to these countries more generally as barbarians or foreigners. A letter from Emperor Qianlong to King George III illustrates the Chinese attitude towards these foreign nations leading up to the Opium Wars. In response to a1793 British request to send an envoy to control the country’s trade with China, Emperor Qianlong wrote, “How can our dynasty alter its whole procedure and system of
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etiquette, established for more than a century, in order to meet your individual views...As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things…have no use for your country’s
manufactures. This then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative” (Qianlong, 1914). In response to additional requests from the British, he wrote, “If other nations, following your bad example, wrongfully importune my ear with further impossible requests, how will it be possible for me to treat them with easy indulgence?” (Qianlong, 1914). A few things are evident from these excerpt. First, the letter establishes China’s indifference to the West. The West did not have anything that interested China; thus, China permitting foreign nations to engage in trade and other activities was considered to be an act of benevolence since it did not benefit from the interaction. Second, the letter communicates Chinese frustration at the West’s attempts to impose itself upon China. China did not believe it needed to change then in order to accommodate the whims of the West, and the same is true in Chinese thought today. Finally, these excerpts show the Chinese concern that making certain allowances for one foreign country would lead to many more trying to obtain the same privileges in China. Given that this is precisely how the U.S.
eventually gained a strong foothold in China, this was an apt concern.
Despite Chinese resistance to a foreign presence in their borders, foreigners flocked to China, many in the form of merchants. Opium was one of the major goods brought into the Chinese market. The opium trade and the Opium Wars brought destruction to China, and are still widely regarded as significant events in the national humiliation story. The end of the first Opium War ended with the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, which forced China to open its ports to foreign trade, lose Hong Kong to the British, and pay large amounts of compensation. In China, this treaty became known as the First Unequal Treaty (不平等條約) due to the concessions it forced upon China and its marking of the beginning of the Century of Humiliation (Kalipci,
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2018). Added to these concessions later were similar forced agreements with other countries, such as the U.S. and France. On July 3, 1844 a document was signed establishing official relations between the U.S. and China, which included a treaty that gave American commerce all the advantages already given to the British (Hunt, 1983). Despite American claims that the opium trade and the plethora of problems it brought to China was exclusively a British venture, the U.S. was also involved in the trade and benefited greatly from the results of the Opium Wars.
These gains for the U.S. were a direct result of the British exploitation of China during the Opium War; thus, the U.S. was not so far-removed from China’s Century of Humiliation as Pence’s aforementioned remarks would suggest, and was in fact a direct beneficiary of early Western exploitation of China. The unfair treatment from this period has not been forgotten;
indeed, the concept of unequal treaties still arises in issues between the U.S. and China today.
For example, on May 6, 2019 People’s Daily posted an article online regarding activity in the South China Sea entitled, “美对华提出「不平等条约」但现在是 1840 年?” (“The U.S.
Demands an “Unfair Treaty” with China. Is it 1840 Again?” (梅新育, 2019). The use here of the phrase meaning “unfair treaty” harkens back to this First Unequal Treaty in a direct equation of past mistreatment with the present.
The Open Door policy, which was created by the U.S. in order to prevent China from being carved up by European nations, also contributed to the Chinese feeling of humiliation at the hands of the U.S. Despite its outward appearance as a set of policies intended to preserve and protect Chinese sovereignty, the motive lying beneath the surface was to enable American commercial interests in China. A China that had been carved up by European powers would be disadvantageous for American trade. The Open Door policy did serve to protect China’s sovereignty, but Pence’s claim that the Open Door policy was intended to preserve Chinese
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sovereignty out of a kind of friendship or moral position is misleading. The policy served American trade interests in China first and foremost. Hu Sheng (1985) argues that its role in preserving Chinese sovereignty was primarily a way to ensure a predominant trade position in China for foreign powers and for the U.S. to further its own imperialist agenda in China. This view is still commonly held in China today. An editorial published in China Daily on November 2, 2018 argues that the U.S. would have been just as imperialist as Europe from the beginning had it been capable; since it was not yet strong enough, it resorted to the Open Door Policy to protect its commercial interests in China instead, and never had China’s interest at heart (Bin, 2018).
On paper, the 1946 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation established reciprocal rights for an equal trade relationship, but it realistically only benefited the U.S. The signing of the treaty caused outrage in China, fervent talk of national humiliation, and radio reportings that signing the treaty had betrayed the country’s sovereignty (Orlean, 1948). To the Chinese, the principles of reciprocity and equality the treaty embodies are included merely as formalities, because the state of the situation at the time was such that benefits would only be able to go one way. China at that time had no real ability to invest in the American market or carry out the other rights that the treaty afforded the U.S. in China, thus making the equality laid out in the treaty negligible (Wang D. , 2005). The treaty and the Chinese reaction to it are good examples of the differences in perspective that caused mistrust: a “fair” treaty to one is
imperialist and unfair to another. While the U.S. saw this treaty as another step in a constructive and productive bilateral relationship, China saw it as another imposition by a foreign power.
Christian missionaries traveled from the U.S. to China in order to bring both their faith and their Western concepts of civilization and development to the Chinese people. While the
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majority of these missionaries were well-intentioned and believed they were only bringing positive developments to China such as Western medicine and education, not all Chinese saw their presence in the same benevolent light. To begin, the presence of American missionaries existed because of rights and agreements extracted from China with force. This tied missionaries to China’s period of humiliation, since they would not have been able to proselytize had China not been forced into allowing foreign countries numerous rights within its borders. The Boxer Rebellion between 1899 and 1901 encapsulated the anti-missionary, anti-Western, anti-Christian sentiment felt in much of China. The Boxers connected the idea of expelling foreigners from China and reviving China, believing that China’s struggles with poverty were the result of foreign interference (Qizhang, 1987).
On November 20, 1900 1901, Wu Ting-Fang addressed the American Academy of Political and Social Science in a speech entitled, “The Causes of the Unpopularity of the
Foreigner in China” (Wu, 1901). He attempted to explain the strong anti-foreigner sentiment that lay behind the Boxer Rebellion by gently and diplomatically outlining the many ways in which foreigners had denigrated China since their arrival. For example, when discussing the role of missionaries, Wu acknowledged the positive results of their presence (translation work,
education, medicine, philanthropy, among others), but also pointed to instances of interference in Chinese systems, overzealousness in conversion, condemnation of all things Chinese, and unfair treatment. While Wu was careful not to excuse the Boxers’ violence, he endeavored to
contextualize it in the problematic treatment of the Chinese and their growing frustrations (Wu, 1901). Both the events of the Boxer Rebellion and Wu’s speech reveal how foreigners generally, and missionaries in particular, were viewed as intrusive and unwelcome. The powerlessness of
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the Chinese to control the foreign presence within their borders due to unfair treaties and the imposed will of other countries contributes to the narrative of national humiliation.
The twentieth century was fraught with many ups and downs for the U.S.-China
relationship. The Chinese Civil War saw the U.S. back the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, who eventually lost and fled to Taiwan. This led to several decades of very limited relations between the U.S. and China (PRC). After the two countries established formal ties in 1979, engagement between the two began to increase, and the cycle of U.S.-China relations swung up towards hope and optimism. Then, towards the end of the twentieth century, the student
democratic protests at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, and the Chinese government’s crackdown on June 4 threw a wrench into the relationship. Congress and the American public heavily condemned the Chinese response to the peaceful protests at Tiananmen, and bemoaned the Chinese government’s decision not to embrace democracy. China’s government faced considerable criticism at this time, much of it coming from the U.S.
Five days after the square was forcibly cleared, Deng Xiaoping issued a public speech regarding the events at Tiananmen. In this speech, Deng steadfastly defended the use of force, praised the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and mourned their casualties, criticized the government’s enemies as wanting China to be dependent on the West, and responded to international criticism, particularly American criticism. “What qualifications do they have to criticize us?” he asked, going on to say, “The U.S. berates us for suppressing students. But when they handled domestic student unrest and turmoil, didn’t they send out police and troops, arrest people and shed blood?”2 (Deng, 1989). The unapologetic tone of the speech was a staunch
2Deng’s comments came in the wake of a secret visit from U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who went to China after the Tiananmen incident bearing assurances that the U.S. would not seriously consider isolating
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rejection of the protesters’ demands and the Western political model of democracy. In addition, calling the U.S. hypocritical in its reproach of China said that China refused to be held to a different standard than the U.S. held itself to. This stands as a confrontation of the American narrative, through which American “exemptionalism” and presumed superiority allow that very thing to happen. Deng’s speech was a rejection of many things, including foreign attempts to once again influence China, a Western model of political development, and Western criticism of Chinese government decisions. Through these rejections, it is clear that China was standing up to potential further national humiliation and claiming to be carving its own path towards greater economic and political development. It can be read as an act of defiance against an unwelcome, imposed parental presence. Aspects of the narrative encourage the Chinese government to choose this more defiant approach over a more conciliatory one.
The April 1, 2001 collision of an American E-P3 surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 jet fighter over the South China Sea exemplifies the Chinese narrative of national humiliation due to the heavy focus the Chinese placed on receiving an American apology. Many believe this
demand for an apology had much to do with saving face on the international stage, which links back to China’s sensitivity to perceived slights and humiliations (Gries & Peng, 2002). The Chinese government insisted that the collision was entirely the fault of the American plane, which it said had violated aviation rules and entered China’s airspace without permission. At a press conference soon after the event, Spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated that the incident
constituted a direct violation of Chinese sovereignty, because the U.S. had long been sending aircraft to the Chinese coast to conduct surveillance activities against the wishes of Chinese authorities (Cheng & Ngok, 2004). Bringing the issue of sovereignty into discussions of the incident demonstrates Chinese concern about foreign countries overstepping once again, and a
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dogged determination not to allow that sort of humiliation to reoccur. Furthermore, the American refusal to apologize read as very arrogant to the Chinese, and seemed to embody distasteful American hegemonic behavior (Cheng & Ngok, 2004). The angry Chinese claim to both victimhood and the right to an apology exemplifies how national humiliation permeates into many parts of the U.S.-China relationship. China’s refusal to see history repeated directed how it dealt with this event. The government’s hard stance in insisting upon an American apology was a statement that China was on its way back to prominence and would not allow other countries, especially the U.S., to take advantage of it anymore.
The U.S.’s “Pivot to Asia” approach to the Asia-Pacific became a focus of American policy following a 2011 Foreign Policy piece by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This foreign policy focus involved increasing U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific on all fronts.
China’s response to the pivot, including the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
proposed trade agreement between twelve countries from which it was quite pointedly excluded, was muted but indignant. The early official reaction was reserved; with statements coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supporting regional economic integration efforts generally, though expressing some doubt as to the feasibility of the TPP (Glaser & Billingsley, 2012).
Numerous articles in People’s Daily accused the U.S. of trying to contain China’s rise through the new policy focus, with some even arguing that the “TPP [was] superficially an economic agreement but contain[ed] an obvious political purpose to constrain China’s rise” (Ding & Ji, 2011). This perspective demonstrates the lack of trust China has in the U.S.’s motives, as well as China’s determination not to let other countries, especially the U.S., interfere in its journey to
“national rejuvenation.” Additionally, many believe that the Belt and Road Initiative unveiled under President Xi Jinping in 2013 is a Chinese-led alternative to the TPP. If it is seen from that
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angle, it demonstrates the part of the Chinese narrative that is determined to see China rise of its own volition and through embracing its own model, not the American one that has been imposed upon it.
In 2012, Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. Though the Chinese Communist Party made use of the national humiliation narrative since its founding, Xi doubled-down on it, focusing primarily on the importance of national rejuvenation to the Chinese dream. In his first public address
following these appointments, Xi outlined the Chinese struggle in modern history and the failure to attain national rejuvenation. Turning to the CCP, he said:
After the founding of the CPC, it has rallied and led the people, it made great efforts and turned the poor and backwards China into a new China…the great revival of the Chinese nation has thus embraced a bright prospect never seen before. Our responsibility is to rally and lead the whole party…working hard for the great revival of the Chinese nation, so that we will stand rock firm amongst nations of the world, and make fresh and greater contribution to mankind. (Xi Jinping's first public address, 2012)
Xi’s statements paved the way for his assertive arrival as a global leader; his use of the narrative as shown in the above quote insists firmly on the goal of national rejuvenation, whereby China will take its place as an equal among other nations. Since 2012, Xi has consistently promoted the idea of a “Chinese dream,” one that involves the renewal of the Chinese nation. More
specifically, this dream involves the realization of national rejuvenation by following a path of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress, 2017). Thus, Xi’s arrival as China’s leader has also contributed to the use of the national humiliation narrative.
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China’s perspective on the escalating trade tensions with the U.S. since 2012 has largely been one of indignation, especially regarding the large number of investigations the U.S. has brought against it. The U.S. harbors a lot of frustration at China for behavior it sees as breaking international rules, disadvantaging others, and implementing protectionist measures. China, on the other hand, takes issue with American intervention and what it sees as an irrational adherence to a zero-sum mentality (Wang Y. , Speech at the Opening of Symposium on the International Situation and China's Foreign Relations in 2018 , 2018). The WTO action the U.S., EU, and Japan took in 2012 to try to halt Chinese export restrictions of rare earths minerals was not welcomed by the Chinese. China denounced the WTO lawsuit as “rash and unfair,” claiming that its restrictions on rare earths exports were in line with WTO regulations and were only in place to account for concerns over environmental impact and long-term supply (Alessi, 2012). To China, U.S. complaints and lawsuits against China are seen as discriminatory competitive measures that have more to do with bullying than with abiding by international rules.