S E C U R I T Y I N A S I A
ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY AND CROSS-STRVXIT RELATIONS
The Taiwanese Perspective
PHILIP YANG
W
rith the ctid of the C^^old War, security issues have rctnaiticd crucial for the survival and devL-lopmcnt of tbe Asia-Pacific region. Some structural changes in tbe sccurit)- environment, sucb as glo-balization, miiitar\- build-up, ;ind the rise of (^hitia, are threat-ening regional peace and stabilit)-. Moreover, crises such as global tctTorism, the North Korean nuclear standoff, and the SARS epidemic have sctiously reshaped and further ccjm-plicated regional stabilit}' and Taiwan-China relations.This paper attempts to chart Taiwan's response to the unfolding events and how the country balances national security with changing political developtnents in the re-gion. First, the paper briefly takes up Taiwan's security-policy in tbe post-Cold War era and how it is dealing with cross-strait security' issues and regional securit}' challenges. Second, the paper discusses the Taiwanese perspective and efforts on some recent security- crises and issues, includ-ing international terrorism, the North Korean nuclear cri-sis, and the impact of SARS. Third, the paper addresses the relationship between regional peace and stability' and cross-strait relations.
Taiwan's Security Policy
Taiwan's security p(jlicies, understandably, arc tnostly framed in the context of cross-strait confrontation, spe-cifically the military tbreat from Cbina and rhe volatility of the relationship. Maintaining Taiwan's security is a com-prehensive task, involving non-military securit)' strategies, tactics, behaviors, as well as military guarantees to protect the island. Some major approaches to Taiwan's security can be sumtnarized as follows:
First, Taiwan seeks to maintain a balance of military p(}wer and qualitative ad\'antage by enhancing self-defense capa-bilities and arms purchase from other countries, especially the United States, While China continues to modernize its arsenal, it alscj possesses the so-called "asymmetric" mili-tary advantage, capable of targeting Taiwan with some 4( Kl ballistic missiles deployed across the Taiwan Strait. There-fore, maintaining military balance, vis-a-vis C^hina, is vital for Taiwan's national security policy
Sec{>nd, Taiwan is eager to ensure that the L .S. plays the role of balancer and stabilizer, both in military linkage and strategic assurance. The security- of Taiwan is a key part
ofthe Linited States' o\ erall seeurit)' strateg)- in the region. Moreover, the possibility' of U.S. military intervention has an important deterrent effect on China. But the Taiwan Re-lations y\ct was not intended tcj be an alliance treaty. It only points out tbat Taiwan's security and stability- are "grave concerns" of tbe United States. Therefore, how to maintain U.S. engagement in cross-strait relations and Taiwan security' issues are two major challenges for Taipei.
Third, through increasing functional cooperative inter-actions with China, Taiwan has cultivated informal economic and social ties that alleviate cross-strait militarj' tension. The ROC government has changed the pcjlicy of "no haste, be patient" to the "mini-three-links," direct transportation, trade and postal linkages, between the two offshf>re islands of Kinmcn and Matsu and mainland China, which can be seen as a concrete step toward the relaxation of "three links."
Fourth, Taiwan hopes to participate in cooperative or-ganizations and regional summits to promote comtnon and coniprchens!\'e security interests with its Asian neigh-bors. However, Taiwan cannot participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF^ and can only send itidi\'idual par-ticipants to the (;:ouncil for Security- Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) working group mccdngs. The lim-ited involvement and parficipation of Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific security dialogue process expose limitations and pose problems for multilateral security- cooperation,
Regional Security Issues: The Taiwanese Perspective Taiwanese people indeed are overh- preoccupied with the military threat from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and, as a result, pay less attention to international and re-gional security issues. However, global terrorism and other regional crises have seri(.)usly impacted Taiwan's security- and economic developtnent. Recently, two regional issues, the North Korean nuclear standoff and the SARS epidemic, h;i\'e dominated the government's agenda.
Terrorism
It is true that no corner of the worid has been unaf-fected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The events have repercussions for the security and develop-ment of the whole world, including the peace and stability ofthe Asia-Pacitlc region. Most students of Chinese and
r^ast Asian security agree that the 9/11 created an immediate and rea! danger for the United States, replacing (^bina with terrorism as the major enemy.
We have witnessed some heated rhetoric in the early months of the Bush administration and increased arms sales to Taiwan for self-defense purposes, indicating a re-vision of U.S.-China strategic relationship. However, even though the impact of 9/11 on international and liast Asian security continues, 9/11 has not fundamentally altered the structure of Sino-U.S. strategic relationship. Major differ-ences and disagreements still remain unresolved, even after the end of the war on
Iraq-Eager to participate in international ac-tivities, Taiwan gave its support and cooperation to the international anti-terrorism campaign. The government and rnany NCJOs have offered sub-stantial humanitarian aid to innocent victims of terrorism and war, from New Yorkers to Afghan refugees.
The government has pledged sub- ^_^_^^^^^^ stantive support for the LIS. effort to
eradicate terrorism, expanded
interna-tional investigative cooperation, cooperated in intelligence exchange to thwart sabotage, and adopted measures to pre-vent money laundering. Private organizations, sucb as the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, which is renowned for its charity work worldwide, immcdiately mobilized its members to assist with rescue and relief work in New York. Funds were raised in Taiwan and overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. for tbe families of tbe 9/
11 victims.
Meanwhile, President Chen Sbui-bian has framed China's tiireats :igainst Taiwan as a f<jrm
of terrorism, since China has never re- — nounced the use of force as a means to resolve cross-strait issues. Facing the threat from increased deployment of hundreds of ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait, President (^ben called on
China to withdraw those tnissiles and ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ asked international community to be
cognizant of tbe pressure faced by
Tai-wanese people from Beijing. "The terror and tbreat posed to Taiwan's people bas virtually exceeded those brought by any terrorist attacks," President Chen said.
North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation
Tbe North Korean nuclear standoff is currently the most important crisis management case in Asia-Pacific region. Pyongyang's alleged nuclear weapons program has generated tensions in Northeast Asia. The United States is worried that if its nuclear program is not stopped. North Korean could very soon be able to develop nuclear weapons and export weapons-grade material to other countries or even terrorist groups. Tbis would bring the
However, even though the impact of 911) on international and fiast Asian security continues,
9/11 has not fundamentally altered the structure of
Sino-U.S. strategic relationship.
Northeast Asian countries will likely explore more diplomatic and military means to enhance
their national security.
risk nuclear proliferation to otber countries in tbe region, which have amassed tbe skills to produce nuclear weap-ons in a relatively short period. Such proliferation would lead to a fundamental change in the balance of power in Flast Asia.
Military conflict on tbe Korean Peninsula is a frigbt-ening scenario to consider. Countries in tbe region, in-cluding Taiwan, are repeatedly by Pyongyang's reckless bcbavior, such as withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, ln response. Northeast Asian countries will likely explore more diplomatic and military means to enhance tbeir national security. Japan's launch ~'~~~^~^"~^^~ of a spy-sateUite to monitor North Korea's missile programs is one such example.
For China, Nortb Korea's closest ally, a nuclear North Korea does not serve its strategic interest, and may pose a risk to its own security. But neither does Beijing want to see the collapse of the North Korean gov-ernment. That could flood China with refugees and bring U.S. trn<jps stationed in South Korea closer to its border. Also, China will not be pleased to see Japan rearming again, especially if it bas medium- or long-range ballistic missiles or even nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is in China's interest to prevent Pyongyang from escalating tensions in the Ko-rean Peninsula. But remains Beijing's prerogarive to de-termine what role it wants to play in this very compli-cated regional security crisis.
Although Taiwan bas no significant role to play in this crisis, the Taiwanese people have great interests in support-ing a diplomatic solution to tbe North ^ ^ ^ - ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ Korean crisis, provided the result will not sacrifice Taiwan's security. Mean-while, Taipei also notes witb pleasure that Beijing's efforts and asserdveness in bringing the United States and North Korea together demonstrated its will-ingness and ability to chart a course to resolve regional disputes in a peaceful manner.
Taiwan does not have any nuclear program or any me-dium-range surface-to-surface missiles. In fact, the govern-ment bas just approved a draft bill tbat would ban the de-velopment of nuclear weapons, gradually phase out the use of nuclear power, and develop renewable energy to meet future needs. The bill calls on for the government to realize six goals: no development of nuclear weapons; a gradual end to tbe use of nuclear power; consequent adjustment of tbe overall energy policy; development and promotion of sources of renewable energy; safe use of nuclear power; and tbe selection of a permanent depository (jf radioactive waste. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether banning nuclear power is a feasible solution in Taiwan.
SARS Crisis
Soon after hitting the news headlines. Severe Acute Res-piratory^ Syndrome (SARS) became a global bealth crisis and caused tremendous economic damage to Cbina, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. The Asian Development Bank estimated that SARS could end up costing US$16 bil-lion in Asia. This estimate seems conservative. While it is true that the economic impact of tbis epidemic was reduced by effectively bringing tbe virus under control, tbe overall economic fallout for the worst affected Asian countries could prove to be significant.
In Taiwan, the damage caused by SARS bas ignited a new wave of doubts about further cross-strait economic excbange. While Taiwan business people and tourists arc returning to Cbina now that the epidemic is under con-trol, tbe psycbological barrier may remain. This wiil further complicate the current relationship, which already suffers
from a lack of mutual trust. I'urthermore, tbe SARS crisis will inevitably become a top issue of debate in the up-com-ing 2(104 presidential election.
On the otber band, tbe SARS outbreak highlights Taiwan's deep frustrations over being blocked from mem-bership in tbe World Health Organization (WHO) and dem-onstrates that tbis exclusion is also a blind spot in tbe global defense network against contagious diseases. Tbe Republic of China was an original member of the WH(), but its seat was given to Beijing in 1972. Taiwan began seeking observer status in 1998 after a serious enterovirus outbreak tbat killed 80 children. Taiwan health officials asked for information on that strain of flu but tbe WHO refused to help.
Unfortunately, Taiwan's struggle to be an observer at tbe WHO this year was viewed as just another political issue between Beijing and Taipei. But the spread of SARS to Taiwan shows the folly of relegating 23 million Taiwanese
outside the world health community simply due to Taiwan's lack of membcrsbip status. Tbe main reason why Taiwan has been unable to become a member or observer of tbe WH(5 bas been the boyccjtt, obstruction, and opposition of Beijing. Wbile the WHO remains vigilant against SARS, it sbould also strive for universal bealtbcare by admitting Tiiiwan.
Asia-Pacific Security Environment and Taiwan Security In the current US.-led Asia-Pacific security environment, "peace" and "self-defense" are tbe two basic principles of cross-straits relations and Taiwan's security. Key to tbe idea of "peace" is peace of the status quo. Thus, "peaceful reso-lution" is notbing more tban a policy of expectation. Nev-ertheless, maintaining the peace and security of the status quo is still imp(jrtant. Meanwhile, "self-defense" is a sec-ondary principle in response to China's continual threat to use tiiilitary torce to resolve the so-called Taiwan problem. ()n one band, by providing sufftcicnt weaponry to Taiwan and, on tbe otber hand, without ruling out the possibility that tbe LInitcd States migbt send troops to defend tbe island. Tbe fundamental goal is to provide a deterrent mea-sure against military threat from C^hina
brom a eertaiti angle, Taiwan can be seen as a special type of non-status quo country, based on its continued dissatisfaction witb tbe existing limits placed on it by the international community and countries In the Asia Paciftc region. A truly sovereign, independent, democratic, and economically vibrant country, tbe Republic of (^Ihina on Taiwan is nevertheless not recognized by a single country in the region. Yet as Taiwan's identity and democratiza-tion continue to grow stronger, the government is stepping up efforts to enlarge its international breatbing space and increase its participation in international organizations.
Naturally, tbere arc significant differences in degree and nature of demands made by Taiwan and tbe other non-status quo countries; yet countries in tbe region should understand tbat appropriate engagement of Taiwan and gradual integration are also necessary. Allowing ROC" par-ticipation in regional security dialogues and discussions will be useful in integrating Taiwanese perspective into regional security concerns. Regional accommodation and engagement can tbus he seen as confidence-building mea-sures to reduce cross-strait tensions.
Strictly speaking, the distinction traditionally made in security dilemma theor\' between offensive and detensive weapons (i.e. tbe concept that f)nly an increase in offen-sive weapons will cause other countries to feel threatened, and that the possession of defensive weapons should not cause a security- dilemma) cannot be applied to relations between Taiwan and Chitia. First, Beijing feels tbat even tbe possession of purely defensive weapons will give Tai-wan increased self-confidence and encourage it to move t(»-wards de jure independence. Second, with tbe development of military tecbntilogy, there are botb strategic and technical difficulties to discern detensive weapons from offensive
weapons. However, tbe current Taiwanese military strategy seeks only to maintain military parity with China and strengthen Taiwan's defensive capabilities in response to tbe threat from China.
All countries in the region have an interest to reduce the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. So far, however, no form of preventive diplomacy or confidence-building mea-sures bas been instituted across the Taiwan Strait. Tbis raises the question of crisis management in tbe region. Bilateral cross-strait military confidence-building measures (C^^BMs) so far are still blocked by cross-strait political stalemate and distrust. However, since tbe mid-198(), informal cross-strait links bave developed rapidly. These understandings and consultative mechanisms on related issues, restraint and no-titlcation of military exercises, and the development ot wider ccon<jmic and social ties can contribute to the management of a peaceful cross-strait environment.
Governments on botb sides of the Taiwan Strait gradu-ally come to the realization that cross-strait interaction is not a zero-sum game. The gain of one side is not necessary- the lost of another. Tbis is tbe same ff)r other countries in the region—enhancing relation with one side across the straits docs not necessarily mean that relation with the other side wil! be downgraded. Regional concern about (China's poten-tial power for destabilization enhances Beijing's leverage. Hut Taiwan's role is to keep C^bina In check and other coun-tries need to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, how to main-tain a balanced relatitmsbip witb botb Beijing and Taipei bas become one of the major, but inescapable, challenges for countries in the region.
Conclusion
The Taiwan security issue is not merely a cross-strait issue, but one of the most important foreign policy prob-lems in the Asia-Pacific region. It bas a real potential to draw involved countries into military conflicts. Also, cross-strait military conflict wil! disrupt regional trade and de-velopment, and may force other countries in the region to side with or against China, altering the security environ-ment and structure in the Asia-Pacific region.
ln the new era of interdependence and globalization, security cannot be obtained unilaterally because tbe world is confronted witb common threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Taiwan has taken extensive measures to cope witb tbese problems and also contributed humani-tarian assistance to the international community to pro-mote regional and international security. In the process, it is clear that cross-strait relations and Taiwan's security cannot be isolated from other regional issues. Other countries can-not ignore the impact of what transpires in Taiwan and across tbe Taiwan Strait.
Philip Yang is an associate pn)fcss<)r in the Department of Political
Science of thu Nnd<inal Taiwan Univcrsitj. Ik' has published extensively in (Chinese, linj;lish and Japanese on topics such as Taiwan and Asia-i'acifie security- issues. Dr. Yang is also the founder and administrator ot the Taiwan SecuHt\' Research website, aii w.tnia<an.miir}l\. ori[.
