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Overall Conclusions – Chen’s human rights legacy

4. Human Rights under Chen Shui-bian

4.5. Overall Conclusions – Chen’s human rights legacy

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contribution to the lowering the number of death sentences and executions. Compared to the other two indicators, it is in this area that Chan made the most progress.

Johnson and Zimring, comparing Chen to his South Korean contemporary, Roh Moo Hyun stated:

“Both were born poor, worked as left-leaning lawyers before entering politics, served time in prison for anti-regime activities, became president because other candidates split the conservative vote, and were plagued during their presidencies by scandal, political defections, and low approval ratings. Yet both remained committed to ending executions and, in rhetoric and reality, to abolishing the death penalty.”67

Although Chen could not effect such abolition in law, for the final three years of his presidency, Taiwan recorded zero executions and this is to be commended.

4.5. Overall Conclusions – Chen’s human rights legacy In 2004, Chen stated:

“We have had a long wait for democracy. It has been well over half a century and I’m glad to say we have taken the right path from authoritarianism to democracy and this is a road of no return. This is also a correct path that we have taken. The road to democracy may be winding and is like a river taking many curves, but eventually the river will reach the ocean.”68

The same may be said of human rights development. Human rights and democracy are clearly connected and Taiwan has waited a long time for both. Once the process of human rights development has begun, it must continue. Without these protections in place guaranteed by law, by independent institutions and government commitment, more is needed. Chen spoke at length of his plans to make Taiwan into a human rights state. His election was momentous. The KMT regime had been defeated by an

outsider, a democracy advocate and a human rights campaigner but in eight years,

67 Johnson and Zimring, 2009. p. 203

68 BBC, 2004. Interview: Chen Shui-bian, 2004. BBC News. March 30. [Online] news.bbc.co.uk [Accessed: 15 March 2010]

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human rights action faltered. Policy objectives were highly credible but on an

implementation level, the human rights progress that was expected did not eventuate.

The major stumbling block to much of Chen’s attempts to build his human rights state was a hostile Legislative Yuan. Throughout his entire eight years in office, Chen lacked a majority in the legislature. This, no doubt, impeded his capabilities of implementing his human rights policies particularly in the cases of introducing a human rights law and establishing a NHRC. Partisanship and opposition suspicion of his motives hindered Chen’s ability to pursue his legislative agenda.

Another hurdle, in my opinion, that prevented Chen’s human rights policies being implemented was the shear amount of legislation being put forward. Particularly throughout the first term, the vast quantity of human rights legislation being put forward did not result in any being successful. Competing bodies were throwing around their draft laws and it is hard to see how this did not hinder their chances of successful passage. If the president had directed drafting efforts to be focused in one body, instead of several organs in the Executive Yuan and Presidential Office, perhaps their efforts then could have been concentrated on producing a draft acceptable to the Legislative Yuan.

This brings us aptly on to the next point and that is of Chen’s leadership and commitment to his human rights positions. Various scholars criticize Chen for his position on human rights and contend democratization (and human rights

development) worsened during his time in office. Copper, in a highly critical article, points out that Chen was ‘preoccupied’ with localization and independence and strongly contends: “He made little effort to expand upon the civil and political rights guaranteed and practiced in Taiwan and there was not only little or no progress in this realm but also a significant deterioration in some important areas.”69 These comments certainly give little weight to the policy objectives Chen espoused in his initial years in office. Copper does though concede that Chen’s focus on past human rights abuses, capital punishment and national identity contributed to Taiwan’s democratization.70 Schafferer raises the issue of dissatisfied human rights campaigners, who had strongly supported Chen’s election only to be disappointed and felt that human rights were

69 Copper, 2009. p. 471

70 Copper, 2009. p. 478

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only being given ‘lip-service’ by Chen’s administration.71 Others are more supportive.

Huang indicates that although Chen’s overall master plan did not get the expected results, there were other areas that had greater success.72 He cites bringing NGOs into greater prominence, the passage of legislation in gender equality and indigenous rights and, most successfully, implementing human rights education policies as examples of human rights progress under Chen.

Overall, Chen set himself high targets in improving the human rights situation in Taiwan. Inspired by righting the wrongs of the past and bringing Taiwan up to

international standards (and attempting to gain the support of the global community in the process), Chen’s human rights policy goal, ‘the building of a human rights state’

seemed to be a priority. Despite much initial effort, the desired results were not forthcoming. The reasons as per above contributed to this state of affairs.

Disappointment among those in Taiwan’s human rights community was the result.

Except for the de facto moratorium of the death penalty and gradual improvements towards reducing capital punishment, the expected gains across the three indicators did not follow. The international human rights treaties were not implemented, nor was a human rights commission established. It would be up to the next president to

complete what Chen had failed.

71 Schafferer, 2008. p. 3

72 Huang, 2008a. p. 184

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