IsslIes & Sludies" 47, no. 2 (June 2011): 87-118
Dual Representation:
Reviewing the Republic of China's
Last Battle in the UN*
PHILlP HSIAOPONG
Lw
Curre叫叫udiesof Chinese represenlalion in the UnÎfed Naliol1s a s-SUlI闊的allheRepllblic ofChil1a's ωpulsion 1,vas inevi的blebecallse ofChi cmg Kai-shek's one Chinll pl'inciple and Beijing:~' ro/e ;11 U.S 戶的gl1pol ÎC:V. This paper provides Gnother perspecliνeon Ihise\也nlby mapping 110\,,, Ihe Uniled SWI凹，using a 1\.110 Chinas slralegy，的1deavored10 secure Ta卜 pej's .'}'eat and hOlV ChiωIg Kai-shekfailhjúlly execlIIed Ihis plal1 Kt:VWORDS: Chinese rcpresentatioßj dual rcprcsentation; Chiang Kai-shekj two Chinasj onc China.
* * *
There are two cOllllllon explanations for the expulsion of the Republic of China (hereafter ROC or Taiwan) frolll the United Nations (UN). The tìrst centers on the stubbornness of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)，whose insistence that the ROC was the only legitilllate
PI-IILlI' HSIAOI'OXG LIU (劉曉鵬)is an assistanl professor in the School of Humanities and Socìal Sciences, Nanyan且 Technolo且 icalUniversily, Singapore. I-Ie can be reached al <hpliu@nlu.edu.sg>
*The author appreciates the valuable C01l1ments of Professor Bruce Cumings and Professor Guy Alillo of the University of Chicago, as well as Ihe assislance of Cindy Kou, McGill Univcrsìty.
"lnstitulC of Inlernalional Relations. National Chengchi University, Taipeì, Taiwan (ROC)
ISSUES & STUDIES
govemment of China killed Taiwan's last chance to stay in the VN.1 The other is that Taiwan lost its UN seat due to Washington's betrayal. The Nixon admini昀st甘ra剖t叫肉l[肌 macyw抽 Be剖吋ijir時 c∞omprorω叩I盯ml昀sed Wa的shir呵tωon'
abi山lit句Y tωo control t由hi芯sissue
,
and Taiwan therefore lost support2 In other words, Chiang's stubbom opposition to two Chinas plus Nixon's new pro-Beijing policy contributed to Taipei's failure to retain its seat in the VN Given this convergence of circumstances, Taiwan's expulsion from the UN was so inevitable that even if it had survived in 1971, "Taipei could have remained in the UN for at most only one year."3As Taipei and Washington declassified documents, scholars began to develop new perspectives. The most popular revisionist view is that Chiang Kai-shek was willing to accept the presence of two Chinas in the VN.4 Thus
, in
1971, Taipei seemed to be pursuing two opposing policies
As demonstrated in part by Nixon personally corralling votes to protect Taiwan's seat,5 Nixon and Kissinger were actively involved in this two Chinas proposal and planned to keep Taiwan in the VN. As Robert'S間，for example, John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalisl China and Americ:an Cold 呦/'Sfrafegy in Asia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997),248-63. Blaming Chiang for Taiwan's losing its chance to separate from China, most pro-Taiwan indepen -dence scholars hold the same perspectiv間的orexample, Li Hsiao-fen且，Taiwanren yinggai 悶悶hide Jial1g Jieslzi (Chiang Kai 吭吭一whatTaiwanese should know) (TI剖開 Yushan
she, 2004), 143-45. Adopting the same point of vicw, somc mainland Chinese scholars praise Chiang's insistence on a one China policy.
2See, for example, Nancy Tucker, Unc凹的inFJ川el1tÚ'hips:Taiwon, Hong Kong, and the United Stafes, 1945-1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), 104-5; James Mann, Abollf Face: A His(01Y 01 America's CurioLts Relationship with Clrina from Nixon 10 C/inlon (New York Alfred Knopf, 1999),38-39; Wang Jin-hung, Caifa悍的hi:conghu妒Idong'al1 kan Toiwan
(lnterviewing history: seeing Taiwan through Washington's archives) (Taipei: Yuanl 山， 2000),337-91
] Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, "Taiwan's Policy toward the U.S., 1969-1978," in Normalizatiol1 O[ V.S.-China Relatiol1s: An lnterna/ional HistOly, ed. William Kirby, Robert Ross and Gong Li (Cambridgc, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 232
4Many MA theses based on newly d自lassilìcddocuments have confirmed Chian皂'sattîtude See Peng Tao, "The Policy toward the Issue of Chinese Representation in the UN of the Nixon Administration" (MA thcsi丸 NorthcastcmNormal Universi旬，Changchun, China, 2006); and Tsai Bingx 山，"Study ofthe Process ofthe ROC's Withdrawal 什omthe Unitcd Nations 1949-1971" (MA thes 峙，National Central University, Chungli, Taiwan, 2008) 'See Zhang Shaoduo, "Meiguo yu Lianheguo Zhongguo daib旭oquanwenti" (America and
UN Chinese representation), Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjill (Contemporary China History Studies) (Beijing) 14, no. 6 (November 2007): 72-73
The Republic o(China's Last Battle il1 the UN
Accinelli indicates, Nixon and Kissinger remained committed to im-proving relations with Beijing while keeping Taiwan in the UN.6 This pledge manifested itself as promising one China to the People's Republic ofChina (PRC) while lobbying for a two-seat agenda in Ihe UN
Therefore, interpreting the last battle over Chinese representation in the UN is more complicated than it once seemed to be. Contemporary conclusions concerning Taiwan's "pre-ordained" and "inevitable" expul‘ sion may oversimplify the case.' Hoping to provide another perspective on the event ，的 ispaper will review Ihe hislory of th 的 developmentfrom a different angle from that of the existing scholarship: that 時，Chiang's acceptance oftwo Chinas and the U.S. two Chinas proposal
Beforc 1971 Under.γ.叫an附T缸dingChi叫angKai-shek
The simplest thing that can be said about Chiang Kai-shek's attitude loward the idea oftwo Chinas is that he always opposed it. His resistance to the idea is understandable considering his nationalism, and it easily be-comes the defaull lens through which to analyze his foreign policy. Yet, his record of struggling against and compromising with warlords and the Japanese makes it difficult to believe that he was not a realist who under-stood the necessity of timely compromise
Most analyses focus on Chiang's dedication to the one China ideal and faillo notice his second choice. Zhang Chunying
,
for instance,
praises Chiang's opposition to Washington's two Chinas plan of the 1950s be-cause Chiang, for fear of being suspected of splitting his governmenl on Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, resisted U.S. pressur巴 togive up the6Robert Accinelli, tlln Pursuit ofa Modus Vivendi," in Normaliz仙。l10jU丘 -ChinaRelati帥， 37
7For Taiwan's preordaincd and i.nevitablc destiny, sec, for examplc, I-Ienry A. Kissinger, Whife liollse拾。'‘(ßoslon，Mass.: Little, ßrown and COlllpany, 1979).773‘and Zhang, "Mel且uOyu Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti," 73一 74
ISSUES & STUDIES
Kinmen (金門) islands and also resisted surrendering Taiwan to UN trllsteeshi p8
At the time when Zhang was making this argument
,
pa前 ofChiang'sdiary from tbe 1950s was made public, revealing him in this, his weakest moment. Althougb UN trusteeship would have meant the de jllre separ-ation of Taiwan from Chinese territory, Chiang was willing to make this sacrifice, hoping simply to retain "de facto governance 州 Thisdiary entry serves as an early instance of Chiang's potential willingness to accept a division of sovereignty. He was willing to do this becallse to him, tilles were less important than state sllrvival. Moreover, even though Kinmen was one ofhis last links with the Chinese mainland, Chiang also repeatedly considered withdrawing from the islands.'o In other words, a symbolic link between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan might not have been as sacred to him as was previously thollght
ln the face of massive challenges, like most leaders, Chiang was probably prepared 10 grin and bear unfavorable alternatives. Chiang's adherence to one China served as camouf1age for his deficient military capability, and he lIsed this facade to figbt for the best outcome for the ROC before he made any compromises- his strategy would safeguard his repu-tation if ever negotiations tllrned sour. We shollld consider Chiang's attitude toward Chinese representation in the UN via the comment ofGeorge Yeh,
the ROC's ambassador to the United States, 1958-1961: "Chiang looks tOllgh, but he will escape throu且hthe backdoor al the right moment." 11 The 1961 U.S.-Taiwan Dispufe 0 νer UN Sfrafeg;
During the 1950s, the United States adopted a moratorium strategy to protect the ROC's seat in the UN: whenever a UN member proposed
'Zhang Chunying, "Shilun Jiang Jieshi wuci dizhi Meiguo fenli Taiwan de tumou" (On the
five times that Chiang Kai-shek blocked the U.S. conspiracy to separate Taiwan), T"ilVal1
yal1jill (Taiwan Studies) (Beijing), no. 2 (2000): 61-67
9Qin Xiaoyi, ed., Z0l1gl0l1g J，悶nggol1gdashi changbian chugao (Chiang Kai-shek Chrono-logy), vol. 9 (Taipei: Zhongzheng wenjiao jijinhui, 2003), 4335, 4356
IOlbid., 4308-10
"Shen Qi，仲'odeyisllel1g: Shen Qi hlliyi/II (My Iife: the memoirs ofShen Qi), vol. 4 (Taipei Lianjin皂，2000)，21
The Rep岫licofChil問:，Lasl Ballle 帥的eUN
to expel the ROC by replacing it with the PRC, the United States would propose a 11l0tion to table the issue until tbe following year. This strategy was successful until 1960, when many of the UN's new members CO
I1l-plained of Washington's antics. In 1955, the ROC used its veto power
against Mongolia's admission to the UN because Mongolia was const itu-tionally part of China. When Mongolia re-applied for UN membership in 1961, Moscow threatened to ex巴rciseits veto to block the entry of newly independent African countries if the ROC blocked Mongolia again.
Be-cause the ROC needed these new African members to support its efforts
to retain its right to represent China, Taipei's one China principle and Wash-ington's moratoriul1l strategy both underwent revisions
Washington devised two new methods to pacify the other l1lember
states: a proposal to establish a UN research committee to suggest a reso-lution to the Chinese representation issue or invoking the "important ques-tion" clause. According to Article 18 (2) of the UN Charter
,
importantquestions concerning matters such as the expulsion of mel1lbers require a
two-third majority of the UN's full l1lembership to pass. Taipei disliked both of these methods because they opened the Chinese representation question to public discussion
Because Mongolia's admission to the UN implied the partition of
China, Taipei insisted on vetoing it regardless of the African votes Taipei would lose as a conseqllence. In other words, Taipei acted as if it wOllld rather commit political sllicide than violate its principle of representing a
lInited China, even thollgh this gesture would hllrt Washington's leadership
of the anti-col1lmllnist world
After serious disputes between Taipei and Washington, Taipei agreed
to tacitly accept Mongolia's adl1lission and sllrrender its one China prin-ciple. 此1oreover，the il1lportant question became the new strategy: China's
representation was an "impo此antquestion" that could only be decided with a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.'2
12Many scholars havc analyzcd the 1961 Washington-Taipei dispute based on the U.S. State Department's PO吋igl1Relaliol1s of Ihe Ul1iled Slal臼 (hereafterFRUS) 1961-1963 Yol
XXII. See, ror example, Tang Xiaoson且， 111961 ni8n Mei Jiang guanyu wai Mengu
ISSUES & STUDIES
By using the "important question" strategy, the U.S.-ROC alliance
could easily defeat the annual Albanian Resolution calling for the ROC to
be replaced by the PRC.13 Ifthe issue was accepted as an "important ques tion," the Albanian Resolution would require a two-thirds majori旬，mean ing tbat most UN members would understand how difficult it would be to
expel Taipei that year. For fear of offending either Washington or Taipei,
both of whom were permanent members of the Security Council at the time, UN members tended to favor the ROC when they voted on the AI-banian Resolution. As Dean Rusk put it, "[f the issue were decided to be an Impo此antmatter, there would probably not be a two-thirds m句。 rityfor any solution."'.
The 1961 dispute was signi 日 cantfor three main reasons. First, it took Chiang about seven months to soften his one China stance. Official
Washington-Taipei negotiations conceming the new strategy began around
March and ended just before the UN voting in October. President John F. Kennedy had to personally convince Chiang to yield on the Mongolia issue by promising some important concessions: the United States committed
itself to assisting Taiwan in building diplomatic relations in Africa, and
Kennedy pledged to use the Washington's veto power against Beijing when necessary.
Second, due to right-wing pressure, Kennedy could not publicly
support Beijing's admission. Taiwan needed protection even though the Kennedy administration obviously preferred a two Chinas solution. As
Lianheguo daibiaoquan wenli de zhenglun" (The dispule between Ihe U.S.A. and Taiwan on the deputy right ofthe Republic ofMongolia in the United Nations in 1961), Shixue yuekan (Joumal of Historical Science) (Kaifeng), no. 1 (2003): 61-65; Niu Dayun, "Kennidi zhengfu yu 1961 nian de Lianheguo daibiaoquan zhizheng" (the Kennedy administration and the 1961 UN Chinese representation dispute), Zhonggongdangshiya句 i1l(Joumal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies) (Beijing), no. 4 (2000): 78-斜;Zou Yao-yong,
"1961 nian Mei Ying guanyu Lia的eguoZhongguo daibiaoquan de fenqi" (The dispute on the Chinese representation in UN between U.K. and U.S. in 1961), J01l1'll01 ojShallghoi Universiry (Social Science Edition) (Shanghai) 14,00. 2 (March 2007): 92-96 "From the 1960s onwards, Albania proposed an annual motion in the General Assembly to
transfer the Chinese UN seat from the ROC to the PRC. For this reason, the motion is com-monly referred to as the Albanian Resolution
'.See document #13, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/ history/frusXXlI/O 1t050.html (accessed August 25, 2010)
The Rep!lblic ofChil7o廿 LaSlBallle in Ihe UN
Dean Rusk described it
,
"It is fundamental to the United States that For -mosa retain a seat in the United Nations. 1 f this is unacceptable to Peking then they are at fault. We don't believe we should have to pay the ticketfor Peking's admission at Formosa's expense. If Peking won't accept ad
-mission lInder these conditions, then that is their choice and we would not be responsible."15
Third, the question of Chinese representation attracted so much
inter-national attention because a small China occupied such a very important
position. Chinese legitimacy was a problem between Taipei and Beijing,
and it would have been less important to the rest ofthe world if neither had
held a permanent seat on the Security Council or ifthe impo此anceofthis
seat were diluted
Fearing for its legitimacy as the govemment of China as well as its starus as a Security Council member, Taipei opposed the formation of a re-search committee because it would almost guarantee a two Chinas out come. There was no way to control the composition ofsuch a committee, and worse, the committee might suggest that the General Assembly revisit tl1e Chinese position in the Charter, and "India, Japan, Brazil, and Niger悶， all ofwhom wanted pe口nanentmembership ofthe Security Council, might then take over the China seat." 16
J 96 J was not the 白rsttime that China's right to occlIpy a Security
Council seat was put in question. As early as 1954, Secretary of State John DlIlles had thought to solve the problem ofChina's seat by replacing China with India on the Secllrity Council in a move to accommodate both Chinese
regimes in the General Assembly. Dulles approached an intemational
lawyer about changing the composition of the Security Council and even discussed the issue with the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. 17 A
"See documenl #14. FRUS 1961 一 1963Vol XXII, http://www.slale.gov/www/aboul_slate/ bistory/frusXXll/O 1 t050.html (accessed Augusl 25, 2010)
16Telegram, ROC Delegalion oflhe UN 10 ROC Embassy in lhe USA, 8/23/1961, in "Di shiliu jie lianda daibiaoquan wenli" (Represenlalion issue in lhe 161h Assembly), Augusl 22-November 20, 1961, International Organizalion Depanmenl Files (hereafler IOF) 88086/633.02, ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafler MOFA)
17Nancy B. Tucker, "10hn Foster Dulles and the Taiwan R001S ofthe Two Chinas Policy," in
ISSUES & STUDIES
similar scenario arose in 1961 when the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Adlai
Stevenson, mentioned to President Kennedy and the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, the alternative of "amend[ingJ the United Nations
Charter.'oI8 The Kennedy administration did seriously consider using Japan
and lndia to dilute the importance ofthe China seat.J9
Taipei, though small, was the only perrnanent member ofthe Security
Council that represented people of color. It was therefore a concern that
other peoples of color would press for a change in representation. A UN research committee on the Chinese seat would certainly see states such as "Tndia, Japan, Brazil, or Nigeria" logically requesting to replace China on
the Security Council. Taipei therefore considered that the "important
ques-tion" strategy was safer than that of establishing a research committee
The J 966
u.s.
-
Taiwan Dispute 0νer UN StrategyIn 1965
,
the "important question" proposal was passed (56:49),
butthe Albanian Resolution for the first time resulted in a tie (47:47). The
United States sensed a generaJ rise in dissatisfaction about postponing
the PRC's admission and was concerned that this tie would affect the 1966 baJJot. To convince more UN members 10 support the "important ques-tion," the United States again suggested instituting a research committee to resolve the dilemma of Chinese representation. For the same reasons as
in 1961, Chiang was opposed 10 Ihis pJan. Because this proposal strongly impJied U.S. acceptance of two Chinas
,
Chiang once again threatenedto commit political suicide by withdrawing from the UN if the proposal
passed. Taipei and Washington were again in serious disagreement20
John DIIII臼 andthe Diplomacy ofthe Cold 仲'ar，ed. Richard Immennan (Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press, 1989),255
"See document #18, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXIl, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/ historyl自rusXX 1V0 1t050.html(accessed Augusl25, 2010)
J9See Document #28, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXIl, hltp:l/www.state.gov/www/about_state/ hislory/frusXXIUOI t050.html, (accessed August 25, 2010)
20Many scholars have analyzed the 1966 Washington-Taipei dispule based on the U.S. Slate
Department'sFRUS 1964-1968, Vol XXX. S凹，for example, Liu Zik山，"Meiguo yu 1966
nian Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan 、，venti"(The US and Chi間'srepresentation in
the UN in 1966), Dangdai Zhongglloshi yanjill (Contemporary China History Studies) (Beijing) 14, no. 6 (November 2007): 55-61; Chen Changwei, "Vuehanxun zhengfu dui
The ReplIb/ic ofChil1(1's Lasl B叫 Ileil1lhe UN
The implications of this dispute were similar to those of 1961. The
firsl one was that it took Chiang about six months in 1966 to soften his
in-sistence on one China. This quarrel began around May and ended just
be-fore the UN voting in November. Like his predecessor, President Lyndon
B. Johnson had to personally coax Chiang
,
who again only yielded afterthe United States made two concessions that echoed those made in 1961
Johnson committed to extending U.S. sponsorship of Taiwan's aid 10
A仕ica21
and to upholding Kennedy's promise to exercise the U.S. velo
power against Beijing. Consequently, Chiang modified his threat: if the
two Chinas proposal was passed, Taipei would effect a "temporary
with-drawal from the General Assembly only . . . not [a) withdraw[al) from the
Security Council."n
Another imp1ication was that maintaining Taiwan's presence in the
UN was again at the heart ofU.S. policy for two reasons. First, pressure
from the right wing meant that Taipei's withdrawal would have caused
serious intemational and domestic problems for Johnson, who was a1ready
facing difficulties with his Vietnam policies. Second, as long as the ROC
stayed in the UN, Beijing would notjoin. As Dean Rusk eXplained to Tai-pei, "a two-Chinas formula . . . is not . . . the view ofthe United States
your presence in the UN
,
in effect,
is the surest guarantee against aCom-munist China presence."23
Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti zhengce zhi ya叮 iu"(A study ofLyndon Johnson's
policy toward Chinese representation in the United Nations), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Joumal of Chinese Communist Party I-listory Studies), (Beijing) no. 3 (2006): 31-41;
Zhang Ying and Chi I-Iaibo, "Yanjiu weiyuanhui jueyi yu 60 niandai zhongqi Meiguo dui hua zhengce de tiaozhe咚"(Theregulating ofthe policy ofthe U.S. to China and the raising
of Study Committee Resolution), Dongbei shifal1 doλ ue xuebao (Joumal of Northeast
Nor01al University) (Chan且chun)，no. 2 (2002): 18-24
21Regarding the extension ofTaiwan's assistance to Africa, see Philip I-Isiaopong Liu, "R
e-assuring Friendship witl>Funds:Reviewing US-Taiwan Cooperation in Africa during the
1 960s," Idenlily, Cullu間，al1d Po/ilics: An AJro-Asiα11 Dialogue 8, no. 1-2 (2007): 19-44 220eputy Foreign Minister Shen Qi reports to the Executive Yuan, 121111966，間 "Oaibiao quanan yiban ziliao" (General information of the representation issue), November 1971,
IOF 90043/640, MOFA. U.S. records use the terms "walk out" and、bsentitself." See
Oocument # 218 and #219, FRUS 1964-68 Vol XXX, http://www.state.gov/www/about
statelhistory/vol_ xxx/21 0_ 219.ht01I (accessed August 詣，2010)
"Oocument # 217, FRUS 1964-6日 Vol XXX, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_xxxl2l 0_219.ht01I (accessed August 25, 2010)
ISSUES & STUDIES
The issue of the Chinese seat in the Security Council had become an
annual annoyance to the U.S. govemment. Domestic politics required the
ROC to remain in the UN, but intemational politics opposed a small China
occupying such a critical position. Therefore
,
as it had done when itquar-reled with the ROC in the past, the United States considered amending the
UN Charter to rotate the Security Council seat between India, Japan, and
China24
Reviewing 1971
ANew 均tingStrategy
Before discussing the U.S.-Taiwan negotiation of 1971,1 would like
to briefly describe the 1971 Washington-Taipei voting strategy.
Essential-Iy, it was a combination of a new version of the "important question" and "dual representation" approaches. The "impo此an!question" became the "important question variable
,
"
and "dual representation" became "dual re-presentation complex."The difference betwcen the "important question" and the "impo口ant
question variable" was that the new resolution applied only to Taiwan's
expulsion. Tbus
,
a simple m句 oritycould lead to Beijing's admission,
butTaiwan's expulsion would need a two-thirds majori 旬，which was still a big
challenge to supporters of the Albanian Resolution. Since the "important
question variable" was the key issue ofthe 1971 voting
,
to attract moresup-porters, Washington needed a way to ensure the settlement of the China
lssue
Washington therefore introduced "dual representation" to demon
stra!e to UN members that it sincerely intended !o permanently resolve the
Chinese representation issue. "Dual representation" was in fact a clearer
version of the previous research committee proposal. In essence, it meant
"See Document # 202, Telegram from the Depanment of State to the Embassy in Canada, FRUS 1964-68, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxx!200_209.htm 1 (accessed August 25, 20 I 0)
The Republic q(ChinCl's L削 18alfle川 IheUN
one China with two representatives, and thus effectively produced two Chinese govemments in the UN. However, "dual representation" did not mention which Chinese govemment should take over the Security Council seat. Later, "dual representation complex" was born when extra articles were appended to the original "dual representation" proposal specifying that the Chinese seat on the Security Council should be assigned to the PRC and implying the ROC's demotion from the Security Council to the General Assembly
The order of the resolutions on the voting agenda was "important question variable
,
"
Albanian Resolution, and then "dual representation
complex." ldeally, "important question variable" would pass, thereby nullifying the Albanian Resolution,
and then the "dual representation com-plex" vote would take place. Since the United States had gone to great lengths to promote both "important question variable" and "dual repre sen-tation complex," it hoped that countries that supported one of these pro-posals would also support the other. Therefore, if"important question vari-able" passed, there was a chance that "dual representation complex" could pass also. However, if"impor1ant que5tion variable" failed, m05t members would understand that the Albanian Resolution would paS5, and then "dual representation complex" would not even be put to the vote.2525 John Garver opînes thallhe United StalcS did 1101 try hard cnough 10 dOmÎnale the General
Committee, the congre且alionlhal sels the agenda for lhe General Assembly's deliberalions The U.S. ambassador 10 lhe UN George Bush had proposed combining lhe Albanian R eso-lution and the U.S, "dual representation" rcsolution into a single "question ofChina" itcl11 10 be considered 10且elherby lhe General Assembly, because leaving the two separale could mean that lhe Assembly's debate and aClions on lhe first proposal might prejudice or pre-cmpl consideralion of the second ilem. This evenlually became the case. Bush's proposal was defealed 12:9 with 3 abslenlions. Garver argues that the United States should have been able to win over three or fOUT votes because among those abstaining were Belgium and Ireland, whosc dcle且atcshad earlier spoken in 臼vorof the U .S. proposal, and among lhose vOling against the proposal was Brilain. Garver further contends lhat lhis agenda-setting failurc had a dccisive innuence on the U.S. proposal. He quoles Kissinger, "U.S. of-licials believed thal lhey could win one more vole in lhe Importanl Question (Variable) which would have forced a debate and a vote on the U.S. dual representation solutions," suggestm且thatthe Statc Departmcnt was ovcrcontïdent. See Garver, The Sino-American
Allial1ce, 253-55
ISSUES & STUDIES
Nixon's Two-Pronged Diplomacy
ln broad terms, Richard Nixon's friendliness toward Beijing in 1969 and Henry Kissinger's 1971 Beijing visits contributed to Taipei's demise in the UN. Scholars have meticulously outlined why Nixon turned to the PRC and how Kissinger confessed to Beijing that Taiwan was pa叫 ofChina. I will not discuss the White House's new policy toward Beijing, but would like to emphasize Ihat even though Nixon and Kissinger seduced the PRC by claiming thal Taiwan was pa口 ofChina, they still attempted to secure Taiwan's place in the UN
When Nixon assumed 0侃侃，the Cultural Revolution was drawing to a close in the PRC but the Sino-Soviet conflict and the U.S. i叮involvem】entIn n
Vietnam were just be咚叩E斟innin
PRC was a rationa叫a訓1move for the Unit紀edStates, but N ixon could not forsake Chiang because of the threat of domestic challenges. Although Nixon's right-wing political history could ward off accusations of appeasement, selling out an ally might have cost him his main support base. As Tucker indicates, Taiwan's debacle in the UN did in fact anger the right wing and cost Nixon his second term26
Nixon was particularly anxious about the response of Governor Ronald Reagan ofCalifornia. Reagan's reputation would secure California for Nixon and calm pro-Taiwan rightists (Kissinger even told Zhou Enlai (周恩來)that if Iheir discussion about Reagan's function became public, Zhou would have to find him a job). Having Ihe UN expel Taiwan might have turned people like Reagan against him. As Kissinger told Zhou, be-cause 62 percent of Americans opposed the expulsion of T，ωwan， passing the Albanian Resolution would rally Nixon's opponents.27 He later co n-firmed his message 10 Nixon, "It was better for both of our countries [the United Slates and the PRC] if the Albanian Resolution did nol pass this year [1971], for then the process [ofnormalization] would be too fast and
26Nancy 8emkopfTucker, "Taiwan Expendab1e? Nixon and Kissinger 00 to China," JOllr
-110101 Americol1 !-lislO1y 92, no. 1 (June 2005): 109-35
27Doc #162, P 506, FRUS 1969-76, Vo1 XV11, http://www.state.gov/documentsJorganization/
70 143.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
The Republic ofChil1a's Last BαIIle川 theUN
there would be a rallying point for opponents ofyour China policy."'8 SO, in 1971，的inthe 1960s, at leasl because ofright-wing pressure, the White House needed 10 keep Taiwan in the UN
In essence, although Taipei fïrsl hoped ωcontinue wilh Ihe old "i
l11-portant question" strategy and later requested to keep ils Security Council seat, Nixon did not let Taipei cOl11l11it suicide. To keep the ROC in the UN, Washington patiently worked to convince Taipei to accepl new strategies ("il11portant queslion variable," "dual representation," and "dual
represen-tation cOl11plex") to attract 1110re votes. When the situation was unfavorable 10 Taiwan, Nixon and Kissinger l11andated the Slale Departl11enl to win
votes and personally fought for Taiwan behind closed doors29 If Nixon
had not wanled to keep Taiwan in the UN, he need not have invesled this effo口;he could have yielded to Taiwan's outdated strategy and waited for Taiwan's expulsion
Nixon was not alone in adopting this two-pronged approach to Chi-nese representation in the UN. He followed the tactics of previous ad-l11inistrations by opening the door 1110re widely for the PRC while working 10 keep Taiwan in the UN. The di 叮erencebetween N ixon and his two pre句 decessors was Ihat Nixon could earn polilical credit both by helping Taiwan and by approaching Beij ing. 11 was logical for hil11 10 pursue the two goals at the sal11e til11e: ideally, he would achieve both, but by only accol11plishing
one or the olher, he would still have gained A Susf，日inablePlan
To accol11plish bolh ofthese goals sil11ultaneously, the White House
was trying to realize a forrn oftwo Chinas in the UN, which was why Zhou Enlai criticized Kissinger for Al11erica's "one China, two Governl11ents"
"Doc #164, P 537, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 701 43.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
"Doc #425, p 844, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 49149.pdr (accessed AlIgust 25, 2010); and Zhang, "Meigllo yu Lianhegllo Zhongguo
daibiaoquan wentij" 72-73. Zhang argues that Nixon was only feigning his support
ISSUES & STUDIES
planJO The logic was as follows:JI
We saw no legal obstacle to the General Assembly decidin且 that，for the present at least, China shall be represented by a delegation from PRC and a delegation from ROC. The Charter nowhere defines either 、tate"or "member" and [the] two terms cannot be considered synonymous. In帥，for example, became a member of the UN when still a part of the British Empire and before it had
attributes of sovereignty which would pennit it to be described as "state" in Ín-temationallaw. Otheroriginal members ofthe UN (e.g., the Philippines, Syria,
Lebanon) were in a similar situation. The best examples of members which
were not states remain Uk.raine and Byelorussia
From the very beginning, even Kissinger agreed to have "a strate-gy. . . for preventing Taipei's expulsion, notjust for a year or so, but for the foreseeable future.'心 Tolet Taiwan stay for the foreseeable future, Beijing must be admitted also, so, in Kissinger's words, "if we opt for Peking's membership in the UN, it brings us very close to an unspoken two China
1:_.. ..33
poltcy.
But how unspoken was this strategy in actuality? Even though Nixon and Kissinger were trying to seduce Beijing with a one China strategy, they were actually practicing two Chinas in the UN. Kissinger tried to convince Zhou Enlai that "this is temporarily one China, one Taiwa日，，，34and that "[if the U.S. resolution passed) it will make it easier next year to moderate our policies in the UN.'
,
J5 Kissinger's goal was to convince Zhou to accept two Chinas in 19丸，but he did not elaborate on policies for the following year. This was how Kissinger explained the "important question variable"JOOoc #162, p 499, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVll, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 70 1 43.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
3100C #393, P 775, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationJ 49 1 49.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
"Ooc #344, p 658, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationJ
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
"Ooc #341, p 644, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationJ
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010)
1400c # 143, p 448, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationJ
70142.pdf(accessed Augllst 25, 2010)
l50 0c #162, p 506, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVll, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 70143.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
The Repub/ic (!/Ch川的 L的 IBallle i/1lhe UN
to Zholl Enlai: "You would be able to take the Security Council's seat to China, and a5 500n as you can get the two-thirds vote for explllsion, you would be the only representative of China in the UN. ,,]6 He talked only abollt the "important question variable
,"
but did not emphasize that the "important question variable" "wollld have the effect that dual representa-tion would wi丸" which is what he told Nixon.J7Scholars and documents foclls mostly on negotiations that occurred
before Taiwan was expelled, but rarely disclIss what the United States was
prepared to do ifTaiwan had stayed. It was generally accepted that even if
"dllal representation complex" had passed, Beijing wOllld not have joined unless Taiwan left the UN. This is based on the assllmption that China was very Impo此antand that the whole world hoped to see Beijing instead
ofTaip巴 iin th巴 UN
However, Taipei's problem was that it pllrported to represent main-land China and occupied a permanent seat on the Secllrity COllncil. Tt followed 10gically then Ihat Beijing cOllld ask 10 resume its legal right in Ihe UN and expel Taipei. Had Taipei acted as Taiwan, where it enjoyed effective rule, and had Taipei stayed in the General Assembly like most other states, UN members wOllld likely have been more reluctant 10 expel it. Beijing sllrely wOllld force Taipei to leave, bllt Kissinger was hoping to "hold together a coalition of those who like Taip凹，those who dislike Peking, and those who are beholden to lIS, slIfficient to resist such a demand from Peking. ,,38
The White House's 1971 plan was essentially a remnant of U.S
strategies of the 1960s: "[our strategy] would stand a good chance of commanding m句。 ritysupport and thus blocking passage ofthe Albanian Resollltion. Moreover, if Peking retùsed to enter on this basis, the onllS for
]('Ooc #140, p4 日，FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 70 142.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010)
3700C #342, P 645, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents!or且amzat叩n! 49 1 48.pdf(accessed August25, 2010)
J8 Ooc #341, P 640, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov!documents/organization/ 491 48.pdf(accessed August 25, 2010)
ISSUES 挂 STUDIES
its non-participation would be squarely on Peking."39 The only major
re-vision was that Beijing would get the Security Council seat and the United
States would pubJicly suppo前此. lf Beij ing stilJ re如 sed to join the UN in order to force Taiwan to leave, it would not be surprising if an annoyed U.S. govemment re-used another J 960s strategy:40
Passage ofa dual representation resolution by the Assembly is unlikely to result
in Peking taking the seat in the immediate future, but could lead 10 a situation
in which the ROC representative is expelled from the Council (in order to 1l1ake
possible the offer ofthe seat to Peking) and the seat re1l1ains te1l1porarily vacant PRC me1l1bership on the Council is likely to increase pressures for Charter 悶，
叫別 on(something which we have generally opposed and to which, according to întelligence repo肘，Peking is also opposed) to enlarge the Council by the addition ofnew permanent members (e.g. Japan and/or ln帥，and perhaps the
FRG after it becomes a member of the UN), to do away with the permanent mcmber veto, or to add new permanent mem bers without the right of veto. 1 f Charter revision continues to appear inadvisable or unobtainable, one possible but unlikely solution rnight be agreement in the respective regional caucuses to give states such as Japan, lndia or Brazil sem卜pe口nanentmember status
through repeated elections to the Council
Finally, should the seat remain empty for any substantial period oftime, thjs
might lead to pressures to reassigll it to another Asian power (again Japan and India would be the logical contenders), a factor which Peking would also have
to take into aCCQunt
ln other words, the American strategy entailed forrning a two Chinas framework in the UN and forcing the PRC to accept it by threatening to deprive China of its position on the Security Council. If Taipei had been moved to the General AssembJy but Beijing had still refused to join the Security Council, it was possible that the United States would have
pro-posed promoting Japan or lndia to the Security Council in an attempt to provoke Beijing to join. It would be almost unthinkable for Beiji 呵 to accept Japan, China's long-standing enemy, becoming a world power by
Beijin皂'sabsence. As for lndia, although there had been a military contlict
J9Doc #341, p 639, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, bttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 49148.pdf (accessed August 25,2010)
40Doc #352, P 680, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationl 49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010)
The Repllblic oJChina:， μIsl Batlle川 ，heUN
with the PRC in the early 1960s
, Indi
a had always supported the PRC asthe legitimate representative of China in the UN because of its leadership
of the non-aligned movement. Its effort to expel Taiwan from the General Assembly would be in doubt if India was a replacement candidate for China on the Security Council
Chiang Kai-shek法Two-ProngedDiplomacy
Between late-1970 and late-March 1971, Beijing gained eight allies Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Italy, Ethiopi丸 Chi 峙，Nigeria, Kuwa此，and
Cameroon. Ofthe eight, five had switched recognition from Taipei. This was a direct result of the unfavorable vote on Chinese representation in 1970, when the Albanian Resolution was passed by two votes (51 :49) Luckily for the ROC, the "irnportant question" passed 66:52 before the Albanian Resolution was put to the vote, and thus a two-thirds majority
was necessary to change the representation of China
Nixon commented that "th巴 oldman [President Chiang Ka 卜 shek]is
partly a realistic figure 叫1 Chiang Kai-shek may have been stubbom, but he was not dumb. He was aware that many cbanges had taken place in the
world and the ROC consequently needed to adjust its China policy. He had considered putting Taiwan under UN trusteeship and withdrawing his anny from Kinmen in 1950 when the world was against him, and he was
prepared to ditch the one China principle in both 1961 and 1966 when the
prospects for the UN looked unfavorable. lt is therefore not surprising that he adjusted his position on Chinese legitimacy in 1971. His chal1enge was
to make this adjustment look good
Chiang, like the US presidents he dealt wi咐，had to face domestic dis-sent on policy changes. If the M inistry of Foreign Aflairs, for instance,
gave the slightest attention to Japanese or American opinions on UN policy that differed from those of the ROC, senior legislators or influential party leaders were quick to attack the govemment for being in favor of two
41 Doc #342. p 654‘ FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. hllp://www.state.gov/documents/or且anization/ 49 1 48.pdf(accessed AlIgllst 25, 2010)
ISSUES & STUDIES
Chinas.42 Both the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly proposed
imaginative ways to secure the ROC's world status. Some wanted to launch a "Charter Protection Movement" in the UN to guarantee the ROC's seat on
the Security Council because the UN Charter still recognized the ROC as a
permanent member of the Security Council
,
while others proposed usingChinese morals and culture to inf1uence the views of other countries:J A
former foreign minister and senior pa即 leader，Huang Shaogu (黃少谷)，
suggested that the ROC propose to abolish the Security Council's veto
power in an effort to win the friendship of smaller countries and thus
im-prove the ROC's popularity:4 Obviously, more than twenty years into
the Cold War, many of the political elite in Taiwan still had no realistic
awareness of the state of world affairs and therefore stood firmly by their
one China principle
ln these circumstances, Chiang's best strategy was to feign a one
China stance while quietly acquiescing in Washington's two Chinas
pro-posal. Ifthe UN vote was favorable, Chiang would be celebrated for
secur-ing the ROC's position in the UN
,
and if the PRC refused to join, Taipeiwould remain the sole representative of China in the UN. If the vote was
unfavorable, domestic politicians would still respect Chiang for upholding
the ROC's historic nationalist mission and the one China principle
Taipei 世 PromptResponse 10 Dual Representation
As usual, official discussions between Washington and Taipei on UN
strategy began around February 1971. The United States formally advised
Taipei that the best way to win over the 1971 General Assembly was to
42Reference Note, Executive Yuan to MOFA, 3/9/1971, in "Lianheguo wodaibiaoquan
-yibanxin shiwult (Chinese representation in thc UN- general a仟'airs) ，from December 19,
1970 to Junc 29, 1971, IOF: 90019/640, MOFA
4JSCC in Letter, Liu Dongyen from National Assembly to MOFA, ibîd., and DallllG Wanbao
(Dahua Evening News), 8/6/1971, in "Zhongguo waijiao zhengce yu duiwaiguanxi" (C hi-nese foreign policy and foreign relations), from February 1, 1967 to November 狗，1971, Department of North American Affairs Files, 411.1/0043, MOFA
抖 Letter，the Nationalist Party to MOFA, 911511971, in "Lianda di e悶hiliujiewodaibiaoquan
zaxian" (Collected information on Chinese representation in the 26th tJN General
As-sembly) from July 29, 1971 to October 13, 1971, IOF: 90088/640, MOFA
The Repuhlic ojChil1a's Last Battle;17 the UN
pllt forward a proposal that featured one China with two di 仟erentseats
According to Taipei's records, U.S. officials pointed Ollt that in this way,
Beijil1g "would 110t enter for at least another three to five years."叫' tar吵yof State Wi川lli昀al11 Rogers evel1 pr閃edict巴吋d tωo Ni以XOI1t仙ha剖tTaiwan 111叫11咆ght1t t
6
have lIP tωo fOll盯ryear悶sWlt出h t出hi的sp抖lan.'峙
Since Taipei and Beijing would have separate seats under this propo
-sal, any 1110tions to expel the ROC wOllld require the Security Council's consent- an impossibility, because the United States would exercise its veto- as well as a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. The ROC wanted to use the "impo口antquestion" strategy again to defeat the AI -banian Resolution, and replied that coexistence with Communist China was unacceptable becallse it was against Taipei's fundamental interests
However, on March 15, without any pressure or concessiol1s from Washington, Chiang Kai-shek informed the ROC's ambassador to the United States that he, in essence, accepted Washington's "new proposal,"
but would not allow this strategy to affect the ROC's position on the Sec ur-ity Council47 [n l11id-April, Nixon sent his special envoy, Robert Murphy,
to Taiwan to officially accept Chiang's request. The United States would
safeguard the ROC's seat on the Security Coul1cil while the dual represe n-tation proposal was introduced in the UN
The United States did not communicate any further details 011 the UN
votil1g strategy after Murphy's departu悶，so Taipei essel1tially relied 011 Murphy to cOl1vey its message al1d awaited the ol1comil1g battle. However, after Kissil1ger visited Beijin皂，the situatior>seemedvery unpromising. 011
JlIly 23, Taipei asked the U.S. govemment to keep its promise al1d adopt E 仟ectivemeasures to secure the ROC's seat on the Security Council
45See abovc information in "Lianda daibiaoquan yinYlngjinguo jiyao" (Summary of dealings with UN Chinese representation), from Oclober 7, 1971 to OClober 1 日，1971，10F 640/ 90038, MOFA. The U.S. officia1s were Jenkins, Shoesmi 叭，and Fc1dman from Ihc Slale Department
峙。oc#342, p 654, FRUS 1969-76 Vo1 V. hllp://www.slale.gov/docllments/。也anization/ 49148.pdf (accessed AlI自usl25, 2010)
47Sce in "Lianda daibiaoquan yinyingjinguo jiyao."
ISSUES & STUDIES
Secretary Rogers said that Washington wanted to comply, but after con-sulting with other countries, it could only guarantee the ROC's UN seat
by admitting Beiji 月'sright to the China seat in the dual representation proposal.48
Although Washington's response contradicted Murphy's promise,
Taipei's response was cool. On July 25, the ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs formally informed the U.S. govemment that the ROC itselfwould have to speak against the dual representation proposal, and requested the
United States not to comment on which party should take the Security Council seat. Taipei 如此herrequested that the United States oppose any
motions to amend the proposal and give the seat to Beijing.49 Meanwhile, Chiang adjusted his definition of "being opposed to two Chinas": he
in-structed his ambassador to speak, but not necessarily vote, against "dual representation. ,,50 Taipei already knew that it would lose its Security
Coun-cil seat, and simply asked the United States not to publicly agree with or
facilitate this result
On August 2, Secretary Rogers fo口nallyrevealed Washington's
pro-posal 10 the world. The United States would suppo口 thePRC's admission
to the UN, but would oppose the expulsion ofthe ROC. Honoring Taipei's
request, Rogers did not acknowledge Beijin臣'sright to a seat on the
Secur-ity Council, but remarked only that the seating problem would be a decision
for all UN members
Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang suggests that because Taipei was reluctant to
agree 10 Beijing's admission, fTiendly states were unaware ofthe ROC's
at-titude toward "dual representation" and this was a key reason why Taiwan
was defeated in the UN.51 This argument is problematic, however, because
Taip凹 'sallies would have known its real intention. On August 19
,
the ROC481bid 491bid
50Chien Fu, Chien FII hlliyilu (The memoi月 ofChienFu), vol. I (Taipei: Tianxia, 2005), 151
Chien was director ofNortb American afTairs in the ROC Foreign Ministry from 196910 1972 as well as bcing ROC foreign minister from 199010 1996
5lChang, "Taiwan's Policy," 231.32
The Rψublic ofChil1a's Last Ballle il7 the UN
Foreign Ministry directed its ambassadors to infon甘 hostcountries that the ROC opposed giving the Security Council seat to Beijing, but al Ihe same lime, foreign posts were instructed to "verbally" request that host countries support "dual representation" and "disregard [the ROC's official] attitude.叫
There is written proof of these directions. For examp峙，on August 24, Malawi received a "strictly confidential" memorandum from the Embassy ofthe ROCS3
For the pu叩oseofproviding an altemative to the so-called Albanian draft reso-lution which prescribes the expulsion ofthe Republic ofChina as a sine qua non to the seating ofthe Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations, and with a vicw to defeating such a resoJution, a proposal known as "Oual Representa-tion" has been advanced by Govemments friendly to the Republic ofChina, in collaboration with those Govemments which maintain a fair and just attitudc toward the matter. Although the Republic ofChina, for obvious reasons, cannot itselfsubscribe to this fonnula, the endorsement given to said proposal by the Govemment ofthe Republic of Malawi will ensure its adoption. Fu吐henno悶， any attempt to prevent the adoption of"Dual Representation" proposal . .. must be efTectively opposed and rejected
On September 8, the United States told Taiwan that, because its pro-posal had failed 10 receive sufficient endorsement, it was now necessary to add an additional arlicle assigning the Security Council seat to Beijing. ln other words, Ihe Uniled States would replace "dual representation" with "dual representation complex," which stated clearly that Beijing should take over the Security COllncil seat
lt is likely that the ROC was humiliated because Washington's pref-erence for Beijing demonstrated its new allegiance. BlIt, again, Taip凹 's response was measured. On September 11, the ROC Foreign Ministηsent telegrams to all its overseas missions informing them thal il was inappro-priate for the ROC 10 request host countries 10 support the U.S. proposal, and that, for the moment, host countries should look to the United Slates and the ROC's olher allies for indications as to whether to vote in favor of
52See note 47 above
SJMemorandum, ROC Embassy to Malawi Ministry 01' External AfTairs, August 24, 1971, 仙"Admissionof Communist China to the UN" (1 0-1-7R/37506/EA 12116), National Archives of Malawi
ISSUES 挂 STUDIES
"dual representation complex." If host countries asked about the ROC's position on the matter, diplomatic missions should simply say that they
were waiting for Taipei's response
Kissinger prophesied that "Chiang Kai-shek would tìnd it intolerable
if the United States openly suppo此edor acquiesced in depriving Taipei of
its Security Council seat. Taipei might very well prefer to walk out of
the UN rather than accept such a development."S4 However, that did not
happen. Taipei's quandary took only about ten days to resolve internally
When the United States officially submitted "dual representation complex"
to the UN on September 22, Taipei simultaneously released news ofan
of-tìcial policy change: ambassadors were to tell host countries that the ROC
would understand their endorsement of "dual representation complex" if
they felt that it was truly in the ROC's best interests.ss
On September 27, the Foreign Ministry re-published this order with
detai led instructions. The revised version inforrned all missions tbat even
though "dual representation complex" violated the ROC's position
,
because tts purpose was ωsecure the ROC's place in the UN, Taipei would fullyunderstand if its allies supported the proposal. To prevent
misunder-standings, the Foreign Ministry attached to this memorandum a message
in English that diplomats were forbidden to allow host countries to see in
written form. The ROC's diplomats were again to "verbally" convey the
following message:S6
1 f the govemment of [the host country] in its own judgment co-sponsors and/or
supports [the contents of the Dual Representation Complex], it would have the
full understanding of the govemmcnt of the ROC
For the moment, the ROC could relax. Using "dual representation
complex" to help pass "impo口antquestion variable" worked. On October
2, Taipei estimated tbat the result ofthe "impo此antquestion variable" vote
S4Doc #341, p 642, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationJ
49148.pdf (accessed AugusI 25, 2日10)
55See note 47 above.
56Telegram, Foreign Minister Zhou to all Diplomatic Posts Abroad, 9/27八 971 ，in "Ershiliujie
lianheguo daibiaoquan wenti" (Chinese representation in the 26th UN General Assembly),
fromSeptember 15, 1971 toOctober27, 1971, IOF: 900311640, MOFA
The Republic ofChil1a's Lasl ßattle il1lhe UN
would be sixty-three votes for, sixty-one against, three abstentions, and
four unknown (but about which the ROC was optimistic).5J The U.S. mis-sion to the UN shared Taipei's optimism5R Three days later, however, the
White House announced that Kissinger would soon be making another
visit to Beijing. Taipei re-estimated the results ofthe "important question
variable" vote on October 8, notably with more pessimism: sixty votes
for, sixty-three against, and six abstentions. Although the U.S. delegation
struggled hard on Taipei's behalf, Kissinger's visit inflicted damage.
Kis-singer was leaving for Beijing around October 20, and at that tim巴， the
United States released its most optimistic estimate of the "important ques-tion variable" result:日的-eightfor, fí fty-seven against, and fifteen ab-stentions, while Taiwan anticipated a vote of 58:60: 12. On October 22, the ROC ambassador to the United States informed Taipei that "the situation
is at a stalemate; all estimations of votes are extremely close. ,,59 Two days later, a phone call from Nixon pushed Argentina into the "maybe for" cate-go旬，and the last projection of the "important question variable" result
was 58:5860
Tbe situation was so tense that nobody could reliably predict the vote
At 16:00 Taipei time (04:00 New York time) on October 25, 1971, Chiang
made tbe following speech in the National Security Conference:61 Our permanent seat in the UN Security Council has become a token seat. 10
h口，for a very long time, other powers have derecognized our position as a permanent member ofthe Security Council. Whenever critical questions arose,
they did not listen to US, and decisions were always made by a couple of big
powers. It is a humiliation for us to Sil as a permanenl member ofthe Security Council. This is a national disgrace. Therefore, I am considering withdrawing frorn the UN when the appropriate time comes.. Ifwe must lose Qur baule
"Chien, Chiel1 Fu huiyilu, 155
58Accinelli, IIln Persuit ofa Modus Vivendi," 37
59Telegrnm, James T. H. Shen from Washington, D.C. to Taipei, 10/2211971, in "Ershiliujie
lianda daibiaoquanan meiguo Iichang" (American position on Chinese representation in
the 26th UN General Assembly) from Au且ust5, 1971 to October 16, 1971, IOF: 90003/ 640.635, MOFA
60Chien, Chien Fu hlliyilll, 155-58
61Con ference Note, 30th National Security Conference, 10/2511971, in "Lianda zhon且guo
daibiaoquan wenti z句 uan"(Collected file of UN Chinese representation), from August 29,
1970 to August 29, 1971, IOF: 900811640, MOFA
ISSUES & STUDIES
in the UN, we should make it an honorable exit rather than a shameful one Maintaining the dignity and honor of our country is far more important than keeping a seat in the UN. Sincc there is no justice and law in the UN today, it has become a filthy place, so why does it deserve 0山 attachment? 80th the resolutions on UN Chinese representation, that is, the AJbanian and American (dual repr自entationcomplex) proposals, violate the UN Charter. The only difference between them is the degree to which they deprive us of our rights. .. Thus, before the voting on the Albanian proposal takes place, we should withdraw 府omthe UN. Even when voting on the American proposal,
we should vote against or absent ourselves from the balioting. Now 1 am mak.ing this decision in the pos山onofthe (Chinese) revolutionary leader. We wili keep the honor of our country ra也erthan a shameful seat
More importantly, Chiang's speech was followed by supplementary written instructions on his UN strategy
1. If the "important question variable" cannot be discussed first, or if it fails to pass, we wili announce our withdrawal before the Albanian Resolution vote accurs. We can wait a little to see if a revision of this proposal is in progress
Ifnot, the Albanian Resolution wili surely pass, and we must withdraw before it is put to the vote
2. Ifthe "important question variable" passes and the Albanian Resolution fails,
when the U.S. "dual representation complex" is putto the v。峙，we should speak against it because it violates Article 23 of the UN Charter. Even though this
proposal supports our membership in the UN, its contents recommend that the
Communists take our seat on the Security Council. We wili protest "dual re-presentation complcx," boycott the vote on 叭.and make appropriate announce-ments after the proposal passes. We wili also see ifthe Communists are coming and make further just and honorable statements. Ifthe U.S. proposal 時間vised
and disse叫edby disapproving countries, we should vote for the articles that
support Ql1r rnembersh巾，but vote against the rest
Chiang's last instructions are revealing evidence of the ROC's UN strategy. On the one hand, the ROC opposed any measures that violated its legitimacy as the govemment of China, but on the other hand, it had tacitly agreed to two Chinas. The public heard Chiang's impressive instruction t。 "vote against" "dual representation complex," but his real intention was contained in the following words: "or absent ourselves from the balloting." Prior to that day
,
Taipei had informed the United States that it would ab-stain,62 the same method of acceptance as it had adopted in 1966. Th巴62Chang, "Taiwan's Policy toward the U.S.," 231
The Republic oJChina's Lasl Ballle il1lhe凹
written instruction was even more f1exible一-Chiangordered his UN
repre-sentatives to "speak agains丸" "protest
,
"
or "boycott,
"
but said nOlhingabout voting againsl
Given these statements, even if "dual represenlation complex" had passed, Taipei would likely have left the conference room temporarily to
save face. Considering Taipei's tacit acceptance of two Chinas
,
however,
Chiang's mention of the "just and honorable statement" and the makingof "appropriate statements" would likely have meant quietly accepting reality.
Compared to previous negotiations on strategy changes, there
ap-pear to have been fewer disputes between Taipei and Washington in 1971
Without any pressure from the U.S. president and even though Washington had broken its promise, Taipei's response to Washinglon's lwo Chinas pro posal was prompt, calm, and cooperative. It accepted the dual represe nta-tion concept as soon as the bilateral talk began, and tacitly accepted the
fact that Beijing would oblain the Security Council seat once the United States had adopted the "dual representation complex" strategy. The ROC
was obviously willing to pay any price for its seat in the UN, even if it was only in the General Assembly. lts one China statements were only a
mask for its new position
Conc\usion
"T，如何markablething abollt the 電fJortto preserνe a place for the Repllblic ofChina in the 26th General Assembly was not that it
failed, bllt that itfailed so narrow紗" - US Stale Department6J
The results of the 1971 vote are well known. The U.S. "important question variable" proposal was defeated by four votes (59:55, with 17 ab-stentions or absentees). The Albanian Resolution was then passed by a
6JDoc#455, P 917, Foreign Relaliol1s oJlhe Uniled 81叫自 (FRUS)1969-76 Vol V, hltp://
www.state.gov/documents/organizalion/49149.pdF (accessed Augusl 25, 2010)
ISSUES & STUDIES
wide margin. The vote in favor ofthe Albanian Resolution meant that dual
representation never had a chance to be tested
History claims that due to the rise of the PRC, Taiwan's failure was
pre-ordained. Nixon's pro-Beijing policy and Chiang's one China doctrine
became the scapegoats for Taipei's exc\usion rrom the UN. But the fact
was that ßeij ing was ready to lose the 1971 UN vote given Washington's
endeavors to secure Taiwan's seat.64 Although historical discussions
should not be based on events that never transpired, it is equally wrong to
fixate entirely on what did occur without investigating the preparations that had been made for a different outcome. Ifthe results ofthe votes had been
slightly different, history might have chosen to praise Chiang's two Chinas
diplomacy and Nixon's e仟ortsto secure the ROC's place in the UN
Scholars and politicians have rarely noted Taipei's compliance with Washington's two Chinas proposal or its endeavors to convince its allies
to accept this policy. As in the 1960s, there was still strong right-wing
pres-sure on the White House to support Taiwan
,
and the United States stillplanned to force Beijing's entry into the UN by diluting the importance
ofChina's seat. The major difference was that Chiang Kai-shek's response
to the United States was prompt and cooperative
Seeing the entirety of the negotiations and efforts between
Wash-ington and Taipei, we can logically assume that, had Taipei not lost the "important question variable" vote in 1971, the ROC's allies, inc\uding the
United States, would have pushed it toward a clearer two Chinas
rrame-work in order to guard against the Albanian Resolution in subsequent
years. Accordingly, Chiang (and his son) would have had to endure the
pressure of redefining Taipei's one China policy on an annual basis until it
satisfied UN members. Taiwan's destiny was not so pre-ordained
Unfortunately, the PRC replaced the ROC on the Security Council
and obtained veto power, so Taiwan was never able to rejoin the UN. Thus,
without the annual problem of securing its UN seat
,
the Chiangs and theirfellow Nationalists won a reprieve from extemal pressure and were able
64Ts剖."Zhonghua minguo個ichuLianheguo," 239-42
The R叩lIblicvfChil7a's Lasl Bal1le il7 Ihe UN
10 keep themselves hidden away in Iheir fo付ressofChinese legitimacy. AI
-Ihough a popular explanation for Taiwan's loss ofils UN seat was Chiang's
insistence on a rigid one China policy, in actuality the causality is reversed Chiang's one China policy appeared rigid because Taiwan lost its seat
BIßLlOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
1. VS State Oepartment Oocument. Foreign Relations of the Vnited States
(FRUS, see in www.state.gov, accessed on Aug 25, 20\0)
1. FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XX11:
Doc #13, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII. hllp://www.slate.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/O 1 t050.html
Doc #14, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/O 1 t050.html
Doc # 18, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/O 1 t050.html
Doc #28, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXIl/O 1 t050.html 2. FRUS 1964-68, Vo/ XXX:
Doc # 202, FRUS 1964-68 Vol XXX. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_ xxx/200 _ 209.html
Doc # 217, FRUS 1964-68,Yol XXX. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/ history/vol_xxx/210_219.html
Doc # 218, FRUS 1964-6日，VolXXX. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_xxx/21 。一219.html
Doc #219, FRUS 1964-68 Vol XXX. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_xxx/2 1 0_2 19.html 3. FRUS 1969-76， 的7/研
Doc #341, p 639, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/49 1 48.pdf.
ISSUES 挂 STUDIES
Doc #341, p 640, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/49148.pdf.
Doc #341, p 642, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/doculllents/
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Doc #341, P 644, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organizationl49148.pdf.
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organizationl49 1 48.pdf.
Doc #342, p 654, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/doculllents/
organization/49148.pdf.
Doc #344, P 658, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/doculllents/ organizationl49148.pdf.
Doc #352, p 680, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/documents/
organizationl49148.pdf.
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Doc#455, P 917, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V. http://www.state.gov/documents/
organizationl49149.pdf. 4. FRUS 1969-76， 的IXVII:
Doc #140, p 413, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII. http://www.state.gov/doculllents/
organizationl70 1 42.pdf.
Doc #143, p 448, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII. http://www.state.gov/documents/
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Doc #162, p 499, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XV1I. http://www.state.gov/doculllents/
organization/70 143.pdf.
Doc #164, P 537, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XV1I. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/70 143.pdf.
The ReplIblic ofChina's Lasl Battle in Ihe UN
n. ROC Foreign Ministry Files 仰'IO FA)
1. Department of International Organization Fi帥" Republic ofCh的a
(IOF, MOFA)
IOF: 88086/633.02, MOFA. Telegram, ROC Delegation ofthe UN to ROC Em-bassy in the USA, 8/2311961, in "Di shiliujie lienda daibiaoquan wenti" (Re-presentation issue in the 16th Assembly), August 22, 1961 to November 20, 1961
IOF: 90019/640, MOFA. Reference Note, Executive Yuan to MOFA, 3/911971, in
"Lia吋leguowodaibiaoquan- yibanxin shiwu" (Chinese representation in the UN- general a作airs)，from December 19, 1970 to June 29, 1971 IOF: 90031/640, MOFA . Telegram, Foreign Minister Zhou to all Diplomatic
Posts Abroad, 9/2711971, in "Ershiliujie lianheguo daibiaoquan wenti" (Chinese representation io tbe 26th UN General Assembly), from September 15,1971 to October 27,1971
IOF: 90038/640, MOFA. "Lianda daibiaoquan yinyingjinguo jiyao" (Summary of dealings with UN Cbinese representation), from October 7, 1971 to Oc-tober 18, 1971
rOF: 90043/640, MOFA, Repo此，Depury Foreign Minister Shen Qi to the Execu-tive Yuan, 12/111966, in "Daibiaoquanan yiban ziliao" (General information on the representation issue), November 1971
IOF: 900811640, MOFA. Conference Note, 30th National Security Conference,
10/2511971, in "Lianda Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti zajuan" (Collected file of UN Chinese representation)，行om August 29, 1970 to August 29,
1971
IOF: 90088/640, MOFA. Letter, the Nationalist Pa前Yto MOFA, 9115/1971, in "Lianda di ershili 吋 ie wodaibiaoquan zaxian" (Collected information on Chinese representation in the 26th UN General Assembly) from July 29,
1971 to October 13, 1971
IOF: 90003/640.635, MOFA. Telegram, James T. H. Shen from Washington DC to Taipei, 10/2211971, in "Ershiliujie lianda daibiaoquanan Meiguo lichang"
(American position on Chinese representation in the 26th UN General As sembly) from August 5, 1971 to October 16, 1971
2. Department of North American Affairs FU肘，Republic ofChina
Department ofNorth American Affi刮目 Files:411.1/0043, MOFA Dahua Wanbao
(Dahua Evening News), 8/6/1971, in "Zhongguo waijiao zhengce yu du
