Chapter III Development of Civil Society and Democracy in Postwar Taiwan
3.3 Weakening Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation after 2000
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first direct elected president by winning the support of the society.
Democratic consolidation was still processing over the subsequent years. The institutional designs were gradually opening up for the opposition of the government to compete in the frequent election. The democratic development in Taiwan ushered in a new phase when the political earthquake9 of the 2000 presidential election pushed the DPP into power.
3.3 Weakening Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation after 2000
3.3.1 Power transition and democratic consolidation
There was a sign for Taiwan moving towards the path of democratic consolidation when the DPP won the presidential election in 2000 for the first time since the long dominant KMT regime. According to Huntington’s definition of democratic
consolidation, the power transfer in power 2000 and 2008 had passed the
two-turnover test10 as a democratic consolidated country. (Huntington, 1991) The peaceful transition proved that democracy had come and the voters and civil society had become increasingly sophisticated.
This political power transfer signaled the coming of a new phase of state-society relations. (Chu & Diamond, 2001, p.224) The 2000 presidential electoral victory was gained by a strategy of aligning with various social groups. There had been a long
9 In 2000 presidential election, the KMT lost power and ended its undisrupted ruling for the first time since 1947. This stunning defeat of the KMT signified an end of one-party dominance and a great move toward democratic consolidation.
10 Huntington defines that “[t]he party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”. In Huntington, S. P.
(1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (3rd ed.). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. p.267
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existing comradeship between the social protesters and the DPP opposition. In the awakening of democracy, the DPP assumed non-institutionalized tactics, such as street protests to coerce the KMT to adopt political reforms. Social activists
incorporated with the political reformers to form collective actions. (Ho, 2010, p.8) The alliances reinforced each other to challenge the authority and sheltered from being cracked down on by the state. There had been partnership and cooperation mechanisms built between the DPP and social groups to mobilize, broadcast ideology, advocate values, and educate the general public.
According to this kind of comradeship, the change of regime was expected to alter the political arena for social activists and provide more desirable political opportunities for social groups. Not surprisingly, the incumbent DPP opened up a meaningful path of political participation for social movements. It absorbed some of prestigious social activists and knowledgeable scholars into the government as high level officials, executives, or committee members. Despite the new encouraging political opportunity, the overall political environment still constrained to the development of social movements.
3.3.2 Institutionalized participation and political compromise
The institutionalized participation mechanism debased the civil power. When the civil society groups were recruited into the decision-making system, strategic collaboration occurred and critical engagement rendered. The civil social groups negotiated with the state in a more compromised way. As a consequence, it would be overoptimistic to assert a flourished social movements and a more transparent political process for Taiwan’s democratic development.
On the one hand, the power transfer in 2000 provided an access for the social
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groups to participate in the policy-making process. It greatly reduced the chances of seeking for street demonstrations and other mass mobilizations strategies. The institutionalized participating mechanism provided a legitimate procedural for social activists to take part in the policy making process. For example, under the DPP
government, prestigious activists, scholars, and the professionals were invited into the policy making process as consultants, such as on the committee of the Council for Hakka Affairs, the National Human rights, and the Nuclear-free Homeland. (Ho, 2010, pp.13-16) It was undeniably a big success for social groups to gain access that was previously blockaded by the KMT. These incorporated social movement advocators became political insiders to exert their influence on the policy agenda. However, from the perspective of state-society relations, this incorporated mechanism had weakened the power of social movements.
On the other hand, this kind of formalized political process required more compromised attitude toward social reforms. It opened up an inside system channel for multiple appeals to be heard and taken into consideration. Various social issues became closed negotiations and reduced public visibility. More importantly, the procedural participation did not pledge sheer a transformation of effective policy outcomes. Many times, the delicate political calculation involving multiple actors made it harder to sway the policymaking from the inside. Paradoxically, these kinds of institutionalized channels crippled the effectiveness, and caused a new phase of social movement hibernation. (Grano, 2014, p.147)
3.3.3 Shifted political stances of the DPP
The second factor that undermined the power of social movements lied in the DPP’s electoral calculation. Since the electoral victory had become the top priority of the
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DPP, earning support from the business turned out to be a strong gravitation. On the one hand, the DPP and the capitalists had created a patronized relationship. The political contribution and support from the business became an important party income to sustain costly elections; meanwhile the party candidate returned with reciprocal policy designs and coordinated attitudes after winning an election. Wang notes that “after winning the presidency in 2000, following KMT, the DPP continued to push for economic liberalization and also establish its own coalition with business groups, which distanced DPP from several movement groups.” (Wang, 2012, p.165) On the other hand, an inexperienced negotiator like the DPP was even harder to get rid of the shackle of money politics. (Ho, 2005a, p. 343) As a result, the DPP’s pro-business policy attempts had to make compromises in many reform issues and disappointed its old social movement allies.
Furthermore, in exchange for vote mobilization in the future elections, the DPP’s ideology and advocates moderated toward the center of the political spectrum. This shifting of ideology had two obvious impacts. Firstly, it made the DPP take more conservative stands in maintaining status quo rather than promoting social and political reform. This was further strengthened with the economic recession and the social stability imperative. Secondly, its policy designs favored the capitalists and prioritized economic development. (Wang, 2012, p.179) As there were strong conflicted interests and values lying among social groups and the capitalists, this made the DPP even more equivocal in its stance on many other issues, such as the anti-nuclear commitment to the environmentalists, protection for the labor rights, and gender equality. Social activists were disappointed that the DPP failed to meet their expectations and realized the failed promises made during the election. The DPP, which was considered to stand by the capitalists, had drawn shade for the prosperity of multiple values and the goal of social equality.
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The DPP’s weak state capability was another blockade to empower civil society.
On the one hand, while taking a cooperative attitude with the capitalists to pursue economic performance, the DPP had limited governing capabilities. Ho argued that
“the dismal economic performance constrained the DPP’s policy options. To salvage the economy became the avowed number one goal, while other reform issues were put aside”. (Ho, 2005a, p.344) It caused a captured state, which means the state capacity had been weak and controlled by the business sector. On the other hand, in the early years of 2000, the parliamentary majority was still held by the KMT. This left restricted room for multiple social issues to prosper.
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