Nanyang Fleet

China‟s the other modernized fleet was the Nanyang fleet. This fleet was established in the 1870s, the fleet suffered big losses in the Sino-French War, escaped intact in the Sino-Japanese War, and was formally abolished in 1909. The main part of the fleet was Southern Fleet. This fleet was based at Shanghai and was the largest of China‟s four regional fleets. The fleet was originally to have had the four steel Rendel gunboats Zhendong, Zhenxi, Zhennan and Zhenbei, completed in 1879. Li Hong Zhang was very impressed from these ships and took them for his famous Beiyang fleet²⁴⁶. Besides these relatively modern gunboats the fleet also included the elderly wooden gunboats.

In July 1884, on the eve of the Sino-French War, the Nanyang fleet was reinforced by the German-built steel cruisers which sailed all the way from Germany in March 1884. During the Sino-French War the commander of the Nanyang fleet was Admiral Li Cheng Mou (李成謀), he had commanded the Fujian fleet and the traditional Yangzte forces. Nanyang fleet remained safely in harbor at Shanghai or Nanking water forces. Part of the Nanyang fleet made a disastrous sortie in February 1885 to try to break the French blockade of Formosa. During the following decade the Nanyang fleet gradually lost its primacy, as Li Hong Zhang invested more in the

245

Lung Chang, 龍章, Yueh-nan yu Chung-fa chan-cheng 越南與中法戰爭, Vietnam and the Sino-French War, Taipei, 1993, p.286.

246 Wright, Richard, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862–1945, London, 2001, pp. 6–43.

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Beiyang Fleet. By 1894, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, the Beiyang Fleet had a comfortable superiority over the Nanyang Fleet both in numbers of ships and quality.

However, the Nanyang fleet continued to have new ships after the Sino-French War, some of were pretty strong and quality²⁴⁷.

3.10 Remarks

These were the most important fleets and armies of Qing China. However, except these units there were many others as modernized army of China. The author just gave the key military units of the modernization period. For the further studies you may research other armies such as; The New Army, Green Standard Army, Xiang Army etc…

After the discussion of military units of China we can now conclude that China had to establish a strong Navy and did it. However, mistakes in managing and controlling the army caused China troubles. Chinese soldiers were not professional enough to deal with the army affairs. China could not achieve to build a navy like Japan. Japan‟s modernization was more professional than China‟s and historians are still discussing the reasons of this. China had face with internal problems and this blocked the way of modernization.²⁴⁸

247 Wright, Richard, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862–1945, London, 2001, pp. 9–67.

248 For a comparative study of China‟s and Japan‟s modernization in mid 19th century please refer to;

Liao Chi Yu‟s thesis, A Comparative Analysis of the Differences Between Chinese and Japanese Modernization in the Mid-Late 19th Century with Particular Regard to the Idea of Rich Nation Strong Army, University of Canterbury, February 2006.

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In this part of the study the author wants to focus on China‟s one of the biggest mistake in the naval development. China‟s internal problems or we can call it “The way of Life in the Cixi‟s Place” gave China very big problems. The author thinks that in this part drawing attention to China‟s some weak points would make the further parts clearer.

The first lesson that China learned in First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) was;

lack of an expenditure of 7.5 million taels of silver on defense before the war cost China 600 million taels of silver after the war. This is one of the most important historical lessons of the First Sino-Japanese War. Monetary loss alone was 80 times the amount that would have been wisely spent on the military before the war. In addition, China had to give away Taiwan to Japan and suffered from various kinds of economic and non-economic losses as a result of the persistent internal instability and foreign wars.²⁴⁹

One another point of view holds that a buildup for a strong navy is enormously costly. In addition, during peacetime, without wars to fight, China had to spend a huge sum to maintain the navy. Furthermore, with constant advancement in science and technology, military technology and weapons equipment require constant updating and replacement as well. This will cost too much and add further financial burden to the country. This is very dangerous thinking. Whoever talks this way does not remember the bitter lessons from the First Sino-Japanese War! As we all know, the defeat in the war caused severe chaos and backwardness in our nation that lasted more than half a century, seriously impeding nation‟s pace of modernization. The key to

249 Wei Li, The Interaction Between Ethnic Relations and State Power: A Structural Impediment to the Industralization of China, 1850-1911, A dissertation Submitted in Prtial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Science, Georgia State University, 2008, pp. 2-273.

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winning that war was to gain the command of the sea. After studying two thousand years of history of naval warfare²⁵⁰.

Alfred Mahan²⁵¹ believed that whoever could control the sea would win the war and change history; that command of the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the seas; that the outcome of decisive naval battles is determined by the strength of fire power on each side of the engagement.

Both inside and outside the Imperial Court, failed to have foresight, all believing it was too expensive to keep a navy. The Ministry of Revenue under Weng Tong Lu ignored the warnings from the Navy, and went on to stop naval spending for two years. Even worse, it appropriated 7.5 million taels of silver out of the naval budget to spend on renovating the Summer Palace for Empress Dowager‟s birthday celebration.

The 7.5 millions taels that had been misused could have been used to upgrade the navy‟s weapons system and bought 280 of the most advanced rapid firing guns.

Nobody not even mention the other 10 million taels of silver the Ministry of Revenue misappropriated for the wasteful “Sanhai Project.”²⁵²

Just before the war, the Northern Fleet planned to spend three hundred and twenty thousand taels of silver to purchase 12 rapid firing guns, but failed to come up with this meager amount of funds. The saddest thing is that the Japanese cruiser, Yoshino, that sank several Chinese ships including Admiral Deng Shi Chang‟s flag

250 This part was quoted from Ni Lei Xiong‟s study. Please see US- China Economic and Security Review Commission‟s web page: http://www.uscc.gov/index.php, for Ni Lei Xiong‟s study please see:

http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated_articles/2005/05_07_18_Sea_Power_and_Chinas_Deve lopment.pdf

251 Alfred Mahan: (September 27, 1840 – December 1, 1914) was a United States Navy flag officer, geostrategist, and educator. Many of his ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world, and helped prompt naval buildups before World War I. His research into naval history led to his most important work, The Influence of Sea power Upon History, 1660–1783, published in 1890.

252 Ni Lexion, Sea Power and China’s Development, The Liberation Daily, 17 April 2005.

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ship, Zhiyuan, was the British made, fastest cruiser with the most powerful rapid firing guns. The cruiser was supposed to be purchased by China. But because of the shortage of funding, the Japanese bought it instead, making it the curse of the Chinese navy, taking Admiral Deng Shi Chang, along with his ships, to the bottom of the Yellow Sea.²⁵³

After the defeat of China, Qing government has paid 230 million taels as indemnity. But China had to borrow money from the British and the French governments to pay for her indemnity, which, including interest, would later amount to 600 million taels of silver in total. In addition, Qing government also lost Taiwan Island to Japan. If the 7.5 million taels of silver were not misused before the war, instead used it to purchase 280 rapid firing guns, then the Northern Fleet would have outnumbered Japan‟s guns by 107; if they used the misused 10 million taels of silver to purchase war ships, then the Japanese cruiser Yoshino could have been a capital ship of the Chinese Northern Fleet. In such a scenario, Qing forces could have won that naval battle, or at least could have shared the command of the sea. Mahan once said, the strength of tactical firepower determined the outcome of a decisive naval battle, which would determine who could have the command of the sea.²⁵⁴

After the battle of the Yellow Sea, most military experts in the world believed that “This naval battle is a classic case study of rapid firing power triumphing over heavy fire power.” Failure to spend 7.5 million taels of silver on defense before the war cost China 600 million taels of silver after the war.

253 Quoted from US-China Economic and Security Review Commission‟s web site please refer to:

http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated_articles/2005/05_07_18_Sea_Power_and_Chinas_Deve lopment.htm They quoted the article from Ni Lexion‟s study on The Liberation Daily, 17 April 2005

254 Ni Lexion, Sea Power and China’s Development, The Liberation Daily, 17 April 2005.

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This is one of the most important historical lessons of the First Sino-Japanese War. Monetary loss alone was 80 times the amount that would have been wisely spent on the military before the war. In addition, China had to give away Taiwan to Japan and suffered from various kinds of economic and non-economic losses as a result of the persistent internal instability and foreign wars. Therefore, in building up China‟s future defense and strong naval forces, we should see farther, free from the bother of

“Enormous” naval expenditure, lest history repeat itself.²⁵⁵

255 This part was quoted from Ni Lei Xiong‟s study. Please see US- China Economic and Security Review Commission‟s web page: http://www.uscc.gov/index.php, for Ni Lei Xiong‟s study please see:

http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated_articles/2005/05_07_18_Sea_Power_and_Chinas_Deve lopment.pdf

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CHAPTER FOUR: Li Hong Zhang and His Role in Self Strengthening Movement

The key figure of the Self-Strengthening period was sure China‟s one of the most important Modern History figure Li Hong Zhang. He and the other leaders as Zen Guo Fan, Zuo Zong Tang etc…, launched the Westernization Movement to introduce techniques of Western capitalist production.²⁵⁶

The key figure in this study is Li Hong Zhang; soldier, statesman, diplomat, and industrialist leader of China. Except Li Hong Zhang the other regional leaders have also very critical roles in China‟s modernization. Especially in the later periods new emerging leaders like Liang Qi Chao etc… will be the milestones for China‟s ideological modernization. ²⁵⁷

The author of this study must point out that grand Middle Kingdom was defeated by a so-called little “Uncivilized” country awakened more Chinese people.

At the coming periods of China many people felt this to be really galling and humiliating. With the efforts of regional leader like Li Hong Zhang people were drawing lessons from this bitter experience against to Western powers²⁵⁸.

256 The author of this study has quoted this part from Wan Xin Sheng‟s online book:

http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/III-13/chapter_iii.htm Chapter 2, Overcoming Nihilism and Modernization of China, for more information please visit the web site of Council for research in Values and Philosophy: http://www.crvp.org/

257 A reference book please see. FOLSOM, Kenneth E, Friends Guests and Collegues- The Mufu System in the Late Qing Period, Rainbow Bridge Book Company, 1968.

258 Quan He Xiu, The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing ChinaExternal Relationship, Modernization and Transitional Phase Northeast Normal University, Journal of Northeast Asian History Volume 5, number 1, June 2008, pp. 21-44. For online version of his study please see:

http://english.historyfoundation.or.kr/Data/Jnah/J5_1_A2.pdf

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The Chinese finally began to realize that Western civilization included not only material civilization, but also political and economic systems, and that the latter were even more important. As a result, such intellectuals as Kang You Wei, Liang Qi Chao and Tan Si Tong (譚嗣同) initiated the Reform Movement of 1898. ²⁵⁹

Li Hong Zhang was best known in the West for his diplomatic negotiation skills with foreign powers. He did many travels abroad and has had very broad understanding Western culture. He developed his skills for political debates with foreign powers. His image in China has a very large area for historical and political scholars. Many historians and politicians have done researches about his period and lifetime. The author of this study says that maybe the most effective person of late Qing period is Li Hong Zhang²⁶⁰.

His importance in modern Chinese history is largely controversial, with most criticizing his lack of political insight and his failure to win a single external military campaign against foreign powers. But praising his role as a pioneer of industrial and military modernization in Late Qing, his diplomatic skills and his internal military campaigns against the Taiping Rebellion and also ended some major rebellions. He was a leading statesman of the late Qing Empire. His time was full of his achievements but after the defeat in First Sino-Japanese War, Li had become a literary symbol for China‟s embarrassments in the late Qing Dynasty. He got many criticisms about the defeat against to Japanese²⁶¹.

259 For a reference book please see: Goldman, Merle, Lee, Leo OU-Fan, An Intellectual History of Modern China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

260 欧阳跃峰(Yue-Feng Ouyang);关成刚(Cheng-Gang Guan);安雪(Xue An), 五邑大學學報(社會科 學版), 10 卷 3 期(2008/08) 頁次 42-45.

261 Quan Hexiu, Study on Choson-China Relations in the 19th Century; Focusing on Li Hongzhang’s Perception of Choson, Seoul: Baeksan Research Press, 2000 Aug, pp. 17–48.

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In this chapter of study the author wants to give objective information about his period. The author thinks that understanding Li Hong Zhang is a key to grab the importance of his efforts for Chinese military and society.