Chapter Five: Conclusion
5.1 Main Findings
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
This Chapter is the final part of the research. It consists of three main sections which are main findings, conclusion and limitation and recommendation for future research. Main findings is the provision of answers for the four research questions, conclusion sums up the main objectives and result of the study, and the last section discusses research limitations and recommends what should be further studied regarding this approach.
5.1 Main Findings
Question 1: How has Myanmar’s Relationship with China and the U.S. changed since 1988?
The China-Myanmar relations were established during late 1980s when China began its economic reforms and sought to expand its economy. In the early years of the relationship, China’s approach to Myanmar mainly focused on trade evidenced by agreements signed between the countries in order to legalized border trade. The ties were immensely improved when Myanmar faced difficulty according to domestic political situation and was consequently isolated by Western countries.
Without interfering with the internal affairs, Beijing offered its political, economic and military assistance to Naypyidaw during the hard time. Politically, The PRC government not only announced its acceptance when the SLORC was established in 1988 but also defended the Burmese government when it was heavily criticized on the abuse of human rights by the U.S. at the UN. in 2007. Though frequent official visit exchange between the two countries and hundreds of the cooperation agreements signed along the way, China and Myanmar are deeply bonded together politically, economically and militarily.
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China’s aim in providing military assistance to Myanmar is not only to gain commercial benefit from arm sales but the influence built with the junta also help Beijing to pave the way for the prosperity in trade and investment. Evidence in Chapter Four shows that China currently has been involved in 30 hydropower projects in Myanmar including the Paunglaung Hydroelectric Power which costs US$ 250 million to build. Three pillar Chinese energy companies namely the SINOPEC, CNPC and CNOOC have the production-sharing contracts on cooperation with the Myanmar’s state-owned company, MOGE in petroleum exploration both offshore and on shore. After the trade ties were established, China become the major supplier of consumer goods in Myanmar’s market and took the lead in investment in Myanmar. Moreover, China also provided financial support for infrastructure development such bridge and road building to support its exporting route to the Indian Ocean.
The tension in Myanmar-U.S. broke out in 1988. Washington was deeply concerned about the extreme measures used by the military to suppress the demonstration in Yangon which resulted in the death of thousand civilians. Instead of normalising the situation by accepting the result of the election held in 1990 as the U.S. urged, the SLORC rejected the election’s validity and insisted its legitimacy in ruling the country. As it mentioned in Chapter Two that American conventional foreign policy emphasizes the importance of democracy and human rights, the grave situation of human rights abuse and undemocratic action of the junta during 1988-1990 made the U.S. feel obliged to act out. According to evidence in Chapter 4, broad economic sanction was firstly imposed on Myanmar in 1988 by the Senior Bush administration, expanded in 1997 by the Clinton administration, and reached its peak in 2003 by Junior Bush administration.
The evidence from Chapter Two shows that the U.S. attention has drawn back to Southeast Asia region again during Obama administration as it become increasingly concerned about Chinese growing influence. Combined with Myanmar’s gestures of desiring to be more democratic and more open to other countries, the rapprochement
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between the two countries took place in 2011. Diplomatic relations have been revived and some sanctions were suspended. Although it is conjectured that Myanmar’s re-engagement this time is aimed to lowered Chinese overwhelming influence, the evidence in the beginning of the rapprochement collected in Chapter Four has not been substantive to identify strong U.S. presence in balancing against Chinese influence Myanmar.
Regarding the pattern of interactions between Myanmar and the two major powers, it can be concluded that China and the United States has applied different strategies in approaching Myanmar over the past twenty years. While China skips the political dissimilarity work toward its national interests with Myanmar, Myanmar’s authoritarianism remains the tangled issues for the U.S. Due to the proximity, strategic location and natural resources, China’s constructive move on Myanmar is sensible in the Chinese national interest perspective. The country has the potential of being the market with roughly 60 million consumers for Chinese goods, natural and energy resources to back up the China’s growing domestic demand and sea access.
Business opportunity in Myanmar unquestionably attracts the U.S. during the time that its economy slows down; nonetheless the main obstacle for business activity is the sanction which has long insisted by Washington government that it will not be lifted unless democracy is truly developed. Thus, the sensible approach to Myanmar is to encourage democratization process and to provide humanitarian supports. Strategically, the Burmese-Chinese bond is overwhelming; however, the U.S. has been attempting to lower mistrust within the Burmese army. This helps alleviating overall tension and creating friendly atmosphere to cooperation.
Arguably, the relationship between Beijing and Naypyidaw could not have been this cordial the without the Washington’s coercive moves. Substantive evidence in Chapter Three and Chapter Four shows that being isolated not only from the U.S. who was its
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major trade partner but also other European partner, Myanmar was inevitably driven to its Asian neighbours especially China. However, when compare to U.S. intention to other Southeast Asian countries in Chapter Two, it is found that Myanmar is relatively insignificant as an individual player; instead, it is rather viewed as a part of the U.S.
strategy in increasing influence in the region as a whole. The U.S. rapprochement with Myanmar is not only implied to the intention to contain China’ s growing power and to regain its own influence in Southeast Asia but also the message to other Southeast Asian countries such as Laos and Vietnam that Washington is ready to work with in order to improve their relations.
Question 2: What are Myanmar’s internal concerns?
After decades of virtual international isolation, the result of the study in Chapter Three reveals that the most intractable problems facing Myanmar perhaps its internal vulnerability. Over the past twenty years, Myanmar has suffered from a wide range of problems including political uncertainty, economic difficulty, and other security concerns. Among all the problems, the ones that acutely harm the country’s stability and pose the challenge to the military government the most are unstable political and depressing economic situation.
The ethnic conflict has persisted since the Burmese gained independence from the British Empire in 1948. Myanmar is ethnically diverse with 135 minority groups in its population. While the SLORC/SPDC government pillar policy is to emphasize the national unity and to integrate those ethnic minorities into Myanmar’s mainstream, those ethnic groups desire an acceptation and greater autonomy. As the two sides cannot agree on the same solution, the conflict has resulted in a long persisting civil war in Burmese history. Despite the central government’s attempt hold the negotiation for the ceasefires, the clash between the central government and the ethnic rebels breaks out from time to
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time. The confrontation not only poses a grave danger to the country’s stability but also displaces thousands of people in the conflict areas and consequently brings about criticism from the neighboring countries.
Apart from the ethnic fragmentation, the political opposition and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, are seen by the junta as the threat to the regime stability as well. Despite being under the detention, the reputation and popularity of the NLD leaders are widely recognized both domestically and internationally. The importance of Aung San Suu Kyi is not only because her way of thinking about democracy represents the West but she is also the influential factor which determines the policy from Western countries toward Myanmar. It is premised that some strict measures imposed on Myanmar such as expansion of economic sanction and international criticism are the result of how undemocratically the junta treated Aung San Suu Kyi. For example, Washington announced to strengthen its trade restriction on Myanmar, and Japan halted its financial assistance after the Depayin incident in 2003 which Aung San Suu Kyi was attacked by the guerillas that were believed to be sponsored by the junta.
Another problem which has been deeply affected the well-being of the people and hindered the country from being developed is the chronic economic issues. It is reported by the U.N. that Myanmar is one of the poorest country in the region and 26% of its population lives under the poverty line. The country experienced the major economic crisis in 1988 which is the consequent result of mismanagement during the Burmese Way to Socialism era of Gen. Ne Win. However, when the SLORC/SPDC took power, the problem remained unresolved. The evidence in Chapter Three indicates that there are three main cause of Myanmar’s depressing economy: the government mismanagement;
political uncertainty and international sanctions.
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Policies implemented by government, namely the strict investment law and tight banking control resulted in the lack of FDI in the country and the lack of real competition in the market. It is also observed that most of the country’s income is allocated to arms and military infrastructure. The junta’s obsession in security threat results in the lack of financial support for education and infrastructure which are crucial factors in developing human resources and logistic network.
Obviously, uncertainty in administration brings about the discontinuity in developing the country’s economy. It is found that Burmese GDP rate dropped from -%4 to -11% after the military crackdown in 1988. As the country’s economy mainly relies on export and foreign investment, being isolated by Western countries results in an even more difficult situation for Myanmar. International sanctions limit the option of trade partner and consequently drives Myanmar to count upon its Asian neighbors. China’s economic influence is eminent in Myanmar’s agricultural, industrial and energy sectors. Although the Burmese-Chinese trade volume has been rapidly increased over the past twenty year, it is premised that Myanmar suffers the deficit all along.
Although there are other issues mentioned in Chapter Three such as fracture within the Tatmatdaw and narcotics, they are perceived as less acute when compare to the two problems mentioned above. Despite the evidence of internal breach within the military which results in the change of power structure in the Tatmatdaw, the absolute power in ruling the country evidently remains secured in the hand of military. Drug trafficking seems to rather trouble the neighbouring countries than Myanmar itself as they are they serve as the market for drug produced in Myanmar. However, the military regime shows that it is willing to participate in the counter-narcotics campaign with the UNDCP and other countries; as a result the international criticism has been lowered.
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The result of the study in Chapter Three combined with the empirical data collected from scholar interviews suggest that pressure derived internally has considerably pushing Myanmar to the point of transition. The evidence reveals the connection between the issues which Myanmar been greatly suffered from and the recent political and economic reforms. As the political and economic problems have been eroding, the regime stability is consequently challenged. Although conditions of Myanmar in general are far from ideal, they are yet to reach such point of severity that the military regime is in danger of collapse. Nevertheless, the military leadership is acutely aware of the high risks inherent in continuing instability and has thus begun to implement reforms designed to simultaneously alleviate condition and buttress their owner. Political reforms including holding an election, giving press freedom and providing political space to Aung San Suu Kyi are aimed to decelerate pressures from both domestic and international aspects.
While the people’s resistance to the military is lowered, their power is secured. Aung San Suu Kyi’s new role decreases the pressure from outside and attracts more assistance. At the same time, economic reforms allow more trade partner and investor to be involved.
Question 3: Which strategic theories –balancing, hedging or bandwagoning –could be the most plausible and understandable explanation for Myanmar’s current foreign policy towards China and the United States?
The study in Chapter Two shows that prior to the recent rapprochement in Myanmar-U.S. relations, Naypyidaw has always been put in the category of “bandwagoner”, who implements a clear policy of engagement toward the China through military alliance and economic cooperation for either profit-sharing or rent-seeking, alongside Cambodia and Laos. However, the evidence of Myanmar’s recent interactions with China and the U.S.
reveals that even after the shift in its foreign policy toward the U.S., Myanmar still maintains its close military ties with and heavily relies on China economically.
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Myanmar’s strategic relationship with the U.S. since 1988 is full of distrust and tension.
According to its history of being invaded by foreigners for many times, Burmese government always has the fears of being attacked by external powers. The provocative situation occured when Burmese military detected five U.S. naval vessels in Myanmar’s coast, and they were believed by the Burmese government to be deployed as an invasion fleet which was sent to help the protestors in 1988. In spite of the U.S. Embassy claim that the vessels were for the embassy staff evacuation, it failed to convince the Burmese side. In turn, the U.S. has always been concerned about Myanmar’s ambition for nuclear weapons as the evidence in Chapter Four shows that Washington expressed its skepticism many times that Myanmar allegedly received assistance from North Korea and Russia in the particular matter. Moreover, the anxiety of the generals towards American is clearly expressed through its rejection to the U.S. assistance for the victims of the Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
While Naypyidaw and Washington became deeply estranged according to the perceived threat from each side, Myanmar’s strategic relations with Beijing were rapidly improved.
The evidence found in Chapter Three and Chapter Four identifies that China was the main weaponry supporter for the Tatmatdaw’s major military enlargement in 1989. The PLA and the Tatmatdaw relations have always praised by the leaders of the two countries as “paukpaw” or “brotherhood”. Beside arms purchasing in 1989, the evidence also shows that weapons used in the Burmese army are 90% from China, and Beijing was the arms supplier for Myanmar since then until 2010. Apart from the commercial benefit from arm sales, China also gained the access to Burmese military bases which was close to Indian military base in the Indian Ocean as well.
Economic cooperation between China and Myanmar is unquestionably vital to the Burmese economy as a whole. During the time that Naypyidaw was sanctioned by Washington and experiencing economic struggle, Beijing has turned itself into the major trade partner and investor in Myanmar. While the U.S. trade activities were absent,
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Myanmar has become deeply and increasingly dependent on Chinese good evidenced by the Chinese import value jumped from US$ 223.54 million in 1990 to US$ 6830.98 million in 2012. Tens of economic cooperation agreements were signed during the official visits to allow smoother business activity both in general and along the borders.
Until the present, there are four border trading points established which include Muse, Lwejel, Chinshwehaw and Kambiti.
Although it has been conjectured by many observers that the changing policy of Myanmar toward the U.S. is the prove that the country is adopting “hedging” strategies in order to lower its dependency on China, the result of the study in this research reveals that Naypyidaw remains deeply engaged with Beijing both economically and militarily, and its behaviours in the rapprochement with the U.S. are hardly described as “hedgers.”
According to the behaviours of Southeast Asian hedgers namely Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, hedging strategy is to simultaneously react positively to China in expanding trade ties and maintain the strategic alliance with Washington.
After investigating Myanmar’s foreign policy which has been adopted by its government over the past few years, it has not seen the desire of the country to ally the U.S.
strategically, and the trade between the two countries has not yet been deepened.
Militarily, the major improvement in Myanmar-U.S. relations is the Burmese military officers were invited to participate the Thai-U.S military drill, Cobra Gold, in 2012 and 2013. This action of the U.S. could be only expected to lower the distrust within the Tatmatdaw which has been deeply rooted since 1988. Moreover, it is evidenced that the PLA and the Tatmatdaw still maintain their frequency in official visits and enhance their strategic cooperation until the present.
In spite of some economic restrictions were suspended, and the bilateral relation was generally revived recently, proportion of trade between Myanmar and China remains
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overwhelmingly higher when compare with the U.S. While Myanmar imports to China generates as high as US$ 1291.54 million, its imports to the U.S. costs lower than US$
200 million. Most importantly, the U.S. announced that it would maintain other sanctions until the real progress of democratization is seen.
The U.S. important roles in this rapprochement are mostly focused on democratization process and the promotion of human rights. Some scholars may suggest that the suspension of Myitsone Dam construction and the dispute over the Letpadaung copper mine project, the major Myanmar-China joint projects, are the sign of Naypyidaw resistance to Beijing. However, the evidence from the study shows that controversy was later on mediated through diplomatic efforts from both sides. Shortly after China expressed its concern over the tension caused by the suspension in 2011, Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry visited China as a special envoy of the Burmese president to discuss the problem and emphasized the value of the Chinese friendship to Myanmar. Similarly, after the negotiations between the two parties, the mine operation was resumed in July 2013.
In conclusion, despite changes in its foreign policy toward the U.S., it is far too early to conclude that Myanmar is adopting “hedging” strategies as there are no such behaviors appeared in the pattern of interaction recently. Moreover, the strategic and economic conditions have shown that Naypyidaw is still deeply dependent on China.
Question 4: What are the driving forces of continuity or rupture in Myanmar’s Foreign policy toward China and the U.S. from 1988-2013?
According to the evidence collected in Chapter Four and the chronology of Myanmar’s foreign relations with China and the U.S., two critical junctions are found. The first shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy was 1988 when its relations with the U.S. experienced a
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rupture, and cordial ties with China were commenced. The change in Myanmar’s foreign
rupture, and cordial ties with China were commenced. The change in Myanmar’s foreign