Identifying Factors of Continuity - CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

CHAPTER III: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE—HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL

3.3 A NALYSIS

3.3.1 Identifying Factors of Continuity

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

overall system system

Power Reproduced because it is supported by an elite group of actors

Change in power distribution Legitimation Reproduced because actors believe it is morally just

or appropriate

Change in beliefs of what is right Adapted from Mahoney, 2000, pp. 517 (Table 1).

Due to the complicated nature of the institution at hand, I try to segment the institution and break it down into three aspects: the political, the social, and the economic. The political aspect deals with the political entities of the day, mainly the power and rulings of the Crown and manorial lords. These institutional aspects are mostly formal arrangements. The social infers to the ethnic and cultural context and meanings. Compared to the political aspect, the social aspect implies more informal arrangements, but is not in any sense a weaker influence to individual behavior. The third is the economic aspect. It focuses on the means of making a living, or in other words, the economic activities of the day. A mix of formal and informal institutional arrangements occurs here. However, it is often hard to dissect completely the functions and its causes or influences into these three categories. Hence, we should not look at the three categories as mutual exclusive; they overlap more or less with some parts of the institution easier to identify with certain aspects.

3.3 Analysis

In this section, using the research structure above, I identify the factors of continuity and change in the British medieval commonfield systems. I examine the factors of change first, then address the factors of change.

3.3.1 Identifying Factors of Continuity

As already outlined in the research, the search for internal and external factors are the

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

main research objectives. Here, I hope to compare the difference of the Midland system to another variant: the East Anglia system, including areas of Norfolk, Suffolk, and parts of Kent. I conduct this part from comparison of three basic aspects of the commonfield system: the political, the economic, and the social. In the end, I point out the developmental differences in their own institutional logics.

3.3.1.1 The Political Dimension

First, the political dimension is the most essential aspect, including the manorial court and the larger background system of feudalism itself. Manors and lords exist both in the Midland and East Anglia. As mentioned by Buck, she gave credit to the communal community models of common land management, viewing it as a critical factor of centuries of success of the common fields system.²⁰⁴ The center to this success, in Buck’s view, rests on the functioning of the manorial courts. This was also the fourth characteristic of the midland model spelled out by Thirsk.

In the Midlands, when decisions affecting villages using the same commons were to be made, all the villages were present and the manorial lord oversaw the court.²⁰⁵ These meetings were recorded by village bylaws, which “emphasized the degree…agricultural practice was directed and controlled by an assembly of cultivators, the manorial court, who coordinated and regulated the season-by-season activities of the whole community”.²⁰⁶ Even within a village, the number of stock each peasant can keep is strictly regulated.²⁰⁷

As pointed out by Dyer, the communal governance did not assert itself,²⁰⁸ especially in a feudal society. It must have been the work of a superior authority—the crown (starting

204 Buck, 1985, p. 60.

205 Thirsk, 1973, p. 232.

206 Roberts, 1973, p. 199.

207 Buck, 1985, p. 55; Christopher Dyer, Making a Living in the Middle Ages: The People of Britain 850-1520 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002).

208 Dyer, 2002, p.185.

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

from William the Conquer conquering England in 1066). Power in the hands of the landlord was laid down in the first place. If village bylaws weren’t enough to enforce the norms and punishments, the court of the feudal lord will intervene and defend its authority and order. “Village governance typically worked in conjunction with manorial officials, and vice versa”.²⁰⁹ Byelaws depended on the feudal lordship’s manorial court for deterring and punishing noncompliance of the peasants, mostly being fines of cash or produce;²¹⁰ it was a built-in hierarchical power relationship in the beginning. The characteristic of coercion of power is obviously at work here, and thus enables the compliance of peasants.

As long as the manorial lord has credible powers to enforce punishment, and the peasant wishes to avert punishment, this feedback mechanism of power explanation sinks in. The power of manorial lords was so big because it was able to ensure so many things attached to that privilege, which we will get to later.

On the other hand, while the East Anglia area also functioned under the same feudal system, the relative powers of the manorial lords there seemed to be weaker from various up keep of certain rules prevalent in the Midlands. For example, the economic and social rules in East Anglia seemed less tidy: the scattered and uneven strips, hamlets rather than condense villages, peasants have lesser duties to the lords, lighter feudal dues and taxes,²¹¹ and a sense of individualism seems to prevail in the East. Hopcroft pointed out that there tends to be more lord representation in a village, and in some cases,²¹² even four lord manors on one village (while there was only one manor per village in the Midland).²¹³ This meant that the peasants could choose to take disputes to other manorial courts of other lords if they aren’t satisfied with the results. The manorial lords sharing one village would

209 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 26.

210 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 26.

211 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 66.

212 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 65.

213 Mark Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 46.

‧

be competing against manpower, tax revenues, and influence in the village council.

The implication was huge: the lord’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the peasants was sufficiently weakened.²¹⁴ Due to this reason, it resulted in lesser labor services demanded by the lords, gave birth to the conversion of labor duties to money payments at an early date, and even more free men and copyholders in this area. By the 13^th century, most large estates in East Anglia used wage labor, while the rest of England used customary labor (which was a development far ahead of England in economic development).²¹⁵ Without powerful lordship in these regions, individualism arose and lesser economic issues were decided communally with the lord overseeing everything (see Table 3-2). This was one of the most important power feedback reproduction mechanisms that dispersed the developmental paths of East Anglia and the Midlands.

Table 3-2. Self-Reproduction Mechanisms in the Political Dimension

Midland Model East Anglia Model

 Being a less communal region, forms of communal activities still exist, therefore village meetings also;

but the number of lords given privilege in this area is clearly more than the Midland

 Land holdings are scattered but much more intact and in order

 Weak land market

 Communal governance has

 Tenants have lighter fees and rents

 Land holdings are much more concentrated but fragmented

 Early existence of wage labor

 Strong land market

 Communal governance is much weaker with lesser

214 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 65-66.

215 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 66.

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

stronger constraints constraints

3.3.1.2 The Social Dimension

On the influence of ideas in the political arena, no one questioned the legitimacy of the feudal way of life—the notion of a patron-client way of life in that people are bounded to land in turn of service to the lord. It may even have been unthought of that the King can be refuted. In fact, scholars have long argued that the communal norms and traditions came from a deep historical origin—a social creation of many complicated factors as well as a fact of historical path-dependency.²¹⁶ Germanic cultural traits of communal traditions were brought to the English Isles by Germanic peoples who migrated to the lands as they conquered them and settled down (as in many other places in Europe). Where Germanic settlements lay, communal communities and common cropping/grazing systems were more likely to evolve, taking into consideration of the environment context and conditions.

Hence, communal courts and communal open field systems with the same sense of strong communalism came from ethnic traits the Germanic people brought with them where ever they went. While how much a fully-fledged system was brought over is still being debate, we can be safe to assume that the traditional traits of kinship, honor, and notion of swearing oath and offering service to a landed person for protection and livelihood upkeep were passed on. This implied power relationships, mutual interests, and mutual expectations in a society.

While Germanic traditional traits do not equal completely to feudalism, quite a few notions passed on as feudalism as we know it. The idea that service in turn for protection and up keep of livelihood (rights of landholding and use of commons) should still be the

216 See Gray 1915; J. Z. Titow, “Medieval England and the Open-Field System”, The Past and Present Society, Vol. 32 (Dec., 1965), pp. 86-102; George C. Homans, “The Explanation of English Regional Differences”, The Past and Present Society, Vol. 42 (Feb., 1969), pp. 18-34.; Rosemary L. Hopcroft, “The Importance of the Local:

Rural Institutions and Economic Change in Preindustrial England”, In Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee, eds., The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), pp. 277-304; Hopcroft, 1999.

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

heart of the lord-serf relationship. Therefore, peasants on the medieval manors always fought to bring their cases against their own lords to the royal court, believing that the King can help them regain freedom on an “ancient demesne”, which the manorial lords were also granted rights to use, just as they are, too.²¹⁷ They seldom target manorial lords directly in peasant revolts, but only hope for a better living condition (regaining lost rights).

These were the underlying fabrics of society, buried so deep in people’s worldviews, as if it does escape scrutiny, boarding on total compliance without knowing. This is the legitimation mechanism at work.

Aspects of communalism in the community on the Midland areas are of heavy influence here. This is also why Hopcroft termed the region the “communal open fields”.

Confirming to tradition is one part of this influence, especially to the hereditary system on the midland common fields. Due to strong lordship in this area and possible ethnic traits of settled people, hereditary system is primogenitary, meaning the father’s right to land is only passed down to his eldest son. (Some places, it is passed down to the smallest son, called “borough”.²¹⁸) This implies no means of concrete livelihood promises to the other children.²¹⁹ Hence, even in an agricultural society which food output was significantly increasing with good prospects, the peasant households in the midlands gave birth only to an average of 1.8 children. In East Anglia, it was 2-3 per household, with the average members in a household to be 5.1.²²⁰

Another example of communitarianism was the village council. It operated as the center of village business administration where every peasant had a say.²²¹ This was a good check against people trying to harm the village’s common interest, but at the same time, proved equally harmful to possible technological innovations and changes to agrarian

217 Dyer, 2002, p. 181.

218 Overton, 1996, p. 35.

219 Dyer, 2002, p. 158.

220 Dyer, 2002, p. 158.

221 Dyer, 2002, pp. 107, 145.

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

methods. This caused slow progression in improving agricultural technique and knowhow.²²² Both of these examples were done in the logic of appropriateness, the reason to seeing fit in a situation where others are doing it, deem it legitimate, and are part of others’ expectation to do so. It is a legitimation explanation of feedback mechanism.

However, in East Anglia, this sense of communalism is has complete opposite—individualism. First reason for this, is that this region was already made up of a different demographic in terms of tenure rights than the Midlands. It was consisted of more freeholding peasantry in the beginning. “Freeholders” are free of feudal obligations, fees, and manorial restrictions.²²³ In Norfolk and Suffolk, there are roughly 36% freeholders (2-2.5 times as many than the Midland areas);²²⁴ in some others places in East Anglia, the free population even reached up to 80% of the population.²²⁵ Due to the common law of the 12^th century, the freeholders also had the right to appeal to the king’s court.²²⁶ Not only did the freeholders reign out of manorial lords’ reach, they could even bring the lord to the king’s court if they feel that their rights have been breached.²²⁷ Moreover, freeholders get to keep everything they reap. With the protection of the king for his gains, this is the very incentive for a freeholder to go the extra mile to work his butt off, and brings about the essence of the individualist spirit: innovation, risk taking, and entrepreneurship. This is another significant difference, imprinted as a power effect which influenced matters greatly.

Adding the far significant percentage of freeholders with a relatively weaker manorial existence, and customary tenants that have few duties and lighter taxes, a communal way

222 Hopcroft, 1999, pp. 75-78; Campbell, 1981, pp. 128-129.

223 Overton, 1996, p. 34.

224 Overton, 1996, p. 34.

225 Hopcroft, 1999, p. 66.

226 Somewhere around 1180. See Dyer, 2002, p. 140.

227 Free tenants only had to pay a few shillings each year being now officially declared free and under

protection of the common law (since the late 12^th century) and under the provision of Magna Carta of 1215. See Dyer, 2002, pp. 140-141. On the translation of the text of Magna Carta, see James Clarke Holt. 1965. Magna Carta. (Cambridge: University Press), pp. 317-337.

‧

of operating about daily economic activity was not the choice of most East Anglians. The peasantry here enjoys much more freedom then their Midland counterparts. This reflects largely in heritage patterns of land, spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship, advance agricultural technologies, and early consolidation of lands (these point I will return to in the next part). Additionally, this also shows in the landscape appearance. While there still were areas of open land, the areas were more enclosed as there were fenced by stones, hedges, and trees, giving the area a “woodland” look.²²⁸ Still, kinds of commons existed even in less-communal regions, so that a kind of village council dedicated to manage such a common would be in place, it would still be significantly weaker in strength and simpler in issues of concern. Table 3-3 summarizes the social dimension in comparing the two regional models.

Table 3-3. Self-Reproduction Mechanisms in the Social Dimension

Midland Model East Anglia Model

The Social Dimension

Status of Peasantry—[Power]

 Mostly are villeins and serfs bound to the lord and are burdened with labor services and fees to the lord

Communalism—[Legitimation]

 Originates from Germanic traits (kinship, honor, and swearing oath and offering service to a landed person for protection)

 Hereditary system  Primogenitary

Free men are protected by the common law and the royal court

 Tenants have heavier fees and rents

 Communal governance caused lagging behind in agrarian technology 

 Tenants have lighter fees and rents

 The spirit of innovation, risk taking, and entrepreneurship, plus protection of the

228 Joan Thirsk, “The Common Fields”, Past & Present, no. 29 (December 1964), p. 3; Hopcroft, 1999, p. 20.

‧

國

立政治大學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

64 weaker agrarian productivity

 Primogenitary  neater land holdings, lesser population and lesser non-agrarian population

common law Flourishing agrarian economy, lively land market, leading edge in agrarian technology, rise of cottage industry (and the non-agrarian population)

 More voluntary enclosures at an early date (due to the individualism spirit and an objective market oriented economy)

3.3.1.3 The Economic Dimension

Economic interest in a communal agricultural setting meant a sense of egalitarianism in the Midland. Recall the first champion model characteristics by Thirsk. It talked about scattered strips of land holdings. According to scholars, it was for fairness that all peasants got to work a piece of the more fertile lands as well as the less fertile ones.²²⁹ And the scattering also meant peasants worked distant and near lands alike.

Another more pending issue of egalitarianism arises in the second characteristic on common cropping and grazing practices on a two or three field rotation. To crop, a plough is needed and implies the need to raise oxen along with other agrarian animal stock, sheep for instance, for their manure to fertilize the soil. Ploughs, unwheeled at this time, needed about 8 oxen to pull and at least two able-bodies men to steer in order to form a plough team.²³⁰ Peasants would need cooperation to work on each other’s landholdings as well as on the lord’s demesne, for it is their service of duty to the lord.

Additionally, it is impossible for an average peasant household to own 8 oxen. Oxen pretty much belonged to the lord, or peasants each owned a few, and teamed up to work together. This demanded cooperation, hence termed “common” cropping. Moreover,

“common” grazing also required all to abide by the village bylaws. Wandering stock would devastate crops before the harvesting season, so it is absolutely pivotal that all peasants

229 Dyer, 2002, pp 23-24.

230 Dyer, 2002, p. 129.

‧

keep their husbandry animals fenced on a common pasture, or appoint a herdsman to look after the village herd. In the surviving ruling records of manorial courts, we find cases filed by peasants to claim damage of others on their right to their produce or property, and crop damage caused by wandering animals were not uncommon.²³¹

In such regions, villages or townships tend to be large and compact. People lived together with the church in the middle of the village or town as the place for association and meets.²³² The long and narrow furlongs and open fields surrounded the village;²³³ and these communities tend to have more village festivals.²³⁴

If a tenant is lagging behind on his duties or simply being careless, other tenants will be burdened with more work and/or be worst off. In the village community, daily economic activities and services to the lord required a strong bond of communitarianism, not only for their own interests, but also to keep an eye out on your neighbors to avoid free riding of cheaters and infringement on the village common interests.²³⁵ In sum, this is a strong legitimation reproduction mechanism on economic interest.

Logically inferring, if the Midland system was successful in agrarian production as Buck thought it was, should it have not had the best output in crops? Sadly, it wasn’t.

During the late medieval period, seed/yield ratios were higher in east England, 7:1 (and higher, Dyer report 8-9:1) compared to 5:1 (at best, some places are as low as 2-3:1) in the midlands.²³⁶ High productivity was due to pressure of dense population,²³⁷ smaller

231 Dyer, 2002, p. 141-142.

232 Hopcroft, Regions, p. 24.

233 “Strips” are the long, narrow units of arable land split up for cultivation. They are usually thin and very long indeed, sometimes up to a kilometer. “Unenclosed strips”, then, are “divided by grassy bulks (unplowed ridges), by boundary-stones, and by the pattern of ridge and furrow left by the plow.” They are then grouped into bigger units call “furlongs”. Surrounding the village and church in the middle, the furlongs spread neatly around the village. Because little fence and hedges are used to mark boundaries, it generally has the looks of a wide-open country, hence “open fields”, or “unenclosed”. “Enclosed strips”, on the other hand, would be the opposite.

在文檔中公有地悲劇的再探：英國中世紀公有地制度對於二十一世紀全球治理的啟示 - 政大學術集成 (頁 63-76)