傳播中國夢–中國軟實力策略之研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Spreading the Chinese Dream: A Study on Chinese Soft Power Strategy 散播中國夢–中國軟實力策略之研究 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Gevorg Khourchoudian Advisor: Dr. Yung-Fang Lin. July, 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(2) Abstract In recent years, China has made great efforts and advancements in increasing its soft power. It has done this by making massive investments in its mass media network and by enhancing its communication capacity. This thesis studies how the Chinese interpretation of soft power is closely built on Nye’s original concept, yet serves has additional purposes such as nation building and enhancing national cohesion. It reviews the respective strategies and efforts of the Chinese government apparatus, the Confucius Institute and Chinese state media in increasing China’s soft power. This dissertation concludes with observing China’s strengths. 政治大. and weaknesses in its quest for soft power.. ‧ 國. 學. 摘要. 立. ‧. 近年來，中國不斷地投入龐大的資金及人力，以增強軟實力。我們可以從中國. sit. y. Nat. 對大眾傳媒之大量投資，以增加其媒體影響力，發現端倪。在這篇文章中，針對中國. n. al. er. io. 關於自身之軟實力詮釋，與約瑟夫.奈爾所提出的原始軟實力概念做出比較，探討了兩. i n U. v. 者的相似與相異之處，另外也對國家建構和增強民族凝聚力兩大主題進行討論。本文. Ch. engchi. 也個別檢視了中國為增加其軟實力，所運用的兩項具體策略及投注之心力：設置孔子學院、以及對官方媒體的經營。最後，以觀察中國在追求增加軟實力這方面上，所擁有的優勢與劣勢歸納出結論。. i. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(3) Acknowledgements This thesis is the final result of my studies at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan. These two years have been an unforgettable chapter of my life during which I have learned a great deal and grown immensely as a person. Firstly, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Yung-Fang Lin, who has not been just a magnificent mentor but also a great friend who has guided me through every step of the way in writing this dissertation. You have set an example of kindness and virtue as an academic and role model.. 立. 政治大. I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee for their helpful remarks and. ‧ 國. 學. guidance through this process. Your discussions and feedback have been invaluable.. ‧. I am grateful to my loving family for their unconditional love and encouragement throughout this adventure. In particular my parents Lily Galstyan and Hakob Khurschudyan. y. Nat. io. sit. and my sister Jana Galstyan, who have supported me both emotionally and financially. Without. er. you, none of this would have been possible.. al. n. v i n C hYang, who has helped My sincere thanks to Chuanmi e n g c h i U me immensely throughout my. stay in Taiwan and stood by me through good and bad times. I am extremely lucky to have met you and I couldn’t ask for a better friend. Finally, I am forever indebted to my former colleague and best friend, Mayumi Nishikawa, who has shown me so much love and friendship from the day I met her. From the stressful times at our former workplace to the carefree days traveling together in Canada and Taiwan: you have supported me through every step and decision I have taken. You are a friend for life and words cannot describe the appreciation and gratitude I feel for your never-ending encouragement and cheerfulness. ii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(4) Table of Contents. Tables ...................................................................................................................................................... iv 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Research Motivation and Purpose ................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Literature Review .......................................................................................................................... 4 1.2.1 The Chinese Idea of Soft Power ............................................................................................. 4 1.2.2 Instruments and Institutions of Soft Power ........................................................................... 9 1.2.2.1 Institutional Structure ............................................................................................................. 9 1.2.2.2 Communication and Mass Media.......................................................................................... 11 1.2.2.3 Confucius Institutes ............................................................................................................... 13 1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 16 1.4 Outline of Thesis .......................................................................................................................... 17 2. Soft Power and the Chinese Dream .................................................................................................. 20. 政治大 2.2 The Chinese Idea of Soft Power .................................................................................................. 25 立 2.2.1 Differences with Nye’s concept ............................................................................................ 27. 2.1 The Concept of Soft Power .......................................................................................................... 20. ‧ 國. 學. 2.3 The Chinese Dream ..................................................................................................................... 33 2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 36. ‧. 3. Institutional Structure, Strategy and Instruments ............................................................................ 37 3.1 Institutional Structure ................................................................................................................. 37. y. Nat. 3.2 Mass Communication and Media................................................................................................ 42. sit. 3.2.1 Radio: China Radio International.......................................................................................... 43. er. io. 3.2.2 Television: China Central Television News ........................................................................... 45. al. v i n Ch 3.3 Confucius Institute ...................................................................................................................... 55 U i e h n gc 3.4 Host Diplomacy ........................................................................................................................... 63 n. 3.2.3. Xinhua News Agency ........................................................................................................... 48. 3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 65 4. Opportunities and Challenges of Chinese Soft Power....................................................................... 67 4.1 Strengths ..................................................................................................................................... 67 4.1.1 A Cultural Superpower with an Enticing Language .............................................................. 67 4.1.2 Alternative Development Model and Generous ODA .......................................................... 73 4.2 Weaknesses ................................................................................................................................. 76 4.2.1 Inconsistent and Contradictive Foreign Policy ..................................................................... 76 4.2.2 Human Rights Issues and Lack of Legitimacy ....................................................................... 79 4.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 83 5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 85 6. References ......................................................................................................................................... 90. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(5) Tables Table 2.1: Spending on External and Internal Security in Million RMB………………………29 Table 2.2: Domestic Security Spending in RMB per Capita for Select Regions………………30 Table 3.1: Growth of Xinhua………………………………………………………………….52 Table 3.2: Facts on Eight Major Global News Agencies………………………………………53 Table 3.3: Number of Confucius Institutes per Country………………………………………61. Figures. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 4.1: Number of Cultural Activities Organized………………..………………………69 Figure 4.2: The Confucius Institute and its Student…………………………………………..70. ‧. Figure 4.3: Number of Inbound Students to China…………………………………………...71. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Figure 4.4: Poll: Does China Respect the Freedom of its People? ..........................................81. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(6) 1. Introduction 1.1 Research Motivation and Purpose. In 2016, the United States spent approximately 661.186 billion USD or 3.29% of its total GDP on military expenditure. It far outranks the world’s second largest military spender, China, who allocated an estimated 215.176 billion USD or 1.92% of its GDP to its defense budget. In fact, the United States spent more on its military than the next 9 countries. 政治大 power’: the use of military or economic coercion to pressure a country into doing what you 立. put together and accounts for 36% of the world’s total military spending. This is called ‘hard. ‧ 國. 學. want.. According to Joseph Nye, one of the most influential figures in contemporary. ‧. 1. The statistics above prove that the United States,. sit. Nat. might to make others follow your will”.. y. political science, hard power is “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military. n. al. er. io. undoubtedly, has the strongest military capabilities in the world and consequently the most hard. i n U. v. power. China, which boasts the largest army in the world with its 2,183,000 head strong. Ch. engchi. People’s Liberation Army, also possesses a considerable amount of hard power.. 2. Waging wars, however, is extremely expensive: not just financially but also in terms of lives. While scientific and technological progress has made warfare more advanced and deadlier than ever, it has also greatly increased the cost of it. Today, armed conflict is accompanied with an enormous political and social price. For example, while China’s actual number of nuclear warheads is officially a state secret, SIPRI estimates that the PRC has 270. 1 2. Joseph S Nye, "Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power," The International Herald Tribune (2003): 10. The International Institute For Strategic Studies, "Chapter Six: Asia," The Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017).. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(7) units in its arsenal. China could easily wipe off entire nations with its nuclear weapons in order to achieve its goals, however, the political consequences would be disastrous.. 3. In addition,. countries today face many problems that cannot be solved by military action or economic sanctions. Non-state actors and NGOs, for instance, have the ability to influence the course of international affairs and hold extensive power and influence. Consequently, states must look elsewhere for solutions in addition to hard power. This is where Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ comes into play. Describing it as the “second face of power”, Nye explains that soft-power in essence means that a country is so. 政治大 them to follow your desired outcomes 立 without having to coerce them, as opposed to hard power. attractive and successful, that other countries would not just want to emulate you but also get. ‧ 國. 學. In other words, soft power is the “ability to shape others’ preferences”.. 4. ‧. While governments from authoritarian regimes can use hard power and coercion at their will, democratic governments need to answer for their politics and are held accountable. y. Nat. er. io. sit. by their electorate, meaning they cannot simply start wars or coerce other nations. They can, however, use a strategy of soft power to achieve their desired outcome. Furthermore, if they. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. can create or influence an environment to conform their values, then their actions will be. engchi. regarded as reasonable. Soft power comes primarily from three resources: a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policy. However, while hard power is completely in control of governments, soft power is not so much. Ever since the inception of soft power, many countries have embarked on a journey to increase and develop their influence. Soft power is a tool, and perhaps the most important. 3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Global Nuclear Weapons: Modernization Remains the Priority," Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2017/global-nuclear-weaponsmodernization-remains-priority. 4 Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public affairs, 2004), 5.. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(8) one, that allows countries to draw from their cultural and institutional resources in order to spread their values and attract audiences. Realizing this enormous potential, the government of the People’s Republic of China has made massive efforts in recent years in order to join the race for soft power. As an emerging world power, China sees the need to improve its reputation and increase its influence abroad. It has made colossal investments, opened its own media outlets along with hundreds of Confucius Institutes all over the world. Under Xi Jinping, China has produced a great number of buzzwords and slogans. 政治大. like “One Belt, One Road,” “Three Stricts and Three Honests,” “Four Comprehensives,” and. 立. the famous “Chinese Dream”, which served as inspiration for the title of this work and is a core. ‧ 國. 學. concept in the Xi Jinping thought. The Chinese Dream, while still a vague concept, entails the. ‧. “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (中華民族偉大復興) after what China regards as. sit. y. Nat. a century of humiliation. This rejuvenation does not only encompass the revival of the Chinese. io. n. al. er. economy but also its political power, its culture and its values, which China is so eager to export.. i n U. v. Yet, while Chinese authorities eagerly embrace the idea of soft power, they do not. Ch. engchi. necessarily conform Nye’s definition. Much has been written about Chinese soft power, however, during my research I found that much of the academic literature on the topic was outdated (since China has taken different approaches to its foreign policy since the past ten years) and very few works provided a comprehensive overview of how China attempts to obtain soft power. In this thesis, I endeavor to contribute to a better understanding in the field by studying China’s interpretation of soft power, its efforts in the domain and the instruments it uses in the process.. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(9) 1.2 Literature Review 1.2.1 The Chinese Idea of Soft Power Much has been written on how China interprets the concept of soft power. Li Mingjiang, for example, states that while the core values are in line with Nye’s definitiongetting one’s desired outcome through attraction rather than through coercion- the Chinese understanding deviates slightly on some issues.. 5. Nye identified three main factors of soft power: culture, political values and a. 政治大 it is an ancient civilization with立 a long history and a myriad of traditions and symbols. Having country’s foreign policy. For China, traditional culture is its most precious source of soft power:. ‧ 國. 學. influenced the Asian continent for thousands of years, it long considered itself the center of the world (中國 or middle kingdom). Arguably, China’s ancient tributary system which perpetuated. ‧. this sinocentric world view was also based on soft power.. sit. y. Nat. io. er. However, there are some dissenting voices which claim that while Chinese traditional culture is an important source of soft power, it is not necessarily the most important. al. n. v i n Csuch one. The author notes that scholars XintianUbelieve that the domestic cultural h easn Yu gchi. revitalization China went through is the reason for China’s cultural soft power. China’s development model is also cited as a source of soft power; the so-called Beijing-consensus as opposed to the Washington Consensus. However, Li argues that this is not a stable approach since China has not yet established itself as a developed nation. A first important point in the Chinese understanding of soft power is the emphasis placed on communication and mass media. While Nye states that major media outlets can help. 5. Mingjiang Li, "China Debates Soft Power," The Chinese journal of international politics 2, no. 2 (2008).. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(10) clarify government positions on certain issues (and thus increase transparency), he also states that they do not necessarily translate into soft power in the countries they’re based in. China believes that the reason why the world is such strongly influenced by Western values is because of the dominance Western countries have in media and mass communications. If China reaches the same communication capacity, it will be able to make its voice heard and compete with these values. Secondly, Chinese authorities view soft power as a tool of national cohesion and nation-building. The Chinese Communist Party is worried of a weakened Chinese identity if. 政治大 ‘peaceful revolution’ and thus undermine 立 the authority of the party. In other words: soft power Western liberal ideology is allowed to gradually sneak into society as this could result in a. ‧ 國. 學. also has a defensive purpose in the Chinese mindset.. ‧. Lastly, soft power is considered as an indicator of a nation’s prestige and its influence. A hegemon needs to possess the power to enjoy flexibleness on the international. y. Nat. er. io. sit. scene. It should also be the heart of civilization whose beliefs, values and ideas attract people from other countries, otherwise the status of world power is not sustainable in the long term.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. For China, it is essential to combat the so-called ‘China Threat’ theory by cultivating a better. engchi. image and creating an environment that allows it to fully develop itself. It is therefore necessary to have the means to show a Chinese perspective. One reason why the Chinese Communist Party so eagerly embraces the idea of soft power is because it already builds on a longstanding tradition of propaganda and that the current interpretation of the concept leans more towards the party’s existing framework of foreign propaganda than to Nye’s concept. Nye developed his theory as a strategy of what the United States government can do to support, instead of undermine, soft power originating from its cultural products and 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(11) political values. The Chinese idea of soft power entails countering Western influence, both domestically and internationally, and is of a more defensive nature; it does not consider soft power as a means that can alter the currently existing structures in international relations. As opposed to the United States, which is already an established superpower and can simply focus on expanding its sphere of influence through soft power, China is still a developing nation and needs to take into account both international influence and domestic development. This marks the second departure from Nye’s traditional theory: the use of soft power for the purpose of nation-building. This is especially the case for the cultural aspect of the matter.. 立. 政治大. Building on Li’s argument, Kingsley Edney argues that the Chinese government. ‧ 國. 學. attributes three qualities in respect to the importance of increasing cultural soft power: an. ‧. increasing demand by the Chinese public for cultural products, an increased and stronger role in the international power scramble but above all, it plays an important role in increasing. y. Nat. er. io. sit. national cohesion and unity. 6 Cultural construction, along with social, political and economic construction are the four components which make up the “Socialism With Chinese. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Characteristics” program of the Chinese Communist Party. National cohesion and unity are two. engchi. essential conditions for the CCP to maintain its political power. So soft power in China has a dual purpose: one is to polish China’s reputation and aim for better understanding and the other is to reinforce stability and cement the Party’s political standing. While Li’s article is very clear and elaborate, it does not discuss why China’s cultural focus is mostly on traditional culture instead of modern contemporary culture. Edney’s work is perfectly complementary to Li’s publishing in this aspect. Edney indicates that all. 6. Kingsley Edney, "Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System," Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 78 (2012).. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(12) cultural products, whether for domestic consumption or export, must be sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party. In other words: all cultural products must uphold and promote social values that are in line with the Party’s agenda. These works might reach a considerable audience in the Chinese domestic market where the government has a monopoly on cultural output, however, in international context they must still compete with other products that do not have to meet certain government requirements and are not subject to censorship and sensitivity when reporting on controversial topics. Edney contradicts Li’s theorem that the Chinese development model is a source of. 政治大 have mostly avoided linking soft 立power to political values. China has focused exclusively on. soft power. He states that while others may consider it as such, Chinese authorities themselves. ‧ 國. 學. culture, making the two almost synonymous in the Chinese understanding of the concept. This greatly deviates from Nye’s theory in which culture is only one of the three components of soft. ‧. power, along with foreign policy and political values. Edney concludes that China’s soft power. Nat. sit. y. ambitions are merely an extension of the government’s propaganda efforts. Chinese soft power. al. n. mind.. er. io. should not only be researched in an international context but also with the domestic situation in. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. While China has very recently started its massive push for soft power, the Chinese Communist Party has always been sensitive to foreign perceptions. Ever since its rise to power, the Party has endeavored to create a desirable image of itself. However, this image has changed consistently over time: change of leadership brought with it a change of image. In her publication, Wang Hongying has analyzed two publications from the Chinese authorities over the course of over 50 years: the Beijing Review, a weekly news magazine with the purpose to inform foreign readers of China’s political and economic development and the Government. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(13) Works Reports, which the premier of the country presents to the National People’s Congress. 7 Wang found that there were four images that were promoted throughout the Communist Party’s leadership: China as a peace-loving country, China as an antihegemony, China as a developing nation and China as a victim of foreign aggression. These images have served for both identity building but also as influential factors in Chinese foreign policy. For example: China’s image as a developing country used to be a defining feature in Sino-Japanese relations and Chinese officials protested heavily to internal discussions about reduction of Japanese Official Development Aid.. 政治大 general public did not always perceive 立 China the way that authorities intend it to. While they Furthermore, after an analysis of American public opinion, Wang found that the. ‧ 國. 學. agreed with some projections such as China being a socialist country as well as a developing country and a major power, Americans have never seen China as a peaceful-loving country. On. ‧. the contrary, many see China as the opposite of an antihegemony and perceive some of its. Nat. sit. y. actions towards neighboring countries as bullying; they do not see China as an international. n. al. er. io. cooperator but rather as an impeding element. Moreover, the public holds views that are not. i n U. v. desired by authorities: that of China being an authoritarian state. 8. Ch. engchi. Wang’s work was published in 2003, the year in which Jiang Zemin stepped down in favor of his successor Hu Jintao. Consequently, Wang’s analysis does not include Hu’s leadership and Xi’s leadership from 2012. Furthermore, the sample taken for public opinion was only based on American points of view and did not extend to Europe, Asia or any other continents.. 7. Hongying Wang, "National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy," China: An International Journal 1, no. 01 (2003). 8 Ingrid d’Hooghe, "Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China," in The New Public Diplomacy (Springer, 2005).. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(14) However, the article is extremely important in showing that the defining features of Chinese soft power ambitions have been continuously shifting over time, depending on the Party leadership, the international political situation and period of time. It also shows that the intended target group of China’s soft power push, foreign audiences, don’t necessarily perceive China positively.. 1.2.2 Instruments and Institutions of Soft Power 1.2.2.1 Institutional Structure. 政治大 power such as media, internet,立 large-scale events, projects and so on. Roger Creemers’ work China mostly uses traditional public diplomacy instruments to enhance its soft. ‧ 國. 學. does an excellent job in dissecting the bodies responsible for China’s public diplomacy. 9. ‧. In fact, there is no single institution in charge of public diplomacy in the Chinese government. Instead, the responsibility is shared in a structure of Byzantine complexity between. y. Nat. er. io. sit. the Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology, the agency of the CCP’s Politburo in charge of nationwide propaganda and information, and the State Council Information Office. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. (SCIO), an organization under direct control of the State Council (the chief administrative. engchi. authority of the People’s Republic of China), as the two main bodies. The SCIO has four main purposes: to disseminate China’s perspective of matters throughout the rest of the world, to counteract against anti-Chinese propaganda, to obstruct support for the Taiwanese independence movement and to explain Chinese foreign policy to the general public abroad. It periodically publishes white papers on sensitive issues such as human rights, Tibet and Taiwan in which it clarifies the position of the Chinese government.. 9. Rogier Creemers, "Never the Twain Shall Meet? Rethinking China's Public Diplomacy Policy," Chinese. Journal of Communication 8, no. 3 (2015).. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(15) The SCIO is overseen by the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and is by far the largest body of the Chinese propaganda machine. It is not just in charge of propaganda abroad but also in domestic spheres. Public diplomacy is also an important duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which has dedicated offices in Chinese missions and embassies. The MOFA has no say in decisions or policy making and is simply in charge of the work “on the ground”.. 10. Other official organs in charge of disseminating “foreign propaganda” are the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the Bureau for External. 政治大. Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Culture. While these different bodies frequently work. 立. together, Chinese public diplomacy is thus very decentralized and divided.. ‧ 國. 學. Agencies such as the SCIO were originally established to disseminate political. ‧. propaganda. With the invention and widespread acceptance of the concept of soft power,. sit. y. Nat. China’s public diplomacy and image-building efforts have shifted from pure politics to a. n. al. er. io. strategy that also encompasses Chinese culture. Before China’s economic reforms public. i n U. v. diplomacy was only tasked with improving China’s image abroad. Today, in addition to image-. Ch. engchi. building, it has to justify and uphold the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule over China (through national cohesion, as discussed earlier), attract foreign capital and to soothe worries about China’s economic and political rise. The author’s work makes it clear that the task of public diplomacy has been allotted entirely by the Chinese bureaucratic system. This results in a top-down, state-driven approach, giving authorities full control of image-building and cultural exports but at the same time. Ingrid d’Hooghe, "The Expansion of China’s Public Diplomacy System," in Soft Power in China (Springer, 2011), 21.. 10. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(16) heavily undermining the credibility of Chinese communication. However, this is not the only challenge that China’s soft power strategies face. I will discuss these in the next chapters.. 1.2.2.2 Communication and Mass Media China’s spectacular growth has provided it with a very powerful tool to implement its public diplomacy goals: money. While there are no official numbers released by the Chinese authorities, it is estimated that the annual budget for external propaganda consists of approximately 10 billion USD; in comparison, the US budget for public diplomacy in 2014 amounted to a mere 666 million USD. 11. 政治大 As Li concluded in立 his work: the Chinese interpretation of soft power identifies. ‧ 國. 學. mass media outlets and a strong communication capacity as a precondition for a powerful nation. Consequently, much of this budget is allocated to the “Big Four” as Yang Jiechi the. ‧. State Counsellor of China calls them: Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television (CCTV),. Nat. er. io. sit. y. China Radio International (CRI), and China Daily.. Sun explains the importance of China’s media ambitions on the basis of three. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. perceptions of the role of communication in contemporary society. 12 Firstly, the conception of. engchi. communication as a role of symbolic power. This refers to the ability to react in favor of one’s own interest and to manipulate processes to achieve a desired outcome. Here, Sun draws parallels with Li’s work, who stated that China perceives the massive Western influence on the world today as a consequence of the West’s media domination.. 11. David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push," Foreign Aff. 94 (2015).. 12. Wanning Sun, "Mission Impossible? Soft Power, Communication Capacity, and the Globalization of Chinese. Media," International Journal of Communication 4 (2009).. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(17) Secondly, the perception of communication as a credibility-gaining process. Based on Daniel Hallin’s Spheres Theory, Sun argues that Chinese media attain credibility in the sphere of consensus but lose this edge when deviating to other spheres. In other words: while state media retain reliability in the eyes of international audiences when reporting on noncontroversial issues, their coverage will be questioned the further they move to more contentious topics. Like Nye also stated, this is a consequence of state media being controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. This is an enormous challenge for Chinese authorities which strive to change this.. 政治大 communication as cultural process 立 in which it can “shape and amend” reality over a distance to Lastly, China maintains a “transmission view” of communication, meaning it sees. ‧ 國. 學. control viewers. Therefore, it is crucial for China to have an extensive and far-reaching media platform to reach large audiences.. ‧. Sun sees 2008 as a watershed in the history of Chinese soft power. The 2008. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Olympic Games placed China in the spotlight of Western media, resulting in extensive coverage of the country’s human rights situation and domestic incidents such as the anti-government. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. protests in Tibet. The Chinese Communist Party perceived the negative press as anti-Chinese. engchi. and became aware that economic boom and newfound political power does not automatically grant it a positive perception around the world. Furthermore, Chinese authorities realized that the country cannot wait until Western media change negative attitudes towards the China and decided to make a push for a more ‘correct’ narrative. Consequently, it adopted an aggressive media strategy to transmit as much media content as possible to an audience as large as possible. Typical for Chinese political coverage is that it does not cover the political process but rather the results and achievements of government policies. Similarly, domestic incidents are always reported from a positive, partisan angle. Unlike parliament-held discussions in other 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(18) countries, the Great Hall of the People is shown to flaunt harmony and unison. An image of stability and unanimity is considered extremely important for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the one-party state. However, China needs not only to overcome a geographical distance but also a cultural and a political distance with its foreign audience. It needs to present itself as a nation whose values and ethics are similar to that of its international competitors. Rigid censorship, unwillingness to cover controversial topics and the lack of opposing voices in the country’s political process heavily undermine the credibility of Chinese media. Sun concludes that in the current climate, it might be near impossible for Chinese. 政治大 for China’s decision to rapidly立 expand its communication agency is the perception that the media to become objective and transparent institutions or even to appear as such. The catalyst. ‧ 國. 學. country’s image is predominantly shaped by foreign (Western) media. However, the largest obstacle China faces is not the lack of communication capacity or the inadequacy to understand. ‧. foreign audiences; it is the inability to adhere to international reporting standards which are not. Nat. sit. y. constrained by government or ideology. While China has ambitious plans to expand its soft. n. al. er. io. power and break through Western media domination, it might still find itself unable to win favorable perceptions abroad.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The author’s work does an excellent job in explaining China’s media push from a communicative theory perspective, it does not discuss the extent of Chinese state media development. For exact statistics and numbers about the current extent of the networks’ reach, I will have to refer to their respective homepages.. 1.2.2.3 Confucius Institutes Aggressive media expansion, however, is not the only soft-power strategy China pursues. As mentioned before, culture, and by extension language, plays a fundamental role in this and the Confucius Institute is by far the most powerful instrument at the government’s 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(19) disposition. James Paradise describes the Confucius institute as a project to encourage Chinese language learning and appreciation of Chinese culture. 13 Yet at the same time, it is part of a grand scheme to win hearts and minds for political ambitions. The Confucius Institute is an entity within and under direct supervision of the Office of the Chinese Language Council International (漢辦 - Hanban). The Hanban itself consists of members from twelve different ministries and commissions, ranging from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. Hanban is also responsible for other educational duties such as the Chinese Proficiency Exam (HSK) and. 政治大. teaching qualification and evaluation. It also runs a Communications Division which is in. 立. charge or international partnerships and exchange projects. Hanban pursues three main goals:. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese language education, fostering cultural exchange and the promotion of trade and business.. ‧. sit. y. Nat. While the Confucius Institute is modeled on the Alliance Française and the Goethe. io. er. Institute, unlike its French and German counterparts, Confucius Institutes are generally established through partnerships between Chinese and foreign academic institutions. The. al. n. v i n C h funds for the project Chinese government generously provides e n g c h i U and as a result, the Institutes are generally located on university campus ground, providing them with a unique and advantageous position compared to their competitors. This, however, is not without controversy.. Paradise points out that partnerships between institutions stipulate that the Institute must be “consistent with laws and regulations of China” and not work against the interests of the country. This leads to fears of interference with academic research and conflicts of interests.. 13. James F Paradise, "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power," Asian survey 49, no. 4 (2009).. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(20) It is for this exact reason that there is an absence of Confucius Institutes at the world’s most prestigious academic institutions such as Harvard and Yale. The author comes to the conclusion that the Confucius Institute should be seen as a type of ‘impression management’, attempting to create a positive image of China. However, it is not purely a soft-power project: while it is not based on coercion, it does rely on financial support from the Chinese authorities. Consequently, this provides Hanban with the ability to greatly influence language and cultural activities. Ultimately, language education alone is not enough to expand China’s soft-power and Paradise points out that per Nye’s definition, China’s. 政治大 fail to help increase Chinese soft-power, 立 they are still extremely valuable in creating networks. success will be based on its attractiveness as a country. Nonetheless, even if Confucius Institutes. ‧ 國. 學. and partnerships with foreign academic institutions.. ‧. Roger Creemers comes to the same conclusion and emphasizes that textbooks and learning materials in the Confucius Institute are all provided by the Chinese government yet. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. notes that the project has not yet developed “an overtly political agenda.” 14. v ni. Gill and Huang’s work, on the other hand, disputes Creemers’ claim.. Ch. engchi U. 15. One. argument raised is that the Confucius Institute exclusively teaches simplified Chinese characters, which the authors see as an attempt to diminish Taiwanese international influence. In addition, maps in Hanban-published textbooks portray Taiwan as part of the People’s Republic of China. Hartig also contests the alleged impartiality of the Confucius Institutes.. 16. After. conducting interviews with a number of executive staff members of Confucius Institutes of. 14. Creemers. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’," Survival 48, no. 2 (2006). 16 Falk Hartig, "Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives," Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015). 15. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(21) several countries, the author reveals that while so far there have not been any explicit directives from Hanban to ban activities, many of the interviewees admitted that they did take in account the feelings of the Chinese. Hartig concludes that Confucius Institute staff members and Chinese Studies’ faculty members consequently risk self-censorship. Moreover, Hartig argues that the Institute fabricates an untruthful and “correct” view of China by deliberately omitting sensitive issues and thus not presenting the “real China” to its audience. Moreover, China’s socalled delicate issues are widely - and often critically- covered by media. This is extremely problematic from a narratological perspective: a narrative must always be in accord with events. 治政大into reluctance of the audience to affect the narrator’s credibility and trustworthiness, resulting 立 further engage with them in the future. The author goes even further, stating that while China. as presented to the narrator’s audience. Any disconnection with the introduced narrative will. ‧ 國. 學. wants to present a narrative of a developing but harmonious and peaceful nation, the. ‧. international audience perceives it as bully and an increasingly hostile country.. Nat. sit. y. So while Confucius Institutes may help disseminate Chinese language education. n. al. er. io. throughout the world, they are less likely to benefit China’s foreign policy goals. Here, Hartig draws a conclusion parallel to that of Paradise.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.3 Methodology This essay will be a qualitative study based on existing literature which I will combine with recent data from newer publications to ensure my research is up to date. I will seek to answer the following questions: 1. How does China interpret soft power? 2. How does China obtain soft power? 3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese soft power?. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(22) This study is entirely based on the concept of soft power. As I have mentioned earlier in this work, my first objective is to research the Chinese interpretation of soft power, which I will study using the original soft power theory as my analytical framework. Through the literature above, I have identified several major instruments of China’s soft power strategy. These are mass media outlets, the Confucius Institutes and China’s host diplomacy. I will elaborately discuss each of them using existing academic literature and current reports.. 政治大 Lastly, I will finish my study by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of China’s 立. ‧ 國. 學. soft power strategy. This will be done by looking at how China’s actions are perceived in relation to their soft power strategies.. ‧. The limitations of this study, among other things, include a language barrier. My. y. Nat. io. sit. knowledge of Chinese is insufficient to process plenty Chinese language resources.. n. al. er. Additionally, there is data that is not publicly released by Chinese authorities. While, for. Ch. i n U. v. example, we can find numbers about the number of CCTV offices and the number of people it. engchi. reaches worldwide, there are no official statistics about the actual viewership of the channels.. 1.4 Outline of Thesis Chapter 1: Introduction and literature review The first chapter of the study will serve to give some general background on the issue. Why is soft power necessary and why does it matter now in today’s international politics? I will introduce the topic of this study and the main ideas. I will then continue to present and discuss the content, the methodology and the general conclusion of the study.. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(23) Chapter 2: Soft Power and the Chinese Dream 2.1 The Concept of Soft Power 2.2 The Chinese Idea of Soft Power 2.3 The Chinese Dream What does soft power actually mean and how do nations obtain it? As my analytical framework for this question is the original theory by Joseph Nye, I will introduce this concept to the reader. Once I have done this, I can proceed to highlight the differences between what soft power means in the West and what it means in the Chinese mindset. After all, Chinese soft. 治政 influence abroad but also domestically. The accentuation 大 of Chinese soft power on elements 立 such as mass media is very different from the original concept.. power varies strongly from its Western definition and does not only serve to expand Chinese. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Chapter 3: Institutional Structure, Strategy and Instruments. sit. y. Nat. 3.1 Institutional Structure. io. er. 3.2 Mass Communication and Media 3.3 The Confucius Institute. n. al. 3.4 Host Diplomacy. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. As opposed to the United States and other countries, cultural products from China do not have a carte blanche and Chinese authorities retain strict control over domestic creations and publications. Consequently, the brunt of the task of generating soft power lands on the shoulders of the Chinese government. How do authorities expand Chinese influence and what do they do to promote Chinese culture throughout the world? Furthermore, what does China hope to achieve with this influence? Mass communication, the Confucius Institute and host diplomacy are the major instruments of the country’s soft power strategy. I will discuss them to study their role and individual importance as part of China’s diplomacy.. 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(24) Chapter 4: Opportunities and challenges of Chinese Soft Power 4.1 Strengths 4.2 Weaknesses Lastly, I would like to identify what opportunities and what obstacles arise in China’s pursuit of soft power. Does China’s nondemocratic system of governance face the same challenges as liberal democracies when it comes to gaining soft power?. 治政 In the last chapter of my thesis, I will form a general大 and comprehensive conclusion in 立 which I summarize my findings. Chapter 5: Conclusion. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(25) 2. Soft Power and the Chinese Dream The concept of soft power has found great resonance with Chinese authorities, yet through a process of adaptation and modification, the Chinese version of varies to a certain extent with Nye’s original conception. As I will discuss, Chinese soft power does not only serve as an external factor but also as an internal one. Finally, I will examine the hallmark of the Xi administration: the Chinese dream before concluding the chapter with a brief summary.. 2.1 The Concept of Soft Power. 政治大. The now well-known term of soft-power was conceived in 1990 by political. 立. scientist Joseph Nye in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, in. ‧ 國. 學. which he discussed how the United States, through influence, not through violence, established. ‧. the post-World War II international order that still exists today.. sit. y. Nat. Nye revisited and further honed his conceptualization in 2004 in his next book, Soft. io. er. Power: The means to Success in World Politics, in which he elaborates on the multiple faces of. al. v i n C h can coerce compliance In other words, countries and obedience from other engchi U n. power. The first face, hard power, relies on incentives and threats or “carrots and sticks” as Nye analogizes. 17. nations by threatening the use of economic duress or military action. On the other hand, the socalled second face of power, soft power, is “the ability to shape the preferences of others”. 18 Complacency through soft power does not happen through coercion. Rather, it takes place through attraction and a desire to emulate said country. Or as Joseph Nye put it in his 2011 book The Future of Power: “Hard power is push, soft power is pull.”. 19. A favorable soft. 17. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power : The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs), 5. Ibid. 19 Joseph S Nye, "The Future of Power," (2011). 18. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(26) power policy can replace the need for hard power, which is extremely costly both financially and politically. However, accumulation of soft power is a lengthy, costly and cautious process that involves persuasion and captivating the hearts and interests of foreign audiences. Global image and international prestige are crucial elements in this. Nonetheless, while governments often have a monopoly on hard power, soft power is less tractable by authorities. Sources of soft power exist both in the private as in the public sector. Even companies can participate in enhancing a country’s soft power. Ikea, for example, is known to benefit and enhance Sweden’s nation brand among international. 政治大 continuously ranked within the 立top ten in Portland’s Soft Power 30.. audiences. Sweden possesses a great deal of soft power, has a very favorable image and has. ‧ 國. 學. diplomat and director-general of the Swedish Institute Olle Wästberg once. 20. Former Swedish said “Ikea is. doing more for the image of Sweden than all governmental efforts together (…) To visit Ikea. ‧. is to visit Sweden.” 21. y. Nat. er. io. sit. The time-intensive nature of soft power poses a challenge for politicians but also the electorates, who wish to see fast results. Moreover, as opposed to hard power, the outcome. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. of soft power is not under the control of governments but rather of the intended target.. engchi. Soft power originates from three tenets: a country’s culture, political values and its policies, both home and abroad. 22 Culture is the pattern of social behavior, rituals and norms of a country. It can be found in many shapes: high culture, which comprises arts, literature, history, education, philosophy et cetera, or popular culture such as mass entertainment (e.g. Hollywood). A. 20. Jonathan McClory, "The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power, 2017," Washington: Portland (2017). 21 Olle Wästberg, "The Symbiosis of Sweden & Ikea," Public Diplomacy Magazine 2 (2009). 22 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 11.. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(27) country’s culture can only be a soft power asset if it is attractive. A culture is more likely to attract if it encompasses values that are shared with other societies. 23 Narrow-minded cultures, on the other hand, will be less effective in generating soft power as they are less attractive to foreign audiences. This also goes for the second pillar of soft power: political values. If a country shares universal values, it is more likely to achieve understanding and attraction abroad. The United States of America, for example, possesses values admired by countries all over the world, many of which share similar ideas such as democracy, human rights and freedom of. 政治大 Yet it is important to note that the exact ideas that help. speech. These have been extremely crucial for Washington in captivating support of the. 立. international audience for its policies. 24. ‧ 國. 學. enhance a country’s soft power in one part of the world may be loathed elsewhere in the world and result in a decrease there. Katzenstein and Keohane already argued that in traditionalist and. ‧. conservative societies, American popular culture is a contributing force for anti-Americanism. er. io. sit. y. Nat. around the world. 25. Lastly, a country’s foreign policy is also a source of soft power if it is perceived as. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. fair and legitimate. Authorities often employ a strategy of Official Development Assistance. engchi. (ODA) towards developing countries in an attempt to boost influence and soft power abroad. China has many assets that could serve as a source of soft power: its massive economic growth that lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty inspires much admiration in both developed and developing countries alike. 26. 23. Ibid. G John Ikenberry, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (JSTOR, 2004). 25 Peter J Katzenstein and Robert Owen Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2007), 121. 26 Asit K; Hartley Biswas, Kris, "China’s Soft Power Struggles," (http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/11/16/chinassoft-power-struggles/.) 24. 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(28) Similarly, when on June 1, 2017 President Donald Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, premier Li Keqiang reaffirmed the Chinese commitment to the agreement, capitalizing on the leadership vacuum left by the United States. Not only will this allow China to take the lead in issues regarding climate change, it will also give Beijing the power to make a wide range of decisions, ranging from international standards regarding trade and environmental laws to infrastructural projects. 27 A move which, without a doubt, will increase Chinese soft power and influence.. 28. For Nye, public diplomacy is how governments can best persuade foreign. 政治大 mobilize these (soft power) resources 立 (i.e. values, culture and policies) to communicate with audiences. In his own words, public diplomacy is “an instrument that governments use to. ‧ 國. 學. and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through. ‧. broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth.” 29. y. Nat. er. io. sit. While there is no obvious way to measure the soft power of a country, there are ways to assess the success of a country’s soft power policies, such as the number of students it. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. attracts, the scale of consumption of its media abroad and its influence and relevance on the international political stage.. 30. engchi. Nye also stresses credibility and reputations of governments as important factors in public diplomacy. Public diplomacy efforts that are perceived as propaganda do not improve a. 27. David E.; Perlez Sanger, Jane, "Trump Hands the Chinese a Gift: The Chance for Global Leadership," (accessed June 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/us/politics/climate-accord-trump-china-globalleadership.html.) 28 Luke Kemp, "Better out Than In," Nature Climate Change 7, no. 7 (2017). Carolyn Beeler, "China's Looking to the Eu for a Partner in Climate Action," (2017), (accessed June 29, 2018, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-06-02/chinas-looking-eu-partner-climate-action.) 29 Joseph S Nye Jr, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," The annals of the American academy of political and social science 616, no. 1 (2008): 105. 30 *** Singh, J.P. and MacDonald S. (2017) ‘Soft Power Today: Measuring the Influences and Effects’.. 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(29) country’s standing, on the contrary, they could erode a country’s reputation and work counterproductively. 31 Gas and Seiter also argue in their 2009 publication that in public diplomacy, the concept of credibility is extremely important but varies among culture and depends very much on context, circumstances and situations. 32 Chitty et al. add that for successful evaluation and execution with foreign audiences perceptions are also very important. In addition to credibility and reputation, variables such as political and political compatibility also play a role. 33 Finally, both soft power and hard power can be combined: this is called ‘smart. 政治大 incidentally is co-chaired by 立 Joseph S. Nye, defines smart power as “an approach that. power’. The Washington-based Center for Strategic and international Studies, which. ‧ 國. 學. underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action”.. ‧. 34. The United States invasion of Afghanistan under George W. Bush, for instance, was an. Nat. sit. y. obvious display of hard power. Soon after though, the Bush administration saw the need to. n. al. er. io. implement various development programs such as basic healthcare and education, along with. i n U. v. its peacekeeping missions to counterweigh Al-Qaeda radicalization to ensure regional stabilization. 35. Ch. engchi. 31. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 106. Robert H Gass and John S Seiter, "Credibility and Public Diplomacy," Routledge handbook of public diplomacy (2009): 162. 33 N. Chitty et al., The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 78. 34 Richard Lee Armitage and Joseph S Nye, Csis Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America (CSIS, 2007), 7. 35 Beth Hill Skinner, "The Need for Smart Power in Afghanistan: How Al Qaeda & the Taliban Are “Outsmarting” the Us," (accessed June 28, 2018, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Skinner%20Smart.pdf) 32. 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(30) 2.2 The Chinese Idea of Soft Power Since the start of its conception, the idea of soft power immediately found resonance with the Chinese Communist Party. With China’s economic growth and its increasing presence on the political stage, authorities saw the need to counter fears about the Chinese ascendance, the so-called “China threat theory”. 36 In the words of Ding, Chinese soft power serves to “deal with foreign challenges and create a friendly international environment.” 37 The concept of soft power was first presented in China in 1993 in a journal publication by Wang Huning （王滬寧）, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s principal. 政治大 theorists and current member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee. Since then, the idea 立. ‧ 國. 學. has been immensely popular among scholars and government representatives and even made its way into the mainstream.. ‧. At the 17th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao （胡錦濤） first explicitly. y. Nat. io. sit. mentioned soft power, stating that “culture has become a more and more important source of. n. al. er. national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in. Ch. i n U. v. overall national strength. [The Party] must stimulate the cultural creativity of the whole nation,. engchi. and enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests.” 38 From there on, Chinese soft power efforts have increased immensely.. 36. Yiwei Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power," The annals of the American academy of political and social science 616, no. 1 (2008). 37 Sheng Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power," Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 64 (2010): 266. 38 Jintao Hu, "Hu Jintao's Report at 17th Party Congress: Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects," (accessed June 30, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/25/content_6225977.htm.). 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(31) China relies heavily on public diplomacy for its soft power strategies. By no means did China start investing in public diplomacy only when the soft power was conceptualized. Indeed, the Chinese Communist party builds on a long tradition of political propaganda and has always been aware of the benefits of a positive image abroad. In the 1930s, when it was still a guerilla army obscure to the Western world, the Party invited Edward Snow to write about their efforts against the Nationalist troops. Snow then published the book Red Star over China, which depicted Mao Zedong （毛澤東）as a national hero and the book rose to international fame. It was later translated to Chinese and became. 政治大. essential in winning over thousands of young Chinese urbanites. 39. 立. After 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, Mao selectively. ‧ 國. 學. invited scholars and journalists to visit the country and report on their findings. In addition, the. ‧. government produced foreign-language publications to inform the outside world about the. sit. y. Nat. evolution of the People’s Republic and about the benefits of communism. Even during the. io. er. country’s decades-long isolation, Chinese authorities still published and distributed magazines such as Beijing Review and China Reconstructs (now titled China Today) all over the world. 40. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Wang asserts that were four images that Chinese authorities consistently portrayed, regardless of change in leadership: China as a peace-loving country, China as an antihegemony, China as a developing nation and China as a victim of foreign aggression. 41 In addition, there have been specific images tied to certain leaderships: under Mao, for example, China projected itself as a socialist country and a supporter of revolution. The reformation era left these images behind and portrayed the country as a major power and an international cooperator. Naturally,. 39. The New York Times, "Red Star over China," (https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/26/books/l-red-star-overchina-977389.html.) 40 Wang, 50. 41 Ibid.. 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(32) many of these images are strategic and serve as cornerstones for national and international image building but they also hold authorities’ self-held images of the country. Not only do these images help shape China’s reputation abroad, they also influence Chinese foreign policy.. 42. China’s recent foreign policy initiatives, however, could not have been more different than under previous chairmanships. Whereas previously it always adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s （鄧小平）famous dictum “hide your strength and bide your time” （韜光養晦）, recently it has launched a vast array of political and economic strategies to catapult China onto the world stage. These include economic programs such as the Go Out Policy （走出去戰略）. 政治大. and the One Belt One Road Initiative （一帶一路）but also major charm offensives to enhance. 立. China’s image abroad.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 2.2.1 Differences with Nye’s concept. sit. y. Nat. Nye identified three main factors of soft power: culture, political values and a. io. er. country’s foreign policy. For China, traditional culture is its most precious source of soft power: it is an ancient civilization with a long history and a myriad of traditions and symbols. 43 Having. al. n. v i n C h of years, it long influenced the Asian continent for thousands e n g c h i U considered itself the center of the world ( 中國 or middle kingdom). Arguably, China’s ancient tributary system which perpetuated this sinocentric world view was also based on soft power.. Much has been written on how China interprets the concept of soft power. While the core values are in line with Nye’s definitiongetting one’s desired outcome through. 42 43. Ibid., 71. Joseph S Nye, "The Rise of China’s Soft Power," Wall Street Journal Asia 29 (2005).. 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(33) attraction rather than through coercion- the Chinese understanding deviates slightly on some issues. Firstly, the Chinese idea of soft power doesn’t lend itself just to nation branding but also to nation building. 44 Whereas projections of soft power are usually directed to an external audience, for China, soft power also serves domestic purposes. Hu’s remarks at the 17th Party Congress reveal the versatile nature of Chinese soft power. While China indeed must enhance its reputation and elevate its standing abroad through more soft power and culture, it must also fulfill the spiritual needs of its citizens and enhance national cohesion（民族凝聚力）. 45. 治政大 in the Chinese government’s Reinvigoration of Chinese culture is a core element 立. approach and is part of the so-called Chinese Dream. High level officials often express the need. ‧ 國. 學. to “restore” Chinese culture to help people cope in today’s global society.. 46. The Chinese. ‧. government sees foreign influences, especially Western liberal ideology, as a threat as they. y. sit. 47. As such, it is important to construct and anchor a robust ‘Chinese identity’ in. io. er. revolution.’. Nat. might weaken and undermine the Party’s authority or possibly even lead to a ‘peaceful. today’s society to ensure stability and cultural safety （文化建設）. 48 The construction of this. al. n. v i n C h broader thought the CCP’s e n g c h i U of. cultural identity is part of. “Socialism with Chinese. Characteristics”, of which the Chinese dream is also part of. As a result: generating soft power will not just attract foreign targets but also enhance national unity through authorities’ propaganda efforts. 49. 44. Li, 288. Ibid., 296. 46 Michael Barr, "Mythe Et Réalité Du Soft Power De La Chine," Études internationales 41, no. 4 (2010): 510. 47 Li Mingjiang, "China Debates Soft Power," The Chinese journal of international politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 302. 48 Jukka Aukia, "The Cultural Soft Power of China: A Tool for Dualistic National Security," Journal of China and International Relations 2, no. 1 (2014): 82. 49 Edney, 913. 45. 28. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(34) Domestically, soft power has another defensive function: it must help to uphold the ruling Communist Party’s legitimacy among its over 1.4 billion people. Edney states that the Chinese Communist Party has a legitimacy problem, based on the increasing number of protests that take place and China’s domestic security spending.. 50. Indeed, Chinese domestic security. costs have risen exponentially, even exceeding China’s military spending. Table 2.1 reveals that China’s domestic security spending surpassed military spending for the first time in 2010. In 2017, however, it was estimated to have risen to 118.6% of the total number of external defense expenditures. 51. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 y. Nat. sit. Secondly, China is home to 55 ethnic minority groups in addition to the Han. n. al. er. io. majority, many of which live in peripheral areas vital to China’s national security. 52 These. i n U. v. areas include Inner Mongolia （內蒙古自治區）, the Tibet Autonomous Region（西藏自治. Ch. engchi. 區）but also the Uyghur Autonomous Region （新疆維吾爾自治區）. The latter two are areas that have proven to be problematic in the eyes of Chinese authorities and, unsurprisingly, are also the regions with the highest domestic security expenditure per capita. Table 2.2 illustrates the explosive growth, almost double the amount, in spending in Xinjiang in one year. Tibet tops the list with 3,137 RMB per capita, a figure that approximates US domestic security. 50. Kingsley Edney, "Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China," Politics 35, no. 3-4 (2015): 5. 51 Adrian Zenz, "China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data," The Jamestown Foundation-China Brief 21 (2018): 6. 52 The People's Republic of China - The State Council, "Ethnic Groups in China," (accessed June 30, 2018. http://english.gov.cn/archive/china_abc/2014/08/27/content_281474983873388.htm.). 29. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(35) expenditures (3,220 RMB per capita), despite the lower human resource and technology costs in China. This highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy issues, especially in areas with ethnic minorities or majorities. Thus, it is in authorities’ interest if they are able to provide the cultural capital for minorities to identify themselves as Chinese or allow them to be receptive of the Han people. As such, the Party’s goal for national cohesion is closely related to its quest for unquestionable legitimacy, which it hopes to achieve through cultural soft power. 53. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 53. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Barr, 82.. 30. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(36) Thirdly, Chinese understanding of soft power further lays a strong emphasis on communication capabilities and mass media. While Nye states that major media outlets can help clarify government positions on certain issues (and thus increase transparency), he also states that they do not necessarily translate into soft power in the countries they’re based in.. 54. China, however, considers achieving a global communication capacity a vital part of its soft power strategy. Both Chinese scholars and officials see Western ‘cultural hegemony’ as a result of Western domination in the media landscape.. 55. 政治大. Officials believe that if China is to become a hegemon, it needs a communication. 立. capacity that corresponds to the role it wants to play on the world stage. This is apparent from. ‧ 國. 學. a 2009 quote from former propaganda director and standing member of the Politburo Liu. ‧. Yunshan （劉雲山）, who said "Communication capability determines the power of influence,. sit. y. Nat. the right of speech determines initiative, and transparency determines credibility." 56. 57. al. n. sovereignty”.. er. io. Joshua Cooper Ramo once described China as suffering from a problem of “image. i n U. v. This is an opinion that is shared with Chinese authorities as well, who believe. Ch. engchi. that China’s negative reputation is not self-inflicted, but rather is constructed by foreign media. In 2008, the Beijing Olympics placed China in the international spotlight. Contrary to Chinese expectations, international media coverage focused on many negative aspects of the country, criticizing authorities’ human rights record, their treatment of migrant workers and accusing the Chinese government of violently suppressing the protests that were taking place in Tibet at the time. Hollywood director Steven Spielberg withdrew from his position as advisor to the. 54. Nye Jr, 107. Mingjiang Li, "Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect," (2008): 27. 56 CNTV, ""From Down-to-Earth Journalist to Top Cpc Leadership"," (accessed March 22, 2018, http://english.cntv.cn/special/newleaders/liuyunshan02.html.) 57 Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China (Foreign Policy Centre, 2007), 13. 55. 31. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.

(37) Olympics in protest of the government’s support to Sudan in the Darfur conflict, causing major embarrassment to Beijing.. 58. Chinese authorities perceived Western media coverage – of what. was supposed to be China’s prestigious event – hostile and anti-Chinese.. 59. Sun describes this moment as “an important watershed for China.”. 60. Chinese. authorities came to the realization that the country’s economic growth did not automatically translate into respect or admiration from the international community. On the contrary, it had further fueled uneasiness. Furthermore, the CCP decided it could no longer wait for Western media to change their perspectives about the country: it had to take matters in own hands and. 政治 This大inspired China’s massive charm offensive that was to take place立 over the coming years. Authorities invest massive amounts of build its own platform to advance its viewpoint.. 61. ‧ 國. 學. money each year. In 2018, the Financial Times reported that the Chinese government’s budget for “external propaganda” （對外宣傳） amounted to a stellar Rmb 60 billion ($9.5 billion),. ‧. double the amount of its 2011 budget (Rmb 30 billion), two years before Xi Jinping’s ascent to. y. In comparison, the US Department of State reports a mere $2.03 billion allocation to. sit. 62. Nat. power.. er. io. public diplomacy for its 2016 fiscal year. 63. al. n. v i n C hmany challengesUin its quest for soft power and as However, China still faces engchi Raswnley points out in his 2007 work: “Cultural and economic diplomacy do not easily or necessarily translate into the realization of foreign policy objectives.”. 64. How China exactly. 58. Austin Ramzy, "Beijing's Spielberg Problem," (http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1713718,00.html. 59 Sun, 58. 60 Ibid., 59. 61 Ibid.. 62 Charles; Ju Clover, Cherry Fei, "China’s Diplomacy Budget Doubles under Xi Jinping," (https://www.ft.com/content/2c750f94-2123-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11.) 63 Katherine Brown, Chris Hensen, and Palak Bhandari, "Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting," Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2015). 64 Gary D. Rawnsley, "A Survey of China's Public Diplomacy," (accessed March 29, 2018, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/survey-china%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy.). 32. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.019.2018.A06.