Chinese oil imports per origin 2007,
VIII. PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU’S “VIABLE DIPLOMACY”
VIII.1. THE LEGACY OF LEE TENG-HUI
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VIII. PRESIDENT MA YING-JEOU’S “VIABLE DIPLOMACY”
2008-2010. IS THE “DIPLOMATIC TRUCE” WORKING?
VIII.1. THE LEGACY OF LEE TENG-HUI
Lee Teng-hui was the first Taiwanese-born politician who reached the position of President of the Republic of China on Taiwan after succeeding Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, thus making history.
In the beginning of his rule, his main goal was to consolidate his grip on power, overcoming the resistance of the conservative KMT old guard and other rivals. Though many saw him as a temporary ruler, they were proved wrong. His first significant political victory was to secure the chairmanship of the KMT, a key step that allowed him to outmaneuver the old guard – formed by influential mainlanders -- and consolidate his power.
In the foreign policy realm, Lee initially held the traditional views and positions kept during the Chiang era, vowing to continue the “one China” policy and defending the notion that the ROC’s government was the legitimate government of all China.
That was only in the beginning. Over time, Lee radically changed the diplomacy of the ROC, its goals, strategies and policies. Lee was determined to carve out a new, special place for Taiwan in the international arena, gaining more space and moving away from the possibility of unification with China, at least in the terms conceived by its Communist leaders. When he assumed, his daunting challenge was to relieve Taiwan from its international isolation.
‘PRAGMATIC DIPLOMACY’
Lee promoted the so-called “pragmatic diplomacy (wu shi wai jiao). Its essence is to seek a new framework in which the island can be treated as a distinct and separate state from the People’s Republic of China.181
181 Wang, T.Y. 2003. P. 245. “Taiwan Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui’s Rule 1998-2000.” In “Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui era – Politics in Taiwan 1988-2000,” Lee, Wei-chin and Wang, T.Y. (editors). University Press of America ® Inc., Lanham, Maryland, USA.
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148 Taipei’s ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ has its origins in Lee’s determination to break the international isolation imposed on Taiwan by the Beijing government. Internal and external factors served Lee’s purposes at the time (1988-2000). Taiwan had become a democracy and this helped the island to win support and sympathy in the world, particularly in the US.
Wang summarized the main elements of Lee’s diplomacy:
“The core idea of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ is to develop all possible contacts including diplomatic, economic, or cultural relations, with any country, even if it has diplomatic ties with the PRC. Specifically,
‘pragmatic diplomacy’ calls for: 1) the advancement of formal diplomatic ties, 2) the establishment and promotion of substantive relations with nonhostile nations, and active participation in international organizations and activities.”182
The strategies used by the Lee’s government were several.
The first one was the pursuit of dual recognition; it meant dropping the long-held official principle of “one China”, taken as given in the Chiang era. The ROC recognized the Communist rule over the mainland and reasserted its own sovereignty over Taiwan and the smaller islands. Taipei began to admit the possibility of having diplomatic ties with nations that had diplomatic ties with Beijing, though Beijing itself has never accepted dual recognition.
The other approach is the use of informal diplomacy. The best models are the unofficial relationships with Japan and the United States. Taipei tried to increase the number of representative or trade offices in the world, looking to keep and upgrade substantive relations – trade, educational, cultural exchanges --with other nations. Chinese stiff opposition and isolating efforts have particularly targeted state-to-state relations and membership in international organizations. “Private visits” and “vacation trips” by Lee and other Taiwanese high officials also played a role in this policy strategy.
A third strategy was to use Taiwan’s economic strength and economic incentives to gain friendship and expand its international visibility. Under Lee, it had two major components.
One element is the foreign aid program; this meant the use of traditional technical and agricultural missions plus bilateral soft loans, grants and contributions to multilateral organizations. The establishment of the ICDF (International Fund of Cooperation and
182 Item. Pp. 248-249.
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149 Development), Taiwan’s cooperation agency, is a major step in the use of developmental aid to gain clout and diplomatic allies.183
The other component is trade and investment, which became important weapons in the Taiwanese diplomatic arsenal.
“Through the expansion of trade and investment, Taipei consolidated existing official ties with its diplomatic allies. Taiwan’s business presence in Latin American and the Caribbean countries was a typical example in this respect, as many governments in the region wanted investment dollars in return for their diplomatic loyalty.”184
A fourth component of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ was the defensive strengthening of national security through the purchase of weapons.
A fifth element was participation in international organizations. Lee considered that substantive participation was more important than the formal name, and flexibility was adopted regarding the names used by Taiwan in international organizations (‘Chinese Taipei’ in sport associations, etc.).
THE BID TO ENTER THE UNITED NATIONS
One of the boldest iniatives of the Lee period was the bid to enter the United Nations, which started in 1993. Diplomatic allies were asked to call for the ROC’s admission and to reiterate it at every suitable event, and to call for recognizing the ROC as a sovereign and independent state. This “ritual” was continued by Taiwan and its allies even until 2008. Actually, the idea of launching a bid to re-enter the UN was an original DPP idea that was appropriated by the KMT and Lee. Due to the adamant opposition of Beijing and its pressures, it has never been successful.
On August 6, 1993, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama jointly requested that the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly, scheduled to start a month and a half later, shall include in its agenda a “consideration of the exceptional
183 Item., pp. 253-255.
184Baum, Julian. 1997. P. 29. “Let’s tango: Taipei asks its investors to back its diplomatic goals.” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 9, 1997. Quoted by Wang.
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150 situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality.”
In the note for Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Central American countries state that Taiwan is “a dynamic and progressive member of the international community and a peace-loving country.” It deserves UN membership, the Taiwan’s allies affirmed, and they also propose a draft resolution establishing a committee to study and then recommend an “equitable, rational and practical solution which will enable the Republic of China in Taiwan to become a full member of the U.N.
As it happened successively since 1993 until 2008, such proposals were not discussed by the General Assembly because of the stiff opposition from the People’s Republic of China.
A senior official from a Central American country whom I interviewed says that “we have always supported Taiwan in its bids to enter the United Nations; they have always counted on us.”
THE PRC POSITION
What did “more international space” mean for the PRC? Chu Shulong, a senior Beijing scholar from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, wrote in 2000 that “Beijing suspects that Taiwan’s international bid is for independence; Beijing thus cannot tolerate Taiwan’s efforts to expand its international space.” 185
Chu maintained,
“Beijing worries that Taiwan wants to go beyond its international boundary. In the past 10 years under Lee Teng-hui, Taipei has tried hard to go beyond the boundary. This forces Beijing to consider what Taipei really wants. […] Lee Teng-hui’s two-state-theory statement on July 9, 1999, clearly showed that Beijing’s concerns are correct. Taipei’s bid for greater international space is not only for doing business abroad and tourism but also for advancing a two-state relationship between the mainland and Taiwan.”186
185Chu, Shulong. 2000. P. 58. “International space for what? Beijing’s concerns and position regarding Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.” In “Taiwan Strait Dilemmas – China-Taiwan-U.S. Policies in the New Century.” Gong, Gerrit W. (editor), The CSIS Press, Washington D.C.
186 Item., p. 59.
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151 The Lee Teng-Hui era was a turning point in the overall foreign policy’s orientation.
This change was not only reflected in the media, in the public language; it also fostered some academic thinking. For example, during an academic conference organized by the DPP in 1993 -- in a paper later turned into a book chapter ----, New York Law School professor Lung--Chu Chen listed some theoretical arguments in favor of Taiwan’s independence from the point of view of international law .
“Taiwan has existed as a sovereign, independent state for more than 40 years. The question today is to acknowledge Taiwan as an independent state in name as well as in fact. The fact of Taiwan’s independent existence is well known in the world community; what is increasingly at issue is whether to call this sovereign, independent entity ‘the Republic of China’, ‘the Republic of Taiwan’, or simply ‘Taiwan’.”187
He added that
“In other words, the conditions for admission of a new member are: (1) the applicant must be a state (country); (2) it must be peace-loving; (3) it must accept obligations of the U.N. Charter; and (4) it must be able and willing to carry out the charter obligations in the judgment of the United Nations. Judged by these conditions, Taiwan is of course amply qualified to be a new member of the United Nations. […] Taiwan has in fact existed as a sovereign, independent state for quite some time. It will be deemed peace-loving insofar as it discontinues the lingering KMT claim to represent China, to “unify” China, or to retake the mainland.”188
Lee’s 1995 trip to his alma mater in the US, Cornell University, was a major diplomatic victory in the fight to break China’s encirclement, boosting his prestige and Taiwan’s image of a struggling, vibrant democracy. China’s response was the 1995 missile crisis, repeated in 1996 as an attempt to impede Lee’s election by popular vote. The US Clinton administration sent two carriers to the Taiwan Strait as a strong warning signal for the Chinese. Nevertheless, some in the US saw in Lee a ‘troublemaker’.
Professor Shelley Rigger defines China’s logic behind its Taiwan policy as follows:
1. For the PRC leadership, preserving and protecting China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity are matters of national and regime survival. Therefore, maintaining the viability of unification between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland is a top priority of China’s foreign and domestic policy at all times.
187 Chen, Lung-chu. 1997. P. 4. “Prospects for Taiwan’s Membership in the United Nations.” In the book “Taiwan’s Expanding Role in the International Arena.” Yang, Maysing H. (Editor). M.E. Sharpe, New York, USA.
188 Item., p.5.
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152 2. Unification will become unviable if Taiwan changes its international status in such a way as to sever permanently its connection to the Chinese nation; this is the meaning of the
‘Taiwan independence.’ Therefore, ‘Taiwan independence’ must be prevented at all cost.
3. Taiwan’s international isolation makes Taiwan independence infeasible. Therefore, Beijing should maximize Taiwan’s isolation, both by preventing it from gaining membership in international organizations and by requiring China’s diplomatic partners to accept Beijing’s view of Taiwan’s status (there is but one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the sole legal government of China is the PRC).
4. A primary obstacle to the achievement of unification (and the eradication of the Taiwan independence threat) lies in the United States’ policy of enabling effective deterrent and defense capabilities for Taiwan. Therefore, to eliminate the danger of Taiwan independence and secure unification, China must increase its power relative to both Taiwan and the United States.189
THE ‘STATE-TO-STATE’ STATEMENT
The highest point of Lee Teng-hui’s quest for broader space was his statement on
“special state-to-state relationships”, delivered during an interview with Deutsche Welle, a German TV channel, in July 1999. Such a formulation ran against four decades of official “one China” policies by the KMT regime and against more recent formulas. Cross-strait relationships hit one of their lowest points.
The scholarly literature calls Lee’s formulation the “two states theory.” Sheng Lijun, a senior fellow of Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, says,
“With this definition, he abandoned Taiwan’s previous position on China and Taiwan being ‘two equal political entities’, which according to him, were actually equal to ‘two countries’. He also noted that there was no need for Taiwan to declare independence again since it (ROC) had always been an independent country since 1912.”190
189Rigger, Shelley. “China, Russia and the Taiwan issue.” In the book “The Future of China-Russia Relations.”
2010. Bellacqua, James (editor). University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. P. 313.
190(Sheng, Lijun. 2002. P. 11. “China and Taiwan – Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian.” Zed Books, Londond and NY; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore).
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153 Soon after the statement, Taiwan announced it would launch, together with its diplomatic allies, a campaign to promote the “two states” policy among the international community. The bid to re-enter the United Nations had consisted in appealing for a repealing of the resolution 2758 of 1971, which gave the PRC the China seat in the organization; this time, the new formal request would be permission to join the UN as a new and separate state, using the German model as reference and precedent; embassies and representatives offices were to explain the notion and point at the ‘Grundlaueruertrag’ or Fundamental Treaty of 1972 between the two Germanys.191
The official Taiwan’s positions on the relationship with China and unification had undergone evolution during the Lee Teng-hui’s period. At the beginning, he continued to adhere to the “one China” principle of the Chiang era. After 1991, Taiwan began to state that Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China, the “PRC is not equivalent to China” and both parts of China have the right to participate alongside each other in the international community as equals.
In 1993, the Lee government started to advocate one China with shared sovereignty, the PRC in the mainland and the ROC over Taiwan and the smaller islands. In 1994, a white paper on cross-strait ties stated that “each side has jurisdiction over its respective territory and that they should coexist as two legal identities in the international arena.” After 1994, Taipei only spoke about
“two equal political identities” across the strait without mentioning “one China.” 192
As it could be expected, Beijing’s reaction was furious. A barrage of propaganda blasted Lee mercilessly. The Chinese canceled a new scheduled meeting of Taiwanese and Chinese special envoys that was going to take place in Taiwan in October 1999, and intensified its blockage of Taipei’s initiatives and pressure on other countries. The PRC even demanded a retraction and a return to the ‘one China’ principle.
Fearing the outburst of a conflict, Washington was also upset at Lee because he did not warn the Americans in advance about his intentions to use this new concept.
“The Clinton administration worried about the risk of conflict erupting through accident or miscalculation and was annoyed that Lee had not informed Washington in advance that he would offer that formulation, which was new in that it was at least a more explicit
191 Item. P. 12.
192 Item., pp.16-17.
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154 statement of the relationship between the two sides,” says Richard Bush, a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan and a leading expert.193
As the 2000 presidential elections neared, the US sent several delegations to Taipei to make its point clear that Lee should not make more controversial statements.
The domestic considerations were always very important in Lee’s foreign policy. His 1995 trip took place during (de facto) campaign ahead of the 1996 presidential election, which Lee himself won; the trip, the publicity and strong reactions it generated and the harsh Chinese military response in the form of missile launching and exercises all turned to be highly favorable to shrewd Taiwan’s leader. Besides, polls conducted in the mid 1990s showed a high degree of support among the Taiwanese public for a larger international space.
The Lee years were characterized by a deepening, evolving feeling of a Taiwanese identity as different from a strictly Chinese identity, according to political scientists. The 1999 two-state declaration came months before the presidential elections, and some observers estimate the leader was trying to influence them in that way, among other moves. Since polls have been conducted in the democratic era, they have reflected that a majority of the public supports the status quo and rejects unification with China under the “one country, two systems” formula advocated by the PRC leadership.
How effective was Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy?
For most of the time, competition for recognition was a typical zero-sum game. When Lee Teng-hui became president for the first time in 1988, 22 countries recognized the PRC. The number had risen to 31 in 1996, and when Lee quit the presidential office in 2000, the figure had fallen to 28 diplomatic allies. That means 6 countries more than in 1988, but at the same time, three important partners had defected to the PRC camp: Saudi Arabia, South Africa and South Korea. The rest were small countries with little clout in international relations, but even so, their recognition provided a basis of legitimacy to the ROC claims of being a state – and it continues to provide it at times when China is becoming stronger in the global balance of power.
As Wang puts it,
193 Bush, Richard. 2005. P. 55 “Untying the knot – Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.” Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.
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“Because a capacity of entering into relations with other states is one of the essential qualifications of statehood, in addition to a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government, the size of this number has become an indicator of the island country’s international as well as domestic legitimacy.” 194
In my opinion, the balance is mixed, though it’s more positive than negative. More countries recognized the ROC in 2000 than it was the case in 1988, though 3 important allies were lost. Taiwan’s annual bids for UN membership, increasing trade and investment in allied countries, Lee’s trips – especially that to the US in 1995 – and statements, the agitated cross strait political interactions, the missile crisis of 1995-1996; all of this made the Taiwan issue more visible to the eyes of the world and helped fostered the image of people and a new, beleaguered dynamic democracy fighting for their survival.
VIII .2. THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN PERIOD AND DIPLOMATIC ALLIES
Chen Shui-bian made history in 2000, winning a presidential election and becoming the first president that was not a member of the KMT party. A prominent opposition politician and lawyer, he was Taiwanese, just like Lee. The worst for Beijing was his credentials as a staunch pro-independence supporter.
As Lee, he was determined to strengthen Taiwan’s international status and opportunities, but once in office, he moved quickly to assuage Beijing’s and Washington’s concerns about radical departures.
In his first inaugural address, he formulated his “Five No’s”: no declaration of
In his first inaugural address, he formulated his “Five No’s”: no declaration of