After the 2004 election, because of the convergence of Taiwan’s public opinion on the Taiwan identity and the possible declining political strength of the pan-blue camp, Beijing would depend less on the pan-blue camp to pressure the Chen Shui-bian administration. Instead, Beijing would rely more on the United States to suppress Taiwan in the future. According to the past experience, Beijing argues that US pressure on Taipei was much more effective than China’s rhetorical attacks and military threats against Taiwan.63
60 See also a senior scholar in Shanghai, conversation with author, November 25, 2002. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Beijing, October 26, 2003.
61 “State Councilor Criticizes ‘Defensive Referendum,’” Xinhua, January 19, 2004.
62 Chun Li, Yu-yan Wang, Li-juan Wang, “Taiwan Advocates Three Links, China Will Cooperate,”
Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], March 6, 2004, p. 7. “China Firmly Opposes Attempt to Separate Taiwan from Motherland: Premier,” Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 2004. See also meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, February 22, 2004. Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
63 Meeting notes with Chinese scholars in Shanghai, October 9, 2002. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with five senior scholars in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
As mentioned above, in December 2003, Beijing appreciated the efforts of President Bush in containing Taiwan’s advocacy of the peace referendum. In fact, Chinese senior officials had heavily pressured the US government several times to suppress Taiwan before President Bush’s public statement.64 In early February 2004, Beijing sent another mission to Washington to urge the United States to take more concrete steps to rein in President Chen. China put pressure on the Bush administration to intervene more decisively to prevent Taiwan from holding the peace referendum on March 20.65
On February 11, Chinese spokesman of Foreign Ministry confirmed that Beijing hoped that the United States could play a more constructive role on the issue of China’s unification.66 On March 23, two days after the election, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing urged the United States to do more for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait (i.e., opposing Taiwan independence) and for the development of relations across the Taiwan Strait (i.e., promoting cross-Strait unification) in a phone conversation with US State Secretary Colin Powell.67 In particular, Beijing wants senior US officials to express their disapproval of Taipei making a radical revision of the Taiwan Constitution.68
Nevertheless, given Beijing’s increasing reliance on the United States to suppress Taipei, the United States will have more leverage to influence China’s
64 Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Shanghai, December 18, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior American official, January 15, 2004.
65 Joseph Kahn, “Beijing Urges Bush to Act to Forestall Taiwan Vote,” New York Times, February 6, 2004, p. A3.
66 Huei-jian Yu, “CCP: Hopes the US Plays a Role in Cross-Strait Unification,” Zhongguo Shibao, March 12, 2004, p. A13.
67 “China Tells United States to Do More for Taiwan Stability,” Agence France Presse, March 23, 2004.
68 Willy Lam, “Chen Shui-Bian after the Election: Lame Duck or Phoenix?,” China Brief, Vol. IV, No. 7 (April 1, 2004).
Taiwan policy. In particular, the cross-Strait policy of the United States is consistently to facilitate cross-Strait dialogue and promote peaceful resolution of cross-Strait disputes, not unification.69 Thus, China has strong suspicion on the role of the United States in the cross-Strait relations in the future.70
Parenthetically, President Chen also proposed a new, more central role for the United States in breaking the stalemate in the cross-Strait relations. “We hope the United States can play a more active, constructive role,” he said, adding that America
“could be a peace bridge, helping facilitate cross-Strait contact, dialogue and consultation.”71 Regardless of its willingness, the United States would play a more important role in cross-Strait relations in the future.
IV. Conclusion
The 2004 presidential election and referendum marked another major political transition in Taiwan, which will definitely have profound implication for future cross-Strait relations. The election has clearly shown that emphasis of Taiwan identity and Taiwan (Republic of China) as an independent country becomes the mainstream of Taiwan’s public opinion. Thereafter, no major political parties or popular politicians in Taiwan would accept the one-China principle and unification in the foreseeable future.
With respect to Taiwan’s China policy, the Chen Shui-bian administration of the
69 Meeting notes with a senior American official, January 15, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior American official, March 10, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior American official, April 7, 2004.
70 Meeting notes with five senior scholars in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
71 Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Chen Touts Peace, Bigger U.S. Role in Region,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2004, p. A12.
second term would uphold the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity.
Based on the DPP principle, President Chen would insist on the four noes and one have-not pledge to maintain the status quo of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty.
Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms would not involve the change of the status quo by means of changing its national name, national flag, and constitutional territory. In addition, for the next term, the major mission of the Chen Shui-bian administration would be “constructing a framework of interaction for peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait with commencing negotiation over direct links and other economic issues as the first step.
In turn, China’s Taiwan policy is still focused primarily around “economic development,” and essentially founded upon two pillars: “utilizing the United States to suppress Taiwan” and “appealing to the Taiwanese public.” Although Beijing had strong suspicion on Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms, there is no urgency or rationale to resort to military action against Taiwan in the near future.
Facing the second term of President Chen, China will adopt a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i.e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer. One the one hand, China will show more clearly its resolution and credibility to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. One the other hand, China would adopt more measures to show its goodwill to the Taiwanese people, including reflecting the fact of growing Taiwan self-consciousness.
Furthermore, Beijing will adopt a “wait and see” approach for the first couple months after the inauguration of President Chen’s second term to observe the credibility and consistency of his China policy. After 2005, China might adopt a more
positive approach to engage with Taiwan if cross-Strait relations do not further deteriorate in the second half of 2004. At least, China would accept negotiation with Taiwan over the direct links and other economic issues without political preconditions.
Overall, in spite of the uncertainties, there is sufficient reason to be optimistic about cross-Strait relations after the 2004 presidential election. Of course, how exactly cross-Strait relations post-2004 presidential election will turn out, has yet to become evident. Perhaps the strongest likelihood is that cross-Strait relations sees a sustained peace and stability, while continuing to be deadlocked in terms of political reconciliation over sovereignty in the next couple years. Hopefully, in the near future, the measures taken by the both sides across the Taiwan Strait since 2000 should help break the prolonged impasse in the cross-Strait negotiation of the direct links and other economic issues.