National Social and Political Structures Around Large Dam Construction Prior to the Nujiang Campaign

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eroded and has been replaced by a drawn out on-and off flow of events. For its part, IR has largely decided to divert much of its attention and funds away from active campaigning against the development of dams in Nujiang, though still remaining in contact with many of its local NGO partners. As Nicole Brewer explained, the stalemate does not lend itself to an active role, though IR is prepared to recommence active campaigning given any new developments (Interview Nicole Brewer, 2009).

One way that IRN has been able to stay connected is through establishing China Rivers Project, which promotes eco-tourism and spectacular white-water rafting trips as a way of reaffirming the uniqueness of the local area and exactly what stands to be lost if a large dam is built.

4.1.1. National Social and Political Structures Around Large Dam Construction Prior to the Nujiang Campaign

A review of the domestic context the commencement of IR's Three Gorges campaign to the beginning of its Nujiang campaign is necessary to contextualise IR's contribution to altering the domestic political and social structures around dam developments in China, and to see the drastic changes in both the political and social structures surrounding dam related development in China.

It is evident that at the time of the Three Rivers campaign, weak social structures and a marginalised voice for environmental protection in the large dam issue area prevailed. In the social sphere, a disparate domestic opposition to the project existed, but was fiercely suppressed, as the most prominent local activist Dai Qing discovered following the publication of “Yangtze Yangtze!” (Changjiang Changjiang), a book she edited compiling scientific and social critiques of the Three Gorges project (Heggelund, 2004; 31). Dai Qing's book was useful in raising awareness of the dams impacts, and in particular the huge relocations it would force, but it was banned in 1989 and her movements were vigilantly monitored by the state, until she was arrested and jailed in 1989 (Heggelund 2004; 31). Despite the fact that scientific and academic articles expressing reservations were published locally, they were not represented in the media and marginalised in the policy-making process (Heggelund 2004; 211). Instead, the domestic media's coverage of the Three Gorges

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Dam was almost entirely positive.

Further, the political structure surrounding large dam construction marginalised the participation of environmental protection. Support for the dam came from powerful sources, both institutionally and individually. The Three Gorges Dam involved a number of state actors, newly independent enterprises with close ties to the state and international companies. However, the highest authority existed with the Three Gorges Dam Project Construction Committee; a powerful nineteen member committee initiated by the State Council and which contained Premier Li Peng, and the governors of Sichuan and Hubei province.

SEPA was also involved in this committee, but even if one goes so far to assume it privately opposed the dams development, it was weakened by the presence and voice of so many political heavyweights, in particular the powerful and Machiavellian Premier, Li Peng. This committee tightly controlled the parameters of the debate, employing Maoist techniques such as the use of 'red experts'. As Beattie notes:

To maintain a pro-dam scientific discourse the CCP loaded TGP committees with dam protagonists and barred dissenters. Of some four hundred and twelve experts sitting on the Leading Group for the Assessment of the Three Gorges Project, only one, an enthusiastic Three Gorges Dam supporter, was an engineer ( Beattie, 2002; 146).

Further, important opposition from within the National People's Congress was decisively manipulated by the State Council. During the debates, Huang Shunxing a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC and expert on hydro-electrics tried to make use of the right of interpellation to voice his criticism. At the crucial moment, the microphones were unplugged (Ho 2001; 90).

There is no questioning the ways in which the political structure demonstrated thoroughly non-pluralistic decision making processes and failed to take into account or even properly recognise the environmental impact information that an organisation

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such as SEPA would have been able to provide if given the chance. The political structure was also impermeable to outside normative influences and unresponsive to the voices of INGOs like IR. Further, many of the procedures involved in developing the project and crafting the propaganda necessary to promote the project to China's citizenry occurred at a time of great social tension in China- the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests. Not only had China's civil society not developed to an extent necessary for International Rivers to be able to operate locally, the tense social situation meant that it was exceedingly difficult to establish local contacts that were opposed to the dam and able to work with IR.

Judged harshly, IRN's campaign against the Three Gorges Dam can be thought of as a complete failure. The Three Gorges Dam proposal was approved, with SEPA being largely sidelined in domestic and state discussion, the local media overwhelmingly supporting the state position (or voicing only faint dissent), and the Three Gorges consortium securing the foreign investment necessary to green light the project¹⁸. It was a campaign that, at least in the crucial stages where the project was being approved, occurred before the information technology revolution that made regular transnational contact frequent and immediate. As such it was not easy for IRN to establish any direct contact with disparate local opposition with in Chinese society, such as Dai Qing, nor did it perceivably influence SEPA, whose role in the approval phase of the Three Gorges Dam was conspicuously diffident.

Due to the massive scale of the project, the cost of financing it and necessary technology acquisition, as well as the large number of government bodies involved at both the horizontal and vertical level, the project did need the acquiescence of numerous actors within the Chinese bureaucracy. Opposition for the project did arise from the National People's Congress (NPC) debate on the project, with more than a third of deputies refusing to support the project. The position of a large number of

18 One should also acknowledge the undeveloped state of international norms of the time regarding large dams, and that until the mid 1980s dams were vigorously advocated and funded by the World Bank as a means of providing 'green' energy and flooding control (World Bank 2001) Since its inception in 1985 and spanning its Three Gorges campaign along with dozens of other campaigns throughout five continents, IR was deeply involved in the process of norm contestation and development. This is an unfortunately gradual process that requires many years of work and unquestionably credible evidence to challenge the determination of businesses that are allured by the abundant financial riches promised by large dam projects.

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NPC delegates was especially significant given that until this point the NPC had for the most part functioned as a rubber stamp legislature. (Ross 1998; 50) This suggests a certain level of penetration of the arguments IR raised in opposition to the dam, however due to IR's lack of penetration in Chinese society, it is more likely that scientific technical advice from domestic experts was more influential in this debate.

Hence, it is clear that IR was not able to empower the political structures through a mobilisation of the social structures in its campaign opposing the Three Gorges Dam.

4.1.2. National Domestic Structures Around Large Dam Construction