The Foreign Policy of the Abe
Cabinet and Its Implication on the
Asia-Pacific Situation
Szu-shen Ho
Professor, Department of Japanese Language, Literature and Culture; Director, Preparatory Office for International College; Director, Center for Japan Studies, Fu Jen Catholic University
Abstract
After the LDP won the general election for the House of Repre-sentatives on December 16, 2013, Shinzo Abe became the first Prime Minister to “return to the plate” in postwar Japan. He faces both do-mestic and diplomatic problems left by the former ruling party, the DPJ. Domestically, Abe faces challenges for his decision to enter the TPP negotiations. Diplomatically, Abe returns to a pro-U.S. diplomatic policy and echoes President Obama’s policy of a rebalance towards Asia. This is to win the support from the U.S. on the Diaoyutai Islands dispute and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Nevertheless, President Obama’s rebalance toward Asia is not a policy intended to contain China, but one to shape a security environment favorable for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, and Abe may have misinterpreted Obama’s strategic objectives. Therefore, this paper will analyze Abe’s foreign policy orientation and discuss its impact on the Asia-Pacific situation.
Keywords: Sino-Japanese Relations, U.S.-Japanese Relations,
Re-balance toward Asia, Pivot to Asia, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
I. Introduction
The 46thGeneral Election for the House of the Representatives
was held on December 16, 2012, and the results are known. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had been a ruling party for the first thirty-eight years of postwar Japan, has successfully retaken political power for the second time; it once again forms a coalition government with the New Komeito Party. Shinzo Abe has become the first Prime Minister returning to the “plate” after the implementation of the new constitution after WWII. Although the coalition government does not surprise the world, Prime Minister Abe will face great cha-llenges as the former ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), left behind some hard domestic and diplomatic problems that arose over the past three years and four months, especially the worst Sino-Japanese relations since 1972. This paper will analyze Abe’s foreign policy orientation and discuss its impact on the Asia-Pacific situation.
II. Prime Minister Abe’s “China-countering Joint-Alliance
Formed with U.S.”
On February 21, 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe started his trip to the U.S. The objectives of this trip were to repair the damaged U.S.-Japanese relations from when the DPJ was in power and to rebuild the trust between the two countries. Abe expressed in a news conference held before he left for the U.S. that he wished to highlight that the damaged U.S.-Japan alliance will be restored to a stable con-dition through the U.S.-Japan summit meeting.1On February 23, Abe
and U.S. President Barrack Obama had a summit meeting at the
〈安倍啟程訪美欲恢復穩固的同盟關係〉,《共同網》(Kyodo News), February 21, 2013, <http://tchina.kyodonews.jp/news/2013/02/47156.html>.
White House; they had dialogue on various issues, such as the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), North Korea nuclear
crisis, and the Diaoyutai Islands dispute, in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.
With concrete action, Prime Minister Abe has shown the U.S. his determination that “Japan is back,” which indicates not only the DPJ’s “pro-China and away from U.S.” policy has come to an end, but also highlights his different diplomatic thinking. As a matter of fact, the “Abe diplomacy” has tried to connect with the “Koizumi diplomacy.” The only difference is that Prime Minister Junichiro Ko-izumi enhanced Japan’s security role in the U.S-Japan alliance through the “War on Terror” launched by U.S. President George W. Bush., whereas Prime Minister Abe echoes President Obama’s strategic “re-balance” toward Asia to enhance Japan’s security role in the expanded U.S.-Japan alliance, which is designed to link the strategic partners of the U.S., such as South Korea, Australia, and India. It is to construct Japan as a “normal country” and to keep Japan in a key position in the “rebalance” strategy of the U.S.
Abe’s trip to the U.S. caught attention as Sino-Japanese relations have been deteriorating and the North Korea crisis has been rising. It was evident that Abe has sent Japan’s sincerity to the U.S., and he wished to gain the support from the U.S. in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. He emphasized that the Diaoyutai Islands are indisputably Japanese territory; he described China as an intruder that keeps laun-ching sovereignty-protecting actions after Japan “nationalized” the Diaoyutai Islands. Abe’s actions are intended to win support from the U.S. for his “military forces managing” policies and to relieve worries of some American experts who think Japan is becoming Rightist by comprehensively modifying its contemporary historical concept after the issue of the “Miyazawa Conversation,”2 “Kono
Conversation,”3 and “Murayama Conversation.”4 China’s Xinhua
News Agency thinks Abe’s trip to the U.S. is a “journey of force borrowing.”5Sankei Shimbun pointed out that Abe’s trip is a concrete
action to counter China.6
Although Abe needs support from the U.S. for his implementation of a “normal country” and his diplomacy with China, President Obama’s “rebalance toward Asia” also needs support from Japan. Vice Dean Jin Canrong（金燦榮）of the College of International Relations at Renmin University of China expressed in an interview with Global Times（環球日報）that the U.S. expects Japan to make
In 1982, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa, regarding the history textbook, issued a statement that the Japanese Government would responsibly correct the content of the textbook. After issuing the “Miyazawa Conversation,” it was added to the Japanese textbook certification standard that “the consideration about history reality and international understanding and cooperation has to be made when dealing with history fact that involves in the surrounding countries.” In December 1991, the Japanese Government conducted an investigation regarding the “comfort women issue” in World War II. On August 4, 1993, the Chief Cabinet Secretary (then) Yohei Kono, according to the released investigation result, issued a statement admitting Japanese forces had established institutions to manage and recruit comfort women during WWII. He expressed apology and reflection upon this matter.
On August 15, 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued a statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII, admitting Japan’s past wrong national policies, which pushed Japan onto the path of war, and ex-pressing deep reflections and sincere apology for Japan’s colonial ruling and invasion.
〈日 本 要“ 回 ” 到 何 處？〉, 《 新 華 網 》 (Xinhuanet) , February 23, 2013, <http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-02/23/ c_114776799.htm>.
〈 安 倍 首 相 訪 米 対 中 抑 止 具 体 的 行 動 〉, 《 産 経 新 聞 》(Sankei
Shimbun), February 21, 2013, <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/print/130221/
concessions on issues, such as TPP and U.S. Forces stationed in Okinawa, but Abe has not made any specific promises; on the other hand, Japan expects reassurance on the Diaoyutai Islands dispute and support from the U.S. for issues like a constitutional amendment and transforming the self-defense force into a “national defense force.”7
Perhaps tensions caused by the Futenma Air Base relocation issue could be reduced after the LDP takes power; however, the LDP, a party that has close relations with farmers and doctors, is vague about joining the TPP. In the “Political Promises” released for the election for the House of Representatives, Abe clearly objects to participating in TPP negotiations with the precondition of lifting all of the tariffs, and hopes to gain the understanding of President Obama on this matter. Abe looks positively on trade liberalization, and he announced on March 15, 2013 that Japan will enter negotiations for joining the TPP to take the last chance to participate in the establishment of free trade rules in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, he also thinks protection measures, such as tariffs on imported rice and beef, are needed while Japan enjoys benefits of free trade. This is in response to the interests groups that have been supportive of the LDP. The White House issued a statement after the U.S.-Japan summit meeting that the U.S. is not asking Japan to lift all tariffs before the final ne-gotiation conclusion has been reached. On the other hand, Abe knows well it will be very challenging for Japan to keep some tariffs on some sensitive items with the agreement of other TPP members. If this goal cannot be achieved, however, Japan will withdraw from the TPP negotiations.
Fred Hiatt, the editorial page editor of the Washington Post,
〈安倍訪美在即中方低估美日峰會意義〉,《朝鮮日報中文網》(The
Chosun-ilbo), February 21, 2013, <http://cn.chosun.com/big5/site/data/html_dir/2013/
reasons that Japan’s participation in TPP can deepen the non-military cooperation with Washington and activate Japan’s reform with its export advantages;8however, it has both advantages and disadvantages
to the Abe cabinet. The ruling LDP will face the challenge of the House of Councilors election in July 2013. To win the election, the LDP needs to obtain the support of farmers and other groups with interests that will be severely impacted by the TPP in order to win in the one-seat agricultural prefectures. The LDP also has to maintain the atmosphere of victory from last year’s House of Representatives election so that it can walk out of the shadow of a “short-lived cabinet”. In addition, with strong objections from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, and Central Union of Fishery Cooperatives, Abe cannot pave Japan’s way to free trade without strong support from the people. Therefore, from the moment he took office for the second time, Abe has demonstrated a different political character from that of his 2006 rule. He intends to shape himself in the image of a strong political figure in order to win support from conservative people. Since 2006, Japan has changed its Prime Minister every year. The political turmoil has weakened Japan’s national power. The serious economic and social problems have damaged the people’s expectation for the future. On the other hand, a rising China also makes Japanese people uneasy. The atmosphere of pushing to the right has increased gradually in Japanese society. If Abe can make good use of this public orientation, he may be able to prolong the life of his cabinet.
The U.S. and Japan have some expectations from each other; however, each party has its own difficulties in reality. It may be
ques-〈美日首腦峰會分析：象徵意義大於實質〉, 《大紀元日報》(The Epoch
Times), February 22, 2013, <http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/13/2/22/n3806857.
tionable if Abe can make U.S.-Japanese relations as close as when Koizumi was in office. In the summit meeting, President Obama was not willing to clearly express the stance of the U.S.; instead, he vaguely expressed that the countries should cooperate on the Diaoyutai issue. Apparently, Abe failed to obtain President Obama’s assurance on an obligation of the U.S. to assist Japan if conflict occurs between Japan and China. Robert Hathaway, the director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, thinks President Obama has been careful on Abe’s demand for giving Japan assurance; he is afraid that getting away from China may worsen the handling of the North Korea nuclear issue.9The U.S. apparently does
not want to satisfy Japan at the expense of worsening U.S.-Chinese relations. Kurt Campbell, the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, pointed out in his trip to Asia before he stepped down that the U.S. hopes Japan will keep calm, that the U.S. does not have the intention of being the mediator between Japan and China, and that the U.S. does not want to get involved in this endless conflict between Japan and China. Shen Jiru（沈驥如）, the senior fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out that the U.S. does not want to damage the Sino-American relations because of the Diao-yutai Islands issues because the U.S.’s “pivot to Asia” would become meaningless, should rupture happen between the U.S. and China.10
〈美日首腦峰會分析：象徵意義大於實質〉.
〈學者：安倍訪美沒有達到向中國“示威”目的〉,《鳳凰網》(ifeng.com), Feb-ruary 23, 2013, <http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyudaozhengduan/ content-3/detail_2013_02/23/22419141_0.shtml>.
III. Maintaining the Japan-Chinese Relations through
the “Politics-Economy Separation” Policy
After Japan “nationalized” the Diaoyutai Islands, China made the “sovereignty-protecting” activities normal routines and began using its ocean surveillance vessels and fishery administration ships to implement operations in the Diaoyutai waters. On December 13, 2012, a Y-12 ocean surveillance plane of China’s “State of Ocean Administration,” entered the airspace of the Diaoyutai Islands for the first time and was expelled by F-15 fighters of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF); China does not seem to intend to stop actions such as this. The Joint Staff of the Japan Ministry of Defense points out that, since December 13, 2012, China’s ocean surveillance plane has started patrolling airspace near the Diaoyutai Islands.11 Japan
regards China’s actions as a test of Japan’s sovereignty-protecting bottom line; it is to elicit ASDF involvement in the Diaoyutai Islands conflict so the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reasonably can in-tervene. NIDS China Security Report 2012 points out that the PLA Navy and Ocean State Administration’s plane will not only cooperate in maritime interest protecting activities in the South China Sea but also in the East China Sea.
Although Japan’s defense institution knows China’s intent, high officials of Japan’s defense authority are worried that China’s actions will trigger conflict and make the dispute uncontrollable. The Diaoyutai Islands has become the “powder keg of East Asia,” so any small incident may become an uncontrollable conflict and the U.S. would find it difficult to exclude itself from this region. Therefore, the
〈中国機 尖閣接近、領空侵犯 〉, 《読売新聞》(Yomiuri Online),
December 25, 2012, <http://kyushu.yomiuri.co.jp/news/national/20121225-OYS1T00233.htm?from=popin>.
U.S. should implement “preventive diplomacy” and support President Ma Ying Jeou’s East China Sea Peace Initiative, encouraging the establishment of an “East China Sea Peace Forum” where Taiwan, Japan, and China can have three-way dialogue and solve disputes.
While Sino-Japanese relations have been at a low ebb, Abe’s China policy has attracted people’s attention. Nevertheless, the Diao-yutai Islands dispute is different from the issue of “Yasukuni Shrine worship”. With public opinion stating that 82% of Japanese people feel no friendliness from China, enhancing Sino-Japanese relations this time will be much thornier than in 2006, when Sino-Japanese relations were at a previous low ebb. Japan’s top priority is to restore the U.S.-Japanese relations damaged by the DPJ so that Japan can win support from the U.S. in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute in exchange for Japan playing a key role in the strategic “rebalance” of the U.S. The U.S. has a favorable attitude towards Japan in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. The White House not only points out that the Diaoyutai Islands are applied to the security commitment made by the U.S. in the fifth article in U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but also gave the same assurance when the Congress passed the National Defense
Authori-zation Act. Nevertheless, the U.S. security commitment on the
Diaoyutai Islands is definitely not a blank check. Washington would not allow Japan’s provocative actions against Beijing on this issue. Although Abe has proposed the policy of “permanently stationing government officials on Diaoyutai Islands” in the LDP’s “Political Promises for House of Representatives Election,” this policy not only fails to gain the support of the U.S., but also contradicts Japan’s pre-vious stance, in which Japan claimed the “nationalization” of Diaoyutai Islands was only to manage the Islands. Toranosuke Katayama（片 山虎之助）, a member of the House of Councilors from the Japan Restoration Party, points out that the policy of stationing government
officials on the Diaoyutai Islands should obtain the support of public opinion in the international community. In fact, public opinion in the international community coincides with the stance of the U.S.; there-fore, Abe expressed that he will “review” the policy of stationing government officials on Diaoyutai Islands. From this perspective, the Abe cabinet will not implement it in his East China Sea policy. Therefore, Abe will adopt a “politics-economic separation” approach in his policy to China, with the consideration of keeping Japan’s national interests in the real world. Abe may make effort to-wards restoring Sino-Japanese relations to the state of the “mutually beneficial partnership” that he claimed when he visited China in 2006. In reality, there are overlapping maritime interests between Japan and China and the construction of a “mutually beneficial part-nership,” which is based on economic cooperation, will become con-strained. The Abe cabinet’s policy of “economically pro-China and militarily pro-U.S.” may test the wisdom of Prime Minister Abe.
IV. U.S. and Japan’s Differences in Their China Policies
In his second term, President Obama implemented his strategy of a “pivot to Asia,” and used the TPP as the core of the economic cooperation with East Asian countries. In contrast to the American-flavored TPP, Beijing proposes the construction of Regional Com-prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).12 For Japan, this
“U.S.-passing” RCEP is not a top choice. It concerns not only Japan’s choice for economic interests, but also a choice in international
If the RCEP is successfully constructed, the free trade zone (composed by Japan, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, India, and ten countries of ASEAN) will have an economic output of US$20 billion and will be one-third of the world economy.
politics. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the foundation of Japanese di-plomacy; therefore, a “pro-U.S. diplomacy” would be Japan’s only choice. Japan will be the proxy of the U.S. when it is promoting the TPP in East Asia. Japan will help the implementation of the strategic “rebalance” of the U.S., and this is an approach for Japan to maintain its role in the region of East Asia. An editorial of the Yomiuri Shimbun points out that the TPP not only carries economic meaning but also has security importance for Japan, because the TPP is the key for strengthening U.S.-Japanese relations, which can contain China on the issue of the Diaoyutai Islands.13
Although North Korea is the strategic buffer of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliance, the strategic meaning of North Korea to China has been reduced, should nuclear proliferation occur in Northeast Asia. For Kim Jong-un, a “nuclear weapon” is just a “plot” in the play, but the “nuclear tests” over and over again may make it a reality. The Japanese right-wing may be happy to see this happen, because it will become a reasonable excuse for Japan’s “possessing nuclear weapons.” On the other hand, it also gives China a more important strategic role in the North Korea nuclear crisis. This may also shorten the strategic distance between the U.S. and China and may lessen the tension in both parties’ East China Sea strategies.
Japan and China have been accusing each other of making military provocations in the waters of the Diaoyutai Islands. While Japan wants the U.S. to express its stance more clearly in this dispute, the political influence from a third North Korean nuclear test cannot be ignored. Kim Jong-un’s calculation of getting negotiations through nuclear
〈「TPP 解散」 首相 交渉参加 旗 掲 〉, 《読売新聞》(Yomiuri
Online), November 13, 2012,
tests may not be successful, but this may add a new variable in the Diaoyutai Islands dispute among the U.S., Japan, and China. North Korea’s nuclear test will become a key to opening Pandora’s Box of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. The nuclear capability of North Korea may not be a worry for China, but a “nuclear-possessed” Japan becomes not only a challenge for Beijing but also trouble for Washington. A Japan with nuclear weapons will not need the protection of the nuclear umbrella from the U.S., and the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty will lose its function as a “security valve.” This will also help
Japan become a rightist society, and the U.S. will lose Japan. In the negotiation of establishing official ties between Japan and China, Henry Kissinger thought that, if the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which has been functioning as a bottle cap, exists no more, Japan will walk on the road to an independent defense and will possess nuclear wea-pons.14Therefore, the U.S. and China would not like to see nuclear
proliferation in Northeast Asia. Although there are conflicting purposes between the U.S. and China in maritime strategy, the two countries have a strategic consensus on the North Korean nuclear issue. That is, the two countries need to cooperate, and this constrains the attitude of the U.S. toward Japan on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. Therefore, the U.S. needs to handle the Diaoyutai Islands disputes carefully. Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser of the White House, thinks that the bottom line of the U.S. is to fully support the security of Japan, and this meets the interests of Japan and China. It would benefit the world if the third largest economy of the world could reduce tension in the East China Sea.15
Henry Kissinger pointed out that, if the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were abolished and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Japan, Japan easily could obtain plutonium from the commercially operated Tonkai nuclear power plant. Please refer to Tetsuo Arima, 〈「沖縄 中国領 」 周恩来 考 〉, 《新 潮45》(Shinchou45), Vol. 32, No. 2, February 2013, pp. 145-147.
Failing to obtain the assurance from Obama, Abe pointed out in a speech held in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that Japan does not intend to worsen the Diaoyutai Islands dis-pute and made an appeal to Xi Jinping, hoping to have dialogue in the Sino-Japanese summit meeting. Nevertheless, Abe does not admit the fact that there is dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands, and this makes it less likely the deadlock between the two countries will be opened. On the other hand, it is clear that Washington does not want Japan to do anything on its own that leads to higher tension in the Diaoyutai Islands issue. China’s Xinhua News Agency commented that Abe’s trip to the U.S. has been treated in manner of “low profile.”16
Although John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, will not abolish the strategy of “rebalance,” he may make some adjustments. In terms of the rising tension of both crises in North Korea and in the Middle East, the cooperation between the U.S. and China is indispensable. Nevertheless, Japan is worried that the U.S. will lean to China at the expense of sacrificing Japan.17On February 23, 2013, when meeting
the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida（岸田文 雄）, Kerry pointed out that the U.S.-Japan partnership is important to the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.18Prime Minister 〈東亞峰會東海南海議題又浮現〉, 《中央通訊社》(Central News Agency), November 20, 2012, <http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aOPL/201211200387-1. aspx>.
〈新華社：安倍訪美遇冷處理〉, 《明報即時新聞網》(inews.mingpao.com), February 23, 2013, <http://inews.mingpao.com/htm/Inews/20130223/ca61628a. htm>.
〈安倍晉三訪美意在加強雙邊關係〉, 《華爾街日報》(The Wall Street
Journal), February 21, 2013, <http://chinese.wsj.com/big5/20130221/bas143738.
asp>.
〈釣島爭議 凱瑞：日方展現克制〉, 《中時電子報》(www.chinatimes.com), February 23, 2013, <http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501012885/1320130223
Abe, after the U.S-Japan summit meeting, claimed that the “trust and link” of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been completely restored. In reality, there is an alliance dilemma between the U.S. and Japan, and it has not diminished after the U.S. started its “rebalance” in East Asia. The situation may be worsened in Obama’s second term. The former Japanese Deputy Minister of Defense and the DPJ member of the House of Representative Akihisa Nagashima（長島昭久） pointed out that, in Obama’s second term, friction may occur between the U.S. and Japan on issues regarding China and that the U.S. would possibly not play a deterrent role to China anymore.19
In order to take effective measures to deal with China’s actions and the paradox between Japan and China in the East China Sea, the Abe cabinet will reinforce Japan’s relations with those surrounding countries that have maritime interest conflicts with China, such as India and Vietnam. Therefore, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to launch joint military exercises with the Indian Navy so that Japan can expand the U.S.-Japan alliance; can construct tri-lateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and India; and can link this cooperation to the U.S.-Japan-Australia security co-operation. This is intended to prevent the power imbalance in East Asia after China’s rise in this region.
In the implementation of a strategic “rebalance,” the U.S. wel-comes Japan playing a greater security role, abolishing an “exclusively defense-oriented policy,” and exercising a “collective self-defense right.” Nevertheless, the U.S. would not like to see the restoration of Japanese militarism become dominant in Japanese politics. A mili-taristic Japan would be more troublesome than China and would be
00559.html>.
harmful for U.S. security deployment of the “pivot to Asia.” The edi-torial of the Asahi Shimbun points out that the U.S. Congress, in addition to China and South Korea, will not agree, should Japan attain a “nationalism of historical revisionism.”（歴史修正主義
）
On January 18, 2013, Prime Minister Abe proposed “five new Japanese diplomatic principles,” emphasizing the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and welcoming President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” policy; meanwhile, he also emphasized the “maritime issues.” Abe pointed out that the ocean is important public property. The dis-tribution should not be made with power but by law. In Abe’s “five new Japanese diplomatic principles,” his policy orientation coincides with the stance of the Japanese government; however, it is clear that, with the U.S., Japan is to contain China’s actions in both the South China Sea and East China Sea.
The Japanese “right-wing” regards President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” as a “reprinted version” of a containment policy. Naoyuki Agawa（阿川尚之）, a member of the Standing Committee of Keio University and expert in defense, pointed out that the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are linked together and, if the map of the world is examined upside down, Japan, India, and Australia would form the shape of a triangle, and China will be trapped inside this triangle. The Chinese Navy will find it difficult to enter into the ocean and break the “First Island Chain of Pacific Ocean” if Japan, India, and Australia jointly contain China.20After taking office, Abe chose East
Asian countries as destinations for his first overseas trip. Instead of China, Abe’s first destinations were ASEAN countries, such as
Viet-Feng Mao,〈日本強勢閱兵劍指中國〉, 《亞洲週刊》(Yazhou Zhoukan), Vol. 26, Issue 43, October 28, 2012, p. 35.
nam, Thailand, and Indonesia. This indicates that Prime Minister Abe intends to unify those countries that have common values with Japan, to win Japan’s allies, and to construct the “arc of freedom and prosperity” that can be used to contain China and to deepen its di-plomacy to China. This also shows, in Japan’s didi-plomacy to China, “Asian diplomacy” is another important pillar in addition to the en-forcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Now that Prime Minister Abe has regarded the ocean as public property of the international community, he should abandon the old thought of using ocean to “contain” China. Tom Donilon, the National Security Advisor of the White House, reiterated that the policy of rebalance is not a policy to contain China, but a policy for the U.S. to construct a new type of relation with China.21 Joseph Nye, a
professor at Harvard University, pointed out in an essay published by Nihon Keizai Shimbun that both Japan and the U.S. are concerned with the rise of China; however, both countries cannot handle China with the thought of “containment” because both countries’ economic relations with China are completely different from those with the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. China’s economic development brings benefits to the economies of both the U.S. and Japan. The military problems will bring a negative influence on the economic interests. Nye thinks the U.S. and Japan should jointly take balanced measures that will enable China to be a responsible stakeholder of the world; this is also the meaning of U.S.-Japan alliance.22
〈美國亞洲再平衡...「不是圍堵大陸」〉,《聯合新聞網》(udn.com), March 13, 2013, <http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR3/7755474.shtml#ixzz2NO2A 9ORM>.
Joseph Nye,〈TPP 参加、日本 有益〉, 《日本経済新聞》 (Nikkei.com), December 2, 2012, p. 1.
V. Conclusion
Nye has reminded Prime Minster Abe that he should not mis-understand the Asia-Pacific policy of the Obama administration. The chance of solving the disputes in the East China Sea will be lost if Japan perceives Obama’s “pivot to Asia” as the policy to “contain” China. It will damage the U.S.-Japan alliance that Japan has been using as a core pillar in its diplomacy, and this will not meet Japan’s national interests. In fact, the U.S. has been offering diplomatic support for Japan on the Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands. Al-though the U.S. has been supportive of Japan’s stance on the Diaoyutai Islands that they are under the control of Japan, the U.S. does not wish to see conflict between Japan and China in the East China Sea. The U.S. is worried that the disputes between Japan and China could become worse and lead to conflict. The basic strategy of President Obama for China is to share the economic fruit brought by China and suppress its military rise in East Asia. The confrontation between China and Japan, which has been an ally of the U.S., will influence the U.S. stra-tegy on China. Therefore, the U.S. will not respond to China’s pro-vocations while reinforcing its ability to jointly handle the Diaoyutai Islands dispute with Japan. This will be the way that the U.S. handles the disputes. Besides, if Prime Minister Abe regards the ocean as public property of the international community, he should not regard the Diao-yutai Islands as Japan’s private belongings, but should respond posi-tively to President Ma Ying Jeou’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. Through trilateral dialogue among Taiwan, Japan, and China, the code of conduct in the East China Sea can be established; therefore, the ocean in East Asia can be distributed through the approach of “law.” Furthermore, as the new leaders of northeast Asian countries have come to power, the U.S. should take the opportunity to incorporate the
East China Sea Peace Initiative into its thought of its Asian strategic
possi-ble East China Sea conflicts. In doing so, Japan will not take an extreme path under the influence of the right-wing attitudes that have been coming out.
Facing the challenge from the North Korean nuclear crisis, Presi-dent Obama should adopt a more balanced diplomatic policy between Japan and China, which will maximize the strategic interests of the U.S. in the western Pacific Ocean. This will also bring Xi Jinping opportunities while he is constructing a “new great powers relations”. Beijing’s attitude on U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 on North Korea will be a start. How Beijing works with western countries led by the U.S. to pressure Pyongyang and force Kim Jong-un to go back to the Six Party Talks will be a key. In terms of the Diaoyutai Islands disputes, China may be able to break through Abe’s “China-containing web,” which is an “arc of freedom and prosperity” made of “value oriented diplomacy,” if China takes the opportunity to work with the U.S. on the issue of North Korea.
References
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Mao, Feng, 2012/10/28.〈日本強勢閱兵劍指中國〉, 《亞洲週刊》 (Yazhou Zhoukan), Vol. 26, Issue 43, pp. 34-35.
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