非政府組織與贊助者之間的角力: 組織間關係和社交網絡在反人口販賣領域的影響 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University. 非政府組織與贊助者之間的角力: 政治大組織間關係和社交網絡在反人口販賣立. ‧ 國. 學. 領域的影響. ‧. How Non-Governmental Organisations Confront Donors: er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. v The Effectsa l of Inter-Organisational i n Ch engchi U Relations and Social Networks in the Anti-Human Trafficking Field. Linus Forsman Advisor: Ray Wang (王韻). July 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(3) Abstract NGOs working with human rights and development make a relatively small impact with their work, considering their vast number and the monetary support they receive. Scholars have formulated a great deal of conflicting arguments and theories on the inter-organisational relations and network effects on NGOs performance. The literature disagrees on the process of how the relationship between donor organisations and NGO affect the NGO’s work. One promising explanation for their limited impact is the problems of coordination. Particularly, this study explores concepts on inter-organisational relations and network effects on an antihuman trafficking NGO working in Southeast Asia. The researcher has investigated documents and conducted interviews at the NGO, as well as observed their work. By using a. 政治大. process tracing method, the data shows that the type of donor matters for the performance of the case NGO. The main finding is that the donors bureaucratises the NGO at the expense of. 立. its performance, the effect is stronger if the donors are dependent on governmental back-. ‧ 國. 學. donors. Furthermore, the demands on the NGO from the donors seem to favour short-term projects that are measured quantitatively, rather than long-term projects. Some donors have also disturbed the NGO’s network of partners and its relationship to the target group.. ‧. However, the NGO tries to resist the demands through negotiation. Levels of trust between. sit. y. Nat. the donor and the NGO seems to moderate mentioned effects, as higher trust facilitates a successful negotiation by the NGO with the donor, and improves management assistance. io. al. n. donor.. er. provided by the donor. Severe trust issues have lead the NGO to end its relationship with its. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. i. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(4) 摘要即便收受鉅額金援，與人權發展相關的非政府組織，其行動往往成效不彰。關於這些組織的相互關係及社交網絡，與其行動成效的關聯性，在學術界有許多不同的爭辯與理論。過往文獻對於贊助者與非政府組織之間的關係如何影響其工作成效有許多對立的看法；一種最可能的解釋是兩者之間的協調問題影響了非政府組織的工作成效。此篇論文探討了在東南亞的反人口販運非政府組織之組織間關係和社交網路，筆者查閱了相關文獻，並在非政府組織間進行訪談，觀察組織成員的工作與他們的關係網絡。經由過程追蹤方法，分析顯示贊助者的類型，對案例中之非政府組織表現至關重要。尤有甚者，贊助者往往因為官僚作風，犧牲了非政府組織的效能，若贊助者仰賴政府. 治政大的短期計畫，而非長期計畫。某些贊助者反而還擾亂了非政府組織的合作關係網路，立甚至該機構與服務對象之間的關係。然而，非政府組織試圖通過談判來抵制這些干. 經費，這個傾向會更加嚴重。此外，贊助者對非政府組織的要求，似乎較傾向可量化. ‧ 國. 學. 預。贊助者與非政府組織之間的信任程度，似乎也可以減緩這些不良影響；更深的信任感，將能促成非政府組織與贊助者之間的談判更有效，並讓贊助者提供的資源，得. ‧. 到更妥善的管理。反之，嚴重的信任問題，將導致非政府組織終止與贊助者的合作關. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 係。. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(5) Acknowledgement It would have been impossible to finish this thesis without the invaluable advice, guidance, and support from my advisor, Dr. Ray Wang. Furthermore, both Dr. Chiung Chiu Huang, and Distinguished Research Fellow Yuan Yi, provided me with excellent advice in the writing process as committee members. Dr. Yu-hsuan Su gave splendid advice on general statistical know-how that was very useful for the thesis. Khunat Pongsiripoj deserves high praise for his excellent interpretation skills from Thai to English during the interviews. Sunisa Teptarakunkarn also deserves high commendation for her translation services of Thai documents to English. Everyone at the case NGO deserves the highest commendation for their difficult and dangerous work, and for agreeing for being observed in their work, for. 政治大 family and fellow classmates in Taiwan, Thailand, and Sweden, deserves high praise for their 立 providing access to their documents, and for agreeing to be interviewed. Finally, my friends,. social and emotional support throughout the research process.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(6) Contents Abstract ................................................i. 3.2.1. Direct Influence ..................... 47. 摘要 .................................................... ii. 3.2.1.1. Managing the Network ... 48. Acknowledgement.............................. iii. 3.2.1.2. Disrespecting the Target Group............................................. 51. Contents ............................................. iv. 3.2.1.3. Undeserved Credit ......... 54. Tables and Figures.............................. v. 3.2.1.4. Releasement of Information Spurring Foreign Influence ........... 57. Chapter 1: NGOs and Relationships: Problems of Coordination. 3.2.1.5. Inappropriate Donor-NGO Interaction ..................................... 64. 1.1. Introduction .................................. 1. 3.2.1.6. Medial Exploitation and 政治 Security Risks ................................ 69 大 1.2.1. Critique ..................................18 立 3.2.2. Structural Influence ............... 70. 1.2. Literature Review ......................... 5. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3. Purpose of the Study .................. 23. 3.2.2.1. Influencing Project Development .................................. 71. 1.4. Social Network Concepts ........... 24. ‧. 3.2.2.2. Influencing the Structure ........................................ 84. 1.5. Method ....................................... 25. Nat. 1.5.1. Qualitative Analysis ...............26. sit. y. 3.2.2.3. Influencing the Identity ........................................... 96. 1.6. Research Plan ............................ 31. Chapter 4: Donor and NGO: An Unequal Relationship. n. er. io. al. Chapter 2: Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia. Ch. i n U. v. e n g c h4.1.i Process Tracing: Observed. 2.1. Anti-Human Trafficking Projects ............................................. 33. Effects ................................................ 99 4.2. Relationship Issues: Problems and Solutions .......................................... 108. 2.2. Human Trafficking and Responses in Greater Mekong ................................ 35. Chapter 5: For the Future. 2.3. The Case ..................................... 42. 5.1. Conclusion and Recommendations ........................... 112. Chapter 3: Case Study 3.1. Data ............................................ 47. 5.2. References ................................ 116. 3.2. Analysis....................................... 47. Appendix ......................................... 123. iv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(7) Tables and Figures Figure 1: Donors influences the performance of the NGO ..................................................... 22 Figure 2: Project implementation procedure .......................................................................... 44 Figure 3: Direct influence ..................................................................................................... 102 Figure 4: Structural influence ............................................................................................... 106. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(8) 1. NGOs and Relationships: Problems of Coordination 1.1. Introduction There are tens of thousands of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working with development and human rights all around the world. Still, their actual impact is relatively small considering their vast number and the amount of funding they receive (Hafer-Burton 2008; Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015). Besides corruption and human rights violators’ resistance, one explanation of why they do not perform better is likely due to poor coordination between donors, the NGOs, and their partners. Some NGO’s might not want to work with certain organisations for various reasons, or they might not be able to work with the organisations they would like to. They might be hindered or manipulated by their donors. 政治大. to work on short-sighted policies, they can disturb the network of partners to the NGO, or they may be drenched in administrative demands due to extensive regulations and agendas. 立. imposed on them. All of this may potentially affect the performance of an NGO. It is not. ‧ 國. 學. certain which processes that regulates these effects, but trust and institutional factors seem to explain some of the observed effects (Murdie, 2013), a conclusion that this study also give. ‧. some support to.. NGOs are sometimes referred to as the “third sector”; set apart from the public and. y. Nat. sit. private sector (Foot, 2016). This viewpoint is correct when describing the purpose and. al. er. io. internal structure of individual NGOs, however misleading when describing their position in. n. the external structure of national and global politics. NGOs are highly interconnected entities,. Ch. i n U. v. not just within their own sector but also between sectors. Both when developing and. engchi. implementing projects, NGOs often work with a variety of partners of different types and origins to ensure effectiveness in their work. They also establish relations in order to receive stable funding, which often originate from the opposite side of the world. NGOs are highly embedded in the international order and often play a vital role in the development of underdeveloped countries. It is therefore important to understand the processes of how and why NGOs develop relations with certain actors, and how these relations shape and build the network of partners the NGO is operating within. As well as to understand how its relationships and networks affect the performance of the NGO. The literature on NGO relations and networks is diverse and contradictory, which is partly due to the great number of different types of NGOs and the different settings they work in. This often leads to academic debates even in the simplest questions; for example, while 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(9) some scholars argue that NGOs that work closely with governments are able to foster better development and human rights progress, other scholars argue the opposite: this relation only entraps the NGO, making them a puppet under the government’s control. However, neither side provide a well-developed theory supporting their argument that can be used for policymaking. The same situation is true for many other types of relations, the number of theories and arguments on the subject are too varied and conflicting in order to guide practitioners in the field. It is evident that further research on the subject should focus on identifying the process that determine how certain relations affect the performance of the NGO, and the network of partners to the NGO. This can then be compared to other research on relation and network effects (Self, 1993; Bob, 2005; Scott, and Carrington, 2011; Mitchell, 2012; Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015; Foot, 2016).. 立. 政治大. An exploratory case study can help determine which social processes and effects of the. ‧ 國. 學. donor-NGO relations can influence the performance of NGOs. By conducting a process tracing method, it is possible to gain detailed insights to exactly how the donors have exerted influence on the case NGO, and how their influence has affected the NGOs performance.. ‧. This bears some similarity Foot’s study: “Collaborating Against Human Trafficking: Cross-. sit. y. Nat. Sector Challenges and Practices” (2016). In her comprehensive study, she investigates how different types of organisations work together towards the common goal of ending human. io. n. al. er. trafficking, and identifies a number of difficulties in this collaboration. However, she does. i n U. v. not focus on how the donors affect the performance of their receivers.. Ch. engchi. This study focus specifically on how donors influence the performance of the case NGO, and compare the findings to the literature. By the use of this method, processes previously unaccounted has been uncovered, such as trust issues between the donor and the NGO, and problems relating to donors who are dependent on back-donors. It was also possible to demonstrate why a certain process and effect was dominating in this case, while others were absent. This study can therefore be used for comparative purposes. This can improve current theories and arguments in this field, which can act as a guide for how donor-dependent NGOs can improve their relationship with their donors, and ultimately improve their own performance. This study focus on how donor organisations influence the work of an anti-human trafficking NGO working in Southeast Asia and its relationship with its partners (such as:. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(10) other NGOs, International Organisations (IOs), and states). This organisation was chosen due to its extensive network of partners, its great variety of anti-human trafficking policies, and the fact that it is completely dependent on funding from its donor organisations. Short of murder, human trafficking is one of the gravest violations of human rights in existence today. Few other crimes inflict the same level of harm to a person. Victims of human trafficking may experience loss of legal documents and assets, debt bondage, captivity, violence, forced labour, rape, organ stealing, and loss of life. The after-effects can also be severe; as former trafficked persons may suffer from permanent physical or mental damage as a result of their experiences. In some cases, they may suffer from the effects of a societal stigma against former victims of trafficking, particularly if they were trafficked for sexual purposes. They also suffer from losses of opportunity: They are often taken by the. 政治大 themselves from poverty. They are then held captive over extended periods, often for years. 立 traffickers in the process of them migrating for work, in order to start a new career and lift. Simply this loss of time can have a severe impact on how their lives develops after being. ‧ 國. 學. freed, particularly for children (UNODC, 2017; US State Department, 2017). The worst examples provided in the previous paragraph are not rare cases in Southeast. ‧. Asia. When collecting data for this thesis, I had the opportunity observe the work of the case. sit. y. Nat. organisation and its partners. They were often working on severe and difficult cases of human trafficking. I observed the rescue of a mother of a four-year old boy, she was repatriated to. io. er. her home country shortly after rescue. I met girls at a rehabilitation camp. Some of them had. al. n. v i n C h of them had beenUsold into sexual trafficking by who had been sold to paedophiles. Many engchi. suffered permanent brain damage by the hands of the trafficker. I visited a shelter for boys their parents. At the time of my visit, the youngest boy at the shelter was only nine years’ old. I have also read about countless of similar stories from the reports by the case organisation, mostly relating to rape of women and children. Some were exceptionally gruesome, the reports included cases of minors being raped and forced into becoming surrogacy mothers, and cases of victims that had died by the hands of the trafficker. This obviously affected me on a deep level. It has been difficult to process how survivors are able to recover from their experiences, and how the traffickers can treat fellow humans in that way. It is impossible to exaggerate the severity of this issue; these individuals have experienced horrors that is not even described in fiction. Furthermore, they often do not receive enough support to be able to recover from their experiences and to reintegrate into the society. For some, their chances in life have been ruined. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(11) Although improvements are being made, the governments in Southeast Asia are for various reasons not well-equipped to help these people, mostly due to under-development and corruption. The very people who are supposed to protect victims of human trafficking are often being paid by the traffickers. This situation is made worse by the states not paying them reasonable salaries, and are not always trained to handle the often complex cases of human trafficking in the region. The laws in the region are also often not developed enough to properly guide the anti-human trafficking officials (UNODC, 2017; US State Department 2017). It is obvious that the states need assistance from other parties. It is therefore immensely important that local NGOs who help these people are supported and not hindered in their work in any way. Besides working on their own anti-human trafficking programmes and. 政治大 trafficking laws, and to report cases of corruption. 立. projects, they often possess a vital role in how states in the region develop anti-human. ‧ 國. 學. As most leaders of the world have signed the Palermo Protocol, the issue of human trafficking is one that most states around the world have committed themselves to eradicate. These commitments also include formal requirements that the states should include NGOs in. ‧. their anti-human trafficking policies (UN General Assembly, 2000). NGOs in this field are. sit. y. Nat. also completely dependent on their relationship with the government in their work, in order to prosecute the traffickers and to make sure that trafficked person receive the correct legal. io. er. status (US State Department, 2016, 2017). Granted the status of NGOs in the human. al. n. v i n C effects on what kind of help are offeredhtoevictims of human n g c h i U trafficking in Southeast Asia. trafficking issue, any problems of coordination in their work will have real and immediate. However, findings from this study can also be compared to other contexts, or types of NGOs, as the literature predicts that coordination problems between the NGO and its partners are not always case-dependent. The relation between donor organisations1 and the receiving NGO will be investigated in depth, to determine which mechanisms and effects are present in the current case. The literature predicts that this specific relationship affects both the NGOs’ work directly, but also have subtler effects, such as shaping norms and identity of the NGO, changing its structure, as well as influencing how they interact with other organisations. The literature suggests that relations and networks, in one way or another, influences the kinds, and the success rate, of 1. The donor organisation can be either governmental or non-governmental, but not an individual, and is hereafter labelled the “donor”. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(12) projects developed and implemented by the NGO. The projects themselves will therefore be analysed as well, while also taking account which projects the NGO chose not to implement.. 1.2. Literature Review Regarding the relationship between NGOs and the state, Peter Self highlights in his book “Governance by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice” (1993) that when states work with, and/or finance NGOs, the NGOs have a tendency of becoming dependent of the state funds, and entrapped by the regulation imposed from the state2. The mechanisms and effects of state-NGO relations that he predicts are based on a philosophical discussion in chapters seven and eight in the book. One foci of the book are what Self terms “contracting out”, which can include what the. 治政大a wide term which also include (Stadtler, 2015). Tough contracting out as defined by Self is 立 arrangements where the state and the private organisations have much more distant roles than New Public Management (NPM) literature often label as “Public Private Partnership” (PPP). ‧ 國. 學. a partnership would demand: They do not necessarily share all the risks, costs and benefits. It is the process of the state hiring private providers to deliver services where the state set up. ‧. regulations for the provider, while being responsible for the funding and the outcome (Self, 1993, p.122). The private organisation can be any kind of non-state organisation, such as an. y. Nat. sit. NGO or commercial organisation.. er. io. Self’s critique of using this method when providing state services is based on a general. al. n. v i n C hof public services.UHis critique is based on the empowering consumers in the delivery engchi assumption that the state regulation bureaucratises the non-profit organisation. The necessity. mistrust of market principles, such as public choice theory promoting market competition and. of uniformity in its delivery makes the organisation lose flexibility, local roots, and the enthusiasm that had worked as a driving force for the organisation (Self, 1993, p.122-124). He further argues that the goal of economic competition cannot be achieved because the state and the private provider end up in a state of mutual dependency. He also highlights that the state lose capacity for planning, monitoring and regulating by contracting out, and that the. 2. Self does not go into great detail of the mechanisms at work here, as the book is more focused on raising critique to the philosophy of public choice theory, rational actors, and a vaguely defined “market state” promoted by Thatcher and Reagan. He raises some empirical examples from the Anglo-Saxon world, but the book is argumentative or philosophical in nature, not very empirical. The cases are used as descriptive examples of his arguments at play.. 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(13) private organisation does not take the public interests into account in its operations (Self, 1993, p.127-129, 154-155). Self goes on to criticise the use of instituting “local councils”, which can be viewed as forms of executive agencies that possess a measure of autonomy from the central government, which act as the “principal” that can choose whichever local private “agent” they wish to deliver a public service. He concludes that this arrangement may have potential for improving the choice of which agent should be responsible for the delivery of the social services, but according to examples in the book, the local councils were too dependent on the government for this potential to be achieved. They were forced to cut budgets and implement laws they did not agree with, which would affect the choices they were able to make when selecting the provider (Self, 1993, p.179-182, 187-189).. 政治大. Suzanne Hoff (2014) also emphasises issues that NGOs have with their relations with. 立. their donors using La Strada and EU as a case. La Strada regularly apply for funding from the. ‧ 國. 學. EU commission. She underlines two problems: The first one being that the application procedure to secure the funding is long, complicated, and often require pre-funding of the projects by the applicant which will not be reimbursed in months, or over a year in some. ‧. cases. This effectively block small organisations to apply. The lengthy procedure is also. sit. y. Nat. badly adapted to the fast changing nature of the human trafficking issue.. io. er. The regulation blocks non-EU organisations to apply. Given the nature of human trafficking and that La Strada regularly cooperate with non-EU organisations, this. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. complicates the organisation’s work in non-EU countries. The funding also requires the. engchi. project to be innovative and cannot have started before the grant agreement is signed. “regular” anti-human trafficking operation costs, such as running shelters, psychosocial support, legal assistance or telephone hotlines, are not covered by the grants. The grants come with a pre-set end date, often resulting in the project to end after the EU grants are stopped (Hoff, 2014). She furthermore highlights that when foreign governments send funds earmarked for anti-trafficking projects that go directly to the local NGO instead of the local government, the local government may become distrustful of the NGO. The government accuse the NGO to exaggerate the problem in order to receive more funds, consequentially restricting the flow of foreign funds into the organisation. The foreign government may also have other political. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(14) goals with their funding, and impose regulation to achieve that. This may further deteriorate the relations between the NGO and the local government (Hoff, 2014). Hoff (2014), like Self, note problems with the use of contracting out, or “social contracting” which is the term she uses. This leads to competition between the NGOs and sometimes between the NGOs and the state. The state develops close ties with certain NGOs, which receive funding or are used to solicit funding from others. This risks dividing the civil society in “normal” NGOs and “GONGOs”, so called Government-Organised NGOs. Natalie Steinberg (2001) also discuss this phenomenon slightly more in depth. She claims that close relations between the NGO and state can lead to a number of problems: The government may use the NGO to downsize their own government by allocating state responsibilities on the NGO, while simultaneously cutting government budgets. Governments. 政治大. use NGOs to receive reports on events in foreign regions, and may use the NGO to spy on a. 立. foreign state. They may be used for diplomatic purposes and become tools of the state’s. ‧ 國. 學. foreign policy. NGOs in developing countries may exchange personnel with the state, which may cause problems of organisational loyalty. On the extreme end, the NGO becomes nongovernmental in name only.. ‧. Many NGOs are dependent on close relations with the media in order to secure funding. Nat. sit. y. or to launch campaigns. The NGO may be tempted to stretch facts to create bigger media. io. er. impacts. In response to this and to the pitfalls above, some NGOs have implemented varieties of formal codes of conduct (Steinberg, 2001). al. n. v i n Hoff (2014) claims that independent private foundations are more C h donor agencies and U i e h n c persons, and they help create a inclined to fund core costs or direct services tog trafficked more stable donor base for the anti-human trafficking NGO. Sponsorships from the business sector in Europe have resulted in support for one-off, short-term and modest projects related to providing, or fund donations of products and services for the NGO or the victims. Though there have been examples when big corporations in US have provided very large grants to specific organisations. However, the relationship with the corporation may cause ethical problems for the antihuman trafficking NGO. They may be inclined to only initiate or support projects that may not be directly in line with the NGOs interests, but rather aimed at the corporation’s interests. Since certain businesses are directly involved with or are using trafficked persons, the NGO may do more harm than good by being affiliated with them. Amnesty International regularly 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(15) organise international campaigns against businesses that are not upholding to human rights standards as defined by Amnesty. A recent example is their campaign against FIFA and Qatar, for using trafficked labour for building stadiums (‘Qatar World Cup of Shame’, 2017). This might deter anti human trafficking NGOs from relying on FIFA in their work. Nicola Banks, David Hulme and Michael Edwards (2015) follow some similar arguments as above, stating that: “The need to act in accordance with the rules of the ‘development marketplace’ means that NGOs are closer in kind to socially responsible market actors than to civil society organizations.” They argue that the contracts and regulations set up by the donors undermine collective action efforts by NGOs and others, and it depoliticises the NGO arena by favouring conformity and professionalization. They become separated of the civil society. Banks, Hulme, and Edwards argue that instead of relying on donor regulation and. 政治大 the society they work in, as well as supporting other independent actors within it. 立. contracts, NGOs should rely more on, and use, the human and social resources available in. ‧ 國. 學. It is argued that increased control (from either the donors or the state) forces the NGO to focus efforts on service delivery, and away from social change and society transformation policies. Because of donors focusing on targets and output, NGO policies are shifted from. ‧. broad or holistic projects, such as empowerment of marginalised groups or efforts to change. y. Nat. repressive systems and institutions, to ones that can be tangibly measured in forms of an. io. sit. increase in input “X” produce an increase in output “Y” for the target population “Z”. Such. er. as vaccination, school building, or infrastructure programmes. Resources are shifted to a pre-. al. n. v i n C h and membersUare offset. The NGO may lose both education are recruited, while other policies engchi specified service delivery and the evaluation of it. Staff with specialised knowledge and. members, capacity for innovation, and the connection to the target population altogether, and become oblivious of the target population’s needs. Their capacity to promote social change and create long term structural development is severely reduced (Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015). George E. Mitchell (2012) also raise many of the points above from an institutional theorist’s standpoint. He claims that NGOs will receive greater revenue by relying on government funds, but they will become more likely to adopt government sanctioned strategies and apply government accounting and reporting standards, even if the government is not actively enforcing it. Even if the donor is not a government, NGOs may become regarded as passive recipients whose only purpose is to provide reports of the local situation to the benefactor. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(16) Mitchell raise several theoretical implications by this resource dependency, the proof of these mechanisms are still inconclusive. If for-profit organisations (firms) are introduced in the field in which the NGO is operating in, and they only receive short term contracts, the NGO may adopt a business strategy driven by competition to ensure financial security, which will result in the NGO to become a business and lose its mission altogether. NGOs are restrained from developing new innovative policies, the policies implemented have to match the donors’ demands. On a more structural plane, NGOs in developing countries may come under the control of the developed world, since they are the ones who pay them. The very identity of the NGO may be threatened as an independent institution from market forces and the state. In Mitchells study he proposes several tactics that may be used by NGOs in order to. 政治大 policies to ones they perceive the funders to be interested in. They then use those policies in 立. avoid external control but retain the funding. The first one is adapting. The NGO adapt their. their pitch when applying for the funds. Contracts is included in this point; NGOs actively. ‧ 國. 學. decides to become the “agent” hired by a “client” in order to secure funds. These policies will likely reduce the autonomy of the NGO, but in Mitchells interviews with NGO leaders, that. ‧. have not always been the case. Instead, they have secured funds for projects that they neither. y. Nat. want to execute, or possess the correct competence to run, which is more of a waste of human. er. io. purpose.. sit. recourses, than a direct loss of autonomy. The effects of this tactic ultimately defeats its. al. n. v i n Ch diversification, funding liberation, geostrategic specialization and selectivity. The e n garbitrage, chi U The second tactic proposed is labelled avoidance. It involves tactics of revenue. strategy of revenue diversification can be combined with the process of commercialisation according to Mitchell (2012).. Revenue liberation is a tactic to increase the revenue of unrestricted money. Meaning that the NGO seek money from non-governmental sources. What Mitchell call geostrategic arbitrage denotes the strategy of international NGOs that set up different fund-raising schemes aimed at different countries. It varies between simply seeking funds from a second government when the first one did not approve, to starting “sister organisations” in certain countries so that the sister organisation can apply for funds with the status of being a local organisation.. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(17) Selectivity is the strategy to only use restricted donors if their demands lie very close to the NGOs’ own goals. This tactic can include separating fund-raising into a separate department of the organisation, so that the people who implement the policies does not get distracted by the money and are tempted to adapt their projects to fit the grant specifications. Specialisation is the process of developing a niche. The organisation may be perceived as unique by the donors. If the donor set up incompatible restrictions, the NGO can educate the donor on their work and convince them to change their requirements. There is also significant literature that have very different viewpoints; the interaction between NGOs, states and IOs lead to cooperation under a positive-sum game. Susan Park (2005) argues that international organisations should be perceived as norm-consumers in their relationship with NGOs and transnational networks. The process take place through direct. 政治大. and indirect socialisation. She assumes that once the IO have consumed the norms, they will. 立. be diffused over the states in every state-IO interaction. For NGOs, this can have the effect. ‧ 國. 學. that certain NGOs may be allocated the status of normatively “good or bad”. The bad ones will effectively be shut out form the global governance structure.. ‧. She argues that NGOs working for a cause must combine their efforts to influence the IO under a joint transnational advocacy network and that the NGOs involved must be clearly. Nat. sit. y. distinct form the state. Changes in the norms adopted by the IO is affected by the NGO. io. er. through persuasion, social influence, and coercion. Persuasion involves continued efforts over time to succeed. Social influence is directed through social punishments such as. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. shaming, shunning, excluding and demeaning, and social rewards such as status and a sense. engchi. of belonging. Coercion is the act of lobbying, according to Park (2005). She further divides these processes into two; direct and indirect influence. Indirect influence occurs when the NGOs first try to influence the state, who then will influence the IO. The more powerful the state the better. Direct influence is simply the action to directly interact with the IO by using any of the tactics mentioned above. It is argued that influence is only successful if both types are used at once. Park seem to imply that the same kind of methods used to influence the IO to change norms can be used to successfully change the norms of the state, with the exception that indirect influence is neither necessary nor possible. Some NGOs find ways to use the regulation imposed on them by the state as a way to free themselves from donor influence and to gain access to national resources, which is utilized indirectly in support of subtler policies of social change and structural development. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(18) In this case, the NGO consciously give up autonomy for attempting to influence the government from within, but they will still face the same problems of contracts and regulations as mentioned in above sections (Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015). Social and structural change is achieved when NGOs position themselves closely with local NGOs in the target country, particularly those with a big member base, according to Banks, Hulme, and Edwards (2015). NGOs will gain access to grassroots who can effectively spread their ideas and norms, and the grassroots (which they label as “Member Based Organisations”, or MBOs) gain knowledge and are empowered by the NGO, which grants them better opportunities to exert political power. By bringing together a diverse set of organisations in the civil society, the NGO can connect, coordinate, combine, and direct influence, so that efforts will have a greater impact than the sum of the individual actors. For. 政治大 the MBOs and NGOs that they are connecting, and not be too obstinate with their own ideals 立 this “bridging” role to be successful, the NGO have to take the role of working in service of. if that risks undermining the bridging process.. ‧ 國. 學. Mwangi, Rieth, and Schmitz (2013) argues that local collaborations between businesses, unions, academic institutions, and the civil society may yield corporations to continuously. ‧. and sustainably improve human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 2013, 203-222). They. sit. y. Nat. believe that this is due to discourses, peer learning, and capacity-building that emerges from networks of this type. By using the Global Compact as a case, the argument is that human. io. er. rights advocates encourage dialogue between the business sector and the civil society. This. al. n. v i n Ch which taken together facilitates the implementation i U human rights policies. e n g c ofh corporate. enables innovation and provide feedback and important information on local conditions,. Deitelhoff and Wolf (2013) highlights the spiral model to promote human rights change (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 2013, 222-239). The model suggests that networks of domestic and transnational organisations team up with international regimes to diffuse norms to the public and governments. This is most effective if the local NGO network is a strong opponent to the local state, and the state is vulnerable against international pressure. They argue that the spiral model is applicable to businesses as well. Vulnerability for businesses takes the form of consumer boycotts, product visibility and prestige, company size, dependency of certain operations, and repercussions from the home state. If successful, the corporation may itself turn into a norm diffuser. By allying itself with other companies, NGOs, IOs, and governments, they start to diffuse the new norms to their supply chain. The company will also try to influence other companies to level the playing field: to make sure that competition 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(19) is within the scope of the new norms so that they are not entrapped in a competitive disadvantage. Amanda Murdie (2013) agree that better coordination between different types of NGOs can have big political and social outcomes, but she also argue that an increased cooperation and coordination between NGOs also improve service-based policies they promote. It is assumed that NGOs that are implementing the same services can increase their efficiency by coordinating their efforts, increase innovation, share costs, gain market exposure, and organise against competitors. The cooperation also generates resources in itself. NGOs typically work with other NGOs that shares the same goals. NGOs gain the ability to normatively frame their work to a wider audience if the they have different specialisations, such as development and human rights. They can gain material. 政治大. resources by utilising their different abilities in a joint activity. For instance; two medical. 立. health NGOs with different specialisations can open a joint clinic. Collaboration also. ‧ 國. 學. provides new means of spreading information. Though actual NGO-NGO cooperation is scarce, when considering the amount of NGOs working with the issue. Initiating a cooperation requires resources, a point that Kirsten Foot (2016) agrees with in her study on. ‧. anti-human trafficking collaboration in the US. Resources can also be in the form of. sit. y. Nat. connections to other powerful actors, shared language, or trust (Murdie, 2013).. io. er. While Murdie think that the resource competition between NGOs probably cannot be completely disregarded, she argues that trust and opportunity are more important variables. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. that are often overlooked in the literature. Both of these variables are dependent on the state.. engchi. Trust and opportunity increases if the local state, or an interventionist humanitarian state provides corruption-free bureaucratic structure for communication and security. By drawing from arguments that institutional trusts facilitate interpersonal or inter-organisational trust, she implies that NGOs that trust the institutions of the state, also are more trusting towards other NGOs (Murdie, 2013). Her argument rests on the assumption that NGOs are more likely to spend resources on cooperation if they deem the risk of the cooperation to fail as low, and that the local or intervening government is the most important variable determining that risk. She does not argue that competition between NGOs in pursuit for donor funds does not exist, but that the donors are actually encouraging cooperation via their donations, and that NGOs, even though they exist in a market environment, are not typical market organisations themselves, so they. 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(20) are pursuing cooperation when possible. Their motivations are altruistic, far from the motivations of a commercial organisation. She also points out that even commercial organisations cooperate with each other if the opportunity presents itself (Murdie, 2014). Kirsten Foot (2016) seems to be of the conviction that because of NGOs lacking sufficient resources and knowledge about the benefits of cross sector collaboration, or how to utilise the cooperation successfully. The state or private donors should take a coordinating role and fund projects aimed at collaboration, possibly in the form of a PPP. Apart from gaining access to monetary resources, the NGO also receive a greater status by being funded by the state or a respected donor. A status which can be used to influence others. However, other NGOs that were not invited to the cooperation, or did not receive funds from the grant, may adopt defensive strategies when interacting with the NGO that received the money,. 政治大. straining the relations between the two.. 立. In her study (Foot, 2016) she also highlights the different types power between the. ‧ 國. 學. trafficking person service providers and the law enforcement officers. While the NGO have the power to build a relationship, and influence the trafficked person in their relation with the law enforcement, the officers possess the “hard” power in the relationship and can define the. ‧. legal status of the trafficked person. She also highlights a gendered relationship between the. sit. y. Nat. two entities. The law enforcement officers were mostly men, and the NGO staff mostly women, which may have provided the basis on why the NGO staff perceived that the officers. io. er. considered the NGO to be subordinate to the law enforcement officers. Some NGOs attempt. al. n. v i n C action they canUpursue for other reasons as well), aimed to separate and clarify their rolesh(an engchi to formalise their relation to the law enforcement officers by formulating policy statements. or simply minimize interaction to the absolute necessary in order to successfully implementing the project.. Foot (2016) suggests that internal composition of the organisations at the individual level determine how the NGO perceive the human trafficking issue, and affects the kinds of policies they will implement. She implies that NGOs that predominately consist of a single gender or race may develop better policies by interacting with organisations of a different race or gender, or a mix between them. In the relationship between the NGO and the law enforcement sector, her observation was nearly the complete opposite; the victim service organisation takes on a motherly role and the law enforcer take the fatherly role, with the result of both treating the former victim like their child. This may hinder empowerment policies directed to the former victim. 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(21) She makes a point of how the dynamics between different government agencies or representatives, affect their relationship with other actors. Businesses, for instance, may not be inclined to initiate cross sector cooperation including the state because they may already be involved with the state in other matters, or are regularly inspected in their work by the state. Additional collaborations will only increase state scrutiny in their work. A discussion is also raised regarding the autonomy of the state agencies involved in the cooperation, and how a different state entity may affect the work of another governmental agency. The reasons underlying issues of cooperation are similar to when NGOs seek cooperation: different government agencies work under a different set of values and regulations that sometimes even explicitly hinder cooperation. Their differing values may not be properly communicated between the agencies (Foot, 2016).. 政治大. She also observes that even though both law enforcement officers and victim service. 立. organisation staff are obliged to work under a victim centred approach, law enforcement. ‧ 國. 學. officers are conflicted between the victim’s needs and the prosecution of the perpetrators, while the NGO staff are not. The reason for this is due to working under different core values, which will spark tensions between the actors, even between individuals in respective. ‧. organisation that have never met before (Foot, 2016).. Nat. sit. y. Even though Foot (2016) observed tensions between religious NGOs and non-religious. io. er. NGOs, this seemed not to exist at the individual level; many of the staff members or the volunteers of respective organisations were working for both types of NGOs simultaneously.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. The reasons for why cooperation is strained at the organisational level is due to strong. engchi. differing values, religiously or human rights based, and that proposed policies are well grounded in those values. There were also observations indicating that close affiliation with organisations with strong differing values may undermine the respectable position the organisation enjoys with like-minded organisations. Organisations based in other values question the competence of the other organisation and their use of methods, and ultimately question the point of a collaboration. NGOs involved in victims’ service delivery are sometimes working on establishing themselves, and their work, as a credited profession, establishing a new formal sector. This is thought to increase their credibility and power in their work, without having to add any additional monetary resources. Though this risks dividing the NGO arena involved in. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(22) trafficked persons’ services by alienating those who are eligible to become formally credited NGOs, and those who are not (Foot, 2016). NGOs may have much to gain by working across sectors under either formal or informal means, but when they choose not to do so, it is to preserve their autonomy, even when regarding NGO-NGO relations. Beliefs and values become an important factor in this, Foot (2016) noted that some faith based organisations chose not to cooperate with other nonreligious NGOs out of fear to loose autonomy to work in the field according to their beliefs. While working together, the organisations share their ideas and norms both via the cooperation itself, by organisation to organisation contacts, and at the individual level. Within sectors, organisations (NGOs or corporations) try to position themselves, or use an established position, to successfully promote anti-human trafficking projects within their. 政治大. sector (Foot, 2016). This behaviour can be seen as trying to utilise an actor’s network and. 立. status in combination, to gain power. This can also be used to boost the power of entities of. ‧ 國. 學. lower status, to provide them with a platform of influence and potentially boosting the status of both actors. Co-hosting events may also yield similar results. Though Foot observed that these events sometimes ignored the potential for developing new policies, particularly. ‧. sit. Nat. status. This was also true when the state was involved in the event.. y. through the input of former victims, and seemed to be more concerned about organisational. io. er. Finally, Foot predicts that for any collaboration to be successful, the participants have to apply themselves in a few areas. One is respect. Organisations have to respect their own and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. the other organisations values and capabilities, as well as establishing relations, and possibly. engchi. implement codes of conducts that take into account that involvement is an investment for each organisation. Trust is built over time during the cooperation, but can be facilitated by formulating shared expectations about the cooperation or project, by acting transparent, and by publishing evaluations of their cooperation and projects. The final factor facilitating a successful cooperation is perseverance. It is better to focus attention on collaborating with a handful of other organisations to establish close relationships that persevere over time, than to initiate collaborations with many organisations for short term projects. Since anti-human trafficking policies usually require much time to be implemented and to yield results, long term relations is to be preferred. Paul J. Nelson (2003) investigate closer relations between human rights organisations and development organisations, and why they established collaborations. Nelson argue that. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(23) development organisations have been able to frame their work as a human right, which have enabled them to exert greater pressure on states. Most states have made official commitments to uphold human rights for everyone residing within its borders; a human rights framing has potentially a strong effect for a development focused NGO’s work. Human rights organisations on the other hand, are able to implement a human rights perspective in the service delivery of the development organisation, effectively educating the target population of their and other’s human rights. Respective organisation has also been able to combine their knowledge to develop new policies, such as letting and encouraging the target population to participate in the development and implementation of new policies. Nelson (2003) also predicts a greater use of advocacy in various forms by development NGOs working with human rights NGOs. This will be noticed internally in the development. 政治大 prediction is that international NGO coalitions involving human rights may result in NGOs 立 NGO as a structural change, slightly shifting the identity of the organisation. Another. setting the standard on what should be considered a human right.. ‧ 國. 學. Development NGOs committing to human rights have also had effects on accountability according to Nelson (2003). By committing to human rights in their work, NGOs are held. ‧. accountable to universal standards in their work. Instead of being accountable only to the. sit. y. Nat. state or their donors, the work of the NGO can be held accountable to anyone, including the local community. The act of applying universal defined rights to the local context may prove. io. er. to be difficult according to Nelson, but may also ease tensions between the state and the NGO. al. n. v i n C h they may worsenUthe state-NGO relations by the the application of their services. Though engchi. in cases where the NGO had received critique of delivering services that hinders the state in. politicisation of the NGOs work.. He further argues that NGO collaboration crossing the global south and north may not only result in the exchange of ideas, norms and policies, but might also prove to be a useful route to outmanoeuvre and influence international corporations, governments and IOs, as well as providing an alternate route for development than the market-dominated one. Organisations involved in developing these collaborative policies are often new and specialised in networking activities. They do not, however, precisely define the specific human rights as agreed upon in international treaties, when working under this type of cooperation. A loosely defined idea of human rights is instead used. (Nelson, 2003).. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(24) Clifford Bob (2005) identify several NGO-NGO relations in the human rights sphere that have a direct effect on their work. Some NGOs in a network functions as gatekeepers. Small NGOs can gain an increase in status by affiliating themselves with the high-status NGO. This will open the gate for the smaller NGO to gain a wider recognition of their work, as well as gaining access to the resources the other NGO have access to, such as affiliated journalists and government officials. The smaller NGO may turn into a “follower” who have no resources to conduct investigations themselves and simply follow the lead of the larger NGO that feed them information. The smaller NGO is typically introduced to the larger one through “matchmaker” agents, people or organisations with special contacts and credibility that is facilitated to introduce the large NGO to the smaller one. The smaller NGO can also issue lobbying campaigns directed. 政治大 personal contact between the organisations, international conferences can function as a good 立. at the larger, preferably international, NGO. This is expected to be most successful via direct. vantage point for that.. ‧ 國. 學. Smaller NGOs also frame their work to match with the profile of the larger NGO. The framing process can involve a tactic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” and frame an issue. ‧. in line with the other organisation’s values, such as a local labour trafficking organisation. sit. y. Nat. framing their issue as an “anti-Nike” movement to attract NGOs that are opposing. io. er. multinational corporations (Bob, 2005).. Bob (2005) also notes that many funding NGOs in the global north are inclined to fund. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. local NGOs in the global south that have a similar organisational structure as their own, as. engchi. well as showing cultural similarities to the donor NGO, with the effect of local NGOs with indigenous values gaining less support. Other important matching factors are similar scope of work, and ethics, pre-existing contacts, previous knowledge of the NGO, identity of the support NGO, monetary resources, charismatic leaders, and perceived legitimacy of the local NGO. Sometimes the donor NGO need to evaluate the local NGO before agreeing to support them, which will be a cost for the donor. So the local NGO apply tactics to provide them with “objective” information about them, such as news articles. Usually, the local NGO apply a mix of the above mentioned tactics. Koch and Dreher, et.al. (2009) also argues in a similar fashion. In their study on the allocation of donor funds from a number of donor NGOs, they found that donor NGOs tend to follow the same pattern as their respective government (follow their back-donor) and that. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(25) they are inclined to fund organisations similar to their own. They tend to select to support organisations in countries that already are supported by other donor NGOs instead on focusing on poor countries. Though they do take poverty into account once they have selected an organisation. 1.2.1. Critique Most scholars seem to converge on that the influence by the donor risk facilitating bureaucratisation, shapes the identity or structure of the NGO, or influences its relationships to other actors, and that this all may affect the performance of the NGO (or is just generally bad for the NGO, without clarifying why). However, they do not all agree on this, and they particularly disagree on the process. The literature on this topic is very disorganised, it rarely follows a clearly defined school of thought or overarching theory. This despite the vast. 政治大. literature on inter-organisational relations between other types of organisations, from fields of. 立. sociology and organisational psychology (Scott and Carrington, 2011).. ‧ 國. 學. Some arguments are seemingly influenced by some schools of thought, but this is not always expressed by the scholar, which adds to the disorganisation of this field and ultimately. ‧. complicates the development of a convincing argument. In this section I categorise above arguments along certain schools of thought or the assumptions they are built on, outline the. Nat. sit. io. er. present my critique.. y. process of donor influence on the NGO’s performance based on the literature (Figure 1), and. al. v i n and the NGO. These arguments assume C hthat the donors tryUto control the NGO and that the i e nremain g c hindependent. NGO has to take countermeasures in order to The implication is that the n. Some arguments follow the assumption of a zero-sum power game between the donor. donor and the NGO have separate and conflicting goals and ambitions, and the relationship is a struggle between them to get the most of their own interest out of the cooperation at the expense of the other organisation’s interests. See outcomes A, B and D in Figure 1 (Self, 1993; Steinberg, 2001; Bob, 2005; Mitchell, 2012; Hoff, 2014; Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015; Foot, 2016). Another set of arguments disagrees with above by underlining the reason of why they are cooperating. They ultimately have the same goal; so the cooperation is actually a positivesum game where both organisations increase their power through the cooperation. An example of the implication of this type of argument is that an NGO actually becomes more independent through the support of their donor, and the donor gain a higher status by their 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(26) support of an independent NGO. See outcome C in figure 1 (Nelson, 2003; Park, 2005; Mwangi, Rieth, and Schmitz, 2013; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2013; Murdie, 2013; Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015; Foot, 2016). Many arguments claims that single relations, or a single type of relations between the donor and the NGO, create structural effects that determine the whole structure of the NGOnetwork in the receiving country. The assumption is that donors, in one way or another, influence the NGO to work with a certain type of actors. This will in turn shape the whole network of the NGO and may even create “blocks” in the network which hinders the NGOs to find the best partner for project development and implementation, or it may facilitate the development of a more interconnected network. See outcome A and D in Figure 1 (Bob, 2005; Mitchell, 2012; Hoff, 2014; Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, 2015; Foot, 2016).. 政治大. Other scholars take the opposing view, by arguing that NGOs are still able to think and. 立. act independently. The argument is simply that the reasoning used to determine who the. ‧ 國. 學. NGOs decide who to work with is mainly based on how to best tackle the issue they work with. They care little of what the donors think in this regard. This argument is essentially based on the assumption that NGOs are informed rational actors, and therefore do not. ‧. respond to attempts of manipulation, but rather use the donors to their own advantage. See. sit. y. Nat. outcome B and C in Figure 1 (Nelson, 2003; Park, 2005; Mwangi, Rieth, and Schmitz, 2013;. io. er. Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2013; Murdie, 2013).. Regarding relations between the NGOs themselves, some scholars argue that if similar. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. NGOs work together, they can increase their efficiency. This is due to them being able make. engchi. joint ventures, following the idea of economies of scale. Dissimilar NGOs working together do, on the other hand, develop more innovative policies. This is due to them being able to utilise each other’s differences during project implementation, or exchange ideas during project development. See outcome C in Figure 1 (Murdie, 2013; Foot, 2016). The above sections show quite clearly that scholars are in disagreements over the effects of donor-NGO relations, but it also hints of the deep complexity of this research area. As an example: Banks, Hulme, and Edwards (2015) are strong supporters of the assumption that the donors create competition between the NGOs due to the introduction of market effects in the NGOs’ work. Murdie (2013) clearly opposes this idea by pointing to the independence and identity of the NGOs; they are driven by ideology, not profit, and have a pragmatic view on the prospects of cooperation. However, Banks, Hulme, and Edwards do agree that, under. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(27) certain circumstances, the donor-NGO relationship can lead to better cooperation between the NGOs. The disagreement between them is not that the donor-NGO relationship will always lead to a certain outcome for the NGO, good or bad, they disagree on which actor’s behaviour in the relationship is the most detrimental for the outcome. Banks, Hulme, and Edwards tends to predict a positive effect on performance from the relation if the donor make good judgements, even if the NGO might object to their demands. They are therefore supporters of outcomes A, C and D in Figure 1. They think that the donor is able to limit their negative influence on the NGO, and even turn it into a positive one, although that may not be the common case today. However, they do not accept the outcome B in Figure 1; the donor will always influence the NGO somehow. For Murdie, the positive effect is usually achieved by. 政治大 irrelevant what the donors “demands” from the NGO, as the NGO will only agree if the 立. the NGO making good choices in the relationship, no matter the donor. In her perspective it is demands are in the NGO’s interest. She is therefore the main promoter of outcome B and C in. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 1.. The example highlights that the disagreements between the scholars are not easy to. ‧. pinpoint at first glance. This might be because they are more concerned about presenting their. sit. y. Nat. own argument than developing counterarguments to scholars with opposing views. The differences are also often in the details, as most theories and arguments presented here are. io. er. minutious, Foot (2016) is a good example at that. Based on her observations, she set up very. al. n. v i n C h test if those conditions outcome. She and others do not, however, e n g c h i U would produce the same particular conditions for when one donor-NGO relationship may have a specific type of. results in other cases, or if other scholar’s arguments hold in the case that they themselves are observing. When focusing on performance, the literature disagrees on how the donors affects the NGO. Scholars tend to argue along the lines as portrayed in Figure 1. The main cleavage exists between scholars who believe that NGOs has no choice but to accept the donors’ demands (outcome A and D), and those who believe that NGOs are able to outmanoeuvre the donors in a variety of ways (outcome B), or are able to reach a common ground for partnership (outcome C). However, it is important to point out that most scholars agree that the donors do attempt to modify the NGO to their liking. The disagreement lies in how successful the donors are in their attempts, and how exactly the NGO is modified if the donors do succeed. Most scholars take an either-or stance regarding the donors’ influence, 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(28) either all donors are successful in influencing the NGO in one way or another, or none of them are. Very few of them argues that only certain types of donors are able to influence the NGO, or that donor influence is successful only under certain circumstances. The main exception to this is Hoff (2014), who argues that some private foundations may have no, or a very small, influence on the NGO, as compared to other donors. However, she claims that this is only true for some foundations, but does not clarify why this difference exists. Foot (2016), on the other hand, insists of that, and explains how, the identity and type of organisations working together, affects the performance of those organisations. This includes the donor-NGO relation. She is a supporter of outcomes A, C and D in Figure 1, and a partly supporter of outcome B, if the NGO are able to generate funds without relying on any donor. She argues that the values and identity of respective organisations will always affect. 政治大 long-term commitments in developing their relationship, are prepared to invest considerable 立 the performance of the NGO. A positive effect will be achieved if each organisation makes. resources in their relationship, and recognise that each organisations may have different goals. ‧ 國. 學. with their collaboration.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(29) 3 Figure 1: Donors influences the performance of the NGO. Figure 1. Cause. Process. Outcome The NGO gain the support of the donor. NGOs compete for the donors money. Donors search for an NGO whose work are more in line with their own goals and identity. 立. ‧ 國. B The NGO's performance is practically unaffected. The NGO generate funds without relying on donors The donor and the NGO develop projects as partners. Donors demand that the NGO work with partners suggested by the donors. Ch. engchi. sit. y. n. al. The NGO do not accept the donors' demands. The donor and the NGO successfully utilisise their different experiences and perspectives when developing the projects. er. io. Donors demand that the NGO change current projects and/or structure. Donors demand that the NGO reports their work to the donor. 3. The NGO have a strained relationship with some other NGOs working in the same field. ‧. Donors want to take credit for their support. Some projects of the NGO are not easy to measure or are not in line with the donors' goals and identity. A The NGO implement some projects that are unrelated to their own goals and identity. The NGO choose a new donor whose demands are in line with the NGO's own goals and identity The NGO successfully re-negotiates the donor's demands. Nat. Donors want to support effective projects that are in line with their own goals and values. 政治大. The NGO are able to use some of the funds to support projects unrelated to the donor. 學. Donors do not completely trust that the NGO is spending the money as stated. NGOs modify their projects according to the donors' demands in order to attract potential donors. The NGO are in conflict with other NGOs that tried to get support from the donor. i n U. v. The donor and NGO introduce their previous partners to each other. The NGO focus their work on projects which are easily quantified The NGO change according to the demands. C The NGO's performance is improved. The NGO shift resources to meet the demands, at the cost of the projects and their relationship to their partners. D Performance is increased in projects that are easily quantified Performance decrease in qualitatively measured projects The NGO improve their relationships with partners proposed by the donor, at the expense of previous partners. The dashed lines indicate that donors can “switch place” in the process leading up to outcomes A and B, but this is not necessary in order to reach respective outcome.. 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(30) It is evident that the arguments are following certain assumptions or schools of thought, but this is not often clarified. Self (1993) is the main exception of this. It may seem supercilious to point this out, though it is important to understand the basis for how and why they construct their argument in such a way, since this may help explain why two scholars make complete opposite predictions of the same event. The example above demonstrates this point clearly. A clear presentation of the foundation of their argument will also make it easier to compare this field with research on inter-organisational relations and networks between non-NGOs. As I already have pointed out, it is surprising that not more scholars use insights from research on relations and networks of other types of organisations, considering that this field is large. The reason may be because they perceive the behaviour of NGOs as being set apart. 政治大 their arguments on, have been used to make predictions on the behaviour of other types 立. from behaviour of other types of organisations. However, the assumptions that they build. organisations as well, as Self pointed out. An interchange on research regarding relations and. ‧ 國. 學. networks between different organisations should therefore prove constructive, and this will be easier to achieve if it easy to identify the foundation of the arguments used.. ‧. 1.3. Purpose of the Study. y. Nat. sit. Inter-organisational relations often have a direct effect on NGO projects, as well as an. al. er. io. indirect effect. There are also cases when no relation is preferable for the projects, from the. n. NGO’s perspective. When looking at the bigger picture, relations turn in to networks. The. Ch. i n U. v. structure of the network itself, and the NGO’s position within it, becomes imperative for their. engchi. work. One basic concept is how the network steer the flow of information within it. NGOs need to position themselves so that they receive relevant information from other parties working with the issue, and are able to steer what kind of information other parties may receive in turn. This study will add to that knowledge by investigating these concepts at play in the case organisation under study. These concepts are often mentioned in literature on development and international governance, as the literature review have showed. The distinct and important role of NGOs in developing countries is irrefutable. As is their role in the international social structure and for global governance. However, a full understanding of their roles will not be achieved unless the effects and mechanisms produced by relationships and networks are explored in depth. The literature suggest that certain kinds 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.

(31) of relations and networks are key in the development and implementation of successful NGO projects. Though the theories and arguments suggested are extremely varied, both in complexity and in their effects. Some effects are also expected to be slow, particularly ones regarding norms, identity and values. Effects from the donor-NGO relation should be the easiest ones to observe: the literature suggests that this relation has the strongest effects. However, it was not clear beforehand what kinds of effects will be present in this case, this study therefore explored the effects as they presented themselves. The processes leading to the observed effects will be compared to the literature, and it will be determined which schools of thought that are the most valid in this case. A social network analysis will be able to determine which kinds of structural factors. 政治大. suggested by the literature are present in this case. However, due to not having access to the. 立. whole network, it will be impossible to determine if the network structure have had an actual. ‧ 國. 學. effect on the NGO’s projects. Though it is possible to investigate how the NGO interact with its partners, particularly if certain organisations affect the performance of the case NGO, and if the donors have had any influence in this. This can be compared to future research on the. ‧. subject, or compared to social network studies on other cases in the same or similar contexts.. Nat. sit. y. This study is focused on investigating these concepts at the individual organisation level.. io. er. The findings may therefore be very detailed and in-depth. However, it might be hard to disregard external factors, as the findings may be very influenced by factors not included in. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. the study, such as migration trends, internal factors of the actors, and factors within the. engchi. population. The study is also biased in favour of the local NGO, as it is only their own perception that is accounted for in this study. This could possibly be controlled for in future research. The case in this study is a good candidate for the purpose of this study: the organisation has an extensive network of partner NGOs, overseas donors, state partnerships, and connections with IOs, while at the same time possessing some benefits of being a local NGO, with close connections with their target group. The case will be presented in depth in a latter part of the thesis.. 1.4. Social Network Concepts This study uses definitions of relation and network effects as stated by Alexandra Marin and Barry Wellan (in Scott and Carrington, 2011, p. 11-26). When stating that the relation or 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.015.2018.A06.