統一進程的協議與章程區別之探討 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學位學程 National Chengchi University International Doctoral Program in Asia Pacific Studies. (IDAS) Ph.D. Dissertation. 政治大. 指導教授：高永光博士. 立. Advisor: Dr. Yuang-Kuang Kao. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 統一進程的協議與章程區別之探討. Nat. y. sit. n. al. er. io. Possibilities of Peaceful Reunification for Two Koreas: agreement versus by-laws differentiates on unification process. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Dissertation Presented to IDAS 研究生：趙智勳 Doctoral Candidate: Jihoon Cho 中華民國一 ○八年一月二十二日 January, 2019. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(2) TABLE OF CONTENTS. LIST OF FIGURES. iv. ABBREVIATIONS. v. 1. Chapter I. Introduction 1.1. Changes in Korean Peninsula Policy ------------------------------- 6 1.2. Problems Between Countries in Northeast Asia ------------------- 7 1.2.1. International Order. 政治大. 1.3. Security Policy and Existing Policy -------------------------------- 10. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3.1. Security Policy in Korean Peninsula 1.3.2. China’s Policy 1.3.3. Russian Policy. 1.4 North Korea’s Policy and Nuclear Testing ------------------------ 15. ‧. 1.4.1. North Korea’s Missile Development 1.4.2. Problems Among Countries in Northeast Asia 1.4.2.1. US Policy 1.4.2.2. Chinese Policy 1.4.2.3. Russian Policy. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 1.5. United Nations Action --------------------------------------------- 20 1.5.1. United Nations 1.5.2. North Korea’s Response 1.5.3. Sanction Against North Korea 1.5.3.1. US Blockade Policy 1.5.3.2. Chinese Policy 1.5.3.3. Russian Policy. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.6. Policy Impact of North Korea’s Nuclear Test ------------------- 24 1.7. Methodology --------------------------------------------------- 28. 31. Chapter II. Unification Policy of Division 2.1. North Korea’s Territorial Provisions and Facts ---------------- 32 2.1.1. The View of North Korea as an Anti-state Organization 2.1.2. North Korea 2.1.3. Constitution of Unification 2.2. Disputes of Territorial Provisions ------------------------------ 34 i. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(3) 2.2.1. Territorial Provision for North Korea 2.2.2. Necessity of Amendment of Territorial Provisions 2.3. Constitutional Interpretation ---------------------------------- 37 2.3.1. Constitution of the Republic of Korea 2.3.2. Improving Relations with North Korea 2.3.3. North Korea’s Human Rights Problem 2.3.4. Feasibility of Territorial Provisions Chapter III. Unification Policy and the Constitutions of South and North Korea. 41. 3.1. Meaning and Types of the Unification Constitution ------- 41 3.1.1. Unification Constitution 3.1.2. Types of Integrated Constitution 3.1.3. Program of Korean Society. 政治大 3.2. Unification Constitution 立 of North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)45. ‧ 國. 學. 3.2.1. Unified Federation System 3.2.1.1. Meaning of Federal Unification 3.2.1.2.. Type of Union. ‧. 3.2.2. Federal Unification Plan 3.3.3. Low-Level Federalism 3.3.3.1. Meaning of Low-Level Federalism. sit. y. Nat. io. er. 3.3. Unification Policy --------------------------------------------- 51. 3.3.1. The Sunshine Policy (Kim, Dae-Jung, Lee, Myung-Bok, and Moon, Jae-In Government) 3.3.2. Lee, Myung-Bok Government 3.3.3. Moon, Jae-In Government (North Korea Policy). n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 58. Chapter IV. Integration with the Single Constitution 4.1. The beginning of Division and the Process of Integration -58 4.1.1. Yalta Conference 4.1.2. The Collapse of the Berlin Wall 4.1.3. Conclusion of German Reunification Treaty 4.2. Yemen Integration -------------------------------------------- 62 4.2.1. The Path of Regency in North Yemen 4.2.2. Yemen’s Regime Course 4.2.3. Dialogue and Reunification Policy of Yemen 4.2.3.1. Yemeni Negotiations 4.2.3.2. Dispute between North and South Yemen. ii. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(4) 4.2.3.3. Preparation for Unification 4.2.3.4. Republic of Yemen 4.3. Unification Constitution of Vietnam ------------------- 67 4.3.1. Destruction of Vietnam 4.3.2. US Intervention and Establishment of South Vietnamese Government 4.3.2.1. Geneva Conference 4.3.2.2. US Military Intervention and War Expansion 4.3.2.3. Paris Peace Talks 4.3.2.4. Paris Peace Treaty Signed 4.3.3. Demolition of the Allies 4.3.4. Unified System. 76. Chapter V. Conclusions. Bibliography. 立. 政治大. 88. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(5) LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES FIGURE: 19. Figure 1.1 North Korea-China Trade Volumes. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. TABLEs:. 政治大. Nat. 17. sit. y. Table 1.1 Five Nuclear Tests in the Past Decade. n. al. er. io. Table 1.2. Comparative Table of two separated countries and its reunification progress30. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(6) ABBREVIATIONS. ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty APEC. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. CVID. Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Nuclear Dismantlement. DMZ (Vietnam) Demilitarized Zone. 政治大. Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. FTA. Free Trade Area. HEU. Highly Enriched Uranium. JMC. Joint Military Commission. ICCS. International Crisis Management Surveillance. MD. Missile Defense System. NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NLP. National Liberation Front. NPT. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. PRG. People’s Revolutionary Government. PSI. Proliferation Security Initiative. PBEC. Pacific Basin Economic Council. SCAP. Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. TKR. Trans-Korea Railway. TSR. Trans-Siberian Railroad. USFK. United States Forces Korea. VC. Viet Cong. n. sit er. io. Ch. y. Nat. al. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 學. FLOSY. engchi. v. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(7) VNQDD. Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang. WFP. World Food Program. WTO. World Trade Organization. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(8) I. Introduction Reunification of the Korean peninsula has been viewed as an inevitable task of paramount importance to nationhood since the country was first divided into two states along the 38th parallel. The will and determination of the general public for eventual reunification has, however, been waning as generations with first-hand experience have dwindled in the 70 years since that tragic event of national bifurcation. In the aftermath of World War II, Germany, Vietnam, China (Taiwan), and Korea suffered the tragedy of national division based on the interests of neighboring countries and powerful nations in the emergent world order. These divided states all succumbed to political conflict driven. 政治大 hegemons, the USA and USSR 立respectively.. by the differing ideologies of capitalism and socialism which were supported by two world. ‧ 國. 學. My dissertations points out the difficulties for the two Koreas to be unified. Both North and South Korea have constitution stating that the other Korea is a rebel, which it is. ‧. being treated as an enemy. Both North and South Korea are internationally being recognized as a formal country, and each has a seat in the United Nation. They can each. Nat. sit. y. vote on international matters independently. Unlike China and Taiwan situation, only. io. al. er. recognized as a country with a seat in the United Nation.. v. n. This assertion raises several interesting questions. What could be the alternative to. Ch. i n U. the committee system? How are parliamentary committee systems being operated in other. engchi. countries? How can it be decided which committee system is better? These are the kind of questions which will address in this paper. The goal of my research is to devise a model of the legislative process to be incorporated into a new constitution for a unified Korea. Although Korea is currently divided into North and South Korea, this model is not simply idealistic speculation. Since the two leader from North and South Korea signed the Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between the North and South Korea ‘Basic Agreement’ in December, 1991, the movement for reunification has been increasing and some forecast the two Koreas could be reunified within a decade or sooner. Once the two Koreas are unified through negotiation and peaceful means, the constitution is likely to be 1. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(9) distinct from present constitutions. It will be different from the present constitution of South Korea, which is based on the idea of capitalism and democracy found in western countries, or the North Korea, which is based on the idea of communism and the former Soviet constitution. This is in contrast to the case of unified Germany where the Basic Law of West Germany now prevails over all of Germany following unification. Although the unification of the Korean peninsula has been considered as an unquestionable national duty since Korea was first divided into two states, Article 3 of the Constitution of South Korea stipulates that in order for the two countries to be reunified ‘the Republic of Korea shall seek national unification, and shall formulate and carry out. 治政 tendency of constitution for each Korea to lead their people 大to believe that other side is not 立 to be trusted. peaceful unification policy based on the free and democratic basic order’, owing to the. ‧ 國. 學. In spite of the global sentiment for international comity and community in the postCold War era, the Korean Peninsula remains mired in the morass of ideological differences.. ‧. War is still a palpable danger and unification seems a near impossibility despite the. y. Nat. persistent attempts by South Korea to win over North Korea with a policy of engagement.. sit. The geopolitical situation of the Korean Peninsula as a strategic maritime and continental. er. io. location has made it a target of numerous invasions in the past millennia. However, Korea. al. iv n C 1887 treaty with Japan, which was an emergent world power h e n g c h i U at the end of the 19th century. On November 18, 1905, the Korean government was then coerced into signing a treaty n. did not suffer national humiliation at the hands of a foreign power until the signing of the. transferring diplomatic sovereignty to Japan; and, on August 29, 1910 Japan’s end goal was finally fulfilled when the last Korean emperor was compelled to approve and declare the Japanese consolidation of Korea. Total sovereignty had been handed over and Korea became a colony of Japan. However, national identity and pride remained in force as evidenced by many independence movements and acts of resistance as well as the existence in exile of the Interim Government of Korea in Shanghai. In spite of global sentiment for international community in the post-Cold War era, the Korean Peninsula remains mired in the morass of ideological differences. War is still a. 2. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(10) palpable danger and unification seems a near impossibility despite the persistent attempts by South Korea to win over North Korea with a policy of engagement. The Korean Peninsula has been a target of numerous invasions in the past millennia due to its geopolitical location of strategic maritime and continental importance. However, Korea did not suffer humiliation at the hands of a foreign power until the signing of the 1887 treaty with Japan, which was an emergent world power at the end of the 19th century. On November 18, 1905, the Korean government was then coerced into signing a treaty transferring diplomatic sovereignty to Japan: and, on August 29, 1910. Japan’s end goal was finally fulfilled when the last Korean emperor was compelled to approve and declare the Japanese consolidation of Korea. Total sovereignty had handed over and Korea became. 政治大 many independence movements and acts of resistance as well as the existence in exile of 立. a colony of Japan. However, national identity and pride remained in force as evidenced by. the Interim Government of Korea in Shanghai.. ‧ 國. 學. After Japan’s surrender to Allied Forces in 1945 Korea again suffered tragedy when. ‧. it was divided into two states. The peninsula division and war that came after Japanese capitulation in 1945 has been an on-going national tragedy that has effected national. y. Nat. competency and been a great hindrance to the national spirit of the divided Korean people. io. sit. since the dawn of the of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, the two Korea’s of. er. North and South both joined the United Nations on September 17, 1991, as two. al. n. iv n C h atethe the two opposing states finally signed h i U high-level meeting held in n gfifthc inter-Korean independent sovereign countries. After lengthy state-to-state discourse and negotiations,. Seoul on December 13, 1991 the Reconciliation and Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation Treaty. Another significant treaty, the ‘Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’, was also signed with an aim to bring about peninsular peace. These negotiations and treaties resulted in some progress toward reconciliation between the two states with certain business trades and cultural exchanges occurring afterward. Despite some issues and incidents that escalated tensions, many attempts were made to sustain the progress made by the two governments. North Korean initiation of nuclear testing, however, proved to be too provocative and the North and South talks fell into a whirlwind of unpredictability.. 3. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(11) What is needed today is the bringing together of wisdom and concessions from both sides in the effort to overcome the many issues and obstacles confronting the project of reunification. Both sides need to work toward the initiation of new rounds of talks on the “Unification Plan of the Korean Community”. Talks that will maximize points of commonality and minimize the areas of disparity between unification methodologies so that the reunification of the people can be accomplished, bringing lasting peace to the Korean peninsula. However, neither the Republic of Korea policy on the “Unification of the Korean Community” nor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “Unification Policy of the. 政治大. Koryo Confederation” present any proposals for the unification of constitutional law or the contents of a unification constitution as a way to form a unified nation. Therefore, even if. 立. the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). ‧ 國. 學. visualize a unification doctrine the pursues of unification in accordance with either one of the two reunification schemes or a combination of the two reunification schemes into a. lacking.. ‧. reunification plan, adequate realistic measures to cope with this an eventuality are still. y. Nat. sit. The purpose of this study is to compare the processes of unification undertaken by. al. er. io. divided countries and their applications of unification constitutions. The contents of these. n. unification constitutions will be presented as guidelines for the necessity and applicability. Ch. i n U. v. of a unification constitution that accords to the circumstances surrounding unification and. engchi. its direction, such that once unification is realized the stability of the reunified country can be maintained under an effective unification constitution. Starting with Chapter 2, a complete analysis of reunifications between states having differing ideological and political systems has been undertaken. Possible means for unification of the ROK and DPRK are compared and analyzed based on an examination of unification processes of divided countries which have implications as precedents for an effective unification constitution, e.g., the German Basic Law and the Yemeni Unification Constitution. The contents of this paper present alternative analysis and a proposal for peaceful reunification of Korea; that which might be applied cable to the pending of Korean reunification process. 4. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(12) Chapter 2, “Necessity and precedent for the unification of South and North Korea,” starts off with an analysis of North Korea’s post-nuclear-test unification environment and then goes on to discuss the necessity of enacting a unification constitution. The process for reunification in Germany and Yemen are presented, along with Vietnam’s 1975 unification, for their implications to Korean reunification. In Chapter 3, “the enactment of constitutions in South and North Korea and unification policy,” is reviewed. The invalidity under international law of the Korea-Japan. ‘Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty’, had a bearing on these constitutions. After the establishment of the Korean nominating government and the formulation of the. 政治大. constitution as well as the legitimacy of the Korean Empire, I examine the legitimacy of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.. 立. In addition, I discuss the constitutions of both North Korea and South Korea that. ‧ 國. 學. has existed in the process of transition between the two Koreas since constitutional governments were established and constitutional law implemented ended for the two. ‧. Koreas in 1948. In addition, the unification relations clause examines the “unification policy” that was based on the unification clause because it is difficult to accurately predict. y. Nat. er. io. according to the types of unification that will take place.. sit. the unification policy, and I will refer to the enactment of the Unification Constitution. al. n. iv n C The regimes of both North and Southh Korean experienced i U violations of human dignity e n ghavec h. In Chapter 4, The ‘direction of the unification constitution and contents is explored’,. based on subjugation to formal national sovereignty while formalizing and neutralizing the sovereignty of the people.. Therefore, the most important function of a unification. constitution is the realization of dignity for human beings. This is also unification’s penultimate task to be accomplished through the establishment of real national sovereignty and the “general principles of constitutional philosophy” on the basis of the enactment and implementation of a unification constitution, Chapter 5, presents a summary of the findings and conclusions along with suggestions for governing authorities.. 5. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(13) I. The Period from the End of the Empire of Korea to the Beginning of Efforts at Reunification After the Treaty of Korea and eventual consolidation into the Japanese empire, both coercive acts without legitimate authority, Korea came under Japanese colonial rule until 1945. Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allies on August 15th, 1945 following the devastation of two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, meant the end of Japanese colonial rule over Korea. The Allies High Command, however, also issued ‘General Order No. One’ dividing the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel. Since the initial North-South bifurcation imposed upon the Korean people by foreign powers, the. 政治大. two sides have in the midst of extreme hostility exchanged numerous envoys and held political talks aimed at reunification, the end result of which has been separate unification. 立. plans settled on by each party: South Korea has proposed the “Unification Plan of the. ‧. ‧ 國. federal system”.. 學. Korean Community” while the North has insisted on the “Unification plan of the Koryo. The two unification plans share some common ground, but there are still many policy differences. The most important difference between the South Korean “Unification. y. Nat. sit. Plan of the Korean Community” and the North Korean “Unification Plan of the Koryo. al. er. io. Confederation” is that the former advocates regarded as a single nation under a “federal. n. state”, and the latter a confederacy. Two critical points in common are the process of. Ch. i n U. v. unification under the three principles of unification, and the widespread adoption of federalism.. engchi. Today, the Republic of Korea is working to reduce the gaps separation the two countries “unification plans” and gradually maximize similarities between the two countries, and develop the ‘Basic Framework for Reconciliation and Cooperation’ in accordance with the Framework Act on the Peaceful Reunification of the People’s Republic of Korea, and develop the “charter of the national community” into the “Constitution of the Reunification of the Nation”. The “Unification Plan of the Korean Community” starts with the proposition of a Korean Council composed of 100 parliamentarians representing the two sides. The Council. 6. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(14) would make up one of the organizations of the “Inter-Korean Confederation” tasked with drafting a unification constitution. The steps and procedures proposed in the “Unification of the Republic,” however, may not be the only pathway to reunification, which might also follow the route of East Germany in a bloodless collapse or that of Vietnam that achieved unification by means of war. To guard against any violent conflicts and bloodshed, the establishment of a unified constitution is therefore a strongly advised necessity. The purpose of this policy study is to advocate the necessity for enactment of a unification constitution that will be able to unify the nation within the frameworks proposed by both the “Unification Plan of the Korean Community” and the “Unification Plan of the. 政治大 The paper discusses the necessity of enacting a unification constitution fro, two 立 different perspectives of unification: ‘internal necessity of the unification plan’ and the Korean Confederation”.. ‧ 國. 學. ‘external necessity unification need” of the Republic of Korea and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.. ‧. 1.1. Changes in Korean Peninsula Policy. y. Nat. sit. On October 9, 2006, North Korea successfully conducted an underground nuclear. al. er. io. test. In spite of strong warnings from the United Nations and other countries, including the. n. United States, the North had carried out this test, focusing worldwide media attention on. Ch. i n U. v. the two Koreas and rising peninsular tensions. In addition, the sense of national security. engchi. increased more than ever, and had a significant impact on the South Korean economy. Some stipulate that unification is not possible as long as the North keeps their nuclear weapons while others argue that regime collapse in North Korea is a just matter of time because of mounting pressure from the international community. Whether North Korea will alter nuclear weapon production is uncertain. Opposition to pressure from the international community and the challenges posed by the choices around nuclearization have added to continuing instability on the Peninsula as well as increased fluctuations in the situation effecting unification.. 7. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(15) On March 6, 2018, South Korean President Moon, Jae-In met with North Korean Chairman Kim, Jung-Un and officials informed that he was prepared to negotiate the abandonment of his nuclear weapons with the United States. He wanted summit meeting with US President Trump to discuss North Korean denuclearization in exchange for regime security guarantees. Since that time, Kim has regularly promised to denuclearize, including his recent commitment to remove all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula by early 2021. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reported “real progress” after a meeting with Kim in October 2018. Russia and China have since requested that the United Nations Security. 政治大. Council relax the economic sanctions on North Korea because of the “positive developments” in Korea.. 立. But thus far, Kim has been all talk and no real denuclearization. North Korea has. ‧ 國. 學. not surrendered single nuclear weapons, which is the first measure of denuclearization. Instead, last year likely built five to nine nuclear weapons 1 , the exact opposite of. ‧. denuclearization. As long as North Korea is nuclearizing, not denuclearizing, it should not. y. Nat. io. er. 1.2. Problems between Countries in Northeast Asia. sit. be rewarded.. al. 1.2.1. International Order. n. iv n C The new international order that h ehasn formed i Uthe post-Cold War is still not g c hafter. clear. However, it is evident that international society is currently trending toward. universal values of liberal democracy and the market economy, indicating growing consensus for a relaxation of political and military confrontation in favor of reconciliation and cooperation. The characteristics of the international order after the dismantling of the East-West Cold War structure are summarized in the following paragraphs. First, the multipolarity of the international order and an increase in international interdependence is taking on prominence. The United States enjoys a hegemonic position. 1. “US Intelligence: North Korea May Already be Annually Accruing Enough Fissile Material for 12 Nuclear Weapons” The Diplomat. August 09, 2017 8. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(16) in all aspects of the military, economy, and information, but is not able to arbitrarily lead the world order and requires the cooperation of China, Japan, the European Union and Russia. In this respect, the current international order can be considered a ‘uni-multipolar system’. Second, after the Cold War, the era of ideological warfare has been transformed into an era of fierce competition among countries, even among old allies, for their own national interests. The global trend of seeking out one’s own interests has led many countries to form regional economic blocks and has intensified with the organization of many different economic blocks on various continents. In 1995, the World Trade. 政治大. Organization (WTO) was created and new rounds of global economic agreements and treaties were held to discuss the new order of the world economy. In Europe, most western. 立. European countries joined and signed onto the European Union, a single mass economic. ‧ 國. 學. block in Europe. EU expansion among Eastern European countries is being pushed. In East Asia, China and Japan agreed to a Free Trade Area (FTA) along with the Association. ‧. of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).. Third, the world is moving toward integration and reconciliation. The international. y. Nat. sit. order, which had in the past been more oppressive and monolithic, is becoming further. er. io. diversified and open. Disputes, however, are increasing at the regional level. In the context of uncertain regional security, NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, and the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, shows that military cooperation and joint-training. engchi. among regional countries is on the rise.. Fourth, the voice of the UN has gained in influence and authority with its efforts at peace and welfare for the international community being globally recognized. The expanding role of the United Nations has not stopped at being a peacemaker in international disputes, but also expanded to the creation of universal norms on disarmament, development, environmental concerns, human rights, and fighting the proliferation of global drug and crime networks. In the post-Cold War era, the new changes to the international order do not automatically guarantee the peace and stability of the international community. The ‘New. 9. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(17) World Order’ has yet to clearly emerge and the post-cold war situation remains rather fluid and uncertain as compared to that of the Cold War era, which was determined by two superpowers. However, it is clear that the major trend of international society today has been changing away from ‘Social Democracy’ and ‘Social Market Economy’ as being the universal values of humankind with the collapse of communism. In order to make good use of these trends, the two Koreas should develop reconciliation and cooperation as the means to create a favorable situation for the unification of the nation. The situation for Northeast Asia is basically that of an unstable condition that has not completely cast off the remnants of the Cold War. While the United States continues. 政治大. to play a leading role, the balance of power in relations among the great powers of Northeast Asia is fluid: Russian influence has been falling while that of Japan and China. 立. has been rising. Whereas Japan and China could not effectively exercise their influence. ‧ 國. 學. during the Cold War under a world order dominated by the hegemons of the US and USSR, they are now actively trying to expand their political and military influence in the process. ‧. of forming a new international order in Northeast Asia. Such movements are in conflict with Russian interests in the region. In addition, even if Japan and China maintain. sit. y. Nat. cooperative relations, the geopolitical situation is likely to result with a threat to Japan. In the end, in the Northeast Asia region, the interests of the great powers are mutually opposed,. io. er. and such is the politics of the region. This situation promotes military instability. For. al. n. iv n C up the missile defense system (MD)h, e and the Proliferation n g c h i U Security Initiative (PSI). The example, The United States has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty (June, 2002) and built 2. strengthening of a strategic partnership between Korea and Russia is also evidence of the instable political situation.. Some factors contributing to regional instability in Northeast Asia as well as problems associated with great power dynamics in the region are as follows: (i) the North Korean nuclear issue in relation to regional territorial interests among China and North and South Korea which includes the issue of China-Taiwan relations amid Chinese territorial claims on Taiwan; (ii) since World War II, Northeast Asia has experienced the world’s fastest economic growth, but suffered from the “East Asian Economic Crisis” in the late 2. The United States increased its budget for MD from $7.4 billion in 2003 to $9.1 billion in 2004. 10. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(18) 1990s, alluding to problems of instability and social issues within the various countries; and, (iii) Northeast Asia is continuing a military build-up due to factors such as the emergence of conflicts among nations and increased economic power enhancing the ability to augment armaments. In conclusion, an important change in the regional situation of the Northeast Asia situation in past post-Cold War decades has been the rise of Chinese power, strengthened bonds between US and Japan, and the reemergence of Russia as a power player in the region through a stabilization of domestic politics and economic growth. Such changes in the situation in Northeast Asia will have a influence on South Korea’s internal and external. 政治大. policies and will play an important role in the unification environment on the Korean peninsula.. 立. 1.3. Security Policy and Existing Policy. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3.1. Security Policy in Korean Peninsula. ‧. The US policy on the Korean Peninsula basically focuses on restraining the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula and maintaining stability in the forward. sit. y. Nat. deployment of its forces. It has been pursued based on the Korean-US alliance system and advanced deployment strategy. Post-Cold War US policy has remained consistent while. io. n. al. er. seeking out alternative positions.. Ch. i n U. v. First, the Bush administration emphasized the ROK-US alliance and considered the. engchi. South’s role in the Northeast Asia region 3 to be crucial. A stronger partnership was developed and the principle of peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through the six-party talks reaffirmed. Second, the United States has promoted an expanded role by the United States Forces Korea (USFK) instead of a strict status quo for a considerable period of time. After the Sept. 11, 2001 (9.11) terrorist attacks, the Bush administration sought to reorganize USFK as part of an overall overseas troop deployment restructuring aimed at the. 3. President Bush attended the Busan APEC meeting (Nov. 2005). The joint statement of the ROK-US alliance and the Korean Peninsula to develop a mutually beneficial alliance, and decided to regularize ministeriallevel power dialogue (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). 11. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(19) implementation of a preemptive attack doctrine for the combatting of new security threats4, including terrorism. This reallocation of US troops was part of a military restructuring focused on improving rapid response capabilities for cost optimization rather than a reduced role for intervention in Korean security. Third, the United States is pursuing a policy of ‘denuclearization combined with a ‘nuclear umbrella’ for the Korean peninsula. The United States advocates a “denuclearization policy” that prevents both the North and South from possessing nuclear weapons as well as nuclear reprocessing facilities, while at the same time seeking “extended deterrence” policies by providing a nuclear umbrella for South Korea.. 政治大 quo in that it strives to preserve its influence on the Korean Peninsula without sacrificing 立 its vested interests. The US policy on the Korean Peninsula is basically one of maintaining the status. ‧ 國. 學. The Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea has been transformed into a. ‧. hard line stance governed by strict reciprocity. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, US-DPRK entered a tense phase when the United States designated the North Korean. sit. y. Nat. regime as part of an axis of evil,.. al. er. io. In October 2002, when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited North. n. Korea, high government officials admitted that the regime had been developing highly. Ch. i n U. v. enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear weapons at locations other than the frozen ‘Yongbyon’. engchi. nuclear facility. As a result US relations with North Korea worsened to a near all-time low. The Bush administration had deep concerns about North Korea’s potential to export nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorist organizations or third countries, which posed a direct threat to US national security. Recognizing the North Korean nuclear issue as a threat to the international order, the US demanded North Korea undertake a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear dismantlement (CVID).5. 4. A part if this organization, the USFK also moved to the southern part of the Han River in the 2nd Division. By 2008, the USFK reduced 12,500 US troops and transferred the Yongsan US military bases to Pyeonhtaek. 5 This was the 1991 declaration of the denuclearization of North and South Korea, as well as the IAEA nuclear safety agreement (NPT). 12. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(20) The second phase of the fourth round of the six-party talks, held from 13-19 September, 2005, resulted in the 9.19 Joint Statement for the Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue. The first phase of the fifth round of six-party talks was held immediately before the APEC Busan meeting, where each country exchanged opinions through bilateral talks. At the plenary meeting, some productive measures, such as a roadmap for preparation, agreement on senior-level talks for each stage, and the Joint Statement were announced. However, substantial progress has not been made due to differences on pragmatic steps surrounding the abandonment of North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the provision of light water reactors.. 政治大. Meanwhile, the United States passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in October 2004, continued efforts as the "Promotion of Democracy," and appointed in. 立. August 2005 a special envoy for human rights in North Korea. The US also applied. ‧ 國. 學. increasing pressure for imposing financial sanctions on North Korea. However, despite the many difficulties, it had not been possible to exclude the possibility that the road map for. ‧. implementing the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks would be prepared during the period from 2008 to 2013, after Kim Jong-Un took power, thus providing a mechanism for. sit. y. Nat. the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime.. al. er. io. In China, the official statement from the Kim-Xi summit did not mention six-party. n. talks, likely in light of American skepticism over the framework. Efforts to revive the talks. Ch. i n U. v. would probably begin only after the U.S.-North summit June 12, 2018.6 1.3.2. China’s Policy. engchi. China's policy on the Korean Peninsula has been inseparable from its ambitions for becoming the dominant power in Northeast Asia. Korean policy related to China’s hegemonic ambitions include: (i) stability of the Korean Peninsula; (ii) strengthening economic exchanges and cooperation with the two Koreas; (iii) expanding its influence on the Korean peninsula; and, (vi) creating an advantageous security environment through the provision of assistance to North Korea. China seeks the maintenance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula through peaceful resolution by means of a balanced approach to the 6. “Kim Jung-Un offers to return to six-party talks,” Asian Review. April 05, 2018. 13. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(21) adjustment of inter-Korean relations that eases tensions and improves relations. In this regard, China is expected to pursue the below mentioned policies. China recognizes Northeast Asia as the region of most importance to its economic growth and has been pushing a diplomatic policy of security. From this perspective, the stability of inter-Korean relations is essential. Therefore, China emphasizes its 'friendship cooperation' with North Korea, while also advocating “reciprocal cooperation” with the Republic of Korea. China is taking this two-pronged approach in an attempt to stabilize inter-Korean relations and has made it a basis for stability on the Korean Peninsula. China's influence on the Korean peninsula will serve as a foundation promoting the realization of. 政治大. higher tier diplomatic goals in its role in Northeast Asia and the broader international community.. However, this approach may lead to an increase of tensions with Japan,. 立. Russia and the U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. China's policy toward North Korea reveals the inevitability of some strategic changes no matter how slight even while it seeks the continuation of its existing peninsular. ‧. policy. Its relationship with the North will be the most likely to change. Therefore, flexibility in North Korea-China relations will be unavoidable within the framework of. y. Nat. sit. current Chinese policy on the Korean peninsula. This implies that the proportion of mutual. al. er. io. benefits will increase versus asymmetric preferences on the North Korea and China. n. relationship. Qualitative change to the Kim Family’ power will be inevitable, and the range. Ch. i n U. v. of change will increase as the influence of the Xi government of China grows.. engchi. Finally, the 2005 visit by President Hu Jintao to Pyongyang, various summits between the two countries, and China's economic cooperation with North Korea, has been a process directed toward the reinforcement of friendly relations. However, this process is redefined as a ‘new relationship’ based on economic cooperation; and, the national interests of the past will likely move in the direction of gradual adjustment. 1.3.3. Russian Policy Russia's policy on the Korean peninsula has been to maintain peace and stability. It is being pursued mainly with the goal of seeking benefits through economic exchanges. 14. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(22) with South Korea , restoring influence with North Korea, and solidifying its influence in the Korean peninsula. (i) Russia is supporting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in order to create a peaceful environment for domestic political stability and economic development with South Korea. As a result, Russia recognizes that peaceful confrontation in the form of direct dialogue between the two Koreas is imperative and urges inter-Korean dialogue, while at the same time promoting a policy of openness on the Korean peninsula by inducing North Korea to open up. (ii) Russia is engaged in economic exchanges in order to attract Korean capital and. 政治大 South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) and Russian President Vladimir 立 Putin during attendance at the 60th anniversary ceremony of Victory Day (WWII) and an. promote economic development in Siberia and the Far East. The 2005 meetings between. ‧ 國. 學. APEC summit helped cement closer relations between the two countries. From these two meetings, the two nations agreed to promote cooperation in areas such as energy, natural. ‧. resources, space, science, technology and culture. Russia, at that same time, expected to expand its role as a mediator in the North Korean nuclear issue, including participation in. y. Nat. sit. the six-party talks, by means of a balanced approach to both the North and South, as well. al. er. io. as accelerating economic exchanges for joint development of gas and oil fields in the. n. Siberian far east, and the linking up of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) with the TransKorea Railway (TKR).. 7. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. On November 30, 2018 a, South Korean train rolled across the heavily militarized frontier into North Korea for the first time in a decade, as Seoul pushed ahead with a plan to reconnect the two railway networks despite heavy U.N. sanctions. But the project cannot go beyond the role of symbolic gestures and become a reality unless sanctions are lifted. Nevertheless, with talks between the US and North Korea stalling, the government in Seoul is keen to show progress in its own peace process with Pyongyang.. 7. Putin had visited North Korea to restore relations with North Korea in July 2000, the first top Russian leader visit to North, and issued a North Korea-Russian Joint Statement. In exchange, Kim Jong-il visited Moscow and the Russian Far East in August, 2001. and August, 2002. respectively, and the two sides kept up mutual visits and friendly cooperative relations. 15. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(23) (iii) Russia has been attempting the restoration of its past influence over Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. Normalization of relations between North and South Korea falls within the purview of this ambition. Russia's balanced policy approach toward the North and South aims at increasing its diplomatic power among the two countries and the Pacific region in general. Russian security interests have also been strengthened by this shift in policy emphasis, along with the trend toward future maintenance of the North Korean system. Changes to the situation can be expected in accordance with developments in the relationship between South Korea and Russia. 1.4. North Korea’s Policy and Nuclear Testing. 政治大 North Korea announced its nuclear test plans in a statement from the Ministry of 立 Foreign Affairs on Oct 3, 2006. International public opinion deteriorated further as a result 1.4.1. North Korea’s Missile Development. ‧ 國. 學. of a North Korean missile test launch. Therefore, the UN Security Council adopted a statement urging them to abandon its nuclear test plans (June 06, 2006) and urged North. ‧. Korea to comply with all the provisions of Security Resolution 1695. North Korea, however, insisted on its right to conduct a nuclear test because of the threat from US nuclear. y. Nat. sit. capabilities and international sanctions. North Korea demanded the following while at the. al. er. io. same time advancing toward its nuclear test: (I) "No preemptive use of nuclear weapons,. n. no threats from nuclear weapons and no transfers of nuclear weapons "; and, (II). Ch. i n U. v. denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the elimination of all nuclear threats on the Korean peninsula.”. engchi. At 10:35 am on October 10, 2006, an artificial seismic vibration of a near equivalency to a TNT 0.4 to 0.8kt explosion was detected in the Punggyori area of Gilju North Gyeongsangbuk-do. The official announcement released by the North Korean government stated that "an underground nuclear test was successfully conducted and there was no radioactive leak," (Oct 10, 2006). Meanwhile, the US National Intelligence Service (NSC) had confirmed North Korea's nuclear test (Oct. 2006) as a fact in spite of the controversy surrounding its success.. 16. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(24) North Korea, which regards nuclear development as the best means of maintaining its regime, has expected to gain international recognition from the status of being a "nuclear weapons state," and has been insistent on its right to nuclear weapons. Such recognition would strengthen its claims of disarmament talks as having the status of nuclear weapons states, demonstrate the ability of Kim Jong Il regime to maintain its regime, and demonstrate Kim Jong Il's position as the national leader in the country.. Table 1.1 Five Nuclear Tests in the Past Decade. 政治大. • The U.S. pushed to block all exports of military equipment to North Korea.. 立. Oct. '06. ‧ 國. ‧. • The U.S. moved missile deferse equipment and nuclear-capable stealth bombers closer to North Korea.. sit. n. al. er. • After the Jan. nuclear test, Congress passed a law empowering the administration to sanction those who trade with N. Korea. In Sep. Obama pushed the UN to toughen sanctions and ban other countries from importing North Korean coal.. io. Jan. '16 Sep. '16. y. Nat. Feb. '13. 學. May '09. • President Barack Obama called the test a "grave threat," but officials said this was a diplomatic, not military, matter.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: The Washington Post. 1.4.2. Problems Among Countries in Northeast Asia 1.4.2.1. US Policy After the announcement of North Korea's nuclear test, US President George W. Bush declared it a “threat to world peace and security,” emphasizing that the United States "will continue to pursue diplomatic solutions without the intention to invade North Korea, (September 10, 2006),” and urged the Security Council to respond promptly.. 17. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(25) US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on October 10, 2006, declared North Korea's announcement of a nuclear test as an attempt to make “a political claim to secure status as a nuclear-weapon state,” and affirmed that the US government would not accept North Korea’s request of direct dialogue. Meanwhile, the US Ambassador to the United Nations at the time, John R. Bolton, submitted a draft resolution on sanctions to the Security Council shortly after President Bush's statement on North Korea, stating, "North Korea needs to know about US military options being left on the table, but President Bush remains in a position to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically and peacefully.". 政治大 people consider it as a sacred national goal and historically each and every administration 立 has had a distinctive policy in it with special name. For United States, however, it is an Actually, pursuing unification is not a new task at all for South Korea. Most of its. ‧ 國. 學. entirely new goal. Of course, as an ally the U.S. has been supportive of South Korea’s pursuit of unification and helped South Koreans to promote it diplomatically in many. ‧. international arenas, but never set unification of the Korean Peninsula as its own foreign or security policy goal.. sit. y. Nat. io. al. er. 1.4.2.2. China Policy. n. After the first missile launch, China warned North Korea repeatedly not to conduct. Ch. i n U. v. any further nuclear weapons related tests, but the North’s disregard of China’s warning. engchi. with another missile launch disappointed and shocked its longtime ally. China eventually issued a rare rebuke through its Foreign Ministry with a statement criticizing North Korea for ignoring the general opposition of the international community, (Oct 10, 2006), and stressing that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and opposition to nuclear proliferation are firm tenets of the Chinese government’s policy. Concerned about the possibility of a North Korean collapse, China urged the DPRK to return to six-party talks as a means to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation, and strongly affirmed its opposition to taking military action as a punishment for North Korea's October 10, 2006 nuclear test.. 18. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(26) Meanwhile, Chinese President Hu Jintao and President Roh Moo-Hyun agreed to a resumption of six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue during a summit meeting.8 China is expected to further strengthen its role on the North Korean nuclear issue by pushing for the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement on North Korea and pushing resumption the "Six-Party Talks" to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. China’s position on the North Korean nuclear issue shows its recognition of the problem as a balance of power matter in Northeast Asia and its resolve in terms of global strategy not to be dragged along by US-led pressure against North Korea, and, moreover, that it. 政治大. considers the North Korean nuclear issue to be a factor for its national development and international influence.. 立. China is North Korea’s most important trading partner and main source of food and. ‧ 國. 學. energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-Un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an. ‧. influx of refugees across their 870-mile border. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and ongoing missile launches have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has continued to. y. Nat. sit. advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, and the multilateral framework aimed. al. er. io. at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top North Korean officials since its young leader. n. came to power and the assassination of Kim Jong-Nam, Kim Jong-Un’s exiled half-brother,. Ch. i n U. v. in Malaysia also spurred concern from China about the stability and direction of North. engchi. Korean leadership. China’s policies have done little to deter its neighbor’s nuclear ambitions. In recent years, despite Beijing’s displeasure at Kim Jung-Un’s unwavering nuclear ambition, connections between China and North Korea have grown. China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for more than 90% percent of North Kore’s total trade volume. In 2017, Chinese imports from North Korea actually fell by 16.7 percent, though exports were up by 20.9 percent. Despite announced trade. 8. On October 13, 2006, the two leaders said they support the UN Security Council to take appropriate countermeasures. 19. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(27) restrictions in textiles, seafood, and oil products, there are reports of North Korean businesses still in operation in China.. Figure 1.1 North Korea-China Trade Volumes 8 7. 6.54 6.01. 政治大. 4. 1.02. 1.38. 2.79 2.68. 1.97. 1.7. 1.58. ‧. ‧ 國. 2. 0. 3.47. 立. 3. 6.06. 學. Trade in Billions (USD). 5. 1. 5.71. 5.63. 6. 6.86. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016. y. Nat. io. sit. Source: Bilateral trade between North Korea and China has steadily increased. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTA). n. al. er. 1.4.2.3. Russian Policy. Ch. i n U. v. When North Korea announced on Oct. 3, 2006 its nuclear test plan, the Russian. engchi. foreign ministry stated that “the military tension in the Korean peninsula and its surroundings will get worse and exacerbate the political situation and affect the international nonproliferation regime.” The Russian ministry also urged Pyongyang to refrain from undertaking any nuclear tests thus, when North Korea actually conducted a nuclear test on Oct. 10, 2006, the Russian government accused it of seriously undermining its efforts on nuclear nonproliferation, but emphasized that the use of force and UN sanctions should be ruled out. The Russian government, which advocated pragmatism, delivered 12,000 tons of grain to North Korea as part of the World Food Program (WFP) (Oct 11, 2006) and said there was no other reasonable alternative to the six-party talks.. 20. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(28) Russia supports dual-track negotiations—one aimed at denuclearization and a parallel process that would formally end the Korean War and establish a peace treaty. Russia’s unique position as a state with relations with both the South and North Korea (a policy position sometimes referred to as “equidistance”) renders it a mutually trusted party in the context of inter-Korean diplomacy. Since the South Korea is trying to lead the dialogue on North Kore sanctions and a peace process for the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, in both South Korean and U.S. skeptical criticism continues over the Moon administration’s foreign policy. The Moon administration’s recent New Northern Initiative is observing such options. South Korea. 政治大. and Russia have already shared aspirations of economic cooperation in nine crucial sectors through summit and high-level talks. The Korean Peninsula now stands in a decisive. 立. moment in its peace process.. ‧ 國. 學. 1.5. United Nations Action 1.5.1. United Nations. ‧. When the North announced that it had successfully conducted an underground. y. Nat. nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting on October. sit. 10, 2006 to discuss countermeasures against North Korea's nuclear test. At the meeting,. er. io. the United States presented UN Charter 7 as a comprehensive use of sanctions against. al. n. iv n C China, agreed with the economic sanctions the North, h e nagainst i U but leery of regime collapse h c g in North Korea, demanded a pledge to exclude the possibility of military action expressed North Korea and Japan in support suggested even stronger sanctions against North Korea.. in Article 42, and the implementation of UN charter 79, only include Article 4110 which expresses resolution through diplomacy. While Russia criticized North Korea's nuclear test, it did not go so far as to demand sanctions. Under such circumstances, the 15 members of the UN Security Council on October 14, 2006 stipulated that North Korea's nuclear test was a threat to the international Chapter VII stipulates “threat to peace, destruction of peace, and acts of invasion" and takes necessary measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. 10 The non-military enforcement measures pursuant to Article 41 include economic relations and transport via rail, sea, air, post, parcel, wireless communication and other means of transportation. Termination of all or part of means for communication means and a discontinuation of diplomatic relations. 9. 21. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(29) community and unanimously adopted “Resolution 1718” to penalize North Korea on the basis of diplomatic measures through economic and commercial sanctions. The resolution consists of a full text having 17 articles. North Korea's nuclear test is described as a challenge to international efforts to implement the NPT and a clear threat to international peace and security. It also stated that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons country. Provisions concerning demands made to the DPRK are in paragraphs from 1 to 711 and urge all member states to report to the Security Council on measures taken to effectively implement the provisions within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution. 政治大 and specify the duties of said committee. The Sanctions Committee consisted of 5 立 permanent members of the security council and 10 non-permanent members; and,. (Article 11), organize a committee with members of the UN security council (Article 12)12,. ‧ 國. 學. exercised comprehensive authority over the carrying out of sanctions. It also demanded North Korea’s non-conditional return to the six-party talks (Article 14).. ‧. 1.5.2. North Korea's Response. y. Nat. sit. Before adoption of the UN resolution North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a. al. er. io. statement stating, "if the United States continues to put pressure on us, we will regard it as. n. a declaration of war and take physical countermeasures in response" (Oct. 11, 2006).. Ch. i n U. v. Korean state media also declared denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to be a long-. engchi. standing goal of Kim Il Sung and the ultimate goal of the North Korean people.. 11. The contents of the provisions on requirements for North Korea (paragraphs 1 to 7) - Condemns North Korean nuclear test and calls for stop on additional nuclear tests and suspension of ballistic missile launches. -Urges to return to NPT and IAEA safeguards - Suspension of all activities related to ballistic missile programs - Dispose of all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irrevocable manner. - Dispose of other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irrevocable manner. All Member States 12 The committee shall review the implementation of the sanctions by all member nations and report on the implementation situation and measures to enhance the effectiveness of Article 8 at least every 90 days. - Determining whether to exclude specific items related to weapons and luxury items. - Designation of individuals and organizations to freeze nuclear-related assets. - Discussing concrete measures for North Korean cargo inspections at sea. 22. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(30) North Korea’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Park Gil-Yeon, made official remarks rejecting the UN Security Council’s resolution that had been unanimously adopted by its members and stated in his speech to the UN that “North Korea considers the resolution to be a declaration of war against North Korea and will fight it with physical countermeasures.” In addition, a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry also issued a statement saying that the UN Security Council's decision to sanction North Korea was viewed as a declaration of war against the people of North Korea (October, 17 2006.)13 1.5.3. Sanctions Against North Korea 1.5.3.1. US Blockade Policy. 政治大 Security Council resolutions. This was premised on US concerns that stopping the nuclear 立 development of so-called "rogue nations," such as Iran and Syria, would increase in. The Bush administration initiated a "blockade and isolation" policy based on UN. ‧ 國. 學. difficulty if North Korea was allowed to possess nuclear weapons.. ‧. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, before embarking on a planned trip to Northeast Asia as part of the international coordination of the North Korea issue remarked. sit. y. Nat. in a State Department press conference on October 16, 2006, that UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea marked a new international standard banning all imports. io. er. and exports of diffusion-related substances to North Korea. At the Foreign Ministers'. al. n. iv n C participation h while e n gthechigh-level h i U US State Department officials. Meeting (Oct 19, 2006), the US demanded South Korean expansion of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). raised questions on various projects, such as Kumgang tourism and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex project. 1.5.3.2. China Policy China’s Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, stated that the resolution represents “a balanced and constructive message” and described the UN Security Council resolution as a decisive and appropriate response, while reiterating China’s position on the. 13. He emphasized North Korea’s adherence to the principle of "denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiation" and that North Korea will" monitor closely the directions of United States actions" and take appropriate measures accordingly. 23. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(31) six-party talks as being a pragmatic means of resolving the issue. China, which is not a participant in the US-led PSI, was expected to sanctions the North on its own initiative as opposed to following along with the US-led North Korean sanctions regime. China made assurances of stricter controls on Chinese cargo vessels, but opposed direct searches of North Korean ocean freight. In response to the Security Council resolution, the expansion of private trade was suspended. Chinese officials began inspecting trucks bound for North Korea more closely.14 Questions have arisen to whether China would enforce the sanctions regime on air and sea trade, and Beijing said it would not stop North Korea-bound ships for the purpose of conducting inspections for illegal. 政治大 China was expected to take steps to gradually reduce or halt the economic 立 assistance it provided to North Korea. However, China, which does not want North Korea weapons and missiles.. ‧ 國. 學. to collapse, did not participate in a full economic blockade of North Korea. From the Chinese point of view, North Korea violated their bilateral treaty which stipulates that. ‧. “important issues between the two countries should be discussed and agreed in advance;” and, as a result, China imposed sanctions of a diplomatic nature and assured that military. y. Nat. sit. assistance to Pyongyang would be halted until North Korea had abandoned its nuclear. er. io. weapons. While taking on its new positions China resolved to actively work on resolution. al. of the North Korean nuclear issue through a return to the six-party talks.15. n. iv n C China’s punitive steps have been h esomewhat i U though. For example, China n g c hrestrained. backed UN Resolution 2375 in September 2017 only after some of the measures in a draft version were dropped, including an oil embargo and authorization to use force when ships do not comply with mandated inspections. 1.5.3.3. Russian Policy. 14 15. “China Reverses Its Refusal to Search N. Korean Cargo,” Los Angeles Times. October 17, 2006 Tang Jiaxuan, who was dispatched to Pyongyang as a special envoy by President Hu Jintao, held talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il (October 19, 2006), persuading North Korea to abandon its second nuclear test plan and return to the six-party talks. 24. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(32) The Russian government referred to the unanimously adopted UN Security Council resolution (October 14, 2006) as "unbiased and balanced" in its aim to restrain North Korean development of nuclear weapons, but did not agree to the use of military measures. Russia, for its part, persuaded North Korea to return to the NPT and the six-party talks and to halt additional nuclear tests. Russia actively pursued diplomatic efforts to alleviate the crisis through close cooperation with neighboring countries such as China.16 Russia was expected to take action to the extent that it did not provoke the North, but if North Korea conducted additional nuclear tests, it would insist on the need for a more rigorous nuclear nonproliferation regime. Russia advocated the use of diplomatic means to. 政治大. resolve the crisis, the assurance of security for the weaker countries through the rule of law on the international stage, and non-discriminatory access to civilian nuclear technology.. 立. Russia and North Korea have a nuanced relationship. However, North Korean still. ‧ 國. 學. needs Russian support. In February, 2018 Russia began sending home many of the 100,000 North Korean laborers who work in Russia and provide a vital source of hard foreign. ‧. currency for Kim Jung-Un’s regime. It has been suggested that Russia has assisted North Korea to get around international sanctions on fuel. Russia too, has a geopolitical reason. y. Nat. sit. to pursue relations with North Korea as; it provides a buffer between Russia and US-Nato. n. al. 1.6. Policy Impact of North Korea’s Nuclear Test. Ch. engchi. er. io. forces stationed in South Korea.. i n U. v. North Korea’s nuclear test was a great shock to South Korea. Amidst criticism that the government’s North Korea policy had been unilateral without any reciprocal relations, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration had consistently pursued the government’s sunshine policy and could not help feeling embarrassed and shocked at the North’s nuclear provocation. The government immediately issued a statement (Oct. 9, 2006), saying that North Korea's nuclear test was “a required crucial steps for stabilization and peace on Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean peninsula ” and “to resolve the nuclear issue. 16. Alekseyev, who visited Pyongyang, said, "North Korea said it did not intend to abandon the six-party talks after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution" (October 15, 2006), and expressed careful optimism on the resumption of the six-way talks. 25. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(33) peacefully” and “the North’s actions trampled the expectations of the international community” as an “unacceptable, provocative act”. Above all, the South Korean government made clear that it would no longer “ignore” or “be misled” by North Korea and would seek the abolishment of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, saying that it “cannot tolerate North Korean nuclear weapons.” In this regard, we should pay special attention to avoid confusing interpretations of our government policies within the government. The UN Security Council's resolution on sanctions against North Korea indicates that the imposition of sanctions aims at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in a. 政治大 given for rethinking whether or not sanctions correspond faithfully to this aim, and, 立 moreover, any interpretation that the implementation of the sanctions resolution on North. peaceful way by inducing the North to return to the six-party talks. No quarter should be. ‧ 國. 學. Korea has been undertaken to increase the anxiety on the Korean peninsula rather than lead to a peaceful solution, must be vigorously rejected.. ‧. The South Korean government’s decisive action against the threat was based on a. sit. y. Nat. solid alliance with the U.S. The ROK fulfilled its commitments while also gaining public support for the enforcement of the policy against the North in accordance with Resolution. io. er. 1718 of the United Nations Security Council and other matters determined by the Sanctions. al. n. iv n C countries, including the United States, well as existing h eas n g c h i Utransactions between South and Committee. This should be reviewed as active cooperation with the PSI participating. North Korea, to see if they are violating Resolution 1718. It was of course necessary to be on alert to various possibilities and take corresponding measures to prevent deterioration. of the situation due to accidental events during the sanctions period, but this was to be done separately from the implementation of the UN resolution. Once North Korea had expressed its willingness to return to the six-party talks, the South came to expect peaceful resolution to the North's nuclear issue. Based on the weak economic situation in North Korea, expectations that the nuclear crisis would be prolonged were alleviated, though this was due more to hope than fact. If the sanctions phase of the United Nations were prolonged, measures to prevent the negative. 26. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(34) effects on the situation in Northeast Asia should also be considered. This is because of the limits it places on the existence of North Korea, which has not been supplied as much as it needs. Therefore, even in such a difficult situation, preparation for unification must proceed. In the first scenario of reform and gradual convergence, North Korea is assumed to follow a development path similar to China in gradually implementing market-oriented economic reform and opening to the world economy. This optimistic scenario then incorporates Korean unification. It is assumed that there are fiscal transfers from South Korea to North Korea that are gradually increased by up 1.5 per cent of South Korea’s GDP or 60 per cent of North Korea’s GDP per year.. 政治大 Korean peninsula. Both South Korea and the United States say they share the goal of 立 forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear arms, and the Trump administration says there. The second scenario assumes that North Korea complete denuclearization of the. ‧ 國. 學. will be no reduction in pressure on Pyongyang until it has completely denuclearized. Any economic relations between the two Koreas are limited by the imposition of sanctions.. ‧. The joint statement resulting from the Singapore summit led to post-summit. sit. y. Nat. confusion. The statement lists three action items: First, both sides will “Build a lasting and stable peace regime” (i.e., an agreement to formally end the Korean War, followed by a. er. io. peace treaty); second, North Korea “commits to work toward complete denuclearization of. al. n. iv n C Korea. Both sides, however, interpreted h ethendocument g c h i inUdifferent way. But there has since the Korean Peninsula”; finally, the recovery of American military remains from North. been a surprising peace initiative, with three inter-Korean summits and a June meeting in. Singapore between Trump and Kim. The U.S. and North Korea are presently working on plans for a second such summit. 1.7. Methodology Today, the Republic of Korea will reduce the gap between the two countries in the same way as the “unification plan” and gradually maximize the differences between the two countries, and develop the “Basic Framework for Reconciliation and Cooperation” in accordance with the Framework Act the Peaceful Reunification of the Democratic People’s. 27. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(35) Republic of Korea, and develop the “charter of the national community” into the “Constitution of the Reunification of the Nation” When we look at the process of applying Germany's long planned basic law after reunification, we can tell that the unification method or process of Yemen and Vietnam were ill prepared and adequate. This can be presumed to be the result of a defeat of justice, along with a defect of legal stability in a unified country. Therefore, we can see that there must be a lot of studies on the unified constitution in preparation for unification of the Korean Peninsula in the future. In this sense, the contents of the Constitution of the Korean Peninsula Unification Constitution are summarized as follows.. 政治大 Korean Community” and the “Unification Plan of the Koryo Federal System” and seek a 立 realistic unification plan. Today, the Republic of Korea and North Korea are able to First, we need to maximize the common point between the “Unification Plan of the. ‧ 國. 學. recognize the commonalities and differences of their unification policies. In other words, the Republic of Korea's “Unification Plan for the Korean Community” and North Korea's. ‧. “Unification Policy for the Koryo Federal System” have considerable similarities. The Republic of Korea and North Korea should expand the common points of the Republic of. y. Nat. sit. Korea's “Unification Plan of the Korean Community” and North Korea's “Unification Plan. er. io. of the Koryo Federal System,” and minimize the differences between the two plans based. al. on this common denominator.. n. iv n C The Republic of Korea and North work together to find a consensus h e nKorea hi U g cshould. to neutralize the differences between the two unification measures by seeking a third compromise plan, rather than giving up their claims. The first norm of this work is the ideological value of nationalism and the second norm is the real value of peace settlement. The Republic of Korea and North Korea should collect all wisdom and wisdom to eliminate the difference between the two schemes. Second, we should prepare a draft of the Constitution of Unification of the two Koreas. To prepare this draft, the decision maker synthesizes opinions of experts from various groups and experts and collects opinions of the general public. From a national point of view, the two Koreas should carefully examine the Unification Constitution.. 28. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(36) The main contents of this draft of the Unification Constitution are summarized as “Absorption - type Unification Constitution” and “Peaceful Consensus - type Unification Constitution”. At this time, the contents of the “Absorption-type Unification Constitution” were mentioned as being applicable to the “Peaceful Consensus-type Unification Constitution.” The following section sums up to the above discussion by developing several hypotheses to categorize and evaluate a constitutional of reunification law in terms of the interaction between the democracy and efficiency aspects of the communist. If a unification law turns out to be good both in the South and North Korea can be peaceful reunification together.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Below is a comparison chart of all Two nations after separated? Nations/ Aspects. North Korea. South Korea. Unified by law. No. Yes. Negotiated. No. Sunshine Policy. agreement. 29. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.

(37) Mighty Power. Independent, Nuclear. Alliance. backing. (China Alliance). (U.S. Alliance). Political. Authoritarian. Democracy. Dispute level. International. International. Dispute resolution. International. International. Isolation and nuclear build-up. Changing policy reacting to. level Strategy. incidents Independently. United Nation. N.D.. Options for. 立I.D.. actions. Independently. 治政 N.X. 大 N.D. I.X.. I.D.. N.X. I.X.. ‧ 國. 學. Table 1.2. Comparative Table of two separated countries and its reunification progress. N.D. = National Level and Endogenous; N.X. = National Level and Exogenous. I.D. = International Level and Endogenous; I.X. = International Level and Exogenous.. ‧. It is clear that the national task and ultimate goal facing our nation today is. y. Nat. sit. unification, not the legalization of division. Therefore, we should carefully consider the. al. er. io. issue of “peace” and “unification” with countries that want to ensure peace on the Korean. n. peninsula by giving full consideration to external circumstances and domestic. Ch. i n U. v. circumstances. We cannot introduce unlimited foreign taxes for peace, and we cannot. engchi. sacrifice unification, nor can we achieve peace by excluding foreign taxes for unification. The wisdom of the people and the base of the people that can ideally harmonize peace and unification are desperately needed more than ever.. 30. DOI:10.6814/DIS.NCCU.IDAS.002.2019.A07.