Chinese oil imports per origin 2007,
VII. TAIWAN, CHINA AND NICARAGUA
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117
VII. TAIWAN, CHINA AND NICARAGUA
VII.1. TAIWAN
Nicaragua is a special case in Central America and Latin America. The social, political and historical experience of the Sandinista Revolution makes it unique in the whole continent, not only in an isthmus considered the unquestionable American ‘backyard’. Though it ended in 1990 – despite the rhetoric of the second Sandinista government now back in power -, it radically altered politics, social norms and customs and society’s many ways of thinking.
Nicaragua is one of Taiwan’s allies in Central America. The historical origin of these ties goes back to the 1960s, though they were interrupted for 5 years in the 1980s, exactly during the revolutionary years. Curiously, ideology had little or nothing to do with that, but cold-blooded pragmatism. Between 1985 and 1990, Managua had diplomatic relationships with Beijing. The new centre-of-the right government broke off with the PRC and reestablished diplomatic relationships with Taipei.
THE SOMOZA YEARS
The family of Nicaraguan dictators, the Somozas, had a good relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek. Both regimes were authoritarian, military governments, staunch anti-communist American allies; the natural affinities served well the relationship.
There is some confusion about the date of the establishment of diplomatic relationships for the first time. In 1930, a General Consulate of the Republic of China was established in Managua; in 1967 it was elevated to the rank of embassy, according to the website
of the Embassy of the Republic of China in Nicaragua.
(http://www.taiwanembassy.org/NI/mp.asp?mp=337).
Nevertheless, some academic literature puts the year 1962 as the initial date of diplomatic ties.
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118 In the book “The significance of Costa Rica in Taiwan’s Diplomacy and the Competition from Beijing,” Costa Rican professor Thais M. Cordoba states,
“The relationship between the two countries was excellent while Somoza was the president of Nicaragua. He reciprocated by appointing a consul to represent Nicaragua in Taipei. Both countries appointed their own ambassadors […] in 1962”.138
Cordoba does not indicate where she got this information.
Jorge Dominguez also provides the date of 1962. 139
It should be noticed that the Nicaraguan ruler of the early 1960s was General Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The president of Nicaragua was then his brother, Luis Somoza Debayle, who was not a military man, unlike Anastasio -- who already headed the army, the National Guard. Luis Somoza was formally Nicaragua’s president from 1956 to 1963, assuming after his father’s assassination in 1956, and dying from a heart attack in 1963.
General Somoza Debayle always was a faithful ROC’s ally. Even as the US under Richard Nixon abandoned Taiwan and switched to the strategic rapprochement with the PRC, Somoza, a furious anticommunist, US-educated dictator who loved to call himself “the last US Marine in Nicaragua” in the presence of visiting American generals (he spoke better English than Spanish, by the way), did not break off with the ROC. In October 1971, Nicaragua voted against the Albanian-Algerian-inspired resolution that ceded the China seat to the PRC in the UN.
THE SANDINISTAS COME TO POWER
The leftist guerrilla of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ousted Gen.
Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979, putting an end to 43 years of a corrupt family’s rule.
On July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan people initiated a new era, euphoric for witnessing something that a few years ago had been deemed as impossible and full of hope for a better future. Tragically, a decade of revolution and war opened in Nicaragua. One of the most beautiful revolutionary processes of the world turned into an authoritarian socialist experiment in
138 Cordoba, Thais M. 2005. “The Significance of Costa Rica in Taiwan’s Diplomacy and the Competition from Beijing.” P. 99. Printed by GENESIS de la Lima, San José, Costa Rica).
139 Dominguez, Jorge. “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes.” June 2006.
Working paper for the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank.
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119 the tropics, and into another low-intensity conflict of the Cold War with the superpowers putting the bullets, and Nicaraguans, just like Guatemalans and Salvadorans did in those times, putting the dead. The phrase belongs to former Guatemala’s President Vinicio Cerezo, the original intellectual father of the idea of peace talks among Central American presidents (a merit usually attributed, unjustly, only to Costa Rican Oscar Arias).
U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s administration adopted a totally hostile policy toward the Sandinistas, aimed at bringing regime change by force to stop what it saw as the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Nicaragua was deemed as a Soviet proxy in Central America, a second Cuba that was trying to export revolution to El Salvador and other neighboring countries. In 1980, the US started to reunite and train the remnants of the extinct National Guard in Honduras. In 1981, the Contras, a counter-revolutionary guerrilla army financed and equipped by Washington, began military actions in Nicaraguan territory.
The Sandinista-controlled Junta de Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional (JGRN), a collective executive power, a five-man committee built under the conception of a popular united front (it formally included non-Sandinista members), continued the relationship with the ROC for a few more years, though as Nicaragua was then an enemy of the United States, it was not possible to expect close contacts between the two parts. Besides, Taiwan sympathized with the Contra movement and even financed it.
THE RUPTURE WITH THE ROC: THE CONTRAS-PRC-ROC CONNECTION In 1985, comandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra – until then the JGRN coordinator – won the first presidential elections of the revolutionary era. He ruled under a presidential system with a parliament controlled by the Sandinistas who also controlled the judiciary, the police and the armed forces.
In December 1985, Sandinista Nicaragua finally severed ties with the ROC and recognized the PRC as the sole and legitimate representative of China. At first sight, ideology could seem to us a tempting easy explanation. But actually, the most absolute pragmatism was behind the move.
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120 It can be assumed that Beijing looked at the FSLN government as a Soviet client state, though Nicaragua never became a Soviet-like Communist state. Always careful about not challenging U.S. interests in the Americas, China always favored anything that would diminish Moscow’s influence in any part of the world. The Sandinistas were close allies of Cuba, the USSR and the Communist bloc. Soviet weapons and generous “brotherly socialist” aid kept the revolution alive despite the U.S. policy.
When the Iran-Contra scandal erupted in the United States in the 1980s, it became known that the PRC was one of the third parties providing weapons to the Contras (“Country 4”), Reagan’s “freedom fighters,” after the US Congress had refused to continue their financing.
Taiwan had donated US$ 2 million to the Contras “in humanitarian aid” between late 1985 and early 1986. Taiwan was called “Country 3” in the papers concerning the Iran-Contras scandal.140
So, paradoxically, Taiwan was providing money that was likely used for purchasing Chinese weapons for the Contras. At least, it supported their war effort.
In late 1985, the war was nearing its fifth year. Although the Contras were never close to their goal of toppling the government by decisively defeating the Sandinista army, they succeeded in damaging infrastructure, agricultural production and farming facilities, and impeding economic development. The war ruined the Nicaraguan economy. The conflict, together with disastrous management and policies by the revolutionary government, wiped off all the major material and economic achievements of the Somoza decades.
It is now clear to me that the main reason behind Managua’s decision to break ties with Taipei was an attempt to cut one source of support and weapons for the enemy. Besides, it is reasonable to expect that the Sandinistas regarded the pro-American ROC as a non-friendly government, though I don’t have any information here that would confirm they were aware of ROC’s support for their enemies. It is probable they did, as both the USSR and Cuba shared intelligence information with Nicaragua. Besides, the gesture was aimed at winning diplomatic support or sympathy from one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
140 Sobel, Richard. 1995. P. 290. “Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues”. Political Science Quarterly, Volume 110, No. 2, 1995, pp. 287-306.
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121 In the mid-1980s, Beijing had made efforts “to build bridges” and improve ties with
“the region’s two pro-Soviet regimes -- Cuba and Nicaragua,” wrote the American expert in US-China-Taiwan issues, Dennis Hickey.141
Hickey comments,
“Relations between Peking and the pro-Soviet Nicaraguan regime of Daniel Ortega Saavedra have likewise improved. Shortly after the normalization of relations in December 1985, Nicaragua received an interest-free loan of roughly US$ 10 million from Peking. Following Ortega’s 1986 visit to Peking, his government received another loan of approximately US$ 19 million. Although Peking has terminated its covert military assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, it has no plans at present to provide military assistance to the Sandinistas.”142
Beijing, according to Hickey’s article, also reminded the Sandinistas that it opposed all hegemonism “whether practiced by big powers or small.” (Item.). In my view, this was a not only an allusion to American dominance but also to Soviet presence and to the backing of the Salvadoran guerrilla (with weapons) by the Sandinistas themselves. According to Alfredo Alaniz, Nicaragua’s ambassador to Peking, “The Chinese do not believe military aid is necessary.”
By abandoning Taiwan and embracing the “one China” principle, the sine qua non condition of the PRC to establish ties, the FSLN regime sought to cut a source of support for the Contras. Besides, as an American ally, the ROC sympathized with the Contra cause, just as Washington and Saudi Arabia did, according to Hickey.143
Hickey believes that both economic and political considerations had apparently played a role in China’s decision to support the Contras.
Information revealed by the US Congress investigation on the Iran-Contras affair points at a “Country number four” among arms and aid providers. It was mainland China. A Canadian arms dealer was used to disguise the Chinese transfers. Between the end of 1984 and
141 Hickey, Dennis. 1989. “Peking’s Growing Political, Economic and Military Ties with Latin America.” P. 398. In the book “Peking’s Foreign Policy in the 1980s.” Chou, David S., editor. Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, ROC.
142 Item.
143 Item., p. 403.
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122 autumn 1985, China sold US$ 7 million worth of surface-to-air missiles and small arms to the Nicaraguan resistance forces.144
“[Until 1985] Peking profited handsomely from its support. Nicaraguan resistance leaders privately complained that Peking charged US$ 42,000 for each of the ten SA-7 heat-seeking missiles it provided in its first arms transfer – almost twice its regular price. Political considerations also played a role as Peking would agree to the arms transfer only after Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North assured Peking officials that a new Nicaraguan government would switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking. During conversations with one high-ranking Peking official, North promised that “Adolfo Calero, the head of the FDN [Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense, the main Contra group], was willing to commit to a recognition [deleted] once the Resistance forces had succeeded.””145
Nevertheless, when the Sandinistas switched sides and recognized the PRC, the Chinese “abruptly terminated” weapons sales to the Contras, Hickey says.
THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, REESTABLISHING TIES
The Sandinistas were thrown out of power in 1990, defeated in open elections by a coalition of 14 opposition parties and movements that had accepted the candidacy of Mrs.
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, a mother-like character that enjoyed great respect and moral authority among the Nicaraguan people.
Barrios de Chamorro is the widow of the famous journalist and former director of La Prensa daily, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal. A civic hero who always criticized and opposed the Somoza rule, he had been assassinated in January 1978. His death ignited riots and the anger of Nicaraguans against the Somoza dictatorship, and it served to create the pre-revolutionary atmosphere that led to the final uprising against the Somozas. While looking at Mrs. Barrios de Chamorro, the people associated her with the image of her late husband. She had been an early member of the collective government directorate (JGRN) of the first period of the revolution, but in 1980, she quit in disagreement with the radicalization of local politics and the authoritarian course it was taking. She also became the first woman to reach the highest office in a Latin American country.
Nicaragua was in ruins and the new government had a very hard time trying to take charge of so many urgent issues. The first great step was to get the demobilization of the
144 Item.
145 Item.
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123 Resistencia Nicaragüense (the official name of the Contras) and bring peace. The mandate of the people had been clear in the polls: the war and the bloodshed must end. That’s why they sacked the Sandinistas. The other most important task was the reconstruction of the economy and the normalization of life.
At the dawn of what political scientists call the “Nicaraguan democratic transition,”
the new government welcomed any kind of help and assistance wherever it came from.
Meanwhile the new non-Sandinista government was trying to consolidate its grip on power, President Lee Teng-hui was fighting to consolidate his own by confronting the Kuomintang’s old guard, maneuvering to increase the constitutional powers of the president’s office and widening its support basis in the KMT and in the country. One of Lee’s goals was to gain more international space for Taiwan.
In this way, the needs of the two parts met in time: the new, weak democratic government of Nicaragua was in desperate need of aid, and the ROC had a new, also democratic leadership that was determined to achieve a different place for Taiwan in the international arena, had funds for that purpose and was eager to use them in exchange for recognition.
Promises of badly needed cooperation aid and soft loans made the Chamorro government take the decision to break off ties with China and re-establish them with Taipei. This finally occurred on November 5, 1990. Thus, Beijing-Managua diplomatic relationships lasted only five years. There is no information available to me on whether the Chinese tried to retain Nicaragua’s recognition or not, or whether Managua authorities made special aid requests. It would be reasonable to believe that they did, given the country’s situation, but it may be probable that Beijing did not responded positively, was unwilling, or it did not concede enough importance to severing relations.
Soon afterwards, the Taiwanese government approved a three-year low-interest loan of US$ 100 million for Nicaragua. In 1991, Vice president Lien Chan paid a visit to Nicaragua.
In 1994, President Lee himself went on a tour of 4 Central American states that included Nicaragua, the first time a Taiwanese head of state arrived in Nicaragua. During his visit, he
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124 agreed to give to Nicaragua a new US$ 30 million-credit and write off US$ 17 million in past debts.146
In his memories, President Barrios de Chamorro’s chief of staff, Antonio Lacayo, evokes those first new contacts and Mrs. Chamorro’s first visit to Taiwan in March 1991.
“The reception they gave her was incredible. The Chinese [sic] were happy with the establishment of diplomatic relations, just as we were,” Lacayo says. The first Nicaraguan ambassador of the new period was Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, President Chamorro’s oldest son.
Lacayo himself is her son-in-law.147
Mrs. Chamorro and Lacayo met several Taiwanese officials and businessmen, in particular of the textile/garment sector, encouraging them to invest in Nicaragua. In his meeting with Taiwan’s prime minister, Lacayo recalls that the PM emphasized political stability as an important condition to develop the economy, exemplifying with the stability the KMT had given to Taiwan for 50 years.148
Regarding the investors, the visit apparently brought results. “Some of them ended up believing in Nicaragua,” Lacayo celebrated. A business group bought the Intercontinental Hotel in Managua (a few years later, it even built one of Managua’s shopping malls, Plaza Inter, in front of the hotel) and many other installed factories in a newly-opened EPZ (‘zona franca’).
In his book, the former presidential chief of staff, also comments some details of Lee’s visit in 1994.
“On May 4 [1994], the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Lee Teng Hui came to the country, the first time a president from that country visited us. (…) During his visit, President Lee emphasized all of the time that he saw in Nicaragua a friendly country, and he reiterated his support for Nicaragua. Doña Violeta expressed him our thankfulness for his interest
146 Wang, T.Y. 2003. “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui Rule, 1988-2000.” Pp. 254-256. In Lee, Wei-chin and Wang, T.Y. (editors), “Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era.” University Press of America ®Inc., Lanham, Maryland, USA.
147 Lacayo, Antonio. 2006. Pp. 375-376. “La Difícil Transición Nicaragüense – En el Gobierno con doña Violeta.”
Fundación Uno, Managua.
148 Item.
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125 in our country and she also asked him to persuade Taiwanese businessmen to invest in Nicaragua, to foster the ‘zonas francas’ (EPZs), to develop the tourism infrastructure, etc.” 149
“Doña Violeta” is a popular, colloquial way of calling the former president. It means Mrs. Violeta, using her first name instead of her surname. President Chamorro paid another visit to the island in May 1996.
COOPERATION AND AID
In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian visited Nicaragua for the first time, when the leader of Nicaragua was Arnoldo Aleman. Between 1991 and 2000, the ROC provided substantial aid to the Central American ally: some US$ 288.4 million.
This cooperation took different forms such as donations, low-interest loans, technical (mainly agricultural) assistance, others. It financed agro industrial programs, social welfare plans, disaster relief (for the post-hurricane Mitch relief, for example, in 1998-199), and payments of interest of external debt. 150
The newspaper La Prensa reported that between 1991 and 2000, total Taiwanese donations (non-reimbursable financial aid) reached US$ 36.4 million.151
For post-hurricane Mitch relief, Taiwan provided US$ 63.5 million in donations and other financial aid, according to the local press.152
The Chen’s visited received much attention in the local media. It was not exempted from persistent rumors on a supposed Nicaraguan demand that the ROC approve new funds for US$ 100 million (the press reports did not specified the character of the disbursement) in exchange for continued recognition. The claim was denied officially and the Taiwanese foreign
149 Item., p. 612.
150 Cordoba, Thais M. 2005. “The Significance of Costa Rica in Taiwan’s Diplomacy and the Competition from Beijing.” P. 100. Printed by GENESIS de la Lima, San José, Costa Rica.
151 La Prensa daily. “Diplomacia del dolar replantea relaciones Taiwan-Nicaragua.” August 17, 2000.
http://archivo.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2000/agosto/17/politica/politica-20000817-07.html
152 El Observador Economico magazine. “Disminuye Ayuda Externa para Nicaragua.” June-July 2001.
http://www.elobservadoreconomico.com/archivo_anterior/113/index.html
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126 minister Tien Hung-mao rejected any kind of pressure. (Item.). It should be said that similar rumors have been commonplace along the years.
FUNDS FOR “EL PALACIO MAMON”
FUNDS FOR “EL PALACIO MAMON”