During 2000-2003, Beijing has adopted a comparatively lenient approach toward Taiwan as discussed above. China’s goal is focused primarily around economic development and thus maintains domestic social stability.46 For the same reasons, in March 2004, Beijing issued an “internal circular” to the leaders of universities, demanding them to prevent any radical actions of the students against Taiwan
43 “Chinese Spokesman Notes US ‘Stance’ on Taiwan Election” (in Chinese), Zhongguo Xinwen She, March 23, 2004.
44 “Chinese Vice-President Meets Taiwan NPC Deputies, Stresses One-China Policy” (in Chinese), Xinhua News Agency, March 11, 2003.
45 In my visit to Beijing and Shanghai in April-May 2004, although most Chinese scholars worried the current situation across the Taiwan Strait, only one senior Chinese scholar mentioned that China might use force against Taiwan by 2006.
46 A scholar in Nanjing, conversation with author, March 11, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Nanjing, December 8, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Shanghai, December 18, 2003. Meetings notes with eight senior scholars in Beijing and three senior scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
independence.47 In addition, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council cancelled two routine press conferences because Beijing did not want to fuel the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.48
Currently, China faced a stronger dilemma on the cross-Strait relations after President Chen won the second term. On the one hand, China would like to avoid possible military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait for maintaining domestic economic development and social stability as well as facing possible intervention of the United States. On the other hand, the Chen Shui-bian administration might continue to provoke China and thus the Chinese government faces enormous public pressures to do something on the cross-Strait relations. Even worse, long-term increasing hostilities and tensions might end up with a war because of miscalculation and misperception.49
With this dilemma, China will adopt a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i.e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer. On the one hand, China will show more clearly its resolution and credibility to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. China would act as a true tiger, not a paper tiger. On the other hand, China would adopt more measures to show its goodwill to the Taiwanese people, including reflecting the fact of growing Taiwan self-consciousness.50
47 “HK Media: Beijing Activates Emergency Mechanism,” Zhongguo Shibao, March 24, 2004, p. A13.
Willy Lam, “Chen Shui-Bian after the Election: Lame Duck or Phoenix?,” China Brief, Vol. IV, No.
7 (April 1, 2004). Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing, author, April 2004.
48 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, April 2004.
49 Meeting notes with seven senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
50 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May, 2004.
In the short term, because of lack of mutual trust, particular on the issue of Taiwan’s constitutional reforms in 2006, and huge gap of bilateral positions on sovereignty, China would not engage with Taiwan in terms of political dialogues.51 Nevertheless, China would not consider resorting to military means on the cross-Strait relations until Taiwan declares independence, or changes its national name, flag, and redefine its territory in the constitutional reforms in 2006.52
There is still some hope for China to engage with Taiwan after 2005 in terms of political dialogue. Beijing would not like to see further deterioration of cross-Strait relations, which will have negative impacts on domestic stability and economic development.53 If either side across the Strait does not further provoke each other during the second half of 2004, it is possible to break through on cross-Strait relations in 2005.54 In fact, after Taiwan’s election, Beijing has shown its willingness to establish low-level dialogues with Taiwan through important scholars with policy significance or expand future dialogues on cross-Strait direct links to other functional and even political issues.55
During 2000-2003, Beijing did not engage with President Chen for four reasons:
first, Chen Shui-bian won with only 39.3 percent of the total votes cast in the 2000 presidential election, not representing the majority of the Taiwan people; second, the DPP had less than half of the total seats in the legislature and thus the pan-blue camp could exert sufficient pressure on the Chen Shui-bian administration from adopting
51 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
52 Meeting notes with eight senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
53 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
54 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, May 2004.
55 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and one senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
pro-independence policies; third, the pan-blue camp might win the 2004 presidential election and China can wait for the victory of the pan-blue camp for four years; and, finally, Beijing did not want to give President Chen any credit on cross-Strait relations, which would help him re-elected in 2004.56
After the 2004 election, however, the situation in Taiwan might alter China’s approach to engage with Taiwan’s new administration. First, President Chen was re-elected with 50.1 percent of total votes cast, representing the majority of the Taiwan people. Second, Beijing has at least to face the reality that President Chen will remain in power for another four year and the DPP might continue in power for next another four years after President Chen completes his term.
Third, Taiwan consensus between the pan-green camp and the pan-blue camp has been clearly expressed during the campaign. There will be no significant difference on Taiwan’s China policy no matter the pan-green camp or the pan-blue camp is the ruling party in the future.57 Fourth, the pan-blue camp’s constraints on the DPP government will weaken. The pan-blue camp might lose many seats in the next legislative election to be held in the end of 2004 and thus the pan-green camp might dominate the legislature after 2004. Many Chinese scholars were very aware of this political trend in Taiwan.58 Two senior leaders of the DPP estimated that the pan-blue camp might lose 5 percent of their share of total electorate in the December legislative election.59
56 Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004.
57 Meeting notes with s senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Beijing, October 26, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, February 22, 2004.
Meeting notes with three senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
58 Meeting notes with eight senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
59 Notes of the comments made by Wan-ching Yan, Deputy Secretary-general, Strait Exchange Foundation, at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004.
Beijing’s option is either to engage with the Chen Shui-bian administration or to isolate the administration for another four years. In addition to the above rationale, three other concerns might leave Beijing no choice but to engage with Taipei. First, Beijing’s isolation of the Chen Shui-bian administration between 2000 and 2003 has increased the inclination of Taiwan’s public opinion shifting toward Taiwan independence, or at least more pro-Taiwan identity. Second, Beijing would like to negotiate with Taipei over the direct links. Third, the United States might pressure Beijing to engage with Taipei. The last two concerns will be further elaborated in the next two sections.