4. Opportunities and Challenges of Chinese Soft Power
4.2 Weaknesses
4.2.2 Human Rights Issues and Lack of Legitimacy
meeting in Hanoi, China’s then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi （楊潔篪） refuted concerns from a Singaporean minister on the South China Sea with the words “China is a big country and other countries are small countries. That’s just a fact.” 223 More recently, spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying （華春瑩） commented that “small countries should not make unreasonable demands” when asked a question on this identical topic. 224 Both quotes were hyped and frequently cited in foreign media outlets.
Without a doubt, some of China’s actions and comments do not further Chinese soft power pursuits at all. On the contrary, they may damage them and undo previous efforts that have sought to win over the hearts and minds overseas. As a rising world power, China needs a consistent and coordinated foreign policy that neighboring countries do not perceive as menacing. If not, China’s efforts to establish itself as a peaceful world power may be in vain.
4.2.2 Human Rights Issues and Lack of Legitimacy
The Beijing Consensus highlighted in previous chapters as a strength of Chinese soft power is at the same time also a weakness. Indeed, values that are attractive in one place can be reviled in another. 225 In Western countries especially, China is viewed as a state with an authoritarian and repressive regime. 226 Indeed The role of civil society in China is very limited and under Xi, it is even being pushed back. Since Xi’s coming to power, China has seen unprecedented crackdowns on human rights activists, lawyers, dissidents and NGOs. 227 The
223 Terry McCarthy, "China’s Aggressive Stance Reveals Lack of Coordination," Yale Global Online, December 5 (2012).
224 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January 22, 2015," accessed July 6, 2018.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1230645.shtml.)
225 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 55.
226 d’Hooghe, "The Expansion of China’s Public Diplomacy System," in Soft Power in China, 29.
227 Nick Cumming-Bruce, "China’s Rights Crackdown Is Called ‘Most Severe’ since Tiananmen Square,"
(accessed July 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/world/asia/china-human-rights-united-nations.html.)
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death of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo（劉曉波） in July 2017 in police custody drew much regret and attention to China’s human rights situation from all over the world. 228
More recently, authorities’ treatment of minorities has also been in the international spotlight, resulting into headlines like “Apartheid with Chinese Characteristics: China has turned Xinjiang into a police state like no other” in the mainstream media outlet The Economist or even led Canada’s public broadcaster CBC-Radio Canada to publish an article titled “'Thank the Party!': China tries to brainwash Muslims in camps.” 229
A 2017 study from Pew Research Center asking participants if the Chinese government respects the personal liberty of its subjects (Figure 4.4) indicates that audiences from most countries believe that it does not. Only 11 out of 38 surveyed countries answering
‘yes’ reached the threshold of 50%, many of which are developing countries. With 71%, the highest percentage of any country, Nigerian participants overwhelmingly agree that Chinese citizens enjoy personal freedom; a consequence of the massive Chinese investment in the country in recent years, no doubt. On the other hand, at least three fourths of participants in all
“Western” democracies, which China frequently accuses of having a monopoly on media and spreading anti-China narratives, gave a negative answer. At the end of the spectrum we find Sweden, where 95% of participants answered that Chinese people do not enjoy the same liberties. Responses from China’s neighbors Japan and South Korea were also negative where only 9% and 18% respectively agreed with the question.
228 BBC, "Liu Xiaobo: China's Most Prominent Dissident Dies," (accessed July 6, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40597514.)
229 The Economist, "Apartheid with Chinese Characteristics: China Has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State Like No Other," (accessed July 6, 2018, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-a-police-state-like-no-other.)
CBC, "'Thank the Party!': China Tries to Brainwash Muslims in Camps," (accessed July 2, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-internment-camps-1.4666686.)
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Nye’s concept of soft power entails that foreign policy based on shared values such as civil liberties and human rights are powerful sources of soft power. 230 The data above, however, reveals that world has by far a negative perception of China’s human rights record.
Chinese authorities frequently announce progress is being made and periodically release white papers on China’s human rights situation. However, for Beijing, improvement of its human rights situations does not constitute granting civil liberties to its citizens but rather more economic and cultural freedom and a higher standard of living. 231 Yet, this has failed to convince foreign audiences in most liberal democracies and China’s human rights situation remains without a doubt an obstacle for Chinese soft power.
Another major hurdle for Chinese soft power is authorities their severe lack of credibility. 232 This is an issue that is very much related to the political system in China and its approach to public diplomacy. China’s political institutions are not only nondemocratic, they are also extremely opaque and secretive. Outside China, this leads to doubts about the Communist Party’s legitimacy and whether or not the Chinese government really does speak on behalf of its people. 233 Such views obviously undermine the diplomatic messages and soft power initiatives of the Chinese government. After all, Nye names credibility and good reputation as essential in order to find an audience in a society that is saturated with information:
a paradox of plenty. 234 Information from governments that lack these qualities will be considered propaganda and yield counterproductive results.
From a media-theoretic point of view, this is also very problematic. While China has indeed invested massively in its international media expansion and now owns one of the
230 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 62.
231 Sheng Ding, Is Human Rights the Achilles' Heel of Chinese Soft Power? A New Perspective on Its Appeal (2012), 645.
232 d’Hooghe, "The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe," 183.
233 Ibid.
234 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 107.
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most extensive networks in the world, its reports are still often considered of questionable authenticity. This is especially the case when the topics covered move from a sphere of consensus to a sphere of controversy. 235 In 2008, Liu Yunshan of the Central Propaganda Department famously declared that the power to disseminate information determines the power to influence （傳播力決定影響力）. 236 However, China’s image problem may not be one of lack of communication capacity but one of lack of credibility.
4.3 Conclusion
The strength of China’s diplomacy lies very much in its instruments. The Confucius Institute is China’s biggest asset in spreading its language and culture. Compared to its counterparts, which have been around for over a century like Alliance Française, the Confucius Institute has seen an extremely high number of enrollments in a little over a decade.
The increasing importance of Chinese because of the country’s economic growth certainly plays a role in the institute’s popularity.
China’s rise has also resulted into a massive increase in international students.
Many of these inbound students come from China’s periphery or from countries that are part of Chinese soft power initiatives, such as the One Belt One Road Project. These students will likely develop an affinity towards China and perhaps even adopt Chinese values and ideas, thereby creating a durable long-term source of soft power.
In addition, China’s increasing popularity as a tourist destination makes it possible for visitors to become familiar with the country. Not only does this provide economic benefits but it also allows visitors to develop a fondness of China. Many of tourists come from ASEAN
235 Sun, 66.
236 中國共產黨新聞, "“接地氣才能有底氣”——記中共中央政治局常委劉雲山," (accessed July 7, 2018.
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/1225/c64094-20013177-2.html.)
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countries, as China has made efforts to develop closer ties with its Good Neighbor Policy.
Similarly, many Chinese travel to these countries, taking with them the image of a wealthy and affluent China. Indeed, China’s economic development has amazed both friend and foe and served as a source of admiration, despite China not promoting its own model. It has also enabled Beijing to grow into one of the largest ODA providers in the world, offering aid to developing countries, regardless of their governance, with “no string attached”. This has won over many hearts in developing countries, on the African content especially.
At the same time, China’s authoritarian system of governance makes it very unpopular in the West and some of its neighbors. Its blatant disregard for human rights and freedom of speech work against its attempts to overhaul its image. Furthermore, while China has massively expanded its communication capacity over the last years, it still lacks credibility, a fact that can lead foreign audiences to perceive Chinese broadcasting as propaganda.
Furthermore, it is clear that the image that China wants to build for itself does not always correspond with reality.
Finally, China’s foreign policy often contradicts its soft power efforts. While Beijing has many policies in place to construct cordial relationships with neighboring countries, it also agitates them by its expansion in the South China Sea. A consistent foreign policy is necessary if China wants to win over the hearts and minds in its periphery.
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China’s push for soft power must be interpreted in the context of the role it has appointed to itself: that of a rising superpower. With President Xi, the days of hiding one’s strength and biding time are long gone. Today, China is an increasingly assertive nation with a growing importance in international politics.
In the beginning of this study, I sought an answer to the following questions:
1. How does China view soft power?
2. How does China obtain soft power?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese soft power?
I have found that in fact, Chinese interpretation of soft power build on Nye’s original concept yet slightly diverges in a number aspects. Indeed, soft power in Chinese context is also based on the principle of attraction: spreading the Chinese Dream and better understanding of Chinese values are a core objective of its soft power pursuit. However, as opposed to just using it to win over hearts and minds abroad, China also uses soft power in its domestic sphere.
For Beijing, soft power serves both for nation branding as well as nation building.
Through soft power, authorities aim to create a robust Chinese identity, one that withstands foreign influence, in order to enhance national cohesion and ensure regime stability. The Communist Party needs to make “Chineseness” an attractive concept if it wants to legitimize its rule, especially in areas with large ethnic populace, such as the Tibet and Uyghur autonomous regions.
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The Chinese dream is an essential part of the Party’s nation building efforts. It is essentially a nationalistic discourse that builds on the humiliation narrative, an integral part of the Chinese identity. Through the Chinese dream, China will finally see its long-awaited rejuvenation and reclaim its rightful place as the center of civilization. Rejuvenation, however, is a gradual process that can only happen under the guidance and leadership of the Communist Party.
Public diplomacy, as the principal method of Chinese soft power, is a responsibility shared between various government bodies. The objectives of Chinese public diplomacy as fourfold: to strive for better understanding from the world by telling its story, to counter foreign propaganda, to promote unification with Taiwan and to promulgate the country’s foreign policies.
China’s enormous investments media apparatus in recent years highlight the importance of mass media it puts on global reach and communication. As China takes its place on the world stage, its influence must correspond its economic might. Right now, China sees itself stuck to the image it was given by Western media: that of a rigid autocratic regime. If China truly wants to exert its influence on a worldwide scale and legitimize its position as a global power, it needs to sway the opinion of foreign audiences in its favor. This can only be done if it has the capacity to reach audiences worldwide.
Today, China’s state media have gone global. In just a few years, China Radio International and CCTV have branched out massively and now have the capacity to broadcast and report foreign listeners worldwide, often from a Chinese angle of interest. While many Western news outlets are struggling, CCTV’s international branch, CGTN, has opened regional offices and broadcasting centers from Nairobi to London. CGTN has heavily localized its
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reporting in order to boost internationalization and credibility of its network. CGTN, too, actively works to build a better image of China and defends the country in light of criticism.
Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, has also undergone thorough reforms and carried out a worldwide expansion. It now ranks among the world’s largest press agencies, alongside Reuters, AP and AFP. It is, however, still under direct supervision and control of the Communist Party. Xinhua’s journalists go through rigorous ideological training to ensure absolute loyalty to the Party. Despite it being one of the world’s largest agencies, it is still a mouthpiece for the Party and its primary function is to serve Party interests.
Nye names three pillars of soft power, namely: a country’s culture, its political values and its foreign policy. For China, its principal source of soft power is its indeed traditional culture as its political system is at odds with most other countries. The Confucius Institute is, without a doubt, the star of China’s cultural diplomacy. The Institute serves several goals: to spread the Chinese language, foster Chinese culture and promote business between China and the world. Despite occasionally being the subject of controversy, in just a matter of years, it has organized hundreds of thousands of cultural activities and enrolled almost two million learners of Chinese. Generous funding from Hanban and the Institute’s exceptional structure have resulted into a rapid expansion of its network and fostered the internationalization and networking of Chinese universities. Confucius Institutes are very successful in introducing Chinese culture to local audiences as well as local elites. They also aim to promote a better, harmonious image of Chinese society.
Additionally, while China does not actively promote its development model, it still remains a source of admiration to a certain degree. China’s economic growth and foreign investment has spurred a massive inflow of international students to the country. Many of these students come from countries in which China has ongoing projects, such as the One Belt One
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Road initiative. Official development assistance has also won over many hearts and minds in developing countries.
However, while China does massive efforts and investments, it faces a series of obstacles and challenges, most of which are arguably self-inflicted. China’s foreign policy in recent years, despite government strategy, very much contradicts its theorem of “Peaceful Rise”. Its ever-growing military budget and aggressive expansion of military bases in the South-China Sea has resulted into anxiousness and distrust in neighboring countries, as witnessed by popular mass protests in the region.
Moreover, China’s opaque and nondemocratic system of governance is extremely unpopular with Western democracies. For the most part, China is perceived as not respectful of the civil liberties of its subjects, a view which is further complicated by government crackdowns on journalists and human rights activists. The treatment of minorities in recent years has exacerbated this impression, as echoed in Western media outlets.
While the efficiency of China’s massive soft power push does not fall under the scope of this thesis, some questions can be raised. Why is it that India, despite having considerably fewer resources to invest, can bring forth Bollywood and the Chinese cultural industry cannot? How can neighboring Cool Japan amass so much soft power? South-Korea absolutely dwarfs China with its popular culture: why is there no Chinese wave? These may serve as motivation for future studies.
Today, China’s soft power push is more likely than ever to succeed. While in 2018, Donald Trump declared that America no longer wants to be the policeman of the world, Xi Jinping talked about China’s responsibility in his “shared future for mankind”. 237 As the
237 Liangyu, "Xi Calls for Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind," (accessed July 7, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/10/c_137099759.htm.)
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United States increasingly its focuses on itself under its “America First” policies and neglects its international standing, there is a growing vacuum for China to step in. If China plays its cards right, this can be a unique opportunity to enhance its soft power and establish itself as responsible superpower.
However, Beijing also needs to reflect on the self-imposed constraints that prevent it from amassing soft power. China wants to present itself as an alternative, the opposite end of the spectrum the world’s relationship with the United States. Its leadership radiates determination and confidence, however, it remains to be seen whether China can also convince the rest of the world.
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