Inconsistent and Contradictive Foreign Policy

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European countries such as Denmark and Norway cut financial aid to the country. ²¹¹ China, however, unfazed by these developments, increased its investments in the country $875 million the next year. ²¹²

For China, its development model, its generous ODA but also the extremely ambitious OBOR project can serve to enhance not just its influence but also its image. China can present itself as a benign actor and a responsible world power: China is indeed rising but at the same time its selfless foreign aid is helping other countries to grow as well. ²¹³

4.2 Weaknesses

4.2.1 Inconsistent and Contradictive Foreign Policy

Perhaps the biggest obstacle of Chinese soft power is, ironically, China itself.

Chinese foreign policy is very inconsistent with the image it tries to shape for itself and often works against its own soft power efforts.

An obvious example would be its attempts to counter the “China Threat” theory.

Beijing is aware that its fast-paced ascent on the world stage has bred anxiousness in the region and has launched a charm offensives with catchy slogans like “Peaceful Rise of China” （中 國和平崛起） and “Good Neighbor Policy” （睦鄰友好政策） to reassure neighbors. Fravel argues that as a result of the latter, China has shown great willingness to resolve territorial disputes with its neighbors. In the past, Beijing has made heavy compromises, sometimes

211 Reuters Staff, "U.S. Cuts Aid to Uganda, Cancels Military Exercise over Anti-Gay Law," (accessed July 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-uganda-gay-announcement/u-s-cuts-aid-to-uganda-cancels-military-exercise-over-anti-gay-law-idUSKBN0EU26N20140619.)

212 Steven F Mandu, "Minister Kyambadde Applauds Chinese for Investing in Uganda," (accessed July 4, 2018, http://eagle.co.ug/2018/01/16/minister-kyambadde-applauds-chinese-investing-uganda.html.)

213 Hongxi Yang, "Make Intl Aid More Effective and Balanced," (accessed July 6, 2018, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/25/content_15616466.htm.)

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settling for less than 50% of the contested areas in some cases. ²¹⁴ However, while China often talks about a “shared destiny” for Asia and has launched a wide array of initiatives to ease these worries (such as the cooperation with ASEAN member states), it still finds itself at the center of territorial disputes and negative attention on the world stage. After all, Xi’s China is no longer a China that “hides its strength and bides its time”, it is a confident and rising world power that is increasingly assertive.

Its most notable territorial dispute is the one in the South China Sea, where China lays claim on the archipelagos and the exclusive economic zones contested by Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. The conflict has resulted in heightened tensions and discontent among China’s neighbors.

In 2014, violent anti-China protests broke out in Vietnam when Beijing greenlit an oil rig deployment near the Paracel Islands （西沙群島） which are claimed by both countries but in fact controlled by China. ²¹⁵ The move resulted into widespread anti-Chinese sentiment among the Vietnamese population, which led to another wave of protests in 2018 when Hanoi announced economic reforms that the public saw as land concessions to China. ²¹⁶

Similarly, in 2016 the Philippines successfully challenged the legality of China’s

“nine-dotted line” at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Beijing, however, dismissed the ruling, stating that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction over the matter. ²¹⁷ Despite popular discontent, the Philippines’ newly elected president, Rodrigo Duterte, did not

214 Taylor M Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 55.

215 William G. Frasure, "Vietnam Steers between China's Threat and Public's Anger," (accessed July 6, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/vietnam-steers-between-chinas-threat-and-publics-anger/.)

216 Martin Petty, "In Vietnam, Distrust of Government's China Policy Fuels Protests," (accessed July 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-protests-analysis/in-vietnam-distrust-of-governments-china-policy-fuels-protests-idUSKBN1JF0VU.)

217 Xinhua, "Chinese Diplomat Says South China Sea Tribunal Has No Jurisdiction," (accessed July 6, 2018, http://china.org.cn/world/2016-05/12/content_38443762.htm.)

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further pursue the matter in exchange for Chinese guarantees of investment and a promise that it would not further expand into other reefs. ²¹⁸

Another major point of concern is the militarization of Chinese-controlled reefs and islands in the South China Sea, which has not just upset neighboring countries but also the United States. In addition to constructing military bases on existing territory, China is also building artificial islands while state media propagate that “China has the right to build whatever it needs within its territory.” ²¹⁹ During a visit from U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, Xi reaffirmed China’s resolute stance on the South China Sea, stating that “China does not want others’ properties but it will also not yield an inch of the territory of its ancestors”

（老祖宗留下來的領土一寸也不能丟，別人的東西我們一分一毫也不要）. ²²⁰

Such remarks reveal a very ambiguous foreign policy: for China the disputed territories are not disputed at all, they are integral part of its territory. As such, China does not see it as a contradiction to its peaceful rise, as it is merely defending its territory. ²²¹ Beijing refuses to acknowledge other countries’ claims and at the same time dismisses the China Threat theory as unreasonable and unsubstantiated. This comes at a time in which Chinese military expenditure has seen a consistent year-on-year increase, reaching $175 billion, up 8.1% from the previous year. ²²²

Furthermore, Chinese officials do not always express themselves with due finesse when confronted with questions regarding Chinese foreign policy. At a July 2010 ASEAN

218 Al Jazeera, "Filipinos Protest China's Build up in Disputed Sea," (accessed July 6, 2018,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/filipinos-protest-china-build-disputed-sea-180210095558354.html.)

219 Yusha Zhao, "Land Reclamation to Expand in South China Sea Islands: Expert," (accessed July 6, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1088347.shtml.)

220 人民日報. “習近平會見美國國防部長馬蒂斯,” (accessed July 3, 2018,

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2018-06/28/nw.D110000renmrb_20180628_1-01.htm)

221 Katherine Morton, "China's Ambition in the South China Sea: Is a Legitimate Maritime Order Possible?,"

International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 916.

222 Brad Lendon, "China Boosts Military Spending 8% Amidst Ambitious Modernization Drive," (accessed July 6, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/04/asia/chinese-military-budget-intl/index.html.)

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meeting in Hanoi, China’s then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi （楊潔篪） refuted concerns from a Singaporean minister on the South China Sea with the words “China is a big country and other countries are small countries. That’s just a fact.” ²²³ More recently, spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hua Chunying （華春瑩） commented that “small countries should not make unreasonable demands” when asked a question on this identical topic. ²²⁴ Both quotes were hyped and frequently cited in foreign media outlets.

Without a doubt, some of China’s actions and comments do not further Chinese soft power pursuits at all. On the contrary, they may damage them and undo previous efforts that have sought to win over the hearts and minds overseas. As a rising world power, China needs a consistent and coordinated foreign policy that neighboring countries do not perceive as menacing. If not, China’s efforts to establish itself as a peaceful world power may be in vain.