Non- Traditional Security Relations

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between two countries (See Appendix II). In the beginning of 2013, the meeting between the U.S. representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Myanmar’s Ministry of Science and Technology’s Department of Atomic Energy was held to discuss the International Safeguards and the Additional protocol (See Appendix II).

4.4 Non- Traditional Security Relations

This section discusses non-traditional security in Myanmar’s foreign relations with China and the U.S. Looking through interactions occurred in the relationship, humanitarian assistance, anti-narcotics cooperation and energy security are viewed as three important factors used by the two major powers to approach Myanmar; however, each element receive different degree of attention from the two respective countries.

China’s need of energy has been steadily accelerating since the economic reforms in Deng Xiaoping era as its government attempts to keep the certain pace of economic growth. Prosperity in trade with other countries also inadvertently brings about issues such as money laundering, bank fraud, and most importantly, spreading drug trafficking (Clarke 2008, 88). Chinese concern on the latter issue over Myanmar is raised when its internal drug problem has started worsened periodically since 1990s. According to the official statistics, the number of Chinese drug addicts registered with the public security organs jumped from 148,000 in 1991 to 1,140, 400 and 1,437,000 in 2005 and 2010 respectively (Steinberg and Fan 2012, 272). Considerable amount of heroin has been transported from Myanmar's Shan State and the United Wa State into China's Yunnan province through smugglers such as Yunnanese, Fujianese or ethic Kokang (Clarke 2008, 75).

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The PRC government not only adopts harsh anti-drug policy but also tries to promote cooperation in drug fighting with Myanmar both bilaterally and multilaterally with the UN Drug Convention participation. In July 1996, the information on drug smuggling prevention and controlling was discussed in Yunnan between the representatives from National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC), Myanmar’s Drug Abuse Control and the UN Drug Convention. The following year, six officials visited Myanmar to boost the cooperation in drug fighting. China also seeks to mitigate trafficking activities along its border through multilateral cooperation as well. The first anti-drug trafficking projects between the two countries were established in January 1990. In 1998, the Pact on drug cooperation, with the support of UNDCP, was signed by representatives from China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam at the UN headquarters in New York (Saichan 1999, 151-152).

China also views Myanmar as a great access of energy supply to support its vibrant trade and exports as the domestic extraction and production cannot satisfy the increasing demand for economic and social development (Steinberg and Fan 2012, 163). The abundant natural resources combined with the advantage in transportation due to the proximity have made Naypyidaw the target to supply hydroelectric power, oil and gas for Beijing. China has been supporting Myanmar to develop hydropower projects since the early stage in the late 1990s. In some capacity, China has been involved in operating and building process of about 30 hydropower projects in Myanmar (Greacen and Palettu 2007, 108). In 1998, the Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE) and the Yunnan Machinery & Equipment Import &Export Co. Ltd. (YMEC) signed US$ 250 million MOU to implement the Paunglaung Hydro-electric Power Project which was located in the east of Pyinmana, Mandalay Division (See Appendix I).

Apart from the electricity, Chinese government also enthusiastically encourages Chinese companies to invest in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector through the frequent official visits.

Supported by a cordial relationship between the two governments, production-sharing

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contracts on cooperation in petroleum exploration both onshore and offshore have been successfully made between Myanmar Oil & Gas Company (MOGE) and major Chinese oil corporation including China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) since 2001 (Steinberg and Fan 2012, 167-168). In 2010, contractors from China, India and South Korea funded US$ 14.2 million for the construction of 793-kilometer long pipeline linking between Kyaukpyu Township on the coast of Arakan State and Kunming, southern China. The construction was complete and began fuelling China in July 2013 (Zarni Mann, the Irrawaddy).

In humanitarian aspect, China’s support is mostly conducted in the governmental level in providing financial aids to build educational facilities and public infrastructure as mentioned earlier. Moreover, Chinese embrace of military regime is also partially blamed as the cause of the continuation of grave human rights situation in Myanmar as it has made the country become less enthusiastic in international concern on the particular issue (Davies 2012, 16).

Although the U.S. presence in Myanmar is not as strong as China in general, non-traditional security aspect has been dominant than the others in the overview relationship.

Washington’s attention on the Southeast Asian region had been declining since the end of Vietnam War in 1975, and assistance provided to Naypyidaw mostly focused on anti-narcotics campaigns and humanitarian (Joonsiriwong 2007, 496). In order to tackle drug traffickers whose stronghold was located in the Golden Triangle area and to provide basic needs such as food and medicine to Burmese people, the U.S. government spent around US$ 12.3 million a year to support Burmese government (495). The aid program was later on proposed to be suspended after the unsuccessful negotiation between U.S.

Congressman Stephen J. Solarz and the military government led by General Saw Maung during the political instability in 1988 (Saichan 1999, 93).

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Although the U.S. suggestion of establishing democracy was not positively responded by the generals, the junta clearly expressed itself that it would not wish to be isolated by Washington. The Burmese government conveyed its commitment on fighting drug issue by inviting U.S. officials to heroine destroying session held by Burmese officials in February 1990 and gave its full cooperation in arresting Khun Sa, who was named as the

‘Opium King’ of the Golden Triangle, in the same year (94). The U.S. government insisted to suspend its direct aid program to Myanmar but remain its support in fighting the issue through the UN organizations.

Democratization and human rights promotion are knowingly the U.S. trademark in pursuing a relationship with other countries. When the pro-democracy demonstration took place in 1988, the U.S. was closely monitoring the situation, and its support to the oppositions has been manifested since the early stage of the conflict. In November 1988, U.S. representative-elect Dana Rohrabacher was sent to Thay Baw Bo student camp near Burmese-Thai borders to reaffirm its political support to the oppositions. The meetings between the U.S. envoys and the detained opposition leader took place for a few times. In 1994, U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson was allowed to visit Aung San Suu Kyi and give her a letter from President Bill Clinton.

Previously, the United States offered its assistance to Myanmar, but the military government was reluctant to receive as its fear of the U.S. hidden agenda. However, after the release of political prisoners and the initial political reforms embarked by the Burmese government, the U.S. humanitarian aid to Myanmar has been immense. During landmark visit to Myanmar by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the U.S. announced it would tighten the ties between the two countries by enhancing cooperation between Myanmar and the UN on health and anti-narcotics programs. Washington also expresses its concern over the violence in the ethnic minority areas evidenced by several visits made by the U.S. ambassador to the disputed areas such as Kachin and Arakan state recently. The government offered US$ 2.73 million of humanitarian contribution for the

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displaced person in the region in October 2012 and offered US$ 100,000 for displaced person in sectarian violence in early 2013. Moreover, the U.S. had made a huge offer of US$ 170 million to strengthen the U.S.-Myanmar Partnership program for promoting development in human rights, democracy and peace in Myanmar (See Appendix II).