Sino-Cambodian Relations - Does Sovereignty or Obedience Prevail While Cambodia Relies on China’s Largess? - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. 政治大 Sino-Cambodian Relations - Does 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Sovereignty or Obedience Prevail While Cambodia Relies on China’s Largess? 主權在握或是俯首稱臣? 從近期發生的五個事件分析中柬關係 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. By: Lin, Yu-Lu (林玉茹) Advisor: Hsueh, Chien-Wu (薛健吾). July, 2019. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(2) Abstract Sino-Cambodian relations have attracted much attention in the political arena. The Kingdom of Cambodia is no doubt China’s very close ally in the Asia Pacific region. While the research question proposed in this paper seems to have a self-evident answer because most people tend to label Cambodia as a Chinese client state, I aim to look deeper into this question and I discover the fact that as compliant as Cambodia seems, it does not listen to China in every way. The spirit of the ancient and magnificent Khmer Empire never dies that the kingdom is still standing tall and proud. I present here five case studies, including two. 政治大 cases of non-compliance (Prime Minister’s Office controversy, illegal wildlife trade, Chinese 立 cases of compliance (Cambodia's deportation of Uighurs, Huawei’s 5G network) and three. VoIP scammers) in the hope of dispelling the myth and making it clear that Cambodia is its. ‧ 國. 學. own boss and it does not always do as China says.. ‧. Keywords: Sino-Cambodian relations, sovereignty, client state, puppet state, FDI. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 摘要. v. n. 中柬關係在政治圈裡受到不少矚目。在當前亞太地區，柬埔寨王國無疑是中國非常要. Ch. engchi. i n U. 好的政治盟友。由於大部分的看法都傾向將中國附庸國的標籤貼在柬埔寨身上，導致本論文的提問乍看之下，答案似乎不證自明、不言而喻，但筆者想進一步探究這個問題的答案，並且發現，柬埔寨表面上看來對中國這個泱泱大國言聽計從，然而事實並非如此。過去那個歷史悠久、絢麗燦爛之高棉帝國精神尚未死去，現在的柬埔寨王國仍然頂天立地，以自己國家為榮。此論文分析五個事例，包含兩個柬埔寨聽從中國的例子，例如遣返維吾爾族、華為的 5G 網絡，以及三個柬埔寨未屈服中國的例子，如柬首相府爭議、非法野生動物交易、遣送中國詐騙集團，希望能夠打破固有觀念，因為柬埔寨自主性相當高，並不會任人擺布，也不願意做中國的傀儡國家。關鍵字：中柬關係，主權，附庸國，傀儡國家，外人直接投資. I. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(3) Table of Contents Abstract List of Acronyms. I IV. List of Figures List of Pictures List of Table. V VI VII. Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Introduction and A Brief History of Sino-Cambodian Relations 1.2 Research Question and My Findings. 1 1 3 3. 1.3 Research Limitation Chapter Two: Theory and Debate in Literature 2.1 How Political Concession Can Be Acquired by Economic Advantage? Military Power vs Economic Power Trade Sanctions Financial Sanctions China’s Economic Leverage Political and Investment Benefits 2.2 Besides Economy, China’s Other Advantages: Military and Soft Power. 立. 5 5 5. 政治大. 6. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 7 7 11 13. Bilateral Military Aid. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. China’s Soft Power 2.3 Examples of China Trying to Use Economic Means to Gain Political Clout Influence Coming from Economic Power Taiwan The Philippines Vietnam Myanmar Anti-Secession Law vs. Tibetan Crackdown 2.4 Conclusion. 13 14 16 16. Ch. engchi U. v ni. 16 17 17 18 18 20. Chapter Three: Case Studies of Compliance 3.1 Cambodia's Deportation of Uighurs 3.2 Huawei’s 5G Network in Cambodia 3.3 Findings of the Two Cases. 22 22 24 26. Chapter Four: Case Studies of Non-compliance 4.1 Prime Minister’s Office Controversy. 27 27. 4.2 Illegal Wildlife Trade 4.3 Chinese VoIP Scammers 4.4 Findings of the Three Cases. 31 33 35 II. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(4) Chapter Five: Discussion Chapter Six: Conclusion References. 36 44 46. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. III. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(5) List of Acronyms. ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. BRI. The Belt and Road Initiative. CEO. Chief Executive Officer. CFO. Chief Financial Officer. CPP. Cambodian People’s Party. DPP. Democratic Progressive Party. GDP KMT. Most-Favored-Nation. Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Official Development Assistance. PRC. People's Republic of China. WUC. World Uyghur Congress. WWF. World Wide Fund for Nature. n. er. io. al. sit. y. Nat. ODA. ‧. MOFCOM. Kuomintang. 學. MFN. 政治大 Gross Domestic Product 立. Foreign Direct Investment. ‧ 國. FDI. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. IV. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(6) List of Figures Figure 2.1. Gross Domestic Product of China and Cambodia. Figure 2.2. GDP Growth Rate of China and Cambodia. Figure 2.3. GDP per Capita of China and Cambodia. Figure 2.4. Merchandise Trade of China and Cambodia (percentage of GDP). Figure 2.5. Bilateral Trade as Percentage of Trade Volume of China and Cambodia. Figure 2.6. China’s Investment in Cambodia as Percentage of Cambodia’s GDP. Figure 2.7. China’s Investment in Cambodia as Percentage of Cambodia’s FDI. Figure 2.8. Military Expenditure of China and Cambodia. Figure 2.9. Ideal Point of China and Cambodia. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. V. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(7) List of Pictures. Picture 4.1. The Office of the Council of Ministers. Picture 4.1. The Peace Palace (the Office of the Prime Minister of Cambodia). 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. VI. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(8) List of Table. The Comparison of Five Case Studies. 立. 政治大. 學 ‧. ‧ 國 io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. Table 5.1. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. VII. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(9) Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Introduction and A Brief History of Sino-Cambodian Relations. Extensive Chinese influence can be spotted everywhere if you pay a visit to Phnom Penh (金邊), the capital of Cambodia. Poverty is not the only problem. There are many more problems waiting to be solved or improved such as corruption, nepotism, illegal land evictions, poor human rights and so forth. China’s aid is indeed very helpful to the establishment of infrastructure. However, due to the fact that the aid is claimed to be “no strings attached,” many worry it is going to do a disservice to the development of. 政治大. Cambodia since the huge amount of money can easily lead to corruption if it is not well-. 立. managed. With their increasingly solidified friendship, Cambodia lost its impartiality in. ‧ 國. 學. the South China Sea disputes (“Cambodia Says,” 2016, para. 7). This has many worried that the relationship between the two countries may go awry in the future. Therefore,. ‧. long-term observation and research are needed to see if Cambodia can preserve its sovereignty while it is pursuing economic growth and development.. sit. y. Nat. As China is becoming more and more powerful, it is expanding its influence around the globe, especially in Cambodia. Over the past few years, thanks to the help from China,. io. n. al. er. tremendous changes have been made to the once extremely underdeveloped and poor. i n U. v. country, mostly in the field of infrastructure. Also, Cambodia’s world-renowned heritage. Ch. engchi. “Angkor Wat (吳哥窟),” a temple complex, has attracted endless flow of tourists from around the world every year. Aid and donations from the international community are flooding into Siem Reap (暹粒), a cosmopolitan city where the World Wonder resides. However, China, among all other countries offering aid, has caught much attention of scholars worldwide. Pheakdey (2012) brings out the point that while the rise of China is no longer a surprise, what is more staggering and eye-catching is China’s involvement in Cambodia’s politics and economic development. Sino-Cambodian ties can be traced back to centuries ago when a Chinese envoy Zhou Daguan (周達觀) visited Angkor from 1296 to 1297 (Yuan Dynasty). His book A Record of Cambodia (2007) gives a very detailed account of the civilization of Angkor. “China has long taken an interest in Cambodia” (“Why. 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(10) Cambodia,” 2017, para. 3). The following is a short introduction of the history of SinoCambodian relations after the late King Sihanouk (西哈努克國王) brought French rein to an end. Cambodia gained independence from France on November 9, 1953. Lon Nol (龍諾) was a Cambodian politician and general who seized power in 1970 and was backed by the U.S. His opponent Norodom Sihanouk and the notorious Pol Pot regime (波布政權) of Khmer Rouge (紅色高棉) were supported by China who provided financial and military aid even after the regime collapsed due to Vietnamese invasion in 1979. But once Hun Sen (洪森) defected from the Khmer Rouge and was sheltered by Vietnam, China started courting him assiduously after he fully consolidated power in 1990s (“Why Cambodia,” 2017, para. 3). In 1993, The FUNCINPEC1 Party won general elections and. 政治大. formed a coalition government with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). King. 立. Sihanouk’s son Prince Norodom Ranariddh (諾羅敦·拉那烈親王) became the First. ‧ 國. 學. Prime Minister while Hun Sen became the Second Prime Minister.. However, patronage from China was withdrawn owing to the prince’s efforts to. ‧. cultivate a close relationship with Taiwan. In July 1997, Prince Ranariddh was ousted in a violent coup staged by Hun Sen. Regardless of the international condemnation and. Nat. sit. y. isolation of Cambodia, China recognized the result of the coup and supported Hun Sen which enabled him to maintain his grip on power even to this day. Since then, Cambodia. io. n. al. er. has supported “One-China Policy” and begins to steer away from Taiwan. The story. Ch. i n U. v. starts from here and the relationship between the two countries has continued to flourish. engchi. to the point that it has generated much concern and controversy among international society. Before delving into a clearer picture of Sino-Cambodian relations and the possible political motives behind China’s plan to cozy up to Cambodia, an issue needs to be addressed first: how economic power enables a country to buy political influence? China has been in the global spotlight with its stunning economic rise and The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) programs. It is keen on developing friendships with as many countries as possible. Besides Southeast Asia, China is also expanding footprint in Africa with a raft of goodies. “Power arises from an asymmetrical interdependence,” says Klaus Knorr (1977).2 When two countries interact, the economically powerful one seems to 1 French: Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif.. English:. National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 2 Cited from “Economic interdependence, bargaining power and political influence,” by R. Harrison 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(11) gain the upper hand. While having economic strength is often linked with having things your way, there are still voices in favor of limited influence economic strength can bring. Therefore, is Cambodia acting according to China’s preference or can it still be its own boss and hold its ground under the aegis of China? A large majority of people think of Cambodia as a puppet state that is obedient to China’s wishes and much worry is revealed by the international society over Cambodia’s overdependence on China. Still, some are quite sanguine about both countries’ friendship. The following analysis aims to look deeper into China’s power and economy and also the effects derived from the interactions China has with other states.. 1.2 Research Question and My Findings. 治政 This study aims to probe into their relationship and see 大 which viewpoint is more 立 correct: will Cambodia’s overreliance on China result in the kingdom’s loss of ‧ 國. 學. sovereignty? Or will this friendship serve Cambodia in the long run so that sovereignty is not sacrificed for national development? Through the five case studies, it is clear. ‧. Cambodia does not comply with China's wishes all the time. The following review of literature explores if China’s economic might helps generate political influence from the. y. Nat. sit. countries it interacted with. The thesis is organized as follows: the first chapter is an. al. er. io. introduction of the Sino-Cambodian relationship. Chapter Two provides literature review. n. and two possible hypotheses. In Chapter Three, I selected five events as my case studies. Ch. i n U. v. to present my viewpoint. These five events include Cambodia's deportation of Uighurs,. engchi. Huawei’s 5G network in Cambodia, Prime Minister’s Office controversy, illegal wildlife trade and Chinese VoIP scammers. A holistic analysis and discussion were made in Chapter Four, followed by a conclusion in Chapter Five.. 1.3 Research Limitation. The three case studies of non-compliance selected in this research paper seem to be very different in nature since one is about government building, another is related to wildlife conservation and the other is a case of social problems. The last two cases may not appear to be quite related to the research question proposed here. However, I would. Wagner. p. 461. (1988) 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(12) like to point the fact that first of all, China and Cambodia see eye to eye with each other in most cases and a dispute seldom arises due to their increasingly good relations. Second, while delving into the cases, I got more insights and was able to make analyses that had not occurred in my mind in the first place. It is interesting that things usually appear in one way, and only if you look deeper into them, will you gain something from a different perspective. Therefore, some turned out to have amazing correlations and what appeared to be a simple event was actually associated with other aspects that should be taken into account before an argument was constructed.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(13) Chapter Two: Literature Review The goal of this chapter is to analyze the edge China has on economic and military aspects over Cambodia. The literature review proceeds in the following manner: in the first section, I open the discussion with the increasing importance of economic power over military power, followed by two sections of trade and financial sanctions available to an initiating state when it holds economic power. In the next section, I talk about China’s economic leverage and its technical prowess with the subsequent section that introduces Sino-Cambodia political and investment benefits. After that, I focus on Sino-. 政治大. Cambodia military relations as well as China’s soft power. In the remaining sections, I list a few countries and incidents that help shed light on whether those states succumb to. 立. China due to its economic clout.. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 How Are Political Concessions Acquired Through Economic Advantage?. ‧. The following passages elaborate on why each and every country is striving to become. Nat. sit. y. an economic powerhouse. A prosperous economy makes a country thrive in every way.. io. and is in all likelihood to bring other states to its knees.. n. al. Ch. Military Power vs. Economic Power. engchi. er. For this reason, a country which gains economic supremacy is the one to call the shots. i n U. v. “The traditional view was that military power dominated other forms, and that states with the most military power controlled world affairs” (Keohane and Nye, 2001, p. 10). However, Nye (2002) in his article Why Military Power Is No Longer Enough points out that over the centuries, the resources of power have shifted as technologies evolved. A considerable amount of discussion has been had with regard to whether economic power has replaced military might or which one is more significant. According to James Graham, military might has been paramount throughout history, but over the years economic and military roles seem to have reversed gradually (Graham, n.d., para. 1). Nuclear weapons, for example, are used as bargaining chips by North Korea. Nonetheless, military power still requires a thriving economy (Nye, 2011, para. 4). Without strong 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(14) economy, it is difficult to build an invincible military force. This is not to say economy is always more powerful than the other. It depends on the context. “A carrot is more effective than a stick if you wish to lead a mule to water, but a gun may be more useful if your aim is to deprive an opponent of his mule.” Critical issues such as financial stability and climate change cannot be solved with military force (Nye, 2011, para. 4). This explains why economic juggernaut, in recent years, has gained importance and caught attention worldwide. The existing literature has shown what a state can achieve through economic leverage and in the ensuing passages are close examinations of such power.. Trade Sanctions. 治政大 (Grieco and Ikenberry, when normal diplomatic means are unavailable or unsuccessful” 立 2003, p. 167). When a country has the capacity to project influence, that is power and it is “Countries use economic sanctions to try to influence the behavior of other countries. ‧ 國. 學. often derived from the economy. Trade and financial sanctions are both common means used by a powerful country to deal a blow to a target country in order to achieve certain. ‧. goals. Concessions are more likely to be made if a target country is very dependent on a country it does trade with. According to Grieco and Ikenberry (2003), there are four types. Nat. sit. y. of sanctions regarding trade. The first is “blockade” which may be imposed by the. er. io. initiator against the target through stopping all commerce the target has with the outside world. Second, the initiator may use “embargo” against the target by means of. n. al. Ch. prohibiting some or all of its exports to the target.. engchi. i n U. v. Third, the initiator might adopt “boycott” against the target by prohibiting some or all imports from the target. Lastly, “revocation of most-favored-nation (MFN) status” is an option by the initiator against the target. “MFN status provides trade equality among partners by ensuring that an importing country will not discriminate against another country's goods in favor of those from a third” (“Most-Favored-Nation Status,” n.d., para. 3). The revocation of MFN is a serious sanction because the target has to negotiate one by one with its trading partners. For example, the United States threatened each year from 1989 to 1994 not to renew MFN status for China until it improved its human rights following 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003).. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(15) Financial Sanctions Besides trade sanctions, financial ones are also at the initiator’s disposal. Four actions can be taken, according to Grieco and Ikenberry (2003). First, “currency attacks” is meant for weakening a target country’s exchange rate. Second, a “freeze on financial assets” can be imposed or residents of the target country may be denied of access to financial assets they hold in the initiating country (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003). A third type is “bans on private bank lending and foreign direct investment.” In 1986, for instance, the U.S. forbad American banks from extending loans to South Africa and banned most new private direct investments there by U.S. enterprises in the hope that South African government would abandon its apartheid policy. The last one is the denial. 治政大sanctions are employed in sanctions are imposed by an initiator itself while multilateral 立 the company of other states (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003). In the following analysis, I of bilateral or multilateral economic assistance to a target. On the whole, unilateral. ‧ 國. 學. explore at greater length the relations between China and Cambodia.. ‧. China’s Economic Leverage. y. Nat. sit. According to The World Bank (2018), China, with a population of 1.3 billion, is the. er. io. second largest economy in the world. Four of China’s tech behemoths are ranked in a top 10 list of the world’s largest Internet companies, which are JD.com (E-commerce. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. platform), Tencent (Social network), Alibaba (E-commerce platform) and Baidu (Search. engchi. engine) (Bloomenthal, 2019, para. 2). In the end of 2018, Huawei, a Chinese multinational telecommunications company, was making headlines because of its CFO Meng Wanzhou’s (孟晚舟) arrest in Canada. The company’s future prospects of becoming the world’s leading 5G market, have many countries worried and especially the US, which is on pins and needles about its precarious status as a world leader. The juxtaposition of bilateral economic indices demonstrates the relative economic advantage between China and Cambodia in the figures shown as follows. GDP and percentage are on the Y-axis while years are displayed on the X-axis. In Figure 2.1, from around 2005 onwards, there has been a conspicuous growth of China’s GDP all over the years while Cambodia’s stays relatively low. In Figure 2.2, China shows better growth dynamics overall. China’s GDP growth rate exhibits two major peaks and in 2012 it. 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(16) started to go down before it climbed up in 2017. Cambodia’s GDP growth rate reached the highest point in 2008 and plunged into rock bottom in 2009. It is from that time the GDP bounced back. It grew considerably all the way to 2011 and since then the growth rate has levelled off in recent years. In Figure 2.3, it shows China’s stronger economic growth. In Figure 2.4 and 2.5, it can be inferred that bilateral trade is of extreme significance to Cambodia than China. It has now become evident that economic power is often seen as the foundation of military and political power.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.1 Gross Domestic Product of China and Cambodia Source: The World Bank (2019). 8. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(17) 立. 政治大. Source: The World Bank (2019). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 2.2 GDP Growth Rate of China and Cambodia. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.3 GDP per Capita of China and Cambodia Source: The World Bank (2010). 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(18) 治政 Source: The World Bank (2019) 大立. Figure 2.4 Merchandise Trade of China and Cambodia. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.5 Bilateral Trade as % of Trade Volume of China and Cambodia Source: The World Bank (2019). 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(19) Political and Investment Benefits. In this passage, I look into how China, with its economic capabilities, wins Cambodia’s heart and is paid back with political and investments benefits. Pheakdey (2012) presents that Cambodia has been a popular market for foreign investors from China, South Korea, the United States, Malaysia and Thailand chiefly because of its untapped natural resources, low labor costs and attractive investment incentives. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are a major driver of economy in Cambodia (Pheakdey, 2012). While China offers “no strings attached” aid to Cambodia, many suspect China has ulterior motives. In Figure 2.5, it shows China’s investment is crucial to Cambodia’s GDP growth rate. It grew to almost 30 percent in 2016. In Figure 2.6, it shows a much. 治政大reveals China as staggering 67.89 percent appeared in the year of 2014 which 立 Cambodia’s largest FDI contributor.. more crystal clear picture of China’s contribution to Cambodia’s FDI growth rate. A. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 2.6 China’s Investment in Cambodia as Percentage of Cambodia’ GDP Source: CDC (n.d.) and The World Bank (2019). 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(20) 政治大 Figure 2.7 China’s Investment in Cambodia as Percentage of Cambodia’s FDI 立 (n.d.) and The World Bank (2019) Source: CDC. ‧ 國. 學. Traditionally, the investments were mainly in the field of manufacturing and garments. But later on FDI inflows are more diversified and investment in non-garment sectors has. ‧. become more visible, according to ASEAN Investment Report (2018). China has. y. Nat. expanded its investment in ihnfrastructure, agriculture, tourism and so on. And in recent. sit. years, China has focused more on casinos, real estate, and resorts in the case of. er. io. Sihanoukvill (Po and Heng, 2019). As Pheakdey (2012) points out, China and Cambodia. al. n. v i n CChina with. Not only that, as early as 2008, became Cambodia’s biggest donor with hen gchi U. have the largest trade growth compared to other ASEAN countries that China does trade. US$257 million, followed by the European Union with US$214 million, and Japan with US$113 million (“China’s Cambodian Hegemony,” 2009, para. 6). Nevertheless, China’s official development assistance (ODA) is most controversial since it is offered with no conditions and China does not interfere in the way Cambodia wishes to spend the money (Pheakdey, 2012). This gives Cambodia a lot of freedom and less stress because the US and its Western allies have many requests while giving the aid. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) places a lot of importance on saving lives, reducing poverty, strengthening democratic governance and many more (USAID, 2019). Therefore, China hit the spot with Cambodia by showing no interests in these reforms as well as sticking its nose into the kingdom’s domestic affairs. To return such a huge favor, Cambodia gives China political and investment 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(21) favors. In the ASEAN meeting in July 2012 in regard to the South China Sea dispute, Cambodia came under fire for its unjust chairmanship (Hunt, 2012, para. 7). 2.2 Besides Economy, China’s Other Advantages: Military and Soft Power. In addition to receiving economic assistance, Cambodia is never short of military supplies offered by China and Chinese soft power is pervasive in the kingdom.. Bilateral Military Aid. China has helped Cambodia tremendously and diversely in military aid such as giving. 治政 (Pheakdey, 2012). In Figure 2.7, it can be seen that China’s大 military power is getting 立 stronger and is in an advantageous position than Cambodia’s. More than that, in May. new barracks, jeeps, ambulances, parachutes, patrol boats, military cars and uniforms. ‧ 國. 學. 2012, both countries signed a military cooperation pact in which China promised to build military hospitals and military training schools and continue training military personnel. ‧. in Cambodia (Chanborey, 2015, para. 5). Cambodia’s military defense has progressed significantly due to China’s generosity, but China is not giving without taking.. Nat. sit. y. Cambodian airfields could also serve as a maritime air cover for China’s in-flight. er. io. refueling (Marks, 2000). Strategically speaking, the unique geographical location of Cambodia proves vital for China’s security in Southeast Asia. China’s increasing exports. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. and thirst for energy have pushed it to pursue its “string-of-pearls” strategy, which means. engchi. establishing a series of nodes (pearls) of military and economic power in a region, often by gaining increased access to airfields and ports (Pheakdey, 2012). Port of Sihanouk is such a precious pearl among China’s “string of pearls,” for it provides China the access to wield its power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of Malacca (Pheakdey, 2012). Cambodia’s pivotal role is what China needs to exert greater influence in Southeast Asia and more importantly, to counterbalance the power of the US (Pheakdey, 2012). As early as 2018, Hun Sen said he had received a letter from US Vice President Mike Pence who raised concerns over an alleged Chinese naval base in Cambodia. He clarified the situation by saying it was not necessary for Cambodia to violate its constitution. Plus, the country was not at war and it was capable of defending itself without the help of foreign troops (Chheng, 2018, para. 1 – para. 11). Nonetheless, in January 2019, three Chinese warships docked in Cambodia for four days, fueling speculation that China is 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(22) building a naval base there. Hun Sen denied such rumors and Cambodian defense ministry spokesman Chhum Socheat also said: “the goal of the visit is to boost ties and military cooperation, especially between the navies from both countries” (“Chinese Warships,” 2019, para. 6). But the speculation is still swirling in July 2019 about China signing a secret deal to station troops in Cambodia. Hun said vehemently that the report was “the worst distorted news” and once again he made it clear that “no such thing happens. Foreign military base is against Cambodia’s constitution” (“Hun Sen Denies Allowing,” 2019, para. 2 – para. 3). No matter what the fact is, it is the unmistakable truth that both countries desire a close military cooperation.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. v i n Figure 2.8 China and Expenditure C hCambodia’s Military U i e h n c (2019) gBank Source: The World China’s Soft Power Culture doesn’t seem to do much in the political sphere because economic and military power are usually the criteria people use to judge a country. However, culture has its share of contribution. It is influential in the actions of other states in a more subtle way. China, rich in its history as well as culture, particularly excels at exercising this instrument of power. “The growth of Chinese-language education and the revival of the Chinese community expanded dramatically in 1998 and 1999, in no small part due to assistance and encouragement from China” (Marks, 2000, p. 97). To strengthen the ties,. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(23) China has created a variety of scholarship programs to attract foreign scholars and students to study, conduct research and work in China (Pheakdey, 2012). By attracting more and more people to learn the language and appreciate the culture, China is able to expand its influence. That is the strong power soft power exhibits. Chinese Cambodians are one of the largest ethnic minorities in Cambodia and “Mandarin Chinese is the second most spoken language in Cambodia after English.” (“Chinese-Cambodia Ties,” 2016, para. 5). What is more noteworthy is that an increasing number of ethnic Khmer are also enrolling in Chinese-language schools (Marks, 2000). That means not only Cambodians who are of Chinese descent study Chinese. So do ethnic Khmer, realizing the gigantic advantages of learning the language and customs from its powerful ally (Sigfrido and Ear, 2010). The cultural influence of China can also. 治政大 up to 80 percent of “the Chinese New Year is one of the largest festivals in Cambodia, 立 Cambodian people celebrate it every year” (“Cambodian PM Sends Greetings,” 2012,. be seen when it comes to Chinese New Year. Hun Sen once said in a public speech that. ‧ 國. 學. para. 7). He also added “Cambodia celebrates three times of New Year in a year: Universal New Year, Chinese New Year and Khmer New Year itself” (“Cambodian PM. ‧. Sends Greetings,” 2012, para. 8).. Even though Chinese New Year is not an official public holiday, it is still one of the. y. Nat. sit. most celebrated festivals that several schools, markets, businesses and government. al. er. io. ministries are closed during this event (Pheakdey, 2012). But the most ambitious and. n. clever strategy is its establishment of the world-famous Confucius Institutes around the. Ch. i n U. v. globe, promoting Chinese language and culture through various activities such as music,. engchi. cooking and lectures on Chinese history and society (Pheakdey, 2012) China is the nearest superpower for Cambodia to fall back on. “Only good relations with Beijing can bring peace to Cambodia and permit political stability, regardless of the composition of the Cambodian leadership” (Ross, 1992, p. 58 – p. 59). The following paragraphs give a few examples that illustrate explicitly whether states give in to Chinese pressure in terms of protecting their own economic benefits.. 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(24) 2.3 Examples of China Trying to Use Economic Means to Gain Political Clout. In this section, I show what economic power can do and cannot do by the multiple examples provided below.. Influence Coming from Economic Power China’s economy-driven influence is not boundless. Countries are more willing to accommodate Chinese interests on economic issues instead of political ones. China’s economic partners are inclined to modify foreign policies conflicting with Beijing’s in order not to disrupt their commercial ties with China (Kastner, 2016). In 2003, for. 治政大for three days (Allenlater after China closed an oil pipeline supplying North Korea 立 Ebrahimian, 2017, para. 8). Also in 2011, the Dalai Lama cancelled a trip to South Africa instance, North Korea participated in six-party talks with the United States a few months. ‧ 國. 學. after having difficulty in obtaining a visa. The Dalai Lama is regarded as a dangerous “splittist” and it is suggested South Africa made this decision due to a number of bilateral. ‧. trade and investment deals it signed with China (“Dalai Lama Cancels,” 2011, para. 7). Back in 2008, Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in aid and loans to Africa and “the money. Nat. sit. y. came with no expectation of anything in return” (Fifield, 2018, para. 1). This explains. n. al. er. io. that countries have trouble in saying no to tempting aid.. Taiwan. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. According to Kastner (2016), “Taiwan is not a clear-cut case of burgeoning economic ties translating seamlessly into greatly increased political influence for the PRC” (Kastner, 2016, p. 984). Many Taiwanese businesses that have a direct stake in the Mainland economy favor moderation and pragmatism in cross-strait policies. Yet Taiwanese attitudes toward unification with the PRC stays minimal (Kastner, 2016). In 2018, China demanded that airlines should stop listing Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as countries (“Airlines Switching,” 2018). Besides, several Taiwanese celebrities including singers, actresses, baker etc. were accused of supporting Taiwanese independence that they were forced to claim they are “Chinese” so as to save their career or business. This has formed an atmosphere for Taiwanese who are doing business in China to be extra-cautious not to touch upon this sensitive issue. However, according to Kastner (2016), “growing 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(25) numbers of Taiwan’s residents self-identify as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese” (Kastner, 2016, p. 984). Though Taiwan is not a clean-cut case, influence, no doubt, is very much visible.. The Philippines. Prior China-Philippines relations have been good, but the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 gave rise to China’s strict phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas. Though both governments denied there was a connection, it was difficult not to connect both the restrictions and the cancellation of tourist visits with the dispute. The Philippine banana industry also viewed these measures as retaliation. The Philippines later came to. 治政 years, economic ties between the two nations have thrived.大 China became the fourth立 largest trading partner of the Philippines in 2018 ($8.7 billion) (Workman, 2019, para. 4). an agreement with China for a mutual withdrawal of vessels (Ravindran, 2012). Over the. ‧ 國. 學. Former President Arroyo was even accused of ignoring the South China Sea dispute as an exchange for Chinese investments (Ravindran, 2012).. ‧. Vietnam. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Sino-Vietnamese relations are a long history of conflict and cooperation (Ravindran,. n. 2012). Both share a communist ideology and were often described as being as close as. Ch. i n U. v. lips and teeth. The relationship turned sour because of 1979 border war with China.. engchi. Bilateral ties were normalized in 1991 when both shifted their focus to economic development (Huang, 2017, para. 3). Compared to the Philippines, Vietnam is much more economically dependent on China (Ravindran, 2012). Experts predict that bilateral trade between the two countries will reach a record high of US$100 billion this year, after reaching $93.69 billion last year (“VN-China Trade,” 2018, para. 1). Despite Vietnam’s economic dependence on China, due to “the unfavorable view of China among the Vietnamese public, Vietnam’s economic vulnerability would be neutralized by political factors” (Ravindran, 2012, p. 125). This means “Vietnam is less likely than the Philippines to concede to China’s demands” (Ravindran, 2012, p. 125). According to Huang (2017), recent opinion polls have also suggested that the US is the most favored country of the Vietnamese while China is the least favorite (Huang, 2017, para. 6). Therefore, for China to wield political influence in Vietnam, challenges are foreseeable. 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(26) Myanmar. Burma had been a major battleground under British and Japanese rule for a long period of time. Consequently, “non-alignment and neutrality were the country’s lodestars upon independence, coupled with a deeply embedded nationalism” (Goh and Steinberg, 2016, p. 57). However, China is the nearest major power to reach out to Myanmar, it is definitely not easy for Myanmar to stay neutral. According to Goh and Steinberg (2016), Myanmar’s policy has changed from hewing to neutrality to pursuing mutual gains with China, then to a growing interdependence at the present. The geographical location of Myanmar and its natural resources are all crucial to China’s national development. Nevertheless, two incidents show that Myanmar is not completely “China’s client state”. 治政大Province in southern China. deep water port in Bhamo that shares the border with Yunnan 立 The proposal was rejected even before construction could begin (Goh and Steinberg, as it is so often referred to. The first example reflects in the 1980s Chinese proposal of a. ‧ 國. 學. 2016).. The most notable setback for China is the Myitsone Dam project suspended on. ‧. account of social and environmental impact. The project was prized by China for the dam’s hydroelectric potential that could benefit not just Yunnan but also other Chinese. Nat. sit. y. provinces (Goh and Steinberg, 2016). On the other hand, “anti-Chinese sentiment” is. al. er. io. another stumbling block that lessens Chinese influence. In Myanmar, many felt “the. n. Chinese had trampled over local interests, propped up the unpopular military regime and. Ch. i n U. v. pillaged the country’s natural resources” (Walker, 2014, para. 8). In short, from previous. engchi. instances, it is clear enough that Myanmar has the ability to act in its own interest.. Anti-Secession Law vs. Tibetan Crackdown Let’s look at two more examples. One is China’s Anti-Secession Law, which was passed during the Chen Shui-bian presidency. Chen is a retired Taiwanese lawyer and politician and a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). To everyone's surprise, it was the first time the party won the presidency. This unprecedented victory put an end to Kuomintang (KMT) rule which lasted more than half a century. DPP's proindependence stance causes China great anxiety and generates fear that this beautiful land of Formosa would drift apart from it. Without question, Chen’s re-election gave rise to pessimism in Beijing about political trends in Taiwan. As a result, the idea of a 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(27) unification law was formed to prevent Chen from moving Taiwan to formal independence during his second term (Kastner, 2016). The other is the 2008 Tibetan unrest, which reflected long-standing grievances against Chinese rule in the region (Kastner, 2016). It was a series of riots that started in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet. In the beginning, it was just an observance of the 49th anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day. However, it turned into street protests by monks and the whole situation went out of control on March 14. That is why the incident is also called the 3-14 Riots. The number of casualties varied because the Chinese government was accused of playing down the severity of the uprising. What’s more, Beijing contained a great deal of information. Journalists were either asked to leave or were denied access (Barboza, 2008, para. 8). China pointed the finger at the Dalai Lama for. 治政大 was the widespread discontent in Tibet. 立 According to Kastner’s study, more countries supported 2005 Anti-Secession Law masterminding the violent protests. He denied such accusation and said the real cause. ‧ 國. 學. than 2008 PRC crackdown on Tibetan unrest. The support for the latter would be more controversial since it is involved in human rights, whereas the support for the former is. ‧. less stressful since it is related to the acceptance of PRC use of force if Taiwan declares independence; however, it is just a hypothesis (Kastner, 2016) and a pipe dream to many.. Nat. sit. y. Therefore, Kastner concludes that a country’s economic dependence on China creates. al. er. io. greater PRC influence in economic arenas than in political ones unless the stakes are. n. relatively low in certain political issues. The examples provided here are the best proof.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(28) 2.4 Conclusion. 立. 政治大. Source: Harvard Dataverse (2019). 學. ‧ 國. Figure 2.9 Ideal Point of China and Cambodia. ‧. In a nutshell, China is an emerging superpower no matter in Asia or around the world. It goes without saying that many least developed countries are in desperate need of its aid.. sit. y. Nat. In Figure 2.9, two lines were overlapping most of the time and that indicates the two countries hold similar political views. This research aims to examine whether. io. n. al. er. asymmetrical power relations between China and Cambodia can remain healthy in the. i n U. v. long run and whether or not Cambodia is becoming China’s puppet state. On the basis of. Ch. engchi. literature, states are more likely to accommodate Chinese interests on economic issues. Political issues are more complicated and are with higher stakes. China “can’t win them all.” That is, “you win some, you lose some.” Strong economic power has its limits. Some countries are not easy to be controlled even though they are small powers. And the sensitivity of the political issues decides how much support you can get from others. Take Cambodia for example, it is not hesitant to express where it stands on Taiwan issue mainly for economic benefits given by China. The existing Sino-Cambodian friendship only seems to get stronger. However, while Cambodia is thirstily welcoming FDI, further research is needed to see whether this friendship is able to benefit not only China but also Cambodia for the long haul and most importantly, will Cambodia lose its sovereignty at the expense of pursuing economic development? According to the different findings in literature, two hypotheses are posed as follows so as to find out 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(29) which one conforms to the reality:. H1: Cambodia usually accommodates Chinese interests in its policy when there is a dispute. H2: Cambodia shows its unyielding stance on certain issues if Cambodian interests are bigger than Chinese interests.. The goal of this research paper is to find out which hypothesis best describes the relationship between the two countries. If H2 is more correct, then under what kinds of circumstances does Cambodia choose not to listen to China?. 治政大it is not surprising when Since Cambodia gives the impression of taking China’s side, 立 Cambodia tilts toward China when a dispute arises. Even though the thesis is meant to. In the next chapter, I present five case studies. I will look at cases of compliance first.. ‧ 國. 學. clear up doubts about Cambodia being a Chinese puppet, it is still necessary to introduce two case studies here to make clear Cambodia’s pro-China attitude. The first case is the. ‧. extradition of Uighurs from Cambodia back to China. It is a major historic event as well as an unforgettable tragedy that has had a profound impact on Cambodia’s reputation.. Nat. sit. y. The second case is about Huawei’s 5G network in Cambodia. Due to the US-China trade. al. er. io. war, Huawei has found itself in deep water over the months. Fortunately, China has this. n. very good friend Cambodia who cannot wait to have 5G penetration all over the country.. Ch. i n U. v. These two events well explain Cambodia’s political stance as expected.. engchi. 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(30) Chapter Three: Case Studies of Compliance This chapter provides two cases of compliance which give good examples of how Cambodia pleases China. A little background behind the event will be introduced first in order to give a clear depiction of the whole incident.. 3.1 Cambodia's Deportation of Uighurs, December 2009.. The first case study is related to 2009 Urumqi Riots which broke out on July 5, 2009, in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang (新疆). It started out as a protest but turned into. 政治大. violent attacks on Han Chinese people. According to PRC officials, 197 people died, most of whom were Hans and more than 1,700 people were injured, with hundreds of. 立. vehicles and buildings damaged. Chinese authorities said that it was the bloodiest. ‧ 國. 學. violence since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (Hays, 2010, para. 1). In fact, the dreadful Urumqi ethnic clashes originated from a brawl between Han Chinese and. ‧. Uighurs at a toy factory in Guangdong Province (廣東省) which left two Uighurs dead and 118 people injured. The purpose of the protest held by Uighurs was to demand a. Nat. sit. y. government investigation of the brawl that had happened overnight on June 25 and June 26 (Wong, 2009, para. 7).. io. n. al. er. “By November 2009, more than 400 individuals faced criminal charges for their. i n U. v. actions during the riots. Nine were executed in November 2009, and by February 2010, at. Ch. engchi. least 26 had received death sentences” (Guo, 2015, p. 48). Due to the great fear of government retribution, “at least 300 Uighurs are thought to have fled China” (Wong, 2010, para. 5) in the aftermath of the riots. According to New York Times (2009), many were terrified of long jail terms or even the capital punishment (Mydans, 2009, para. 4). Therefore, twenty-two Uighurs, including a pregnant woman and two children (Crothers, 2013, para. 4), entered Cambodia with the help of a Christian group, but two of the Uighurs have disappeared after setting foot in the country, said the Cambodian government (Mydans, 2009, para. 7). The remaining twenty Uighurs were ill-fated because their asylum request had been rejected that they had to be expelled from Cambodia back to China. “Amnesty International warned the Uighurs could be tortured on their return to China, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said the move was a grave 22. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(31) breach of international refugee law,” (Moore, 2009, para. 6). It is sad that Cambodian government ignored the gravity of the situation and chose to make this appalling decision just for the sake of economic benefits given by China. Two days after deporting 20 Uighur asylum seekers, Cambodia signed 14 deals with China worth approximately $850 million (Ferrie, 2009, para. 1). China justified itself by saying those escaped Uighurs were criminals and also thanked Cambodian government for their assistance. Xi Jinping, the then vice president, remarked “it can be said that Sino-Cambodia relations are a model of friendly cooperation” (Mydans, 2009, para. 3). As for Cambodia, the government spokesman, Koy Kuong, said the reason Cambodia expelled the Uighurs was because they entered the country illegally and Cambodia was just implementing its immigration laws (Ferrie, 2009, para. 10).. 治政大 it hard to believe there between deportation and the signed deals, the world still found 立 was no connection. U.S.-based Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer said that “Cambodia’s Though both countries tried to justify their actions and denied there was a link. ‧ 國. 學. deportation was no doubt influenced by enormous Chinese pressure, backed by hundreds of millions of dollars in aid” (Ferrie, 2009, para. 6). According to Human Rights House. ‧. Foundation (2010), “Cambodia has become an accomplice to the Chinese government’s human rights violations against the Uyghurs” (Bergen, 2010, para. 3) and it also mentions. Nat. sit. y. that “WUC3 vows to continuously hold Cambodia accountable for this horrific action and. er. io. to make sure that the world never forgets this atrocity committed by the Cambodian government” (Bergen, 2010, para. 4).. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. This case study is a very important index of examining whether Cambodia is a. engchi. Chinese client state. From Hun Sen’s decision, he sent a clear message that Cambodia did not yield to international pressure on human rights protection. China is the only country the kingdom bows to. Furthermore, in 2015, Cambodian officials praised Thailand’s repatriation of 109 Uighurs back to China (Gruber, 2015, para. 1). “Thailand has showed its respect for the sovereignty of China by not interfering in China’s internal affairs,” said Cambodian government spokesman Phay Siphan (Gruber, 2015, para. 1). This has also deepened the belief in Cambodia losing its impartiality because human rights were treated like dirt and traded as a commodity by Cambodia.. 3 World Uyghur Congress. 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(32) 3.2 Huawei’s 5G Network in Cambodia, April 2019.. The US-China trade war has been ongoing since 2018. This is predictable because US President Donald Trump, since he took office in 2016, has complained about China’s unfair trading practices. Versed in twiplomacy,4 Trump tweeted that China has been taking advantage of the United States on trade for many years and he will retaliate against China if their farmers, ranchers and industrial workers are targeted (Sengezer, 2018, para. 2). As the trade war heats up, Huawei has become a target that the US has urged its allies to block Huawei equipment from government and commercial networks (Isidore, 2018, para. 3). Moreover, American officials also expressed worries over “the use of the Chinese equipment in countries that host U.S. military bases such as Germany, Japan and. 治政大also partly because of security threat due to “alleged links to Chinese government,” 立 Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei (任正非) who used to be a military engineer Italy” (Ramli, Chiang and Hong, 2018, para. 9). To the US, Huawei is perceived as a. ‧ 國. 學. (Ramli, Chiang and Hong, 2018, para. 3).. As for Huawei CEO, he seems very confident in Huawei’s future and said in many. ‧. interviews that customers will come to realize how good their product is and there exists no security issue. “If you do your product well, there is no need to worry about sales. It. y. Nat. sit. would be stupid on their part if they don’t buy,” said Ren with a smiley face (Jiang, 2019,. er. io. para. 4). On the other hand, the immense pressure coming from the US must be very. al. difficult to deal with because this reflected in Ren’s rare media appearances recently.. n. v i n According to Reuters (2019), Ren seldom since he founded Huawei in C h spoke to the media U i e h n g cin 2015 (Jiang, 2019, para. 6). One 1987. His last talk to the press took place at Davos BBC correspondent who had one-on-one interview with him at Davos also dubbed him “world’s most mysterious chief executive,” especially when he is the founder and CEO of the world’s largest telecommunications company (Yueh, 2015, para. 2). Ren is indeed a rare orchid “in our media saturated age” (Yueh, 2015, para. 1). However, he said he was forced by his public relations department to open up to the media. “I must make our clients understand us, make our 180,000 employees understand us, come together and get through this tough time” (Jiang, 2019, para. 7). Despite his efforts, Australia was quick to ban Huawei while the other three members of the Five. 4 A word combined by Twitter and diplomacy.. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(33) Eyes alliance,5 namely the UK, Canada and New Zealand were still undecided. Surprisingly, “Australia is actually ahead of the US on the ban” (Tobin, 2019, para. 13). Australia decided to exclude Huawei from its national broadband network in 2011 long before Trump waged a trade war and targeted the tech giant (Tobin, 2019, para. 11). Whereas in Southeast Asia, Cambodia is the first country to sign a deal on 5G with Huawei while Hun Sen joined the second Belt and Road forum in Beijing (Narin, 2019, para. 3). He commented on Facebook that “this is the best if Cambodia has 5G Internet technology since it is fast” (Narin, 2019, para. 4). According to statcounter, Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Cambodia with 62.9 percent of users from June 2018 to June 2019 (“Social Media Stats,” n.d.). Digital statistics shows that in 2017, there are 7.16 million internet users and 4.9. 治政大left provocative comments Hun Sen himself also fought back Vietnamese netizens who 立 on his Facebook in consequence of his pro-China stance on South China Sea issue. He million active social media users in Cambodia (“The Development of,” 2017, para. 1).. ‧ 國. 學. said he wants to reaffirm he is neither a Vietnamese puppet nor a boss of Vietnam. It’s not his duty to serve the benefits of Vietnamese country and he’s not asking Vietnam to. ‧. serve Cambodian political interest, either (Nguyen, 2016, para. 7). Also, when accused of betraying Vietnam, Hun replied “Vietnam is not my boss. How can I betray it? My. Nat. sit. y. loyalty only goes to the Khmer nation” (Nguyen, 2016, para. 9). Facebook is obviously a. al. er. io. good tool for Hun to build popularity by proclaiming loyalty to the Kingdom of. n. Cambodia whenever there is a chance.. Ch. i n U. v. Accordingly, it can be imagined that Internet speed and Huawei's 5G networks are. engchi. essential to him as well as to the development of the country. In short, the UK has allowed Huawei limited access to help build noncore infrastructure (Swinford and Hymas, 2019, para. 2). “Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia have already partnered with Huawei to develop 5G networks” (“Cambodia signs 5G,” 2019, para. 5). Being the very first country in Southeast Asia to embrace Huawei, Cambodia shows its determination to support China no matter what. Be it BRI doubts, suspicions of Chinese warships docking at Sihanoukville port or Huawei crisis, Cambodia has proved itself one by one that it is a reliable ally.. 5 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.. 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(34) 3.3 Findings of the Two Cases. From the observation of the two cases, Cambodia clearly did not follow in the US's footsteps, nor was it affected by the pressure from the international society. It chose to do something agreeable to China and most importantly, the decisions Cambodia made not only further cemented their friendship, but they also benefited Cambodia greatly. It is exactly “killing two birds with one stone.” What is not to love?. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(35) Chapter Four: Case Studies of Non-Compliance In this chapter, I select three bilateral disputes as cases of non-compliance to further examine if Cambodia could act freely when the incident is concerning Cambodian interests. The first case is about The Office of the Council of Ministers. This is the most obvious incident to show how Cambodia behaves when differences in opinions occur. The second case is regarding the illegal wildlife trade found in Chinese Chamber of Commerce Office in Phnom Penh. The issue is worth investigating because Cambodia did not treat the Chinese chamber with the greatest courtesy as expected. The third case is related to Chinese nationals who were arrested for internet phone call scams. A shocking number of Chinese nationals are being sent home incessantly. This reflects the kingdom’s. 政治大 they are chosen will be illustrated 立in the beginning of each section.. door is not wide open for everyone who hails from China. The more detailed reasons why. ‧ 國. 學. Since China and Cambodia are close-knit friends, I aim to look for places where Cambodia is capable of making its own decisions when facing clashing interests. The research question proposed in this thesis seems to have a self-evident answer, for most. ‧. people believe that Cambodia is a Chinese client state. However, if one conflicting case. y. Nat. can be found, then it is reasonable to infer that Cambodia would change its path for its. io. sit. own good when needed instead of always pleasing China. In the following passages, I. n. al. er. expand upon three cases for the purpose of searching for the answer to the proposed. i n U. v. question. They were arranged according to decreasing intensity from the highest intensity to the lowest.. Ch. engchi. 4.1 Prime Minister’s Office Controversy, April 2009. The first case of non-compliance is about the Chinese-built building in the capital of Cambodia. The grand building is conspicuous on the street in Phnom Penh and the case was selected because it is not only an embarrassing reminder to China but also an object of ridicule to the locals. It is assumed that China wants control over Cambodia by the alleged wiretap in the Chinese-designed building but naturally enough, both countries deny such allegation. If it is really not about keeping tabs on Cambodian government, then China must be craving for more friendship and loyalty, though their friendship couldn’t get better. The reason for Cambodia to shoot China down is imaginably because. 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(36) of the protection of sovereignty and also the peace of mind when it knows the office is safe and the building is not kept under surveillance by another country. The Office of the Council of Ministers in Phnom Penh was funded by China. The building has a peculiar design which an almost pyramid-shaped construction resides in the hollow center (indicated in Picture 4.1). It is said Prime Minister Hun Sen did not like the design of the building because it resembled a mausoleum.6 Plus, there was a suspicion that phone lines might have been tapped by China, says a local tour guide. More credibly, an anonymous government source told The Phnom Penh Post that “the prime minister was in fact not happy with several aspects of the Chinese-designed building” (Hayes and Sokheng, 2009, para. 10). Therefore, Prime Minister wanted a second building next door which was designed by Khmers and built in a Khmer style (Hayes and Sokheng, 2009,. 治政大 (indicated in Picture Peace Palace, a.k.a. the Office of the Prime Minister of Cambodia 立 4.2). para. 6). The newly-built structure next to the Chinese-funded building is called The. ‧ 國. 學. Picture 4.1 The Office of the Council of Ministers. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: Wikimedia (2012) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Council_of_Ministers_headquarters,_Phnom_P enh_(2012).jpg (accessed on 3 April, 2019). 6 This information was acquired through the conversation with the local tour guide in 2016.. 28. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(37) Picture 4.2 The Peace Palace (the Office of the Prime Minister of Cambodia). 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Source: Wikimedia (2012). https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27248698 (accessed on 3 April, 2019). sit. y. Nat. io. er. According to Hayes and Sokheng (2009), the inauguration of the Chinese-funded edifice was supposed to take place on April 4, 2009. Phay Siphan, spokesman for the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Council of Ministers, denied that the delay had anything to do with the unlucky number 4. engchi. which sounds like “death” in Chinese. He said both buildings would be inaugurated on November 8, 2010 (Hayes and Sokheng, 2009, para. 5). Even though Phay Siphan explained that the reason Prime Minister wanted a second building was due to lack of space in the Chinese-built structure to host international conferences, rumors of Hun Sen disliking this Chinese gift have been circulating. It is indeed very embarrassing for China to be given the cold shoulder. Nonetheless, The Chinese Ministry of Commerce said such report did not conform to the facts and stressed that Cambodian government has never expressed any complaint about the Chinese-funded building (聞育旻, 2009, para. 1 - 2). This incident is very unusual because Cambodia invariably accepts everything China offers with great joy such as military equipment, financial aid, massive infrastructure projects and so on. The kingdom just cannot thank China enough. “About 70 percent of roads and bridges in Cambodia have been funded by China” (Retka, 2017, para. 1). 29. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(38) National Highway 6 of Cambodia is such an example. According to people.cn (2018), it connects the capital Phnom Penh with Siem Reap where the mysterious ruins of Angkor Wat are located. One tour bus driver says it used to take 8 hours for just a one-way trip. Now it only takes 4 hours to commute between two places. Therefore, it is called by the locals as “the best road in Cambodia.” A Khmer proverb goes, “Where there is a road, there is hope” (孫廣勇 and 趙益普, 2018, para. 3 - 11). Obviously, Cambodia’s appreciation to China is beyond words. With China’s tremendous support, Hun Sen did not fret over the US’s warning of cutting aid when Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the country’s main opposition party in 2017. “Hun Sen welcomes and encourages the U.S. to cut all aid” (Prak, 2017, para.8). Hun’s utterances manifested audacious defiance and it just shows he couldn’t care less when China’s got his back.. 政治大 ordinary. Even though both sides denied any complaint about the building, conflicting 立 voices can be heard anywhere. Besides, it is worth noting that according to the news. In light of past events, this incident of the Chinese-funded building is really out of the. ‧ 國. 學. release of Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) (2009), The Peace Palace under construction was not a new prime minister office building, but an. ‧. international conference center (“柬方對中國援建,” 2009, para. 3). However, The Peace. y. Nat. Palace, also known as the Office of the Prime Minister of Cambodia is in truth the. sit. principal workplace of the Prime Minister. China’s official statement was to avoid. al. er. io. embarrassment as well as appease Chinese public opinion because China not only lost. v. n. money but also lost face. Nobody would expect that Cambodia never knew “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.”. Ch. engchi. i n U. This costly gift from China is a total debacle and triggered much criticism in the Chinese public who has accused the government of practicing dollar diplomacy. The Chinese government has been blamed for only providing what the leader and the government want without paying much attention to what the people really need there (修羅陛下, 2009, para. 9). However, considering this accusation, it is not entirely true because we have seen a lot of changes from China when it does help Cambodia with schools, hospitals, infrastructure and the like that truly benefit the locals. But then again it is also said that China is given to achieving its goals by bribery or by sending gifts, big or small, to please the recipient (修羅陛下, 2009, para. 7). Since this incident makes China look bad, there is not much information to be found on the Internet because China’s army of censors are very good at removing negative comments. We can see from this case 30. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(39) study that notwithstanding their unbreakable friendship, Cambodia does not necessarily obey China in every way.. 4.2 Illegal Wildlife Trade, October 2014. In this section, I introduce the second event to show the conflicts China and Cambodia had in 2014 when Cambodian police raided on the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Phnom Penh and discovered illegal wildlife trade. According to MOFCOM, the Chinese chamber, with the aim to promote trade and commerce, has many offices stationed in different regions and countries such as Hong Kong, Macau, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan and so on. This event is worth noting and discussing because Cambodia did not give royal treatment to the chamber at all just because China is Cambodia’s major benefactor.. 政治大 worse, bury the case when discovering 立 China’s wrongdoing in its own territory. This. And for a country that is infamous for corruption, Cambodia did not make concessions or. ‧ 國. 學. proves that Cambodia is not a puppet, for a puppet is deprived of a will of its own. Before further analyzing the incident, I want to show Cambodia’s outright differential treatment in situations where it needed to pick sides and decide whom to make friends. ‧. with. Taiwan and Cambodia had diplomatic ties between 1947 and 1958 when Prince. y. Nat. Norodom Ranariddh was in power and a Taiwan consulate was located in Phnom Penh to. sit. help foster the bilateral relationship. However, after Hun Sen ousted the prince, he. er. io. suspended the diplomatic relations and due to the abolition of Taiwan consulate, related. al. n. v i n CThe Cultural Office in Ho Chi Minh City. a well-managed website which h eoffice n gruns chi U. affairs between Taiwan and Cambodia are instead taken care of by Taipei Economic and. provides not only Vietnam related information but also detailed economic and trade news about Cambodia. Owing to the fact that Hun Sen was determined to support China wholeheartedly when both countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1958, Hun has been regarding Taiwan as a breakaway province that should be reunited with China (Gnanasagaran, 2018, para. 4). Hun expressed explicitly in 2003 that a Taiwanese representative office would not be reopening in Cambodia in support of One-China Policy (Sambath and Barron, 2003, para. 1). More specifically, Hun has made his stance clear many times throughout the years and the recent one happened in April 2019. “Although Taiwanese people are allowed to conduct business in the Kingdom, the government will not allow a consulate,” said Hun during a dinner with the Association of Khmer-Chinese in Phnom Penh (Narim, 31. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(40) 2019, para. 1). The same prohibition also applies to the raising of the Taiwanese flag. Hun said that Cambodia respects the sovereignty of China and nothing should be done to affect such respect. He told the people there not to raise the Taiwanese flag wherever they are, “even at the hotel during the Taiwanese national holidays” (Chung, 2017, para. 4). As mentioned above, Cambodia showed ruthless efficiency when it dealt with Taiwan issues and those decisions Hun Sen made were only out of the purpose of putting a grin on China. Bar none. Therefore, when we compare the way Cambodia treats Taiwan and the way it does China, we get the straightforward answer of how much Cambodia treasures this Chinese friend. But when we look at the case of Chinese chamber, China’s gesture is really surprising. It happened in 2014 when two Chinese officials were arrested at the Sichuan (四川) and Chongqing (重慶) Chamber of Commerce in Phnom Penh. 政治大 intelligence gathering, Cambodia’s Forestry department, military police and officials 立 from the NGO Wildlife Alliance carried out a raid by joint efforts. (Heath, 2014, para. (Soenthrith, 2014, para. 1 - 2). With the help of the Wildlife Rapid Rescue Team’s. ‧ 國. 學. 10).. The police discovered a cache of illegal wildlife parts including 19 clouded leopard. ‧. skins, 2 Asian golden cat skins, 6 clouded leopard paws, 10 otter skins and so forth (Heath, 2014, para. 3). Live animals such as long-tailed macaques, tortoises and turtles. y. Nat. sit. were also found (DPA, 2014). The chamber was in fact running a wildlife trade center. er. io. and it was not just a transit route where live animals, animal parts and products are. al. v i n animals were killed and processed because were still being dried on C h the fresh peltsU i e h n g c officials were released without wooden frames (Heath, 2014, para. 4). The Chinese n. transported to the destination countries. The chamber was also the place where the. charge after agreeing to pay a fine of $25,000. There were comments about the punishment being too mild. However, granted their rock-solid friendship, Cambodia was not afraid to take actions, nor did it turn a blind eye to China's crime. According to World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), “wildlife trafficking is the world’s fourth largest illegal trade after drugs, human trafficking and counterfeiting. It is valued up to US$26 billion per year” (“The world's fourth,” n.d., para. 1). And China is the largest market for wildlife products. A lot of wild animals such as tigers and bears are bred in China. “Today’s tiger farms are basically feedlots where tigers are bred like cattle;” however, the farming does not help conservation efforts much because the animals are made into luxury products such as tiger bone wine and tiger skin rugs (“Wild. 32. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.

(41) laws: China,” 2016, para. 4 - 6). A great demand also comes from traditional Chinese medicine that dates back to ancient times. For example, pangolin scales are said to help with lactation and arthritis. Rhino horns are used as ornaments as well as remedies (Actman, 2019, para. 5). This conservation battle against China may be a long fight since traditional Chinese medicine is age-old and the relish for exotic animals is deep-rooted in Chinese culture. On top of that, in 2015, two government conservation workers in Cambodia lost their lives in an execution-style killing shortly after their team confiscated chain saws at an illegal logging site. The underlying cause of the tragedy was directed at China’s vast appetite for luxury items (Conniff, 2015, para. 1). Illicit wildlife trade and logging will not be a short-term problem to solve not just for China and the world but also for. 政治大. Cambodia itself. But at least on this matter, Cambodia stuck to its faith and was not being lenient when China crossed the line.. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 4.3 Chinese VoIP Scammers, July 2017.. The last case study is about Chinese nationals who were arrested and sent home due to. ‧. telecoms scam. Even though it does not seem as obvious and significant as the two case. y. Nat. studies shown above, still there are some aspects that are worth looking into. It took place. sit. in July 2017 when the police raided on a network of 31 Chinese nationals who were. er. io. involved in planning a telecom fraud. It was alleged that they intended to use a Voice. al. n. v i n C ha month after this incident, (Koemsoeun, 2017, para. 1). Less than more than two engchi U. over Internet Protocol (VoIP) to scam people in China out of their hard-earned money. hundred Chinese were busted once more because of VoIP scams. Desk phones as well as online gambling equipment were all confiscated (Suy, 2017, para. 5 - 6). Fourteen days later, two hundred and twenty-five Chinese suspects with a similar cause were arrested again in Phnom Penh (Odom, 2017, para. 4). Apparently, Cambodia has become a hotbed of crime and a haven for scammers. Despite the fact that many were caught, fraud cases just came one after another. In 2018, more than one hundred Chinese were arrested in April (Meta, 2018, para. 1) while two hundred more Chinese were taken into custody in November 2018 (Sokha, 2018, para. 1), plus 28 in May 2019 (Sovuthy, 2019, para. 3). So far thousands of Chinese have been deported from the kingdom. Even though it seems more than natural to crack down on crime and send the lawbreakers home, Cambodia is sending a signal of not welcoming 33. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901048.