中美強權政治下的生存之道：緬甸外交政策的變與常 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 治政碩士論文大. 立 Master’s Thesis ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. Nat. Navigating China-U.S. Nexus: (Dis) continuity of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy (1988-2013). n. al. er. io. 中美強權政治下的生存之道：緬甸外交政策的變與常. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Siriyakorn Kaewsangsai Advisor: Alan Hao Yang. 中華民國103年1月 January 2014.

(2) Navigating China-U.S. Nexus: (Dis) continuity of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy (1988-2013) 中美強權政治下的生存之道：緬甸外交政策的變與常. Student: Siriyakorn Kaewsangsai Advisor: Alan Hao Yang. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 國立政治大學. ‧. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. Nat. n. sit er. io. al. y. 碩士論文. Ch. e nAgThesis chi. i n U. v. Submitted to International’s Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In partial fulfilment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國103年1月 January 2014.

(3) Abstract. Navigating China-U.S. Nexus: (Dis) continuity of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy (1988-2013). Being sanctioned by the United States and its allies, Myanmar has long been isolated from the international community and become deeply dependent on China over the past. 政治大. twenty years. Until recently, the country embarked on political and economic reforms and expressed its desire to engage with other countries. The United States positively. 立. responded to the opening gesture, consequently the rapprochement between the two. ‧ 國. 學. countries was commenced. As the competition for influence between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia has long been existed, the shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy might. ‧. represent the new challenge in this tug-of-war. This research aims to investigate the continuity or rupture in Myanmar’s foreign policy trend and to re-assess the influence of. sit. y. Nat. China and the United States presented in Myanmar. The collected data is analysed qualitatively. The result of the study shows that despite the re-engagement in Myanmar-. io. n. al. er. U.S. relations, Myanmar-China relations remain cordial and the status of China-U.S. influence in Southeast Asia is not challenged.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Key Words: Burma, China-U.S. Influence in Southeast Asia, Myanmar, Myanmar’s Foreign Policy, Southeast Asian Affairs.. i.

(4) Table of Contents List of Tables .................................................................................................................... iv List of Figures .....................................................................................................................v. Chapter One: Introduction ..............................................................................................1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................1 Background of the Problem .....................................................................................1 Problem of the Study ...............................................................................................8. 治政 Purpose of the Study and Research Questions大 .......................................................10 Research Design立 and Methodology .......................................................................12 Significance of the Study .........................................................................................9. ‧ 國. 學. Assumption, Scopes and Limitation ......................................................................15. ‧. Chapter Two: China-U.S. Relations and Strategic Interactions in Southeast Asia ..18 China-U.S. China Relations ...................................................................................18. y. Nat. sit. Theoretical Perspectives: Balancing, Hedging and Bandwagoning ......................22. n. al. er. io. Further Discussion .................................................................................................43. Ch. i n U. v. Chapter Three: Myanmar’s National Concerns (Domestic Perspectives) ................46. engchi. Political Instability .................................................................................................46 Economic Struggles ...............................................................................................50 Military Insecurity .................................................................................................55 Non – Traditional Security Concern ......................................................................59 Further Discussion .................................................................................................63. Chapter Four: Myanmar’s Relations with China and the U.S. (External Perspectives) ....................................................................................................................69 Diplomatic and Political Relations ........................................................................69 Economic Relations ...............................................................................................74 ii.

(5) Traditional Security Relations ...............................................................................80 Non – Traditional Security Relations ....................................................................85 Further Discussion .................................................................................................89. Chapter Five: Conclusion ...............................................................................................92 Main Findings ........................................................................................................92 Discussion of the Main Findings .........................................................................104 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................107 Limitation and Recommendation for Future Research ........................................107. 治政 References ......................................................................................................................109 大立 ‧. ‧ 國 io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. Appendix II. 學. Appendix I. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(6) List of Tables Table 1: List of the names of scholars, students and journalists interviewed ..................15 Table 2: Military Leaders Visits between China and the United States, 1994 - 2014 .......22 Table 3: PRC’s Trade with the United States, 1982 - 2013 ...............................................25 Table 4: Statistics on debts owed to China that have been cancelled by the Chinese Government .......................................................................................................................27 Table 5: Southeast Asian states’ behaviour in response to China-U.S. influence competition .......................................................................................................................42 Table 6: Myanmar Economic Growth , 1981-2013 ..........................................................51. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iv. i n U. v.

(7) List of Figures Figure 1: China’s Annual Real GDP and Military Budget Growth, 2000 – 2009 .............20 Figure 2: U.S. and China’s Export of Goods to Selected Regions of the World in 2007..24 Figure 3: Myanmar’s External Reserve and Its Tendency, 2007-2013 ............................55 Figure 4: China Trade with Myanmar, 1988-2013 ............................................................76 Figure 5: U.S. Trade with Myanmar, 1992-2013...............................................................79. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v.

(8) Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Introduction As Southeast Asian countries enjoy fast economic growth, Myanmar seems to be falling far behind these stories of success. The country has long been living in the shadow of its label as a “pariah state’ (Steinberg 2001; Canning 2007; Kinley and Wilson 2007; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2008). Myanmar has been saddled with a regime of military rule and the consequent sanctions from Western countries which began two decades ago. While the United States acts as a forefront in pressuring the Burmese military regime, China approaches Myanmar closer and has turned itself into the most important ally for the. 政治大 countries, revealing glimpses 立 of political transformation to the international community.. country. Until recently, Myanmar signalled its intention to improve relations with other. al. er. io. 1.2.1 Myanmar’s Foreign Relations. sit. y. Nat. 1.2 Background of the Problem. ‧. ‧ 國. Burmese-U.S. has consequently taken place.. 學. Washington positively responded to the opening gesture and the rapprochement in. n. iv n C geopolitical and demographic aspects been the main concerns in formulating h e nhaveg always chi U. As Myanmar is located at the crossroads of Asia’s great powers, India and China,. its foreign policy. Moreover, the fact that the country is an ethnically diverse nation with 135 distinct ethnic groups means that the dynamic of the international system essentially matters as well internally (Tin Maung Maung Than 2010, 448-9). The military state has continually exercised a strict neutralism and subdued bilateral relations based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence”1 until the 1988 military crackdown which had shifted the nature of Myanmar’s diplomatic relations (Maung Aung Myoe 2006, 6).. 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004. According to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, “these principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.” 1.

(9) The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) started reviewing the selfimposed isolationist policy of the past as an irrelevant approach to the shifting international and regional security development. The country started working on narrowing the gap between itself and ASEAN in the early 1990s, and made a key gesture of its intention to join the group in 1995 (Maung Aung Myoe 2006, 9). The desire of Myanmar about the accession to ASEAN generated debate among member countries regarding the regime and human rights issues (Aung Zaw 2001, 41-43). However, Myanmar was finally accepted to join the group in July 1997, despite the controversy within the ASEAN (Alden 2010, 9-11).. 政治大 Some scholars attempt to investigate the reasons behind this diplomatic action. Haacke 立 believes that Myanmar has decided that it should no longer be isolated in this age of. ‧ 國. 學. globalization, and it should instead strengthen “friendly relations with international partners whose help is vital for its economic development” (2006, 9). Maung Aung. ‧. Myoe claims that besides following the flow of regionalism, joining the ASEAN group was perceived with delight by the military regime as it will receive financial support, gain. y. Nat. sit. regime legitimacy and still be able to retain the main intentions of its current foreign. n. al. er. io. policy (2006, 10-14).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The nature of Myanmar’s diplomatic relations shifted after the events of 1988 when the country was ruled by SLORC (McCarthy 2010, 330). Under the military rule, the country has traditionally relied on strict neutralism coupled with low-key bilateral relations (331). The regime has emphasized high value on an independent foreign policy and halted attempts at foreign interference in internal affairs. While implementing this non-aligned policy, the military took some diplomatic steps in order to support its economic policy. It developed bilateral relations with China, India, and Thailand and joined ASEAN in 1997 (Katanyuu Ruukun 2006, 830). While China was the first country to recognize the new military regime after the 1988 coup, and the frequent visits between the two countries. 2.

(10) paved the way for agreements on the military, economy and other cooperation, the United States instead applied sanctions and isolated Myanmar to force it into regime change.. For more than a decade, the military government proved the persistence of its independent foreign policy. Myanmar’s ties with China were considerably improved whereas the U.S. attempted to condemn Myanmar in the international community over its undemocratic regime and human rights violations. However, after a new government took office, Myanmar demonstrated its new attitude of being responsive to domestic pressure on over-dependence on China. Myanmar’s re-balancing of its relationship with. 政治大 after the visit of the Secretary of State in 2011. Myanmar has proved itself to be more 立 open recently by re-engaging with Western nations and preparing to take the ASEAN. China was evidenced when its relations with the U.S. were perceived to become closer. 1.2.2 China –Myanmar Relations: The Solid Friendship. Nat. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. chair in 2014 (BBC 2011).. China-Myanmar relations have been established since ancient times with hundreds of. io. er. years of cultural exchange. In terms of contemporary history, the founding of the. al. n. iv n C U h ehave The ties between the two countries since late 1980s, and China n gchanged c h i drastically. People’s Republic of China was the beginning of new era in Sino-Myanmar relations.. is seen by Myanmar as its important ally until the present. (Arnott 2001, 69). Although China’s cooperation with Myanmar in some areas is not as deep as with other states, China nurtures its ties with Myanmar through the traditional term ‘paukphaw’ which means brotherhood (Li 2007, 49). By the end of the 1980s, Myanmar had suffered difficult situations both economically and politically, leading to the series of military crackdowns and the establishment of SLORC in consequence (Pels 2008, 15). Under military rule with a strong political stance, Myanmar was blocked from the international community by subsequent sanctions mainly because of its human rights violations and 3.

(11) undemocratic regime, and China remained the only one strong alliance that Myanmar had left (Pels 2008, 15-16). According to Li (2007, 49), China overlooked Western criticism of Myanmar and decided to establish a special relationship with the isolated nation. As a result, isolation allowed the ties between China and Myanmar to be even more tightly (Clapp 2010, 409).. Despite the uncertainty of the military regime, a strong political relationship between the two countries has been manifested through the frequent exchange of visits by top leaders (Li 2007, 50). China’s top leaders have visited Myanmar at least 7 times; similarly,. 政治大 2001). Moreover, China and Myanmar support each other when dealing with important 立 and global and regional issues. China provides political protection at the United Nations. Myanmar’s top leaders have visited China more than 9 times since the 1950s (Arnott. ‧ 國. 學. Security Council, and Myanmar consistently support “One China policy” (Li 2007, 51).. ‧. Whilst the bilateral relations have been deepening, Myanmar starts seeking new allies. y. Nat. sit. (Yun 2011). Recently, Myanmar has demonstrated opening signs to the outside world. al. er. io. that it wishes to improve its relationship with others by establishing initiatives on. n. political and economic reform. It is believed that the release of political prisoners. Ch. i n U. v. including Aung San Suu Kyi, granting of more freedom to the public, and the acceptance. engchi. of the 2012 election of the civil-backed government are deliberate signals to the international community (Barta 2012).. Although China has publicly approved the. relationship of Myanmar with others, after all of these opening gestures to the West, China has appeared nervous about Myanmar’s relations with its new allies (Bristow 2011).. 4.

(12) 1.2.3 Myanmar-U.S. Relations: The Rapprochement Myanmar and U.S. relations over the past few decades have been characterized as an aloof, but stressful relationship. The series of military crackdowns in September 1988 and the establishment of the SLORC seem to be the beginning of the United States’ isolationist policy towards Myanmar (Steinberg 2006, 209). As Washington’s main diplomatic purpose in general is the promotion of democracy and human rights, the fact that the SLORC employed violence to suppress protests, refuted the validity of election results and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest consequently harmed Myanmar’s cordial relationship with the U.S. (Contemporary Southeast Asia 2010).. 立. 政治大. The worsening of the diplomatic fall-out was evidenced by the downgrading of the U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. representative from Ambassador to Chargé d’Affaires in 1990, the termination of the diplomatic mission in the same year, and the decision to retain the relation at the Chargé. ‧. d’Affaires level until recently. Despite the changes in U.S. government during the 1990s to 2000s, the relationship between the two countries remained troubled; the U.S.. sit. y. Nat. government maintained limited contact with Myanmar’s government and did not permit. io. Service 2012, 7).. n. al. er. new investment in Myanmar by U.S. individuals or entities (U.S. Congressional Research. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Shortly after Myanmar signalled its intentions for reform, the U.S. secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, was dispatched to Myanmar, revealing U.S. hopes for improving the relationship. Clinton also indicated the steps that Myanmar’s government would have to take to further improve relations including; •. The release of all political prisoners and the establishment of rule of law in Burma;. •. The cessation of hostilities in ethnics’ areas, and allowing international humanitarian groups, human rights monitors and journalists access to conflict areas; 5.

(13) •. Effort to seek a ‘true political settlement’ with Burma’s opposition and ethnic groups;. •. The continuation of the democratization process and the holding of free and fair parliamentary by-elections ‘in a timely manner’;. •. The creation of a broader space for political and civic activities;. •. The implementation of legislation protecting the ‘universal freedom of assembly, speech, and association;’ and. •. Compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 [which impose sanctions on North Korea] and the severance of military ties with North Korea (U.S. Library of Congress 2012, 28-29).”. 立. 政治大. When the Secretary of State Clinton returned home, the U.S. government decided to ease. ‧ 國. 學. sanctions banning investment followed by the European Union and Australia which also suspended certain sanctions on Myanmar (Norman and Hookway 2012). The United. ‧. States Treasury Department has issued a general directive authorizing certain financial transactions in support of humanitarian, religious, and other non-profit activity in. sit. y. Nat. Myanmar (Bangkok Post 2012). In May, Derek J. Mitchell was nominated the first American ambassador to Myanmar since 1990 (Myers 2012). These developments are. io. n. al. er. indicative of the improvement in the bilateral relationship.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.2.4 Southeast Asia in the China – U.S. Tug of War: Bandwagoning, Hedging and Balancing The result of serial military crackdowns on the pro-democracy protests in Myanmar in 1988 has shaped the country’s diplomatic relations with great powers – China and the United States – in paradoxical directions. While its relations with China have been growing stronger and stronger, the incident led Myanmar into consequent sanctions imposed by the U.S. (Storey 2007, 15). As China starts to be considered as the potential regional hegemon, geo-political friction with the U.S., whose influence has been previously dominant in the region, was generated (Friedberg 2005, 7). 6.

(14) There has been a long and intriguing debate amongst scholars of international relations theories regarding the provision of policy options for states facing an emerging power or hegemon. The terms ‘bandwagoning,’ ‘hedging,’ and ‘balancing’ have been commonly used among scholars to analyse Southeast Asian states’ reactions to the China-U.S. nexus. Among these three terms, scholars tend to see Myanmar as a bandwagoning state rather than a balancer toward regional hegemons (Chung 2010; Roy 2005).. 政治大. While its economic ties with China seem to be deepened, Vietnam seems to suffer from the trade ties with China due to trade competitiveness and unequal job opportunities. 立. (Chen and Yang 2013, 291). Combined with the strategic concerns which derive from a. ‧ 國. 學. geographical proximity, history and South China Sea disputes, Vietnam is considered to adopt the soft-balancing strategy against China (292-294). Conversely to its neighbour,. ‧. Cambodia is evidently pursuing the bandwagoning strategy toward China (295). Cambodia not only perceives low threat from China but also gains considerable benefits. sit. y. Nat. from partnership activities with Beijing including military assistance, political support,. io. er. direct investment and foreign aid (295-298).. al. n. iv n C Singapore is hedging its interesthand e ndognotc wish h i toUside with any major powers (299302). Despite the concern over the sea navigation, Singapore is not acutely alarm by the. fact that China’s presence in the sea has become more eminent (300). Moreover, the country, amongst its neighbouring countries, has enjoyed the benefit from the economic ties without losing its trade deficit to China (301). Thailand has been pursuing classic hedging strategies trying to maintain good relations with both China and the United States simultaneously (Roy 2005, 312). Many Thais perceive the United States quite positively. The U.S. has been a significant arms provider for Thailand, and the two countries conduct military exercises annually. On the other hand, Thailand has a strong bilateral economic cooperation with China, and tries to accommodate Beijing by criticizing Taiwan and not welcoming Dalai Lama and Falun Gong (312-313). Despite 7.

(15) growing economic and warm diplomatic ties, the Philippines clearly perceives an external threat from China especially from South China Sea dispute. Although the agreement allowing American base in the country was terminated in 1991, Philippines realized that it became too weak militarily to be against China, so that the military ties with the United States was strengthened again with an American regular military exercise (314-315).. In the case of Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore as an example of the lack of balancing behaviour in Asia (Kang 2003, 61-62). Even if Vietnam has been through several difficult historical moments with China including the current issue on. 政治大 indication proving that Vietnam has no intention to balance against China (61-63). 立 Moreover, as the military ties between the United States and Philippines, Indonesia, Spratly Islands, deepening economic agreement and tourism cooperation are the. ‧ 國. 學. Malaysia and Singapore are maintained, these countries simultaneously engage with China (63). However, Kang’s argument was criticized as treating the term. ‧. ‘bandwagoning’ as an economic engagement and failing to encompass security considerations in his analysis. Moreover, economic cooperation can be existed even. y. Nat. sit. amidst an intensify situation between the two governments, and it unnecessarily forestalls. n. al. er. io. military conflict (Acharya 2003/4, 152 and Roy 2005, 307-08).. Ch. 1.3 Problem of the Study. engchi. i n U. v. As mentioned earlier, the influence of the United States and China over Myanmar evidently have detrimental effects on Myanmar’s interactions with other countries. Following the pro-democracy uprising in 1988, China has become Myanmar’s staunchest ally who provides financial support and acts as political umbrella against international criticism for the country (Li 2007, 49-55). Although the reciprocal relations with China have benefited the country both in various aspects, it is conjectured that some Burmese elites are concerned about Myanmar’s over-dependence on China (Roy 2005, 319).. 8.

(16) Myanmar’s recent opening gesture draws growing attention throughout the region and attracts a number of potential new allies. After a series of reforms by the civil-backed government, the country has become a host welcoming many world leaders and diplomats to the country. The landmark visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Naypyidaw in December 2011 raised questions from observers as to whether this would usher in a new chapter in Myanmar’s relations with the U.S. (Myers 2011.) Despite the uncertainty over the government’s long-term commitment to political reform, reengaging with Myanmar could unleash the country’s economy and open a new and vibrant market in Asia for the U.S. (Quinn 2011).. 政治大 China-U.S. geopolitical friction has been heated for quite some time, but it still remains 立 under control as the two countries tried to avoid falling into the trap of confrontation and. ‧ 國. 學. escalation. While evidence of major power’s competition has been investigated in many Southeast Asian countries, no such competition has been studied in Myanmar. As having. ‧. been closely tied with China, the changing situation may bring about the new challenge of Myanmar in responding to the two giants’ manoeuvres. Besides, prior studies on. y. Nat. sit. Myanmar’s recent transition, particularly regarding its foreign affairs, have been mixed. al. er. io. and contradictory. It could be conjectured that Myanmar became acutely aware that its. n. international isolation was deepening its dependence on China, an unwelcome situation. Ch. i n U. v. which led the nation to seek to improve its relations with other countries (Roy 2005,. engchi. 319). On the other hand, it is argued that despite its reform initiatives, the military-backed government may possibly claim that reforms have been ineffective and rescind upon them, particularly if the U.S. does not give a substantive response (Steinberg 2001).. 1.4 Significance of the Study Due to its non-alignment policy combined with the persisted political uncertainty, Myanmar’s interaction with other countries had been minimal. Over the past twenty years, the pattern of interaction in Myanmar’s foreign policy is tentatively viewed as having China as the main supporter and the United States as the perpetual opponent. 9.

(17) Until recently, the competition for influence between the two major powers has been widely studied in Southeast Asia countries except in Myanmar because Beijing influence over Naypyidaw is knowingly overwhelming, and the Myanmar-U.S. relations are deeply estranged. Consequently, scholarly works in this regard are rarely found in pertinent literature.. When the Burmese government implemented political and economic reforms and expressed its desire to re-engage with the West, the relationship between Naypyidaw and Washington was lifted up to the whole new level. As the rapprochement have just. 政治大 and the U.S. in Myanmar remains minimal. This research offers to conduct an extensive 立 review and analysis on the particular subject to fulfil such gap in the body of literature. commenced, the comparative study related to competition for influence between China. ‧ 國. 學. Moreover, the recent improvements in Myanmar-U.S. relationship have sparked the intention academically whether Myanmar is genuinely going through transition in its. ‧. foreign relations with the two major powers. It is also worth investigating why the Burmese government has suddenly decided to transform the country in various aspects. y. Nat. n. er. io. al. sit. after more than 20 years of isolations.. 1.5 Purpose of the Study C and Research Questions n. hengchi U. iv. This research attempts to explore why the Myanmar’s military government should have suddenly decided to undergo such significant changes and to examine how the country balances its relations with the two major powers in order to pursue and ensure its best national interests. The expected contribution of this thesis is adding a fresh insight analysis on Myanmar’s foreign relations with China and the U.S. to current literature body. The main objective of this study is to investigate how Myanmar positions itself in the China - U.S. tug-of-war. In order to obtain a well-rounded answer for the research’s central question, four pillar questions are constructed as a guideline for extensive and thorough study. 10.

(18) 1. How have Myanmar’s relationships with China and the U.S. changed since 1988?. This question examines the evolution in Myanmar’s relations with China and the U.S. since the military coup in 1988. Viewing from an external perspective, the driving forces of the two respective countries in engaging with Myanmar are also investigated.. 2. What are Myanmar’s internal concerns?. 政治大 countries. As mention earlier, the shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy took place for a few 立 times over the past twenty years. This question is created in order to explore the link. Domestic issues play an important role in shaping Myanmar’s relations with other. ‧ 國. 學. between Myanmar’s internal issues and its changing position in foreign affairs.. ‧. 3. Which strategic theories – balancing, hedging, or bandwagoning – could be the most. sit. y. Nat. plausible and understandable explanation for Myanmar’s current foreign policy towards. io. er. China and the United States?. al. n. iv n C the dominant characteristics in relationship h e n g cbetween h i Umajor powers and secondary states. The realist term of balancing, hedging and bandwagoning are commonly used to identify. in Southeast Asia. Myanmar has been normally viewed as a bandwagoner to China for many years. However, there has been a shift in the pattern of Myanmar’s foreign policy recently; thus, its relationship with China and the U.S. should be reassessed in the particular term.. 4. What are the driving forces of continuity or rupture in Myanmar’s foreign policy toward China and the U.S. from 1988-2013?. 11.

(19) Myanmar’s has recently gone through shifts in its foreign policy. This question attempts to explore whether there is continuity or rupture appeared in the pattern of interaction in Myanmar relationship with China and the U.S. and to identify the cause of that continuity or rupture.. 1.6 Research Design and Methodology 1.6.1 Research Design Research design is a logical sequence that connects empirical data to a study’s initial. 政治大 as the overall plan for a piece of research and consists of four main ideas: the strategy, the 立 conceptual framework, the question of who or what will be studied, and the tools to be. research questions and ultimately to its conclusion. The design can generally be described. ‧ 國. 學. used for the collection and analysis of empirical materials (Punch 2005, 142). This research aims to investigate the interactions between Myanmar, China and the U.S. in. ‧. order to explore the continuity or rupture of Myanmar’s foreign policy from 1988 until 2013. The study is carried out through a qualitative approach, which is developed in the. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. (Punch 2005, 56).. sit. social sciences in order to enable researchers to best study social and cultural phenomena. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In the process of answering the research questions, four main features need to be taken into consideration: theoretical terms which best explains the pattern of strategic interaction between Myanmar and the two major powers, internal factors which has an effect on decision-making process in Myanmar’s foreign policy toward China and the U.S., Myanmar’s relationship with the two respective countries from the external perspectives, and the driving forces of continuation or ruptures occurred in Myanmar’s relationship with China and the U.S.. 12.

(20) In order to answer the research four main questions, the study is consisted of five chapters. Chapter is an introductory part which displays the rationale behind the research and the guideline on how the entire research should be conducted. The study in Chapter Two has two objectives; first is to refine the strategic theories which are used as the tool to test out behaviors of the three main actors acting toward one another, second is to address Chinese and U.S. influence over Southeast Asia to the audiences in general. In the second parts, patterns of competition and cooperation between Beijing and Washington combined with the interactions of the two major powers with secondary states in the region are examined.. 政治大 Chapter Three’s main goal is to answer the second research question. This Chapter 立. examines Myanmar’s domestic concerns from various perspectives including politics,. ‧ 國. 學. economics, traditional security and non-traditional security. Chapter Four aims to investigate the dynamics of Myanmar’s relationship with the two major powers over the. ‧. past twenty years and to identify their interests in engaging and dis-engaging with Naypyidaw. Chapter Fives consist of research finding and assessment for the future. y. Nat. sit. dynamics parts. The results of the study in each chapter are integrated to identify. al. er. io. continuity or shifts in Myanmar’s foreign relations with China and the U.S. mentioned in. n. the first question and test out the refined strategic theories in the third question. Empirical. Ch. i n U. v. findings derived from the previous study combined with information gathered from. engchi. interviews with experts offer an extensive analysis of Myanmar’s foreign relations with China and the U.S. The assessment for the future dynamics of the relationship is also discussed in this chapter.. 1.6.2 Methodology Several types of data collection may be used in a qualitative research. Interviews, observation, participant observation and document collection are the common methods in gathering qualitative data (Punch 2005, 169). The possibilities for collecting valid and reliable firsthand data on foreign policy is relatively low as the opportunities to interview 13.

(21) policymakers are practically zero. As such, this research will rely on two other methods of collecting data – documentary evidence and semi-structured interviews with experts in related fields – in order to obtain well-rounded information.. The functional process of this research is divided into two main stages, the pre-empirical and empirical stage. Chapter One to Chapter Four is considered to be in a pre-empirical stage dealing with literature review and preliminary analysis of the study result. Secondary data is collected in this stage from published and unpublished works including books, journals, official documents, news articles and multimedia sources. Chapter Five. 政治大 interviews with experts and journalists on Myanmar’s foreign policy, Myanmar-China 立 is in the empirical stage which involves an extensive analysis on secondary data and. relations, Myanmar-U.S. relations and Chinese-U.S. influence in Southeast Asia.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Respondents for an interview were selected based on their background knowledge regarding international relations and the familiarity with Myanmar’s foreign relations. y. Nat. sit. (See Table 1). The interview question formulation was based on the main research. al. er. io. questions presented in Chapter One as well as on the relevant matters which emerged. n. during an interview. Before the interview commenced, the purpose of the interview and. Ch. i n U. v. the broader context of the research were explained to the participants. As the discussed. engchi. topics can be considered as a sensitive matter for some group of people, interviewees were asked ensured the confidentiality of the data they were about to give and if they would like their names to appear in the research. Data were collected through voice recording machine and the interviewer’s notes. After the in-depth interviews, data was integrated and analysed along with a result of the studies from previous chapters.. 14.

(22) Table 1: List of the names of scholars, students and journalists interviewed Names and Organizations. Time. Location. Ko-sume Saichan Lecturer at Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University Pich-apa Pisutseranee Lecturer at Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University Wirat Niyomtam Director of Myanmar Studies Center, Naresuan University Burmese student (anonymity) Undergraduate Program Burmese student (anonymity) Undergraduate Program Burmese student (anonymity) Undergraduate Program Burmese student (anonymity) Graduate Program Burmese student (anonymity) Graduate Program Toe Zaw Latt Democratic Voice of Burma, Thailand Bureau Chief Khin Maung Soe Democratic Voice of Burma, Editor.. August 5, 2013. Chiang Mai University, Chiangmai, Thailand. August 5, 2013. Chiang Mai University, Chiangmai, Thailand. August 13, 2013. Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand. n. Ch. engchi. y. sit. Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand Chiangmai, Thailand. er. io. Source: Author’s own. ‧. Nat. al. 15, 2013 August 15, 2013 August 15, 2013 August 15, 2013 August 23, 2013 August 23, 2013. 學. ‧ 國. 立. August 政治大15, 2013 August. i n U. v. 1.7 Assumptions, Scopes, and Limitations 1.7.1 Assumptions This research is expected to provide an extensive review and analysis of Myanmar’s foreign relations with the two major powers – China and the U.S. – and explores its foreign policy trends toward the two external actors. As China’s influence in Southeast Asia grows, the rivalry between Beijing and Washington, whose power dominance has long been presented in the region, has been intensifying. This research identifies how secondary states – with Myanmar as the specific case study – adapt themselves under 15.

(23) such circumstance. As Myanmar has been isolated and considered a pariah state for decades, the vast majority of literature on foreign policy focuses on times when there were very few external influencing factors involved. This study is anticipated to fill a gap in existing literature, by exploring how Myanmar’s foreign policy choices are made when more external actors are involved.. 1.7.2 Scopes Regarding influence of China and the U.S. over the region, the majority of literature. 治政 or focuses on Myanmar-China or Myanmar-U.S. relations 大 separately. This research looks 立influence between China and the U.S. in Myanmar through at the potential rivalry for either takes a generalizing approach, treating Southeast Asian states as one unitary actor,. ‧ 國. 學. strategic theories and other aspects including politics, economics and non-traditional security. The China-U.S. relations and their competition for influence over the region are. ‧. mentioned in order to provide a basic understanding to the audiences; however, extensive analyses on the overall relationship of the two major powers are not included. The. sit. y. Nat. investigation on Myanmar’s foreign policy trend covers pressure that perceived by the country both externally internally. Apart from China and the U.S., other external factors. io. n. al. er. such as India, Thailand are mentioned only when they are relevant to the content.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.7.3 Limitations The study time frame begins from the military crackdown in 1988, which is viewed as the point when not only Myanmar’s economic policy but also the nature of its diplomatic relations changed considerably. The time frame continues up until 2013 which includes a major shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy as it allows the topic to be studied more thoroughly and comprehensively as it covers the most crucial transition periods in the country’s history.. 16.

(24) A further and crucial limitation of this research may be the lack of scholarly literature on recent occurrences in Myanmar. Although Myanmar’s sudden opening gesture to the world has raised its significance in the international community, this gesture remains under academic debate. As a consequence of the recent nature of these changes, there is as yet very little academic work available to inform the specific approach of this study. As a result of the shortfall of academic work concerning Myanmar’s current situation, this research may also be confined by inadequacy in empirical evidence; the study will thus depend substantially on literature review and empirical data from interview. This research method may be afflicted with uncertainty and may not directly suggest new theories or approaches. In order to resolve these limitations, interviews with scholars may. 政治大. help gather more in-depth information for the analysis.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Finally, since this thesis is analysed qualitatively, it carries some inherent limitations and pitfalls due to the nature of qualitative research. However, it is argued that this approach. ‧. provides tools and data-collection techniques which provide a better understanding of social phenomenon and international relations.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 17. i n U. v.

(25) Chapter Two: China-U.S. Relations and Strategic Interactions in Southeast Asia This chapter is consisted of three folds: navigating U.S.-China relations, strategic interactions, and further discussion. Despite the central goal of this research is to investigate U.S.-China influence in Myanmar as a specific case study, it is necessary to understand the relationship in a broader sense as a background for the investigation in the following chapters. The first fold focuses on the China-U.S. interaction in three main areas, economic, strategic and other non-traditional security perspectives. The second fold, on the other hand, examines how Southeast Asian countries response to the. 政治大. competition between the two great powers.. 學. ‧ 國. 立 2.1 China-U.S. Relations. sit. y. Nat. Security. ‧. 2.1.1 Great Powers’ Patterns of Interaction: Competition and Cooperation. io. er. The United States and China have shared their long history of ups and downs in the complex relationships as the two countries have fought one another and also have been. n. al. i n U. v. strategic partners. In a military relationship over the past decades, Beijing and. Ch. engchi. Washington have experienced both important achievement and major setbacks, and continued to an effort to improve mutual trust and understanding. However, strategic distrust which has arisen from tensions and crises periodically seems to play a major role in the relationship, consequently, military-to-military interaction between the two countries is considered to be minimal.. Despite the end of Korean War in 1953 and the volatile confrontation during Cold War which lasted as long as 20 years, military ties still remained one of the most intriguing dimensions of Sino-U.S. relations. During the last decade of the twentieth century, the 18.

(26) two countries were struggling with the unhealthy relationship because of several provocative incidents. After the Taiwan Strait crisis in 19962 and the accident at Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 20003, the tension standoff broke off again when a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided with a US Navy EP-3 surveillance plane about 70 miles off the Chinese island of Hainan in international airspace. It was reported that 24 U.S. military personnel on board were removed from the aircraft by the Chinese military personnel and detained in an undisclosed location (Rosenthal and Sanger 2001). Immediately following the accident, both sides blamed each other for causing the accident and accused each other of violating international laws of air and sea. After the several rounds of intense negotiations and a number of diplomatic notes exchanges, the standoff came to an end in. 政治大. a peaceful manner (Tian and Chao 2008, 2-4).. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Mutual distrust within the U.S. government derived from not only the legacy of Cold War and the fear of the potential military confrontation over Taiwan Strait but also from the. ‧. suspicion on Chinese military capability. As its economy has grown rapidly, Chinese government has spent considerable sum to improve its military capability making its. y. Nat. sit. military budget the highest in Asia (Lum et al. 2010, 31). According to the Chinese. er. io. government report, China spent less than US$ 20 billion in 1996, US$ 40 billion in 2004, and recently US$ 70 billion in 2009 respectively to support its People’s Liberation Army. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. or PLA (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012, 66). Chinese military expenditure trend has. engchi. sparked a debate among experts and American policymakers on China’s intention in pursuing hegemony (Chen and Feffer 2009, 47-48). Chinese government, later on, came out to explain that the rising military spending was simply reflected from the general. 2. Robert S. Ross 2002, 48. In 1996, China carried out the military manoeuvre and missile tests in the area of Taiwan Strait believably aiming to threaten Taiwan during the time of the presidential election. The U.S. was uneasy with such action and deployed two aircraft carriers to be stationed in the area. The U.S. arm sales to Taiwan were increased, and the US in missile defence was heightened. 3. Gries 2001, 45. NATO warplanes bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo in 1999. The attack killed three Chinese journalists and injured more than 20 staff members (Myers 2000). NATO and the United States came out to apologize to the public and claimed that the forces mistakenly attacked the embassy; however, the bombing sparked mass protests from Chinese across the globe and the apology was not well-accepted. 19.

(27) economic growth, and devoted to non-threatening expenditures. More importantly, it is considered as a small percentage when compares to the U.S. military spending each year (48). However, it is argued that China has vastly underreported its military spending. According to the annual report to congress (Figure 1), it is estimated that China spent roughly US$ 40 billion in 1996, US$ 80 billion in 2004, and US$ 140 billion in 2009 (Office of the Secretary of Defence 2010, 42).. Figure 1: PRC’s Annual GDP and Military Budget Growth, 2000 – 2009. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence. http://defense.gov.pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf.. Although tension and crisis are dominant factors in shaping Sino-U.S. security relations, Beijing and Washington have shown their efforts to improve the relationship through confidence-building measures and high-level exchange visits of defence ministers and military leaders.. 20.

(28) After the Korean War, two estranged major powers were drawn closer when Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor, and President Richard Nixon made groundbreaking visits to China in 1971 and 1972 respectively (Garson 1994, 153). By the end of 1980s, the rapprochement of Sino-U.S. relation was improved according to the vision of new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, and the changing gesture of the United States in handling Taiwan issue (Yahuda 1993, 562-63). Alongside hundreds of science and technology research projects, it was reported that there had been cooperation agreements on security initiated which mainly covered three elements: high-level visits, selected. 政治大. transfers from the United States to China of military technologies and items and functional exchanges meant to enhance the PLA’s institutional capacities (Finkelstein. 立. 2010, 6). From 1985 to 1987, the United States granted four programs of Foreign. ‧ 國. 學. Military Sales (FMS) including modernization of artillery ammunition production facilities, modernization of avionics in F-8 fighters, sale of four Mark-46 anti-submarine. ‧. torpedoes, and sale of four AN/TPO-37 artillery-locating radars (Kan 2012, 1). However, all the defence contacts and military-related commerce which had been made with China. y. sit. io. er. 06, 169).. Nat. were suspended after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Campbell and Weitz 2005-. al. n. iv n C The relationship was revived inh1993 i U Secretary of Defence Chas W. e n when g c hAssistant Freeman, Jr. visited China to resume military-to-military contacts and open up dialogues with the Chinese military (Finkelstein 2010, 10). However, previous tensions such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 1989 suspension have made China reluctant to be closely re-engaged with the United States (10). In 1994, Washington emphasized its effort to build mutual trust and understanding with the PLA by sending Secretary of Defence William Perry to Beijing to improve the relationship through high-level dialogue (Yuan 2003, 53). Since then, there has been a regular visit between the top defence and military leaders from the two countries (Table 2).. 21.

(29) Table 2: Military Leaders Visits between China and the United States from 19942014 Year 1994 1996 1997 1998. China. The United States Secretary of Defence William Perry. Defence Minister Chi Haotian. Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC) General Zhang Wannian. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton with Cohen. 2000 2003. Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC) General Cao Gangchuan. 2004. 立. General Richard Myers Secretary of Defence Ronald Rumsfeld. ‧ 國. Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC) General Guo Boxiang. Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie Defence Minister General Chang Wanquan. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 2014. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates Secretary of Defence Robert Gates Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel. ‧. 2007 2011 2012 2013. 政治大 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 學. 2005 2006. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili Secretary of Defence William Cohen. Ch. i n U. v. Source: Yuan (2003); U.S. Library of Congress (2012); U.S. Library of Congress (2014).. engchi. Economics The trade ties between the two countries has been bridged 30 years ago and drastically developed after China’s accession to WTO, despite the political tensions. (Frisbie and Overmayer 2006, 243). Although both have benefited from this link, they are considered as competitive rivals on global trade (Lum et al. 2010, 39). The competitiveness has been evident in an export sector in both countries and their attempts to creating economic ties with other countries through FTAs. In the U.S. public opinion, China’s growing economy is seemingly to be at the U.S. expense. A growing number of Americans, including policy 22.

(30) makers, believe that China has harmed the U.S. economy through its unfair trade practices, namely the policy on currency and on the intellectual property rights.. In an international trade perspective, as Chinas has surpassed Japan to be the world’s second-largest economy, it becomes a major trading nation which is catching up with the United States in export of merchandise (Dawson and Dean 2011). In comparison on China-U.S. export in 2007, both countries exported about the same amount in total. The United States exported more than China did in Oceania, the Middle East and Latin America while China exported more than the United States did in South Asia, Northeast. 政治大. Asia, Africa, Europe and the rest of the world (See Figure 2).. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Moreover, there have been efforts from both China and the United States to establish FTAs with their trading partners. China has the FTAs agreement with Hong Kong and. ‧. Macau, and is currently negotiating with more than 24 countries including Australia, South Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Iceland, Switzerland, the Gulf countries and the Southern. y. Nat. sit. Africa Customs Union (Lum et al. 2010, 37). On the other hand, the United States has. al. er. io. signed FTAs with Israel, Canada, Mexico, Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco,. n. Bahrain, Peru and Oman, and the agreements with Panama, South Korea and South. Ch. i n U. v. African Customs Union are still legislative approval and negotiation process (37).. engchi. 23.

(31) Figure 2: U.S. and China’s Export of Goods to Selected Regions of the World in 2007 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0. 464.2 311.9 286.7. 243.6 43 45.7 51.2. 34.920.4 21.122.5. 立. 37.123.7. 94.1 60.6. 362. 160.2 97.4. 政治大 China. U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. Source: COMTRADE Database, United Nations. http://comtrade.un.org/db/. ‧. China’s currency policy is another issue that creates uncomfortable political situation between the two countries because some American policy makers believe that an. Nat. sit. y. undervalued RMB is the major cause of a widening U.S. trade deficit with China. io. er. (Council on Foreign Relations 2007, 59). In May 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department released its report on international exchange and identified China as a “currency. n. al. i n U. v. manipulator” (Frisbie and Overmayer 2006, 248). In the same year, Senators Schumer. Ch. engchi. and Graham received a bipartisan support in Congress to call for 27 per cent tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. if China does not “float” its RMB (59).. 4. After the Asian. financial crisis in 1997, the flow of financial resources from China to the United States is much greater than the United States to China evidenced by increased China’s share in the U.S. imports 5.8 per cent in 1995 to 15.5 per cent in 2006 ( Bottelier 2008, 199). However, it is argued by some experts that the bilateral trade imbalance between the two countries occurred long before the RMB was thought to be undervalued, and the. 3. Council on Foreign Relations 2007, 59. However, the Schumer-Graham bill was withdrawn in the fall of 2006 according to the pressure of Bush administration after visiting China in summer 2006. 24.

(32) exchange rate might not be the important factor which influences international trade flow (204-05). Table 3: PRC’s Trade with the United States from 1982 to 2013 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars). U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total U.S. Balance. 1982 2.91. 1985 3.80. 1988 5.04. 1991 6.29. 1994 9.29. 1997 12.48. 2000 16.3. 2003 28.4. 2006 55.2. 2009 69.6. 2011 103.9. 2013 121.7. 2.50. 3.86. 8.51. 18.98. 38.78. 62.6. 100.0. 152.4. 287.8. 296.4. 399.3. 440.4. 5.41 0.41. 8.02 0.06. 14.31 -3.47. 25.27 12.69. 48.07 29.49. 75.4 -49.8. 116.3 -83.7. 180.8 124.0. 343.0 232.5. 366.0 226.8. 503.2 295.5. 562.1 318.7. 立. 政治大. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. http://www. census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. As the trade ties between China and the United States are growing, the intellectual property rights in China have been a major concern in both American business. sit. y. Nat. community and Congress. The U.S. Chamber of commerce has estimated from its study that the United States loses between US$ 200 billion to US$ 250 billion each year. io. er. globally due to the intellectual property rights violation, and China is believed to be. al. n. iv n C h e n g cto himprove Chinese willingness i U the. responsible for a quite significant proportion of that loss (Council on Foreign Relations 2007, 57). Despite. intellectual property rights. protection by acceding the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyrights Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms, the American intellectual property is seemingly not adequately protected according to lax enforcement and modest punishment in Chinese law (57-58).. In spite of depressing issues such as trade deficit lie within China and the United States commercial relationship, the two countries, at a present, have been among each other’s important economic partner (Frisbie and Overmayer 2006, 243-44). The economic 25.

(33) relationship has begun in the late 1970s when China decided to open itself to foreign trade 243). From a barely trickle in 1970s, the U.S. total imports and exports with China reached US$ 2.32 billion in 1979, increased to US$ 14.31 billion and up to US$ 75.4 billion in 1997 (See Table 3). Despite the fluctuated political situation, the trade volume grows even more drastically over the past ten years (Xu 2001, 239). The trade volume accelerated to US$ 116.3 billion, US$ 343.0 billion, US$ 503.2 billion in 2000, 2006 and 2011 respectively (See Table 3). According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, China is currently the U.S. third largest good exports market, and the U.S. largest supplier of good imports.. 政治大 The U.S. investment in China began in 1980; however, the trade ties became largely 立 integrated when China and the United States reached an agreement on China’s entry to. ‧ 國. 學. the WTO (Xu 2001, 238-41). According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the U.S. direct investment in China was just US$ 1.7 billion between 1979 to1989. As China has. ‧. continued its economic reforms, opened up more sectors to foreign investment and adopted some exceptions to encourage foreign companies to enter China such as tariff. Nat. sit. y. reductions, the elimination of import licensed and quotas, the U.S. direct investment went. io. al. n. Overmeyer 2006, 243).. er. up to US$ 26 billion in 1999 and reached US$ 51 billion by the end of 2005 (Frisbie and. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Non-traditional security To attain a global power and to advance their goals, both China and the U.S. have been exerting their influence through other non-coercive approaches to promote their culture, political ideology and diplomacy. In addition to the issue regarding strategic and economic concern, the two countries also compete each other to gain global confidence through foreign aid funding and educational activities. In the bilateral relationship; however, there has been counterterrorism cooperation and combined efforts to solve environmental issues between Beijing and Washington. 26.

(34) As its economy is growing rapidly, China has shown its desire to be a part of global aid effort (Tan-Mullin, Mohan and Power 2010, 879-80). However, it is argued that aid program initiated by Beijing has challenged the West’s architecture for aiding Africa’s development and has supported pariah regimes or paved the way for accessing resources (Brautigam 2011). According to a white paper on China’s foreign aid, 45.7% of overall Chinese foreign aid was poured into 51 African countries in 2009, and most of the funding was distributed to industry, economic infrastructure and public facility sector (China’s Information Office of the State Council). Besides providing financial aids (See. 政治大. Table 4), it is also reported that China has cancelled 380 debts worth 25,580 million RMB from 50 countries which 312 debts are from countries in Africa (China’s. 立. Information Office of the State Council). The increasing Chinese aid brings about. ‧ 國. 學. concerns within the U.S. government because it believes this new aid landscape represents China as a new alternative to the U.S. (Tan-Mullin, Mohan and Power 2010,. ‧. 890). Although the U.S. has been attempting to encourage China to embrace the good governance-mode of foreign aid and to reconsider its non-interference policy, China does. sit. y. Nat. not seem to response to the U.S. concern and continued its no strings attached policy. io. er. (Kjollesdal 2010, 10).. al. n. iv n C Ubeen cancelled by the Chinese Table 4: Statistic on debts owed that ihave htoeChina h n c g Government (by the end of 2009) Region Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Oceania Total. Number of Countries 35 10 2. Number of Debts Cancelled 312 41 14. Amount Cancelled (million RMB) 18960 5990 400. 3 50. 13 380. 230 25580. Sources: China’s Information Office of the State Council, issued on April 21, 2011. http://www.scio.gov.cb 27.

(35) Educational activity is one of discernible aspects indicating China and the United State have been competing in power expansion. According to its high ranking universities, the United States has been attracting more foreign students than China has (Lum et al. 2010, 25). It is reported that the U.S. Department of State issued more than 600,000 student and exchange visitor visas in 2007, while the number of foreign students studying in China was just 195,000 in the same year (25). However, the student enrollment in the U.S. has been dropping due to the stricter visa policy after the September 11 terrorist attack (25). On the other hand, China not only loosened its requirement to attract more students but. 政治大. also expanded its influence through academic institutes, the Confucius Institute to present a kinder and gentler image of China to the outside world (Gill and Huang 2006, 19).. 立. According to the Chinese government report, there were 322 Confucius Institutes and. ‧ 國. 學. 369 Confucius classrooms established in 96 countries and regions by the end of December 2010 (Hanban 2010, 74).. ‧ y. Nat. Despite the fact that the two countries have to contend against each other to gain global. sit. influence, China and the U.S. share some common interest and are willing to establish a. er. io. cooperation. Notably, the relationship between Beijing and Washington has been. al. n. iv n C 7). After President Bush announced on terrorism, h ethen war i U China showed the sign to fully h c g cooperate with the U.S. in a wide range of counter-terrorism measures (Roy 2006). One improved considerably after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (Friedberg 2005,. example showing China’s effort to accommodate both international public opinion and the U.S. objectives in war on terrorism is its suppression of the financing of terrorism. Beijing attempted to freeze assets liked to terrorist group and have the People’s Bank of China organized a Terrorist Finance Investigative Department within its anti-moneylaundering bureau (Roy 2006). In addition, the two countries see an increasing understanding about environmental issues between the two largest consumers of energy over the past few years. The China-U.S. forum on climate was held more frequently, at the same time, there was also a support from a private sector such as American and 28.

(36) Chinese company which provided a financial support the environmental protection campaign (Zhang and Smith 2012, 61-62).. 2.1.2 Great Powers’ Competition in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia is considered as a crucial arena of Sino-U.S. competition (Egberink and Putten, 2010). Due to its strategic position connecting the Indian and Pacific Ocean, not only the United States but also China are seeking to have a permanent strategic interest with the ability to control sea-lanes and maritime choke points in order to transport armed. 政治大. forces and energy resources from the Middle East through these flows to support their economy (Percival 2007, 129). As a result, both countries see the potential economic. 立. interests that can be secured from the Southeast Asia’s open markets and equal. ‧ 國. 學. commercial access (130). As a region that is open for many external influences, it is argued that the strategically pragmatic Southeast Asian States prefer to maintain the U.S. strong presence in the region to ensure regional stability against a potential expansive. ‧. China, at the same time, some countries in the region are increasingly asserting their own. sit. n. al. er. io Security. y. Nat. interests from the Chinese rising influence.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. If the Southeast Asian region is treated as the stage of a game for influence between the two major powers, the United States is presumably in a favour of this competition strategically. The traditional U.S. security relation with Southeast Asia has been established since the Cold War era by having Thailand and Philippines as its strong alliance (Park 2011, 138). Although it is unlikely for the Southeast Asian nations to flock with Washington in a balance-of-power coalition against Beijing, the region sees a more aggressive move from the U.S. to shore up the bilateral military-to- military relations with a number of countries. (Stuart-Fox 2004, 136). Since the beginning of the new millennium, the United States has sought to strengthen its security relations by offering an increased military financing assistance from US$ 17 million to US$ 30 million for 29.

(37) Philippines in 2005 and engaging with Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines in a series of training exercises with the U.S. naval forces since the year 2002 (Economy 2005, 419).. As for the weaker countries with similar regime to China including Cambodia and Laos, they are believed to be drawn closer to Beijing because the need of protection from their powerful neighbours, namely Thailand and Vietnam, rather than from the U.S. threat (Stuart-Fox 2004, 134). Additionally, despites its strong strategic ties with China, Myanmar was no longer estranged from the U.S. evidenced by the U.S. invitation for. 政治大 (Alexander, Thatcher and Storey 2012). 立. Myanmar to participate the 2012 Cobra Gold military exercise as an observer in Thailand. ‧ 國. 學. In addition, China’s assertiveness on claiming its sovereignty over the islands in South. ‧. China Sea has generated acute concerns among its neighbour, namely Philippines and Vietnam (Thayer 2011, 78). After the China’s provocative action in 2011, Philippines. y. Nat. sit. evidently increased its funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and. al. er. io. strengthened its alliances with the U.S. (79-81). Likewise, Vietnam protested Chinese. n. action and solidified its defence cooperation with the U.S. (88-87). Although the three. Ch. i n U. v. island claimants have agreed on the guidelines to implement the 2002 Declaration on. engchi. Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) toward the end of 2011, the guidelines are criticized as not binding, and the diplomatic process still have to operate under limit and tensions (96-98).. Economics During the 1997-99 financial crisis, China had an opportunity to demonstrate regional leadership and its commitment to Southeast Asia (Ba 2003, 635). While Southeast Asian countries were disappointed that the United States was reluctant to help Thailand during the time of trouble, China became the helping hand by pledging US$ 1 billion to help 30.

(38) Thailand and supported it throughout the crisis (637). China’s benevolent action during that time is the cultivation for its latter economic prospects in the region. Until the present, the rapid growth of Southeast Asian-Chinese trade is frequently mentioned as the indication of Chinese growing influence, and consequently, as challenge to the United States power in the region (Percival 2007, 134-35).. China has also been attempting to boost its economic ties with ASEAN through several trade agreements. The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation to create ASEAN-China Free Trade Area within10 years was signed in 2002,. 政治大 Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 立 People's Republic of China was signed in 2004 and the Agreement on Trade in Services. the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive. ‧ 國. 學. of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed in 2007 (Lum et al. 2010, 69). While China is creating strong economic bond with Southeast Asian countries through. ‧. multilateral approach, the United States is bonding with ASEAN states individually through the Free Trade Agreement. However, Singapore was the only Southeast Asian. y. Nat. sit. nation that successfully signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Unites States. n. al. er. io. while the negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand have failed to reach agreements (70).. Non-traditional security. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. China and the United States have long been involved in Southeast Asia as vital external actors and drawn upon considerable strength in projecting soft power in the region. Chinese influence has increased considerably owning to the effort to improve public perceptions in its neighbours combined with the U.S. aloofness during the post-Cold War era; nevertheless, it is still indiscernible to pinpoint the region is dominated by which side.. 31.

(39) While China proposed its new security concept, The Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence which encourages a country to avoid interference in other’s internal affairs and creating mutually beneficial contacts and security stability, the United States engaged the region with the counterterrorism agenda (Sutter 2005, 290). Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Southeast Asia suddenly became the 'second front' in a global war on terror for the United States (Economy 2005, 418). In 2003, President Bush sent message of counterterrorism during bilateral visits to the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia and successfully persuaded those countries including Malaysia to become the based cooperation on the counterterrorism campaign (Percival 2007, 132-34).. 政治大 Later on, the U.S. conducted a military cooperation with Thai and Filipino’s military to 立 improve port security and expending significant resources and provided assistance to the. ‧ 國. 學. Indonesian police to improve its counterterrorism capacity (Economy 2005, 419). The U.S. intention on region was emphasized again in November 2012 when President. ‧. Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the Asia trip, visiting Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia, in order to strengthen its partnership and promote. y. Nat. n. er. io. al. sit. democracy and human rights (Baker 2012).. Ch. i n U. v. On the other hand, China’s diplomatic effort with the region has been increasingly. engchi. visible. China seeks to improve the positive perception and extend its trade ties with the Southeast Asian states by including itself into multilateral organization, including ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit (EAS), and restraining its assertive action on South China Sea (Thayer 2011, 90-98 and Lum et al. 2010, 69). Moreover, China’s influence is also actively expanded through educational exchange activities and foreign aid. Chinese government provided scholarships to more than 10,000 foreign students, expected to award 3,000 additional scholarships each year between 2008 and 2010, and planned to enroll 300,000 foreign students by 2020 (Xinhua 2008). Like in Africa, China offered a considerable amount of foreign assistance to developing countries including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (Lum et al. 2010, 71). With the pledging amount of US$ 32.

(40) 12.6 billion for Southeast Asian countries, 59% was poured into infrastructure development, 38% for investment in natural resources and only 3% distributed to humanitarian and military assistance (71).. In conclusion, in spite of China and the United States are competing for dominance in Southeast Asia, both countries appear to use different approach to engage with the region. Instead of stridently opposes to American power, influence, and policies in Southeast Asia, China subtly and gradually expands its influences at the expense of the United States and other powers in Southeast Asia through multilateral initiatives and economic. 政治大 security umbrella, China has spent over a decade actively persuading Southeast Asian 立 States with new diplomatic initiatives, trade and investment and foreign aid. The U.S.. cooperation. While the Southeast Asian nations deeply value the long-standing U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. firmly responded to Vietnam, Philippines after the South China Sea tension broke out, and the claimants have made it clear to keep Americans close as security partners and. ‧. also to counterbalance growing Chinese power (Paal 2012, 8-9).. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Despite the U.S. economic and military power displays its world’s superpower status; it. n. is apparently becoming more difficult for the United States to dominate the international. Ch. i n U. v. agenda and to pass on its own economic difficulties to international market. It is still. engchi. debated among scholars on China’s future capabilities and intentions in a sense of pursuing hegemony; nonetheless, the rivalry between the two major powers is inevitable. China will be wherever the United States seeks to expand its power and influence and ready to deflect US moves with its own alternative initiatives to achieve a more equitable order in the wide spectrum of international affair (Garson 1994, 222).. 33.

(41) 2.2 Theoretical Perspective: Balancing, Hedging and Bandwagoning 2.2.1 Balancing, Hedging and Bandwagoning: The origin The concepts of balancing, hedging and bandwagoning are considered as a part of the balance of power theory, a core tenet of both classical and neo-realist theories. While the term of balancing and bandwagoning has been in an International Relation literature and developed through scholarly debates for a few decades, the concept of hedging is relatively a new term. The term bandwagoning as a description of international alliance behaviour first appeared in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Waltz gave credit to Stephen Van Evera as the person who coined the term; however, it was later on. 政治大 work, A Study of War (Waltz 1979, 126 and Schweller 1999, 28). 立. suggested by Randall Schweller that bandwagoning was created by Quincy Wright in his. ‧ 國. 學. In his structural model of balance of power theory, Waltz explains that bandwagoning. ‧. represents the opposition of balancing as balancing means allying with the weaker side while bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition (Waltz 1979, 126). In an. y. Nat. sit. anarchical environment where a political authority is absent, state cannot assume other. al. er. io. states will come to their defence even if they are allies. In order to protect themselves. n. from being attacked by a hegemon, states prevent potential dominance from arising by. Ch. i n U. v. balancing against it (121). States can ensure their survivals through either internal. engchi. balancing where states rely on their own capabilities to increase economic and military strength, or through external balancing where states form alliance to increase their capabilities (118).. Later on in 1987, Stephen M. Walt offered more suitable terms for the balance of threat theory: “when confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger.” Walt explains, although balancing behaviours is more common, the existential evidence in history has provided 34.