C
ROSS-S
TRAITR
ELATIONS AFTERT
AIWAN’
S2004 P
RESIDENTIALE
LECTIONCHEN-YUAN TUNG
Assistant Research Fellow Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University
Abstract
This paper analyzes the implication of Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election and peace referendum on the future development of cross-Strait relations. Instead of speculation, this paper provides a framework to objectively analyze both prospects of Taiwan’s China policy and prospects of China’s Taiwan policy, and thus conclude with assessment of cross-Strait relations after Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election. This paper concludes that, in spite of the uncertainties, there is sufficient reason to be optimistic about cross-Strait relations after the 2004 presidential election. The strongest likelihood is that cross-Strait relations sees a sustained peace and stability, while continuing to be deadlocked in terms of political reconciliation over sovereignty in the next couple years. Hopefully, in the near future, the measures taken by the both sides across the Taiwan Strait since 2000 should help break the prolonged impasse in the cross-Strait negotiation of the direct links and other economic issues.
*Prepared for the 33rd Sino-American Conference on Contemporary China, sponsored
I. Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election and Referendum Results
On March 20, 2004, incumbent President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the re-election by less than 30,000 votes. The DPP ticket won with 50.1 percent of the total votes cast, compared with 49.9 percent for the joint ticket of Chairman Lien Chan of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chairman James Soong of the People First Party (PFP).
In addition, the historical peace referendum held alongside the election was automatically invalidated as less than 50 percent of the Taiwanese electorate voted on the two questions. The turnout for the referendum on reinforcing national defense was 45.17 percent; the turnout for the referendum on cross-Strait negotiations was 45.12 percent.
Out of 16,497,746 eligible voters, 7,452,340 citizens collected ballots on the first referendum question, which asked voters whether Taiwan should boost self-defense by purchasing more advanced anti-missile weapons against the 496 missiles deployed by China targeting Taiwan. The question was endorsed by 91.8 percent of valid ballots, while 8.2 percent of valid ballot said “no” to the proposal.
On the second question, 7,444,148 persons voted on whether Taiwan should pursue negotiations with China to build a framework of interaction for peace and stability. The question was supported by 92.1 percent of valid ballots, while 8.0 percent of valid ballots expressed disagreement.
cross-Strait relations? Will the re-election of President Chen start a new era of cross-cross-Strait constructive interaction? Or will the re-election lead to spiral instability and conflicts of cross-Strait relations in the near future? Or will the re-election have no significant impact on current stalemate of cross-Strait relations?
Four years ago, after the 2000 presidential election, many experts on cross-Strait relations said that a crisis was emerging or even imminent in the Taiwan Strait.1
Nevertheless, over the past four years, relations between Taiwan and China were relatively stable, although deadlocked without bilateral dialogue. These experts did not appreciate enough the change of DPP policy toward China after May 1999 as well as the essence of China’s Taiwan policy.
Instead of speculation, this paper provides a framework to objectively analyze both prospects of Taiwan’s China policy and prospects of China’s Taiwan policy, and thus conclude with assessment of cross-Strait relations after Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election. With respect to Taiwan’s China policy, this paper will elaborate major principles of DPP policy toward China over the last four years, and President Chen’s statements on cross-Strait relations during and after the 2004 election. As to China’s Taiwan policy, this paper analyze the essence of China’s Taiwan policy prior to the 2004 election, China’s reaction to the 2004 election, and prospects of China’s Taiwan policy after the election.
I. Interpreting the Election and Referendum Results
1 For instance, see Yu-shan Wu, “May 20 Is Never A Crisis, But After,” Zhongguo Shibao (China
A. Taiwan Consensus on Cross-Strait Relations
Although both pan-green camp (DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union)2 and
pan-blue camp (KMT and PFP) garnered around half of the total votes and divided on many campaign issues, both presidential candidates have shown clear consensus emphasizing Taiwan identity on cross-Strait relations during the presidential election. As a matter of fact, this consensus is reflecting the national identity of the Taiwan people. According to the opinion polls conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, in July 1992, 45.4 percent of interviewees identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, 26.2 percent only Chinese, and 17.3 percent only Taiwanese. In comparison, in December 2003, 43.2 percent of interviewees identified themselves as only Taiwanese, 42.9 percent both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 7.7 percent only Chinese.3
In its resolution regarding Taiwan’s future passed on May 8, 1999, the DPP asserts, “Taiwan [named the Republic of China under its current constitution] is an independent sovereign country. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite. Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic of China. China’s unilateral advocacy of the ‘one-China principle’ and ‘one country, two systems’ is fundamentally inappropriate for Taiwan.”4 That is,
the DPP’s policy is to maintain the status quo of independent sovereign Taiwan, instead of changing it by declaring independence or re-unifying with China. Moreover, on August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian clearly defined cross-Strait
2 During the campaign, Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) explicitly supported incumbent President
Chen Shui-bian. As a result, TSU belonged to the pan-green camp.
3 Ching-hsin Yu, “Some Observations on the 2004 Presidential Election,” presented at the 31st
Taiwan-Japan Conference on Mainland China Issues, Taipei, sponsored by the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, March 26, 2004.
4 Democratic Progressive Party, Nianqing Guojia Guanxin Xianfa [A Young Country, A New
relations as “each country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait, which is description of the status quo, not to change the status quo. Throughout the campaign, President Chen has presented consistently the above position.
In an interview by Zhongguo Shibao (China Times) on December 15, 2003, surprisingly, Legislative Speaker and Director General of the pan-blue camp Wang Jin-pyng said that the pan-blue camp has never opposed President Chen’s definition of relations between Taiwan and China as “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait, nor will it stand against Taiwan independence in the future. He added that the pan-blue camp does not rule out the future option of Taiwan independence for the people of Taiwan. In addition, he stressed that the pan-blue camp will stop insisting on the so-called “1992 consensus” and the notion of “one China, with each side making its own interpretation.”5
One day later, Chairman Lien confirmed Speaker Wang’s position. In an international press conference on December 16, Chairman Lien explicitly dropped his party’s long-standing goal of Taiwan’s eventual unity with China. Chairman Lien emphasized, “We insist on the maintenance of the status quo. We opposed to the idea of so-called immediate independence, and we are also opposed to being labeled reunificationists.”6 In addition, he pointed out that the Republic of China has been an
independent country and the statement of one country on each side across the Taiwan Strait is not disputable at all.7
Furthermore, Chairman Lien explained in another interview in early February
5 Huei-Zhen Jiang, “Wang Jin-Pyng: KMT and PFP Not Oppose Independence and Attract More
Voters of Taiwanization,” Zhongguo Shibao, December 16, 2003.
6 Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan’s Opposition Alters Tack,” Financial Times, December 17, 2003, p. 3. 7 Zhen-zhen Li, “Lien: The Republic of China Sovereignty Independent, No Issues of Unification and
2004, “Beijing’s insistence that Taiwan reaffirm its commitment to a one-China policy before talks is a nonstarter.” He also rejected a “one-country, two systems” approach for Taiwan.8 In mid-March, Chairman Lien reiterated, “The Republic of
China is a sovereign nation. We will never merge, be taken over or united with the People’s Republic of China.”9
B. The Meaning of Referendum Results
During the campaign, President Chen advocated that Taiwan should revise the current constitution or even introduce a new constitution by 2006 through a referendum. The invalidity of the peace referendum shows that if the pan-blue camp boycotts constitutional reforms through a referendum, it will be very difficult to achieve the goal proposed by the DPP. The DPP government needs either to compromise with the pan-blue camp in the convention of constitutional reforms to avoid the boycott of the pan-blue camp or to promote constitutional reforms by reaching consensus through the mechanism of the legislature.10 Of course, this kind of
constitutional reforms will not change the status quo of Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Although the peace referendum was invalidated, the results are still significant for the Chen Shui-bian administration of the next term. It shows that participants had a very high degree of consensus because both questions were endorsed by about 92 percent of valid ballots. Particularly, in the circumstance of the explicit boycott of the pan-blue camp, such a high degree of consensus should reflect the strong support of
8 Mark Magnier and Tyler Marshall, “Opposition Candidate Picks Middle Ground,” Los Angeles
Times, February 8, 2004, p. 4.
9 Allen T. Cheng, “Lien Denounces Military Threats from Beijing,” South China Morning Post,
March 14, 2004, p. 6.
10 Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior
the pan-green supporters on these two questions proposed by the Chen Shui-bian administration. In particular, President Chen would have more confidence to negotiate with the Chinese government over a framework of interaction for peace and stability since his supporters are on his side.
For instance, in the acceptance speech of winning the presidential election in the evening of March 20, 2004, President Chen emphasized that even though the two referendum questions did not legally pass, the government will abide by the overwhelming majorities voiced for “strengthening defense and entering into talks with China based on equality.” “Under the precondition of ensuring Taiwan’s sovereignty, dignity and security, we will immediately initiate a task force to promote a peace and stability framework for cross-Strait relations,” President Chen promised.11
II. Prospects of Taiwan’s China Policy
A. The DPP Principle: Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity
Ever since May 2000, Taiwan’s China policy of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration could be characterized by three pillars, which can be abbreviated as the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity. The first pillar is democracy. In the DPP resolution regarding Taiwan’s future, the status quo of an independent sovereign Taiwan can only be changed through a democratic process with the Taiwanese explicit consent.
The second pillar is peace. Upon taking office, President Chen has consistently
reiterated the position: in accordance with the principles of “goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent peace,” both sides across the Taiwan Strait must mutually promote constructive development in cross-Strait relations. It was based on these premises of reconciliation, cooperation, and peace that President Chen proposed to the Chinese leaders in his inaugural speech: let us jointly deal with the question of a future “one China.”12
In addition, President Chen pledged that during his term in office, as long as China does not hold the intention of using military force against Taiwan: he would not declare independence, he would not change the national title, he would not push forth the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and he would not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. Furthermore, he added, there was no question of abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council. These pledges are what has since come to be known as the so-called “four noes, one have-not” or “five noes.”
Moreover, on December 31, 2000, President Chen pronounced that the integration of bilateral economies, trade, and culture across the Taiwan Strait should be a starting point for gradually building faith and confidence in each other. This, he suggested, could be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.13
Finally, on January 1, 2003, President Chen urged both sides across the Taiwan
12 “President Chen’s 520 Inaugural Speech: Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era
(Excerpt),” Mainland Affairs Council,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/cb0520e.htm , accessed May 7, 2004.
13 “President Chen’s Cross-century Remarks,” Mainland Affairs Council,
Strait to strive towards building a framework of interaction for peace and stability and to make this a primary goal at this stage of cross-Strait development. He stressed consultation and promotion of direct transportation links, as well as exchanges on other relevant economic issues, could constitute a first step forward and set the stage for further economic and cultural interaction.14
The third pillar is prosperity. Since May 2000, to better balance the needs of economic development and national security concerns, the Chen Shui-bian administration has discarded the long held “no haste, be patient” policy and adopted a new policy of “active openness and effective management.” Thereafter, Taiwan has gradually but surely come to relax its regulation on both cross-Strait trade and investment.
With respect to hard figures on cross-Strait trade, for December 2000 only 53.9 percent of trade commodities were permitted as imports from China to Taiwan whereas by September 2003 these figures had jumped to 77.5 percent. Moreover, based on Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)’s estimates, both Taiwan’s exports to China and Taiwan’s imports from China increased by around 30 percent in 2002 and in the first half of 2003. Accordingly, Taiwan’s exports to China accounted for 24.0 percent of Taiwan’s total exports, while Taiwan’s imports from China accounted for 8.3 percent of Taiwan’s total imports. In fact, China has been Taiwan’s largest export market since 2002.
In terms of regulating Taiwan’s investment to China, the Taiwanese government relaxed restrictions on Taiwanese investment in China’s high-tech industry and it also
14 “President Chen’s New Year Day’s Message (excerpt: cross-strait relations),” Mainland Affairs
did away with the investment ceiling of US$ 50 million. Instead, the Taiwanese government established a review commission with clear standards on investment projects of over US$ 20 million. Furthermore, the government has also opened the way for Taiwanese financial firms to establish branches in China. By June 2003, based on Chinese official statistics, Taiwan’s cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in China was US$ 35.2 billion, or 51.7 percent of total Taiwan outward FDI.
Furthermore, Taiwan has put forward a three stage schedule that allows for China’s investment in Taiwan: Taiwan will allow China’s investment in the real estate sector in first stage, in some service industries and the manufacturing industry in the second stage, and in the capital market in the third stage.
Finally, after the revision of the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in October 2003, the Taiwanese government is reviewing and relaxing regulations regarding Taiwan’s investment to China, introducing Chinese technology to Taiwan, cross-Strait financial exchange and taxation issues, expanding mini three links15, China’s investment to Taiwan, and
issuing Chinese business visas to Taiwan.
B. Maintaining the Status Quo and Insisting on Four Noes and One Have-not
Based on the DPP principle, in many occasions during the election campaign, President Chen has reiterated his firm position on maintaining the status quo and insisting on four noes and one have-not. For instance, in his statement on the peace referendum on January 16, 2004, President Chen reiterated, “after I assume this office
15 Since January 2001, the “mini three links” have legalized trade and travel between Taiwan’s
as the 11th President of the Republic of China, I will continue to strive to the fullest to
maintain the status quo .….. Furthermore, on the basis of maintaining the status quo, I will continue the proposed reengineering of our constitution.”16
In early February, President Chen emphasized that, if he was re-elected, he would continue to insist on the principle of “four noes and one have-not” in his second term. He added, “We will certainly continue to maintain the status quo of Taiwan’s sovereignty …… In the coming four years, we do not want to see the status quo unilaterally being changed. We will surely promote constitutional reform on the basis of maintaining the status quo.”17
Couple days later, interviewed by Los Angeles Times, President Chen stressed again his plan to draft a new constitution for Taiwan by 2006 would be conducted “on the basis of the status quo” and would involve a series of internal issues aimed mainly at improving government efficiency. Furthermore, he pledged to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait --- a status quo he defined as including Taiwan as an independent, sovereign country that carries the official name of Republic of China.18
In the presidential debate on February 21, President Chen re-confirmed the above position on constitutional reforms and insistence on the principle of “four noes and one have-not.” Furthermore, he reiterated, “Taiwan is an independent sovereign country, not part of China. Under its current constitution, its national name is the Republic of China. Any change of the status quo must be decided by the people of Taiwan through referendum.”19
16 “Presidential Statement,” Office of the President, Republic of China, January 16, 2004.
17 “President Chen’s Press Conference,” Office of the President, Republic of China, February 3, 2004. 18 Tyler Marshall and Mark Magnier, “Taiwan’s Chen Defends Move on Referendum,” Los Angeles
Times, February 8, 2004, p. 1.
After he won the re-election, President Chen explained to a group of business, executives and human rights activities on March 25, “Our existing constitution is outdated and fails to meet Taiwan’s present situation. We should face up to this reality. The key point of our reform is not aimed at addressing the thorny independence or unification issue. Our top goal is to upgrade government efficiency and national competitiveness.” In addition, he emphasized that the underlying principle of his constitutional reform programs is that Taiwan’s present status quo should not be changed.20
In his interview by the Washington Post on March 29, President Chen reiterated his firm position. He emphasized “Our future efforts at re-engineering our constitution and constitutional reforms will only be done on the principle of not changing the status quo and maintaining the status quo,” adding that “These issues do not have any bearing on the independence or unification issue, nor will the constitutional reform effort violate our ‘five no’s’ commitment and pledge.” To be precise, he stressed, “I believe those articles relating to the territory in our constitution will not be the core of emphasis in our constitutional reform project. I think there is no problem with the content of Article 4 in our constitution. The question lies in how to define it, and interpret it.”21
Although Beijing and Washington speculated that Taiwan’s constitutional reforms would change the status quo, President Chen’s statements and interviews
20 Sofia Wu, “President to Prioritize Taiwan Unification, Stable Cross-Strait Ties,” Central News
Agency, March 25, 2004.
21 “President Chen’s Interview by the Washington Post,” Office of the President, Republic of China,
March 30, 2004. See also N. K. Han and Sofia Wu, “President Chen Reaffirms Commitment to Constitutional Reform,” Central News Agency, March 31, 2004. Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Chen Touts Peace, Bigger U.S. Role in Region,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2004, p. A12.
have tried to do away with this concern. In the second term, President Chen stressed that the goal and mission of the Taiwanese government is to “unify Taiwan and promote stable cross-Strait relations as well as to stabilize our society and reinvigorate our economy. Among which, stabilizing cross-Strait relations is one of our key issues.”22 Even though Taipei, Washington, and Beijing have different definition of
the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, President Chen pledged not to change the status quo per se by means of changing its national name, national flag, and constitutional territory in order to maintain stability of trilateral relations among Taiwan, the United States, and China.23
C. Constructing a Framework of Interaction for Peace and Stability
Based on the DPP principle, the most important mission for President Chen in his second term would be constructing a framework of interaction for peace and stability.24 President Chen’s proposal has long history and policy consistency, not just
an election tactics. In its resolution regarding Taiwan’s future passed on May 8, 1999, the DPP asserts, “Taiwan and China should engage in comprehensive dialogue to seek mutual understanding and economic cooperation. Both sides should build a framework for long-term stability and peace.”25 On November 15, in his white paper
on China policy, presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian called for “building up a stable interaction mechanism” and the establishment of a transitional system for cross-Strait dialogue in order to sign a bilateral peace agreement.26
22 “President Chen’s Interview by the Washington Post,” Office of the President, Republic of China,
March 30, 2004.
23 Meeting notes with senior Taiwanese officials, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior
Taiwanese official, April 19, 2004.
24 Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior
Taiwanese official, April 19, 2004.
25 Democratic Progressive Party, Nianqing Guojia Guanxin Xianfa [A Young Country, A New
Constitution] (Taipei: Democratic Progressive Party, 2003), p. 19.
26 The Campaign Headquarter of Presidential Candidate Chen Shui-bian, “The White Paper of
On January 1, 2003, President Chen proposed for the first time the idea of building “a framework of interaction for peace and stability” across the Taiwan Strait. In the first two decades of the 21st century, he said, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
should begin crafting a common niche for economic development, thereby fostering an environment conducive to long-term cross-Strait engagement. He added, “Consultation and promotion of direct transportation links, as well as exchanges on other relevant economic issues, could constitute a first step forward and set the stage for future economic and cultural interaction. This will enable both sides to work together, abiding by the principle of “democracy, parity, and peace”, in an effort to resolve long-term issues through existing foundations and with increasing confidence.”27
In his statement of proposing the peace referendum on January 16, 2004, President Chen announced the second question advocating Taiwan engage in negotiation with China on the establishment of a framework of interaction for peace and stability. He elaborated that the negotiation would include, among others, such substantive issues as direct transportation links, the protection of the rights and interests of Taiwanese business people in China, and other topics.28
In his international press conference on February 3, President Chen further elaborated main elements of the peace and stability framework. He stated, “After March 20 this year, we will invite Mainland China to appoint its special envoy to meet and to work with our special envoy toward the initiation of cross-Strait
Mainland Policy (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2004), pp. 149-162.
27 “President Chen’s New Year Day’s Message (excerpt: cross-strait relations),” Mainland Affairs
Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/ch9211e.htm, accessed May 7, 2004.
negotiation, in light of the ‘One Principle and the Four Major Issue Areas.’”29
The “One Principle” is to establish the principle of peace, President Chen said, adding that both sides must recognize that maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait is the joint responsibility of both parties and should, therefore, work together to attain the objective of maintaining peace. In particular, he emphasized that both sides should not make unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait area.
The “Four Issue Areas,” meanwhile, are: the establishment of a negotiation mechanism; exchanges based on equality and reciprocity; the establishment of a political relationship; and the prevention of military conflicts. President Chen advocated that both sides should have representatives stationed in Taipei and Beijing to facilitate negotiations. He suggested that expansion of cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation should include economic issues (direct transportation links, tourism, trade and economic cooperation), and cultural, as well as technology exchanges. He pointed out that the political relations across the Taiwan Strait should be based on mutual recognition of jurisdiction (not sovereignty) and non-interference of each other’s diplomatic affairs. Finally, he emphasized that Taiwan and China should prevent military conflicts through confidence-building measures.
As the first step in honoring his campaign promise, President Chen met with Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh on March 25 to thrash out a plan for the establishment of a framework for peace and stability in cross-Strait interaction. In his interview by the Washington Post on March 29, President Chen confirmed his commitment to constructing the peace and stability framework of cross-Strait
interaction.30 On May 6, President Chen reaffirmed his commitment to establishing
the framework by establishing a cross-Strait peaceful development committee and mapping out cross-Strait peacefully development guidelines.31
D. Commencing Direct Links Negotiation
Based on the DPP principle, since the second half of 2003, Taiwan has indicated increased commitment to the negotiation of the direct transportation links. On August 13, President Chen pledged to resume direct links with China by the end of 2004. Two days later, the Taiwanese government issued a policy paper called “The Assessment of the Impact of Direct Cross-Strait Transportation,” which further signaled that the Taiwanese government was preparing for the direct links negotiation.
On October 9, Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan, passed the revisions to the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. According to the revisions, the Taiwanese government will have to draft bylaws concerning the opening of direct cross-Strait transportation links within 18 months. More importantly, government agencies will be able to entrust private organizations to engage in cross-Strait negotiation on their behalf. That is, Taiwan has agreed to China’s preferences for the negotiation channel through private organizations over the direct transportation links.
The second question of the peace referendum focused on the establishment of cross-Strait interaction for peace and stability, in which negotiation over direct links is
30 “President Chen’s Interview by the Washington Post,” Office of the President, Republic of China,
March 30, 2004.
31 Lilian Wu, “President Committed to Establishing Stable Cross-Strait Relations,” Central News
a major issue. Although this referendum question was automatically invalidated as less than 50 percent of the electorate voted on the question, President Chen’s supporters has shown strong consensus in supporting him to conduct negotiation with the Chinese government on this issue.
In the acceptance speech of winning the presidential election in the evening of March 20, 2004, he reiterated his commitment to negotiate with the Chinese government on this issue. Right after the election, President Chen has met with Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh to push for the establishment of the framework of interaction for peace and stability with negotiation of economic issues as the first step. In his interview by the Wall Street Journal on March 31, President Chen reiterated hopes that the two sides across the Taiwan Strait should complete negotiation on the direct links by the end of 2004.32 All of the above mentioned
actions have led to the conclusion that Taipei is willing to negotiate with Beijing over the direct links in the near future.33
III. Prospects of China’s Taiwan Policy
A. One Center and Two Pillars: China’s Taiwan Policy prior to the 2004 Election
Prior to the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, Beijing had hinted several times that if Chen Shui-bian were elected, Beijing might use military force against
32 Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Chen Touts Peace, Bigger U.S. Role in Region,” Wall Street Journal, April
1, 2004, p. A12.
33 Meeting notes with senior Taiwanese officials, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior
Taiwan.34 After the election, however, Beijing did not adopt a harsh response, but instead, followed a low-key and responsive approach of “listen to what he says, and watch what he does.” Then Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Vice Premier Qian Qichen all expressed a stance that China could not afford to use military force against Taiwan, as it could jeopardize China’s economic development.35
Diverging from past practice, China began to implement a series of comparatively lenient policies towards Taiwan. First, after July 2000, China has been seen to take up a more lax definition of the one-China principle. Second, after August 2000, Beijing ceased insisting that the one-China principle be a prerequisite for negotiation of the “three direct links” (direct trade, postal, and transportation links). Third, Beijing began to accept the so-called 1992 consensus, which it objected before 2000, and asserted this consensus as the foundation of resumption of cross-Strait dialogue.36 Fourth, after October 2002, Beijing began to define cross-Strait air and sea
links as “cross-Strait routes.”
Why did China adjust its tactics towards Taiwan? China’s Taiwan policy is focused primarily around “economic development” (one center), with the hope that the Taiwan issue does not delay or undermine the progress of China’s economic development. That is, stability of cross-Strait relations is one of major goals of China’s Taiwan policy. In addition to this, China’s Taiwan policy is essentially founded upon two pillars: “utilizing the United States to suppress Taiwan” and
34 Ming-yi Wang, “Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council: White Paper Is Not an
Ultimatum,” Zhongguo Shibao, February 26, 2000, p. 3. “AFP: PRC FM Spokesman Warns Taiwan on Election Result,” Hong Kong AFP, March 14, 2000. Jing-xiang Lai, “Without ‘Two-State Theory’, There Would Be No White Paper,” Lienho Bao [United Daily], March 16, 2000, p. 3.
35 “Jiang Zemin Proposes 16 Words of Taiwan Policy Guidelines,” Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily],
April 6, 2000, p. 11. Shang-li Xu, “Qian Qichen: Three Links As Soon As Possible; Yeh Ju-lan: Need Equality and Reciprocity,” Zhongguo Shibao, May 27, 2000, p. 1.
36 Chi Su, “Yige Zhongguo Gezi Biaoshu” Gongshi de Shishi [The Historical Fact of “One China,
“appealing to the Taiwanese public.”37
In spite of the apparent leniency, China has not changed four elements of its overall approach towards Taiwan. First, China intentionally ignores the existence of the Republic of China on Taiwan, which continues to be an independent sovereign country as it has been since 1949. Second, China has persisted in and even reinforced its military threats against Taiwan by deploying more missiles (about 500 missiles at the end of 2003) targeting Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait.
Third, China continues to suppress Taiwan’s international space. Not only does China object to Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) but also great effort is made to bar Taiwan from joining regional free trade areas in Asia. In fact, due to China’s opposition, Taiwan received little help from the WHO during the SARS epidemic in spring 2003 and as a result, Taiwan suffered greatly. Moreover, with China’s dominance in forming the Asia-Pacific regional free trade regime, Taiwan is also faced with fears of being marginalized in the regional economic integration.
Fourth, and most importantly, China has declined overtures to negotiate with Taiwan and resolve bilateral disputes peacefully. Based on the Taiwanese official statistics, between May 20, 2000 and March 31, 2004, Taiwanese senior officials urged the Chinese government to resume cross-Strait dialogue 162 times.38
B. China’s Reaction to the 2004 Election
37 Chen-yuan Tung, “The Assessment of China’s Taiwan Policy of the Third Generation and Its
Prospect,” Asian Survey, forthcoming. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, February 22, 2004.
38 “Patience and Goodwill [Naixin yu Shanyi],” Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/891012.htm, accessed May 6, 2004.
Over the past two years, Beijing was increasingly relying on Washington to suppress Taipei. For instance, in his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, US President George W. Bush publicly criticized Taiwan that “the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”39 The Chinese government
applauded President Bush’s statement and asserted their diplomatic efforts a “complete success” by maintaining the one-China principle in the international community.40
During the period of Taiwan’s election campaign, China kept very low profile other than reiterating its existing position on cross-Strait relations because Beijing learned lessons from the previous elections in Taiwan that its intervention could be counter-productive.41 When interviewed by the Taiwanese media in the March 2004
National People’s Congress, Chinese senior military officials did not say anything provocative or threatening to Taiwan. Chinese senior officials in charge of cross-Strait relations chose either silence or reiteration of Chinese existing position. The only thing Beijing clearly opposed during the election was Taiwan’s referendum.42
Couple hours after the election, Beijing made no comments on Taiwan’s election result because the uncertainty of election disputes in Taiwan. Nevertheless, Beijing issued a statement criticizing that the peace referendum went against the will of the 39 Dana Milbank and Glenn Kessler, “President Warns Taiwan on Independence Efforts,” Washington
Post, December 10, 2003, p. A1.
40 John Pomfret, “China Lauds Bush for Comments on Taiwan,” Washington Post, December 12,
2003, p. A44.
41 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing, October 2003. Meeting notes with two
senior Chinese scholars in Beijing, April 2004.
42 Huei-jian Yu, “Avoid Provoking Taiwan’s Election, the CCP Demands Silence,” Zhongguo Shibao,
March 6, 2004. Jun-wei Lian, “Taiwan Election Issue, The Chinese Congresses Keep in Low Profile,” Gongshang Shibao [Commerce Times], March 10, 2004. Ping Liu, “Kuangkai Xiong: PLA Is On Demand,” Zhongguo Shibao, March 11, 2004.
people in Taiwan and was doomed to failure. Three days later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan broke the silence slightly by stressing, “It must be pointed that the election in the Taiwan region is a local election in China. No matter what is the outcome, it cannot change the fact that Taiwan is part of China.”43
Overall, although President Chen was re-elected, from the Chinese perspective (self-justification), China’s policy toward Taiwan was still successful in terms of US non-support to Taiwan independence and the referendum, regarding Taiwan’s election as a local election, and the invalidity of the referendum on March 20. As then Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao emphasized in March 2003, “The international community generally upholds the basic stand of recognizing one China, and the basic pattern and development trend of cross-Strait relations has not changed.”44 That is, China has no
urgency or rationale to resort to military action against Taiwan in the near future.45
C. Prospects of China’s Taiwan policy
During 2000-2003, Beijing has adopted a comparatively lenient approach toward Taiwan as discussed above. China’s goal is focused primarily around economic development and thus maintains domestic social stability.46 For the same reasons, in
March 2004, Beijing issued an “internal circular” to the leaders of universities, demanding them to prevent any radical actions of the students against Taiwan
43 “Chinese Spokesman Notes US ‘Stance’ on Taiwan Election” (in Chinese), Zhongguo Xinwen She,
March 23, 2004.
44 “Chinese Vice-President Meets Taiwan NPC Deputies, Stresses One-China Policy” (in Chinese),
Xinhua News Agency, March 11, 2003.
45 In my visit to Beijing and Shanghai in April-May 2004, although most Chinese scholars worried the
current situation across the Taiwan Strait, only one senior Chinese scholar mentioned that China might use force against Taiwan by 2006.
46 A scholar in Nanjing, conversation with author, March 11, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior
Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Nanjing, December 8, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Shanghai, December 18, 2003. Meetings notes with eight senior scholars in Beijing and three senior scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
independence.47 In addition, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council
cancelled two routine press conferences because Beijing did not want to fuel the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.48
Currently, China faced a stronger dilemma on the cross-Strait relations after President Chen won the second term. On the one hand, China would like to avoid possible military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait for maintaining domestic economic development and social stability as well as facing possible intervention of the United States. On the other hand, the Chen Shui-bian administration might continue to provoke China and thus the Chinese government faces enormous public pressures to do something on the cross-Strait relations. Even worse, long-term increasing hostilities and tensions might end up with a war because of miscalculation and misperception.49
With this dilemma, China will adopt a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i.e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer. On the one hand, China will show more clearly its resolution and credibility to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. China would act as a true tiger, not a paper tiger. On the other hand, China would adopt more measures to show its goodwill to the Taiwanese people, including reflecting the fact of growing Taiwan self-consciousness.50
47 “HK Media: Beijing Activates Emergency Mechanism,” Zhongguo Shibao, March 24, 2004, p. A13.
Willy Lam, “Chen Shui-Bian after the Election: Lame Duck or Phoenix?,” China Brief, Vol. IV, No. 7 (April 1, 2004). Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing, author, April 2004.
48 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai,
April 2004.
49 Meeting notes with seven senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in
Shanghai, April-May 2004.
50 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in
In the short term, because of lack of mutual trust, particular on the issue of Taiwan’s constitutional reforms in 2006, and huge gap of bilateral positions on sovereignty, China would not engage with Taiwan in terms of political dialogues.51
Nevertheless, China would not consider resorting to military means on the cross-Strait relations until Taiwan declares independence, or changes its national name, flag, and redefine its territory in the constitutional reforms in 2006.52
There is still some hope for China to engage with Taiwan after 2005 in terms of political dialogue. Beijing would not like to see further deterioration of cross-Strait relations, which will have negative impacts on domestic stability and economic development.53 If either side across the Strait does not further provoke each other
during the second half of 2004, it is possible to break through on cross-Strait relations in 2005.54 In fact, after Taiwan’s election, Beijing has shown its willingness to
establish low-level dialogues with Taiwan through important scholars with policy significance or expand future dialogues on cross-Strait direct links to other functional and even political issues.55
During 2000-2003, Beijing did not engage with President Chen for four reasons: first, Chen Shui-bian won with only 39.3 percent of the total votes cast in the 2000 presidential election, not representing the majority of the Taiwan people; second, the DPP had less than half of the total seats in the legislature and thus the pan-blue camp could exert sufficient pressure on the Chen Shui-bian administration from adopting
51 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior scholars in Shanghai,
April-May 2004.
52 Meeting notes with eight senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in
Shanghai, April-May 2004.
53 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in
Shanghai, April-May 2004.
54 Meeting notes with a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, May 2004.
55 Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and one senior Chinese scholar in
pro-independence policies; third, the pan-blue camp might win the 2004 presidential election and China can wait for the victory of the pan-blue camp for four years; and, finally, Beijing did not want to give President Chen any credit on cross-Strait relations, which would help him re-elected in 2004.56
After the 2004 election, however, the situation in Taiwan might alter China’s approach to engage with Taiwan’s new administration. First, President Chen was re-elected with 50.1 percent of total votes cast, representing the majority of the Taiwan people. Second, Beijing has at least to face the reality that President Chen will remain in power for another four year and the DPP might continue in power for next another four years after President Chen completes his term.
Third, Taiwan consensus between the pan-green camp and the pan-blue camp has been clearly expressed during the campaign. There will be no significant difference on Taiwan’s China policy no matter the pan-green camp or the pan-blue camp is the ruling party in the future.57 Fourth, the pan-blue camp’s constraints on the
DPP government will weaken. The pan-blue camp might lose many seats in the next legislative election to be held in the end of 2004 and thus the pan-green camp might dominate the legislature after 2004. Many Chinese scholars were very aware of this political trend in Taiwan.58 Two senior leaders of the DPP estimated that the pan-blue
camp might lose 5 percent of their share of total electorate in the December legislative election.59
56 Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004.
57 Meeting notes with s senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar
in Beijing, October 26, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, February 22, 2004. Meeting notes with three senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
58 Meeting notes with eight senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and three senior Chinese scholars in
Shanghai, April-May 2004.
59 Notes of the comments made by Wan-ching Yan, Deputy Secretary-general, Strait Exchange
Foundation, at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, March 26, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior Taiwanese official, March 26, 2004.
Beijing’s option is either to engage with the Chen Shui-bian administration or to isolate the administration for another four years. In addition to the above rationale, three other concerns might leave Beijing no choice but to engage with Taipei. First, Beijing’s isolation of the Chen Shui-bian administration between 2000 and 2003 has increased the inclination of Taiwan’s public opinion shifting toward Taiwan independence, or at least more pro-Taiwan identity. Second, Beijing would like to negotiate with Taipei over the direct links. Third, the United States might pressure Beijing to engage with Taipei. The last two concerns will be further elaborated in the next two sections.
D. Negotiation of Direct links and Other Economic Issues
Ever since June 1995, China has completely disrupted cross-Strait negotiation through bilateral semi-official channels, i.e., Taiwan’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Furthermore, up until now China has continued to insist that Taiwan must accept the one-China principle before resuming SEF-ARATS negotiation.
After August 2000, however, China asserted that establishing the “three direct links” did not mean that the two sides needed to resolve political issues (the one-China principle) first. one-China proposed that this issue be solved through private-to-private, industry-to-industry, and company-to-company channels. In addition, in October 2002, China re-defined cross-Strait air and sea links as “cross-Strait routes,” minimizing the political controversies of the “direct links.” Furthermore, on December 17, 2003, China issued a policy paper on promoting direct links between
Taiwan and China, reiterating its flexible position on the negotiation of the direct links.60
During Taiwan’s election campaign, on January 19, 2004, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan (secretary-general of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group of the Chinese Communist Party) reiterated China’s aspiration to realize the three links and establish an economic cooperation mechanism with Taiwan.61
Moreover, in China’s March 2004 National People’s Congress, Beijing stressed that, no matter who would win Taiwan’s election and would like to negotiate with China over the direct links, Beijing would cooperate and push for direct three links across the Taiwan Strait.62
E. Relying More on the United States
After the 2004 election, because of the convergence of Taiwan’s public opinion on the Taiwan identity and the possible declining political strength of the pan-blue camp, Beijing would depend less on the pan-blue camp to pressure the Chen Shui-bian administration. Instead, Beijing would rely more on the United States to suppress Taiwan in the future. According to the past experience, Beijing argues that US pressure on Taipei was much more effective than China’s rhetorical attacks and military threats against Taiwan.63
60 See also a senior scholar in Shanghai, conversation with author, November 25, 2002. Meeting notes
with a senior Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Beijing, October 26, 2003.
61 “State Councilor Criticizes ‘Defensive Referendum,’” Xinhua, January 19, 2004.
62 Chun Li, Yu-yan Wang, Li-juan Wang, “Taiwan Advocates Three Links, China Will Cooperate,”
Jingji Ribao [Economic Daily], March 6, 2004, p. 7. “China Firmly Opposes Attempt to Separate
Taiwan from Motherland: Premier,” Xinhua News Agency, March 14, 2004. See also meeting notes with a senior Chinese official, February 22, 2004. Meeting notes with two senior Chinese scholars in Beijing and two senior Chinese scholars in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
63 Meeting notes with Chinese scholars in Shanghai, October 9, 2002. Meeting notes with a senior
Chinese official, October 23, 2003. Meeting notes with five senior scholars in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai, April-May 2004.
As mentioned above, in December 2003, Beijing appreciated the efforts of President Bush in containing Taiwan’s advocacy of the peace referendum. In fact, Chinese senior officials had heavily pressured the US government several times to suppress Taiwan before President Bush’s public statement.64 In early February 2004,
Beijing sent another mission to Washington to urge the United States to take more concrete steps to rein in President Chen. China put pressure on the Bush administration to intervene more decisively to prevent Taiwan from holding the peace referendum on March 20.65
On February 11, Chinese spokesman of Foreign Ministry confirmed that Beijing hoped that the United States could play a more constructive role on the issue of China’s unification.66 On March 23, two days after the election, Chinese Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing urged the United States to do more for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait (i.e., opposing Taiwan independence) and for the development of relations across the Taiwan Strait (i.e., promoting cross-Strait unification) in a phone conversation with US State Secretary Colin Powell.67 In particular, Beijing wants
senior US officials to express their disapproval of Taipei making a radical revision of the Taiwan Constitution.68
Nevertheless, given Beijing’s increasing reliance on the United States to suppress Taipei, the United States will have more leverage to influence China’s 64 Meeting notes with a senior scholar in Shanghai, December 18, 2003. Meeting notes with a senior
American official, January 15, 2004.
65 Joseph Kahn, “Beijing Urges Bush to Act to Forestall Taiwan Vote,” New York Times, February 6,
2004, p. A3.
66 Huei-jian Yu, “CCP: Hopes the US Plays a Role in Cross-Strait Unification,” Zhongguo Shibao,
March 12, 2004, p. A13.
67 “China Tells United States to Do More for Taiwan Stability,” Agence France Presse, March 23,
2004.
68 Willy Lam, “Chen Shui-Bian after the Election: Lame Duck or Phoenix?,” China Brief, Vol. IV,
Taiwan policy. In particular, the cross-Strait policy of the United States is consistently to facilitate cross-Strait dialogue and promote peaceful resolution of cross-Strait disputes, not unification.69 Thus, China has strong suspicion on the role of the United
States in the cross-Strait relations in the future.70
Parenthetically, President Chen also proposed a new, more central role for the United States in breaking the stalemate in the cross-Strait relations. “We hope the United States can play a more active, constructive role,” he said, adding that America “could be a peace bridge, helping facilitate cross-Strait contact, dialogue and consultation.”71 Regardless of its willingness, the United States would play a more
important role in cross-Strait relations in the future.
IV. Conclusion
The 2004 presidential election and referendum marked another major political transition in Taiwan, which will definitely have profound implication for future cross-Strait relations. The election has clearly shown that emphasis of Taiwan identity and Taiwan (Republic of China) as an independent country becomes the mainstream of Taiwan’s public opinion. Thereafter, no major political parties or popular politicians in Taiwan would accept the one-China principle and unification in the foreseeable future.
With respect to Taiwan’s China policy, the Chen Shui-bian administration of the
69 Meeting notes with a senior American official, January 15, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior
American official, March 10, 2004. Meeting notes with a senior American official, April 7, 2004.
70 Meeting notes with five senior scholars in Beijing and a senior Chinese scholar in Shanghai,
April-May 2004.
71 Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Chen Touts Peace, Bigger U.S. Role in Region,” Wall Street Journal, April
second term would uphold the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity. Based on the DPP principle, President Chen would insist on the four noes and one have-not pledge to maintain the status quo of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty. Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms would not involve the change of the status quo by means of changing its national name, national flag, and constitutional territory. In addition, for the next term, the major mission of the Chen Shui-bian administration would be “constructing a framework of interaction for peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait with commencing negotiation over direct links and other economic issues as the first step.
In turn, China’s Taiwan policy is still focused primarily around “economic development,” and essentially founded upon two pillars: “utilizing the United States to suppress Taiwan” and “appealing to the Taiwanese public.” Although Beijing had strong suspicion on Taiwan’s future constitutional reforms, there is no urgency or rationale to resort to military action against Taiwan in the near future.
Facing the second term of President Chen, China will adopt a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i.e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer. One the one hand, China will show more clearly its resolution and credibility to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. One the other hand, China would adopt more measures to show its goodwill to the Taiwanese people, including reflecting the fact of growing Taiwan self-consciousness.
Furthermore, Beijing will adopt a “wait and see” approach for the first couple months after the inauguration of President Chen’s second term to observe the credibility and consistency of his China policy. After 2005, China might adopt a more
positive approach to engage with Taiwan if cross-Strait relations do not further deteriorate in the second half of 2004. At least, China would accept negotiation with Taiwan over the direct links and other economic issues without political preconditions.
Overall, in spite of the uncertainties, there is sufficient reason to be optimistic about cross-Strait relations after the 2004 presidential election. Of course, how exactly cross-Strait relations post-2004 presidential election will turn out, has yet to become evident. Perhaps the strongest likelihood is that cross-Strait relations sees a sustained peace and stability, while continuing to be deadlocked in terms of political reconciliation over sovereignty in the next couple years. Hopefully, in the near future, the measures taken by the both sides across the Taiwan Strait since 2000 should help break the prolonged impasse in the cross-Strait negotiation of the direct links and other economic issues.
