Public Accounts Committee Public Hearing
on 24 February 1992
HKUST CAMPUS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
SIRS Y CHUNG'S SPEAKING NOTE
T
he establishment of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) is a major milestone in the long-term economic development of this territory. As an insti-tution of higher learning for teaching and conducting research in science and technology, the University must be able to reflect in its campus the characteristics of advanced science and technol-ogy. Building a university of this nature and scale is a major undertaking that is not happening very often not only in Hong Kong but even in the world. It is the third university in the 150-year history of Hong Kong and the first one exclusively for science and technology. The University is built not for one year, or one decade, or even one century but for generations and generations. I therefore welcome this opportunity to clarify a number of misconceptions about the campus design and con-struction.In responding to all the questions related to the decision of the HKUST Planning Committee in choosing the runner-up design instead of the winner, it is necessary to point out at the outset that the responsibility of selecting the design for the HKUST campus rested solely on the Planning Committee itself andnot,as widely misunderstood, on theAssessmentPanel. The Planning Committee had never delegated this responsibility to the Assessment Panel, whose job was confined to picking the winner for the architectural competition, and nothing else. Therefore, the picking of the winner in the competition and the selection of the project architect for the campus are two different issues. Unfortunately, Professor Maki, like many other people, had mixed up these two different issues.
The Planning Committee as the sponsor for the competition readily accepted the recommendation of the Assessment Panel, announced the result of the competition, and awarded the prize to the winner in full compliance with the rules of the competi-tion. As far as the competition is concerned, this was the end of
it.
There was no reason to seek the view of the Assessment
Panel for its professional opinion, as suggested in a question of thePublic Accounts Committee (PAC), because the Planning Com-mittee itself had a team of Technical Advisers representing eight specialist areas.
According to the legal opinion from the Attorney General's Chambers, it is quite clear from the terms of the competition that no warranty was given that the group producing the winning design would be appointed the project architects. Clause 2.27 of the rules for the competition explicitly states that the promotor shall not be held liable in the event that the winning architect is not appointed. There can therefore be no reason for any com-plaint on legal grounds. Contrary to the view expressed by Professor Maki, the Crown Solicitor has furthermore remarked that it was surely well known that the winners of architectural competitions were often not awarded contracts
as
a result.As to the reasons why the Planning Committee did not use the winning design, the answer begins with the Report to the Plan-ning Committee by the Chairman of the Assessment Panel. The responsibility for the written report of the Panel's decision was left by the Members with its Chairman. The Report concluded with the following paragraphs:
"The ranking of the three submissions 'J', 'K' and 'L' by the members of the Panel were
as
follows:-First Second Third Dr Chan (Chairman) J L
Professor Maki K J L Dr Werner L J
Mr Chung J L K MrLei J
Right: Model of the design submitted by Simon Kwan & Associates in association with Perey Thomas Partnership ( HK).
Bottom: Model of the design submitted by Design Consultants & Lotus in association with Wong & Ouyang (HK)Ltd.
"As a result of the foregoing (that is, 3 out of the 5 judges
voted for the design J), the Assessment Panel has selected submission J by Design Consultants and Lotus in association with Wong & Ouyang (HK) Ltd as the winner. However, in the light of the fact this decision was not unanimous, it is considered that submission L by Simon Kwan & Associates in association with Percy Thomas Partnership (HK) should be regarded as the runner-up. Members of the Planning Committee are invited to consider, in the light of the foregoing, whether the master plan proposed by the winner of the competition or by the runner-up should become the blueprint for the University."
It therefore can be seen that the naming of submission L as the runner-up in the competition is made by the Chairman of the Assessment Panel in his Report and not, as alleged by Professor Maki, by the Planning Committee. The Planning Committee was not aware of the disagreement within the Assessment Panel at that time. In this connection, Members of the Public Accounts Committee may find it of interest to note that Professor Maki did not vote for the winner, nor for the runner-up. He himself voted for the submission K which, in the opinion of the team of Technical Advisers, was the most expensive to build, costing about 20% higher than both the winner and the runner-up.
The rest of the story is public knowledge and forms part of the two Reports of the HKUST Planning Committee published in September 1987 and April 1988 respectively. In short, the Planning Committee first spent a long meeting on 15 November 1987 in considering the semi-finalist of six designs with the assistance of the Chief Professional Adviser who was seconded
from the Government's Architectural Services Department.
After receiving the Assessment Panel Chairman's Report on 20 November 1987 the Planning Committee had spent two more meetings to consider the two designs recommended by the Panel Chainnan. At the end a most prudent method of secret
ballot was taken in view of the fact that, no matter what the result would be, the decision made could be controversial. In the one and only ballot taken, all the 15 members voted unanimously for the runner-up design.
These 15 members includedfourprominentlocal academics and administrator from the Hong Kong University, the Chinese University, the Hong Kong Polytechnic and the City Polytech-nic as well as a respected barrister who has since become the Chairman of the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee (UPGC). Among these 15 members there were also four distinguished persons, who either were at that time Honourable Legislative Councillors or are now Honourable Members of the Legislature. Furthermore, within this group there were a prominent professor and head of department of civil and struc-tural engineering, a consulting civil and strucstruc-tural engineer, and five very senior professors and professional engineers special-ising in electrical, electronic, mechanical and computer engi-neering. Clearly, it was the opinion of each and every one of these 15 members that the runner-up was a more suitable design for a university of science and technology. This was the unanimous decision of the Planning Committee in carrying out its responsibility as a collective body.
Some Members of the Public Accounts Committee have asked through the media that why was it that when the Planning Committee discussed the designs on the first day views were mixed, and on the second day they were unanimous? I was only one of the 15 persons voting for the runner-up and can only speak for myself. In my view, both designs were not perfect and therefore attracted mixed views during the discussions, but when it came to the final voting design L was definitely the better design from the point of the end user. It is unfair for any one to cast any doubt on the integrity of the members of the Planning Committee and I would strongly suggest that the PAC should give these members an opportunity to declare their independence and competence in this exercise. For this pur-pose, I am submitting to the PAC a full list of names of the 15 members who unanimously voted for the runner-up design in November 1987.
The PAC has also asked that why did the Planning Commit-tee choose the runner-up design which, when compared with the winner, was more expensive in terms of cost and more difficult and took longer time to build? It should be noted that each
submission to the competition was required to provide a cost estimate and these cost estimates were then checked and revised by a team of Technical Advisers representing eight specialised areas including Quantity Surveyors, who are experts in cost estimation, so as to confinn their reliability and to enable comparison on a common basis.
COST COMPARISONS
Lotus (J) Simon PSI (K)
Kwan(L) $M $M $M Competitor's Est 1,389.99 1,431.20 2,125.08 98% 100% 148% Quantity Surveyor's 1,517.28 1,559.67 1,829.10 Est 98% 100% 118%
*PSl=Planning Services International
Members of the Public Accounts Committee should know that, contrary to what has been widely rumoured, the cost estimates as submitted by the competitors of the two designs differed by 2-3% only ($1,390 million against $1,431 million). The cost estimates after revision by the quantity surveyors gave the same magnitude of difference for the two designs ($1,517 millionvs$1,560million). Theseareestimatedtotalcostsforthe campus building project including site fonnation, foundation and construction work. It therefore can be seen that, as far as total cost of construction is concerned, the difference between the two designs is insignificant. With these sets of cost figures available to the Assessment Panel, one would find it strange for any member to criticize the choice on the basis of total cost.
As regards to the other part of the same question that the runner-up design was inore difficult and took longer time to build, the technical advice given to the Planning Committee by an experienced professional in the field of civil engineering construction did not support this assertion. This expert was the fonner Project Director of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation and was responsible for the construction of the underground railway in Hong Kong. In fact, in the view of this expert, there would be less problems during construction with the runner-up design. The phasing arrangement proposed for the winner of the competition, involving building on three sides, would also be difficult to implement without rather serious disruption.
I am involved in the design and construction of the HKUST campus in a number of capacities and, because of this, there are frequent questions raised in the media by some Members of the PAC about the conflict of roles on my part. As you know, I was the Senior Member of the Executive Council (EXCO) until August 1988, the Chairman of the HKUST Planning Committee (PC)untilMarch1988,andtheChairmanoftheHKUSTCouncil since April 1988.
I now would like to respond to those questions relating to my dual role as Senior member of EXCO and Chairman of the
HKUST Council. First, let me explain the practice in the Executive Council on this matter during my tenns of office.
It is generally well known in public service that there are two different and distinct types of conflicts. One is the conflict of interests in which personal financial interests are involved, and the other is the conflict of roles in which there is no involvement of personal financial interests.
The guidelines for members of the Executive Council, as I know them, are that when a member has a conflict of financial interests in an item on the agenda, the paper for that particular item will not be issued to that member and other members are so notified with a view to discouraging them from discussing the issue with that particular member concerned During the dis-cussion of the item in the Council, the member concerned will leave the chamber and therefore not take part in both the discussion and the decision.
It should be noted that a member having a dual role does not necessarily have a conflict of roles, because in many instances both roles are compatible in the widest sense of public interest. Nonetheless, in case that there is a possible conflict of roles, the particular member concerned is still given a copy of the paper but at the outset of the discussion the member concerned would usually ask the Council to take note of his position in the paper. The member will not take part in the decision and nonnally does not participate in the discussion unless is asked by the presiding Chairman of the Council.
Under the current practice of the Executive Council, there are two types of declaration of interest, namely, exclusionary inter-ests and declaratory interest This classification is paralleled to the foregoing two types of conflicts. A declaratory interest is therefore equivalent to a conflict of roles. Current EXCO guidelines indicate that membership of boards and committees such as the University and Polytechnic Councils is not, strictly speaking, a declaratory interest. However, it is nonnal that such position be made known and noted.
According to my memory, when the Executive Council discussed the donation of the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club on 2June 1987, I did ask the Council at theoutsetofthediscussion to take note of my position as Chairman of the Planning Com-mittee and also did not take part in the decision. It is understood that the Clerk of the Executive Council, at the request of the Public Accounts Committee, had recently confinned the proper action which I had taken at the EXCO meeting on 2 June 1987 when the HKUST campus building and funding arrangement was discussed.
As quoted in a question of the Public Accounts Committee, the Executive Council in accepting the $1.5 billion donation from the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club (RHKJC) and appointing the Club for managing the HKUST campus project on a turnkey basis on 2 June 1987, considered two major directives. One directive is that, in line with current practice, the project design and construction of HKUS Tis to confonn with the standards and nonns acceptable to the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee (UPGC) and the Government. It should be noted, however, that this directive is only applicable to this particular donation of $1.5 billion and to the expenditure of Government
funds, but would not apply to any additional donations to HKUST from non-Government sources at any time.
The other directive is that the award of contracts and the approval of contract variations by the Project Manager (that is, the RHKJC) shall be subject to the approval of the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council for any commitment above the sum of$1,500 million pledged by the Jockey Club. The same question of the PAC has asked that, as Senior Member of EXCO, did I then ever seek to ensure the two directives were carried out and to see how they were carried out? According to my understanding, decisions and directives of the Executive Council of this nature are to be implemented by and are the responsibility of the Administration in the Government The job of an Unofficial Member of the Executive Council is to assist the Government in the formulation of policies and not in the execution of these policies.
In this case, it is up to the Administration, and not any Unofficial Member of the Executive Council, to report progress to the Executive Council and, if thought fit, to apply for additional funding from the Finance Committee of the Legis-lative Council. In a similar manner, Members of the Legislature are to make laws and to vote public funds, but they are not to enforce laws and administer the use of Government money.
Another question of the PAC asked that, as Chairman of the HKUST Planning Committee (and later Council), did I know long before that there would be massive increase in the cost of the project? If yes, did I as Senior MemberofExecutive Council reflect the situation to the Council? If not, why did I fail to have an overall understanding of the construction progress ofHKUSTI Before answering this question, I would like to ask Members of the PAC first to take note of the fact that the Planning Committee (PC), after deciding on the campus model in No-vember 1987, immediately handed over the whole project to the Jockey Club on a turnkey basis as directed by the Executive Council. From then on, as Members of the Finance Committee were informed on 17 June 1987 and on 1 June 1990, (1) all architects, contractors and consultants working on the project are to be employed directly by the Jockey Club and (2) the construction of the HKUST campus is being undertaken by the RHKJC and all aspects of the management of the project are the responsibility of the RHKJC.
As soon as the selected design was passed to the Jockey Club, a meeting was held with the Financial Secretary and his deputies on 9 January 1988, at which the Secretary-General of the Planning Committee warned that the cost estimates pro-vided to the Chief Secretary (CS) were made without consul-tation with the HKUST Planning Committee and were likely to be grossly under-estimated.
Subsequently, another meeting was held on 13 January 1988, in which the Finance Branch (FB), the Education and Manpower Branch (EMB), the Architectural Services Depart-ment (ASD), the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee
(UPGC), and the HKUST Planning Committee (PC) were present The Planning Committee was represented by the Secretary-General under the direction of its Chairman. The following two resolutions recorded are relevant to the question asked by the
PAC:-(1) The Secretary for Education and Manpower (SEM) is the Controlling Officer of the HKUST project and to convene regular meetings with representatives from HKUST, ASD, UPGC andFB with a view to monitoring the progress of construction work in order to ensure that expenditure is within cash limits.
(2) When it is apparent that the limit of funding will be reached, the HKUST will have the choice of finding additional funds from non-Government sources, modi-fying the scheme to effect savings, or to approach Government for further funds.
From the record of the University, as early as October/ November 1988 and long before building contracts were awarded, the Controlling Officer of the HKUST project (the SEM) was fully aware that the preliminary estimate made by the RHKJC would be inadequate. In December 1988, the Chairman of the Jockey Club and I, as Chairman of the HKUST Council, were discussing how the inadequacy of the cost estimate could be rectified in accordance with the resolution (2) made at a meeting in the Government Secretariat on 13 January 1988 as mentioned above.
Consequently, a meeting chaired by the Chief Secretary with both RHKJC and HKUST represented was held on 1 February 1989 to discuss, among other things, the reasons for the cost under-estimate, the ways for additional financing, and a package for assigning responsibilities for cost increases in future.
Itis important to note that at this stage the campus construction work had not yet begun. In fact, tenders for the major works in Phase I did not begin to come in until June 1989 (FC Paper of 1/06/90 refers), and actual building construction work did not commence until August/September 1989.
Now, referring to the PAC's question whether or not, as Chairman of HKUST Planning Committee, I knew long before that there would be massive increase in the cost of the project? The answer is definitely yes, I did know that the estimated cost would be inadequate. As Chairman of the HKUST Council, I also had reflected the situation to the Government.
However, it was not the responsibility of any Unofficial Member of the EXCO to act as a watchdog for the EXCO and so I did not reflect the situation to the Executive Council. Further, when the first sign of a possible cost under-estimate was noted in October 1988, I had already retired from the Executive Council.
Procedural matters apart, the important point was that there was basically no breach of the two directives from the Executive Council. First, the Administration did seek and obtain the approval of the Finance Committee of the Legislature on 1 June 1990 for commitment of additional public funds before the exhaustion of the sum of $1,500 million pledged by the Jockey Club. In other words, there was no commitment of additional public funds prior to approval of the Finance Committee. Thus the second directive has been fulfilled.
As a matter of fact, in the paper submitted to the Finance Committee of the Legislature on 1 June 1990 when the budget of $3,548 million was approved, Members of the Finance
Committee were informed by Government that in early 1989 it was brought to the attention of Government that the original estimate of the base cost of $1,620 million would be inadequate. Contrary to what has been widely andconsistentlyrumoured, the reasons for the increases in the base cost were clearly explained to the Finance Committee. They were due to "the original estimates having been based on very preliminary designs which had not taken into account a number of site and infrastructural factors, the particular requirements of a high technology uni-versity, the tight construction time-table, and the additional work necessary to anticipate a future Phase ID. The precise magnitude of the increase could not be finnly established until the tenders for the major works in Phase I were received from June 1989 onwards." Base Cost TPI430 BSI239 Inflation Total
. Estimate Budget Increase May 1988 June 1990
$M $M $M 1,620 2,340 720
310 1,208 898 1,930 3,548 1,618
At that time the Finance Committee had the option either to reduce the scope of the project to effect savings or to vote for additional public funds without changing the scope. It was not a Hobson 's choice. Members should take note that even at that stage no additional Government money had been committed. However, these explanations of the Administration for the increase of the base cost from $1,620 million in the preliminary estimate to $2,340 million in this budget were accepted without opposi-tion vote by the Members of the Finance Committee when they approved the budget of $3,548 million on 1 June 1990.
By approving this budget the Finance Committee assumed responsibility to be accountable to the public for the spending of funds on Phases I and II of the HKUST campus up to the level of $3,548 million. As long as this budget is not exceeded, it is not justified nor right to say that there is cost overrun. If the Members of the PAC today do not agree with the decision of the Finance Committee of 1990, explanation should be sought from the Finance Committee of 1990. Any suggestion that the Finance Committee made its decision 20 months ago without a full and complete understanding of the facts and implications of this issue is an insult to the competence of its Members.
Now, coming to the other directive of the Executive Council
that the project design and construction of HKUST should conform with the standards and norms of the UPGC and the Government, the Director of Audit's comments are contained in the two paragraphs 13.17 and 13.18 of his Report. Paragraph 13 .17 deals with the so-called additional building areas (totalling20,508 square metres) for general infrastructural and external works included in the project The University and Polytechnic Grants Committee has advised the Director of Audit that such areas are not covered by the normal space norms, and that they would be approved on the basis of individual merits.
During the public hearing on 19 December 1991 the Chief Executive of the Jockey Club responded that "all the areas mentioned had been included in the brief for the architectural competition and became part of the original master plan with the
full knowledge and agreement of the Government and the UPGC." This explanation is very clear indeed.
Gross floor area (square metres) Multi-storey carpark 12,048 Northern entrance canopy 1,037 East west transport link bridge 2,523 East west transport link areas in housing 2,371
Others 2,529
Furthermore, Members should take note of a directive given by the Chief Secretary to the Chairman of the Jockey Club in December 1989 before the Administration decided to recom-mend the budget of $3 ,548 million to the Finance Committee of the Legislature. The Chairman of theJ ockey Club was asked that his Project Manager should get together with the Government's Director of Architectural Services to examine the detailed as-pects in a Paper titled, "Points requiring clarification on the budget submission", in which all items having any bearing on cost increase were included. Items such as reconciliation of areas, non-funded accommodation and car parking were in-cluded in this Paper. Since all those items were finally inin-cluded in the $3,548 million budget they clearly had the approval of the Government
Paragraph 13.18 of the Director of Audit's Report draws attention to the provision of 5 items which appear to lie outside the UPGC norms or the scope originally approved by the Gov-ernment. Two of these 5 items (air conditioning for post-graduate hostels and swimming pool for the Distinguished Visitors Lodge) have been dealt with by the Chief Executive of the Jockey Club at the public hearing on 19 December 1991. I shall therefore confine myself to the remaining 3 items.
Taking, first, the item on the infrastructure to allow provision
of quarters for 75% ofeligible staff and 72% of students, it is true
that the original approved scope was for 50% of eligible staff and 30% of students only. The original intention was to have 50% of the University staff living outside the campus in order to mix with the community and to enhance the town and gown relation-ship.However, in view of the fast rising property prices and rentals in recent years, the University Council took a prudent step to maximise the potential of housing sites on campus with a view to saving staff housing cost and hence public money in future years. The additional capital cost of$30.2 million for expanding the infrastructure could bring a net saving of about $400 million,
if the University were to acquire properties off campus for its staff housing at a later date. Alternatively, the saving would be approximately $380 million at 1992 prices over a period of 20 years, should the University continue to rent off campus staff housing.
The University believes strongly that a very important part of tertiary education lies in the student life on campus. For a technological university where students have to spend much more time during the day to attend laboratories and workshops, active participation in university community life can only be possible by residence on campus. For this reason, the University Council has had many discussions with the Government and eventually received its consent to build a greater number of student quarters than the original 30% limit, provided that private funding is available for capital costs and recurrent costa are to be met from hostel fees. The additional infrastructure is to make this future development possible and had to be carried out at this stage.
Turning to the eight town houses for senior academic staff, it is correct that the original approved scope was for apartments, which were intended for less senior staff. It was discovered later that the original plan overlooked the requirements for very senior staff. Instead of buying or renting housing for the very senior staff off campus, the University considered that it would be more economical in providing on campus eight town houses for very senior staff instead of eight apartments for less senior staff. It
should be noted that there are already over 30 town houses at the University of Hong Kong.
With regard to the comment by the Director of Audit for providing 1, 116 car parking spaces instead of the original scope for 700 spaces, it should be noted that there is no UPGC norms governing the number of car parking spaces and that the number depends on factors relevant to the institution and site concerned. The way used in the original master plan was to provide one space for every ten Full Time Equivalent (FTE) students. The
Facilities provided
7 ,000 FTE students planned for Phase II equated therefore with 700 car parking spaces. Another way, as the University learned at the later stage, is the formula that works satisfactorily at the University of Hong Kong. This method is that all Assistant Lecturers or equivalent and above are eligible for parking labels, and 1.5 labels are provided per space. Nonetheless, in view of the sub-urban location of HKUST causing greater car usage, one space is provided for 1.25 parking labels. If experience at a later date shows signs of over-provision, adjustment can be made at the Phase ill.
Members of the PAC have seen that there were good reasons for all these so-called non-standard provisions. Again, contrary to the erroneous impression created, these so-called non- stand-ard provisions cost a total of about $50 million, or 1.5% of the total budget of $3,548 million.
The University Council conveyed its wish to make these changes for the above items to the Chairman of the Project Management Committee, who then directed the RHKJC Project Manager to include these revised requirements in the papers attached to the $3,548 million budget submission.
It is understood that all these changes have been reviewed by the Director of Architectural Services together with RHKJC Project Manager as directed by the Chief Secretary in December 1989. Accordingly, their continued inclusion in the HKUST project was clear evidence that they all have had the full knowl-edge and agreement of the Government
The Director of Audit in making the comment that these provisions and facilities, in his own word, appear and !,repeat appear, to lie outside the scope originally approved by the Government without taking a more thorough investigation into the subsequent process of approval by the Government is, to say the least, misleading and, more unfortunately, causing much damage to both the University and the Jockey Club.
Finally, with regard to the last question directed to me concerning a meeting on 11 April 1990 between the Chief Secretary, the then Chairman of RHKJC and myself, as the Chairman of the HKUST Council. Both Sir David Ford, as the Chairman at that meeting, and Sir Gordon Macwhinnie had already responded to the various points queried by Members of the PAC, and I have nothing more to add. CJ
Estimated cost
Air-conditioning for 300 post-graduate hostel units $4.6M A swimming pool for the Vice-Chancellor's Lodge
(built for the adjoining Distinguished Visitors Lodge) *Eight town houses for senior academic staff
* 1116 car parking spaces were provided up to Phase II *Infrastructure to allow provision of quarters for 75%
of eligible staff and 72% of students
$0.7M
$3.9M Not Known $30.2M
Public Accounts
Committee
Public Hearing
on 2 March
1992
HKUST
CAM
P
US
DESIGN
AND CONSTRUCTION COST
SIRS Y CHUNG'S SPEAKING NOTES
I
just want to make a brief statement Last week, Mr Jose Lei used the metaphor of a taxi by saying that the Government was a paying passenger in the back seat of a taxi and the driver was the Jockey Club, who was told to go anywhere by the University.The taxi analogy involves the Jockey Club, the Hong Kong Government and the University of Science and technology. Speaking for the University, I will say that it is totally untrue that the University was dictating to the Jockey Club, which then blindly followed our instructions while the Government, repre-sented by Mr Jose Lei himself, was somehow unable or unwilling to control the course taken by the taxi.
Mr Lei's implication that the University has been lavishly spending public funds to build a Rolls Royce campus, are simply not supported by facts. First, with all the expertise and diligence of the Audit Department, they could only identify what appeared to be the so-called deviations from design standards and norms shown in paragraphs 13.lTand 13.18 of the Director of Audit's Report. Even then, all these so-called deviations, which amounted to 1-2% of the total budget, have been explained and shown necessary and had the full knowledge and agreement of the Government
As Mr Lei's accusation at the last hearing on 24 February is serious, I have asked the Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Administra-tion and Bushiness to review in detail the minutes of all the 54 meetings of the Campus Project Management Committee since it was set up in 1987. He is present here this morning, and I would like to ask him the following
question:-How many requests did you find that were made by the University to the Jockey Club which were outside the original scope of the project, or were in violation of the UPGC norms, and were not approved by either the authorizing party but were nevertheless included in the project?
(The Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Administration and Business has reviewed all the minutes in detail and has not found any University's request carried out without the explicit approval of Government or UPGC.)
It is therefore very clear that no request made by the Univer-sity had been carried out without the explicit approval of the Government or the UPGC. If Mr Lei can point to any instance when the Jockey Club had carried out any request from the University without Government or UPGC approval, I would like . to hear it
As for the charge that public funds were lavishly spent to build a Rolls Royce campus, the most telling evidence to refute this allegation is by comparing its unit cost with another campus of similar nature and built during the same period. First, let us calculate the unit cost for the HKUST campus. The total budget for the construction of the University campus, Phases I and II, as approved by the Finance Committee of the Legislature on 1 June
1990, is $3 ,548 million, inclusive of professional fees, for a total of 279266 square metres GFA, giving a budget unit cost of $12,705 per sqm GFA.
According to the list of adjustment factors published by the Government's Architectural Services Department for tender price comparison atdifferentsite locations, prices for construction contracts in Sai Kung area are to be discounted by 10%. Hence the adjusted budget unit cost for HKUST campus in accordance with the Government's own formula and practice is $11,434 per sqmGFA.
It happens that the Universitycampus,Phasesl and II, and the City Polytechnic campus, Phase II, are being built at the same time and both are expected to be completed by the end of 1992. Strictly speaking, no two campuses are alike. Nonetheless, this comparison does serve an important and useful purpose.
The budget for the construction of the City Polytechnic campus, Phase II, is $542.6 million, also inclusive of professional fees, and the total GFA is 49 ,324 sqm. The unit construction cost works out to be $11,001 per sqm. As the City Poly campus is in the urban area, the discount factor is zero.
Comparing the unit construction costs of the two campuses, the University campus is about 4% higher than the City Poly-technic, Phase II, being constructed at the same time as the University, under Government control.
Much of this difference is accounted for by the fact that the University had to be built on a steep slope, requiring substantial substructural works. In addition, again because of the large 60-hectare site and remote location of the University campus, it was necessary to put in major surf ace and underground installations both for distribution within the campus and for connecting the campus to the outside infrastructure such as water, gas, electricity, and communication and transport links. Moreover, a major sewage tunnel through a mountain to Junk Bay had to be constructed specially for environmental reasons.
While this comparison may not be precise, nonetheless it does give some indication of the order of comparative costs. Certainly, 4% difference in unit cost between the University and the Polytechnic, if anything, is purely marginal and can hardly be called Rolls Royce.
It does not matter how the University and the Jockey Club are being criticized, or how dramatic and eloquent the taxi analogy appeals to the public, it is the bottom line that counts. And the bottom line of unit cost does not support the mis-guided and damaging publicity that has discredited both the University and the Jockey Club.
To conclude, the HKUST campus is neither a runaway taxi, nor a luxurious Rolls Royce, but rather a designed well-made and hi-tech vehicle transporting Hong Kong's young people into the 21st century world of science, technology and
一九九三年二月二十四日公共帳目委員會公開聆訊 科大校園設計與興建問題 鍾士元爵士答稿 香港科技大學的成立，是本港畏連經濟發庸的一個主要里程碑 。作為－所專門從事科技教學和研究的高級學府，科技大學的校園 有必要顯示出先進科扭的特點。建立一所遭樣的性質和規模的大學 ，在香港，以至在世界上，都不是一件經常有的事，是本港近年一 項重要成就。香港科技大學，是本港問埠－百五十年來創立的第三 間大學，且是第一間專注於科技研究的大學。香港科技大學的興建 ，不是只為滿足一年、十年甚或－世紀的需要而興建，它是為滿足 本港市民世世代代子女的教育需要而興建的。因此，本人很高興借 此機會，澄清圍繞校園設計和興建的一些誤解。 設到香港科技大學習學備委員會為什麼起揮校園設計比賽亞軍作 品，而不取冠軍作品的問題，我們首先要指出，決定拇用哪一個校 園設計，純粹是科大總委會的繼貴，和校園設計比賽評審委員會無 干。這一點很多人投有了解。科大草草委會從來沒有把這個構責交給 比賽評審委員會﹔評審委員會只是負責錦還冠軍的參賽作晶，此外 再沒有其他任藹。因此，站還比賽冠軍與選擇校圓的建築師是兩回 事。不宰地，和許多人一樣，日本的被文彥教授把道兩者混淆了。 作為設計比賽主辦人的科大籌委會，完全接納了評審委員會的意 見，公佈比賽結果，并把獎金頒給冠軍得主，這一切都完全符合tb賽 章程，設計tb賽到此也就告終。我們不需要撈取公共帳目委員會所建 遍，為了尋求專業意見而再次召集比賽評審委員會。因為科大讀草委會 本身便有一個技術顧問團，提供八個專業領域的專家意見。 根鐵律政署的專業意見，設計比賽章程措詞很清楚，說明不保 揖冠軍得主會讀聘為校舍建築師。比賽章程第 2.27條明白表示，贏 得冠軍的建樂師知不過騁，比賽主辦人概不負責。因此，這件事在 法律上是毫無箏曲的。與被文彥教授的意見相反，民事檢察專員還 說，很多人都知道，贏得建樂設計比賽，往往不會因此便贏得建築 合同。 至於科大籌委會沒有採用冠軍作晶的原因，體由設計比賽評審 委員會主席致科大籌委會的一的報告說起。（把撰寫此賽報告的責 任委托予設計比賽評審委員會主席負責，是設計比賽評審委員會自 己的決定。）以下是該報告的結束段講： 「各評審委員對三的設計作品 J 、 K 、 L 的評選名 次排列如下： 冠軍 陳乃強博士（主席） J 搞文彥教授 K 韋納博士 L 錯議楠先生 J 李銘根先生 J
持一
L暉
LJJL K 由於上述原因（即五位評審委員之中，只有三位投 設計 J －累） ，本委員會決定，資藝顧問公司與王歐隔 則師樓合作設計之參運作品 J ，宜膺冠軍。惟鑑於此決定並非各委 員之一致意見，開聲明建第師樓與唐諜士公司合作設計之參選作品 L ，理瞳規為E軍。科大型學委會論自行決定，在上述情況之下，未 來大學之藍圖，跑拇用冠軍抑亞軍之總體設計。」 可見，把設計 L 說為亞軍是設計比賽評審委員會主席致科大籌 委會的報告中所作的，而非如棋文彥教授所指控，是科大籌委會自 行決定的。那時，科大籌委會并未覺察到在設計比賽評審委員會內 存在各種不同意見。在此，公共帳目委員會委員也許有興趣知道， 棋文彥教授臨沒有扭冠軍一票，也投有投亞軍一票。根鐵技術顧問 團的意見，他選擇的作品 K ，是最昂貴的設計，無論 tb冠軍或亞軍 ，都高出百分之二十左右。 在道之後的發眉，已成眾所周知的事，并1萬成香港科技大學鑄 備委員會於一九八t 年九月及－九八八年閏月發表的兩個工作報告 的部的內容。簡而言之，科大籌委會在政府建第署暫時調激過來的 總技術顧問協助下，於一九八t年十－月十五日舉行了一次畏時間 會麓，就進入導決賽的六個作品進行討論。一九八t 年十一月二十 日，在收到了設計比賽評審委員會主席的報告之後，科大草草委會又 特別召開了兩次會遍，對評審委員會主席推荐過來的冠、亞軍作品 反覆進行研究。最後，為了慎重起見，草草委會特別舉行不記名投票 ，因為大家都明白，無論投票結果怎樣，都可能引起爭論。全體十 五位出席委員只投了一次景，一致選擇了亞軍設計。 上圖：關善明建築師 樓與唐謀士公司合作 設計之蓋章運作品模型 左圖：資童基顧問公司 與王歐晦則師樓合作 設計之聲選作品揖型這十五位，軍委會委員包括四位在香港大學、中文大學、香港理 工學脫和城市理工學臨任穢的著名學者和有組行政人員，以及一位 深得人望、現正擔任大學及理工教育資助委員會主席的大律師。在 十五位委員中，有四位傑出人士是當年的或現任的立法局撞員。再 者，科大籌委會成員還包括－位擔任土木及結構工程系系主任的姐 名教授，－位土木及結槽顧問工程師，五位在電磁、電子、磁絨及 電腦工程方面十分資潔的教授和專業工程師。顯然，科大，草委會遣 十五位委員，都認為亞軍設計比較適合一所以科技為教研重點的大 學。連個選擇，是登個普草委會集體負責，一致決定的。 公共I慎目委員會有些委員還過據介提出一個問題：因何科大量學 委會在第一天會聲討論冠、 E軍兩個設計時，意見不一，而到了第 二天，意見便趨於一致了？本人只是十五位選擇亞軍設計的投軍人 之一，只能代表自己說話。武器為，兩個設計都不是十全十美的， 因此，討論時自然有不同意見。但是，到了最後投票的時候，扭累 人覺得設計 L 對大學來說，無疑 th 另一個設計較為合用。懷疑當時 投累的草草委會成員是否公正，對他們是不公平的。我強烈要袁公共 1幢目委員會的成員給每－位科大籌委會委員一個省會，去表達他們 當時是以獨立、公正和負責任的態度去投造神聖的一票。因此，我 特別把籌委會十五位在一九八t年十一月－致投票選擇亞軍作品的 委員名單呈交，希望公共帽目委員會予以考慮。 公共帳目委員會又問：庇然亞軍設計比冠軍設計的工程比較昂 貴，興建起來比較困難，需時較久，科大書草委會為什麼還要採用？ 關於這個問題，我們先要明白，所有吾吾賽作品都要附有成本估算： 這些成本估算後來自一個有八個專業領域的專家組成的故術顧問團 查接、修訂，以確保所列數字可囂，所用尺度相同，這樣才能互相 th較。而此技俯顧問團包括估算專家在肉。 公共帳目委員會理瞳早已清楚，恰恰與傳言相反，冠、亞軍作 品原來的成本估計相差不過百分之二至三（一為十三種九千萬元， 一為十四億三千一百萬元） 。經過估算員修訂之後，兩密相差幅度 還是一樣（相當於十五憶一千t百萬及十五億六千萬）。還些成本 估算數字，是校間建築工程估計需要的全部費用，包括建造地基、 地形改造和興建費用等等。由此可見，就建第費用來說，兩個設計 的差別極小。以上所到數字，－直在比賽評審委員會手上﹔報如有 人以組建築費用為詞，批評科大變委會的選擇，那是很奇怪的。 價格比較
Lotus （刀 Simon PSI (K)
百萬元 Kwanι） 百萬兀 百萬元
參賽者估價 1,389.99 1,431.20 2,125.08
98% 100% 148%
估算員估價 1,517.28 1,559.67 1,829.10
98% 100% 118%
*PSI=Plaru白1gServices International
對這個問題的其他部的，即 E軍設計比冠軍設計興建起來比較 難題，而冠軍設計所建蠶的分期施工方案，需要從三方同時進行興 建工作，不獨施工困難，而且對教研工作會造成很大干擾。 本人以不同身的參與香港科拉大學的設計和建築事宜。因此， 公共帳目委員會委員及傳媒均有質疑我開於角色街突的問題。我曾 任行政周首席讀員，到一九八八年八月為止﹔又曾任科大驚備委員 會主席，到－九八八年三月為止﹔從－九八八年四月起，我擔任了 科大校董會主席。 現在，我要回答關1it:＊ 人兼任行政局首席穆貝和科大校董會主 席的「雙重身份」問題。首先，讀我談談在我任內行政局的一些運 作方式。 眾所周知，公萄上有兩種截然不同的街突，一種是個人利益街 突，涉及本身經濟利益﹔男－種是個人角色街突，和本身經濟利益 無關。 鐵我所知，行政局鑽員須遵守一條規則：在行政周會踐自費祖上 ，但如有一項和某磁員個人發生經濟利益街突，有關專項的文件便 不會發給那位敵員，其他鑽員也會撞得通知，以兒他們跟那位有經 濟利益衝突的直接員談論有關事項。開會期間，討論到該專項時，那 位議員~、讀避席，不能參加討論和決策。 必2頁指出，一身兼兩公穢的錯員不－定有角色街突問題，因為 從最廣襲的公共利益著暇，他的兩種角色往往並無矛盾。但是，假 如某讀員的雙重角色可能有矛盾，有關文件的然會發給他，只是在 行政局開始討論的時候，那位讀員通常都會申明自己的身伯。他不 會參與決策，一般也不會參與討論，除非會議主席因微詞他的意見 而需要他吾吾與討論。 根草草行政局的現行做法，關於利益街突的申報共有兩種：不相 輔雌（exclusion叮泊tere耐）和須申報利益（declaratory interests）。 這個分野與上述兩種不間的街突相同。頌申報利益與角色街突相腫 。按現行的行政局守則規定，行政局正聲員若在某些委員會擔任職務 ，如擔任大學及理工學臨校益，嚴格來說，并不屬於績申報利益。 但一般來說，同時擔任這些職位者都會知會行政局。 鐵本人記憶所及，一九八t年六月二日行政周討論香港賽馬會 摘款的時候，本人曾經教請其他講員留意本人兼任科大草草委會主席 的特殊身分，而且沒有吾吾與有關問題的決定。在回瞳公共帽目委員 會的詢問，行政局給害最近己種實當年，即一九八t 年六月二日， 在行政局討論香港科按大學校園興建和撥款問題的會講上，本人確 實拇取了正確的行動，作了上述聲明。 正如公共帽目委員會提出的一個問題所引述，一九八t 年六月 二日，行政局接納了香港賽馬會十五體元捕款，並且委任馬會負責 管理科大校園建築計剖，直到交付使用為止。行政周當時曾考盧過 兩條重要指令，其中－條是，根鐵慣例，科大校圖設計和建築事宜 必讀符合大學及理工教育資助委員會和政府所訂各項準則。要特別 指出的是，這條指令只適用於賽馬會指出的十五億元，以及政府撥 出的費用﹔其他指給科大的款項，只要不是來自政府，自然不受這 條指令約束。 困難，需時較久等等疑問。科大籌委會從土木建築工程專家所得到 至於另一條指令，是工程管理經理（賽馬會）在批出合同和批 的技術性意見，卻恰恰相反。這位專家是香港地下鐵路公司的前任 准修訂合同的時候，所用款項－旦超過賽馬會捐出的十五億元，必 工程計劃飽監，他認為在施工時，亞軍設計會比冠軍設計遇到較少 須得到立法周財務委員會的批准方可進行。
上述公共帽目委員會所提出的問題是：本人身為行政局首席議員 的時候，有沒有盡力使行政局那兩條指令得以確實軟行，及教行是否 得當？按我所知，行政局遣一頓決定和指示血由政府當局負責執行。 行政周非官守搔員的責任，只是協助政府制訂政策，而不是教行這些 政策。就上述兩條指令來說，向行政周報告有闖進展、按需要向立法 局財藹委員會申請增加撥款的工作，瞳該由政府當局軌行，行政局非 官守睡員並未世賦與這個責任。這好th立法周禮員有責任制訂法律和 表決企帝的運用，卻無續執行法律和運用公布－樣。 公共l悔自委員會提出的男一個問題是：身為科大籌委會（以及後 來的校董會）主席，本人是不是早就知道建築費用會超支？假如知道 ，本人身為行政局首席讀員的時候，有tit有向該局反映遣個情說？假 如不知道，為什麼我會對科大建築工程的進履缺乏全盤了解？ 回答道個問題之前，本人種諸公共幟目委員會留意－件事：科 大鑄委會一旦決定了採用那一個校園設計之後，便立即依照行政局 指示，把建第計創交給賽馬會管理，直到校舍落成交付使用為止。 由那時開始， （一）所有吾吾與校園建提計創的建築師、承建商、顧 問等，都由賽馬會直接聘用：（二）科大校園建築、管理建築工程 的全盤責任，都由賽馬會負責。以上安排，早在一九八t年六月十 t 日和一九九零年六月一日，立法局財搗委員會已全知悉。 科大籌委會決定採用的校園設計交給賽馬會之後，財藹科、教 育統，學科、建築署、大學及理工教育資助委員會和科大籌委會代表 曾在一九八八年一月十三日舉行了－次會囂。科大籌委會代表是按 本人指示出席的秘書畏。根撮紀錄，道次會過通過了多項讀案，以 下兩項和公共帽目委員會捏出的問題有關： （一）教育統籌司出任科大建~計創管制人，定期召集科大、建~ 署、大學及理工教育資助委員會和財務科代表出席會鹽，續討建築 工程進度，確保開支不會超過撞准動用的款項。 （二）當建與經資看來接近限額的時候，科大可以尋沒額外私人資 助，可以修改建與計刪節省開支，也可以要求政府增加撥款。 另外，科大.委會秘書畏在－九八八年－月九日在男－個由財 政司親自主持的財藹科會通肉，提出警告，說及向布政司提交的科 大建校費用估算，指出該估算的數字並沒有諮詢科大籌委會意見， 並有嚴重低估的可能。 根鐵科大紀錄，早在一九八八年十月、十一月間，在建第合同 批出之前，科大建與計創管制人（教育統籌司）已經清楚看到賽馬 會最初的估算是偏低了。一九八八年十二月，本人以科大校萱會主 席身的，開始和賽馬會主席討論怎樣補救費用低估，做法是根鐵上 述一九八八年一月十三日在布政司署開會通過的第二條決道。一九 八九年二月－日，賽馬會和科大代表出席了－個由布政司任主席的 會道，討論事項包括低估了建校費用的原因，籌集額外資金的辦法 ，以及將來所需費用增加責任誰屬的一套規則。 本人必須指出，校舍建築工程遣時還未腰間。事實上，到了一 九八九年六月才開始岐到第一期校會主要工程的投標害，（當閱財 路委員會文件 l/1個別）。而建築工程則要到－九八九年八、九月間 才正式腰間。 反映了這個情況。 但是，行政局非官守鐘員並沒有代行政局負責監察的責任，因此 ，本人沒有向行政局本身反映這個情氓。此外，當可能低估建~費用 的跡象在一九八八年十月首次出現時，本人已經退出了行政局。 撇開各司其穢的原則不訣，問題的重點是科大建校事宜基本上 並投有違背行政府那兩條指令。首先，在賽馬會捕贈的十五億元用 輯之前，政府當局已於一九九零年六月一日向立法周財藹委員會申 請增加撥款，並且攪得批准。換言之，從無發生過未經立法局財務 員會批准而攝用公幣的事件。這符合了行政局第二條指令。 事實上，在一九九零年六月一日，財務委員會批准了三十五憶 四千八百萬元的財政預算。當時呈交立法局財路委員會的文件指出 ，早在一九八九年初，政府便獲悉最初的十六億二千萬元基本費用 估算並不足夠。該文件向財委會清楚地解釋了基本費用增加的原因 ，理由是：「當初的估算，以十分初步的設計為基礎，間沒有顧及 一些地基和基本建設因素，也沒有顧及－所高科技大學所需的特殊 建築設施，緊迫的建黨工期，以及校舍第三期建築所需的準備工夫 。至於基本資用要增加多少，讀待一九八九年六月之後，收到了各 項主要工程投攘書，才能夠確定。」故此基本費用低估原因，己清 楚地解釋，實同一般傳聞及誤導相反。 當時財麓委員會並不是投有選擇的餘地。他們有兩個選擇：一 是縮小科大建築規模，削減開支﹔－是維持建築規模，表決增加撥 款。本人謹請公共l贖回委員會各委員注意：直到那時為止，科大的 然沒有取得政府任何額外撥款。而財路委員會在一九九零年六月一 日批准三十五億四千八百萬元的財政預算時，所有委員都接納了政 府的解釋，把初步估算的十六億二千萬元基本費用調高至二十三億 四千萬元，沒有－人投反對票。 一九八八年 一九九零年 增加 五月估算 六月財政預算 百萬元 百萬元 百萬元 基本費用 1,620 2,340 720 T凹的0 （政府建造投標價倍指數） BSI239 （政府機電工程成本價格指數） 過服 310 1,208 898 飽和 1,930 3,548 1,618 財務委員會批准了這個財政預算之後，向公眾解釋科大第一、 二期校舍建築費用的責任，便睡由財務委員會承擔，除非建築費用 超過了三十五億四千八百萬元。而建第費用一日不超過三十五億四 千八百2萬元的預算，我們便 7.lt 有理由說有超支情況。假如今天公共 帳目委員會委員不同意一九九零年財務委員會的決定，臨最要求一 九九零年的財藹委員會解釋。報如有人說，二十個月之前財務委員 會作出決定時，對問題各方面沒有充分了解，那就是侮辱當年的財 務委員會各成員的辦事能力。 至自t行政局的另外一條指令，即科大校園設計和建築讀符合大 現在，再說公共帳目委員會提出的問題：本人身為科大籌委會 學及理工教育資助委員會和政府所訂各項準則，按數署署畏在其報 主席，是不是早就知道建築費用將會大帽增畏？答案是肯定的，本 告會第 13.17 、 13.18兩段裡提及這條指令。第 13.17段是針對建築計 人早經知道估算費用個低。本人出任校董會主席之後，也曾向政府 創中基礎設施和外圍工程涉及的所謂額外建築面積（總共二萬五百
零八平方公尺）。大學及理工教育資助委員會告訴接數署署長說， 這些面積不屬標單面積，讀按個別情況考慮而批准。 一九九一年十二月十九日，賽馬會行政飽載在公開聆訊中答覆道 個問題時，他指出：「報告提及之全部區1萬均包括在校園建築設計比 賽之規值之肉，並且在政府與大學及理工教育資助委員會完全知器及 同意的情況下成為原來之飽體規削的一部的。」遣個解釋十分清楚﹔ 如果我們細開賽馬會行政飽裁道全段聲明，事情便更加清楚了。 機面飽面積（平方米） 多層停車塌 12,048 北面入口拱頂 1,037 東西面交通連接橋 2,523 宿舍區東西面交通連接區 2,371 其他 2,529 此外，各位請注意，一九八九年十二月，即政府當周決定請立法 局財藹委員會批准三十五體四千八百萬元的財政預算之前，布政司給 了賽馬會主席一條指令，要求賽馬會科大建集計創管理經理和建築署 署畏開會，詳細討論一的名為「財政預算建種所讀澄清事項」的文件 。遣的文件包括了所有與建築成本增加有闊的事項，例如面積銬和， 未有建築冀的設備和停車ii等等。這一切後來都列入了那份三十五體 四千八百萬元的財政預算之肉，當然是得到了政府的批准。 接數署署長報告書第 13.18段提到了五項設施，似乎超出了大學 及理工教育資助委員會所訂標準，或政府原先批准的範圍。其中兩 項設施（研究生宿舍空調設備、貴賓宿舍泳池），賽馬會行政飽裁 在一九九一年十二月十九日公開聆訊中已有解釋。因此，本人只會 討論其餘三項設施。 首先要說的一點，是「進行墓禮設施工程，以便為百分之t十 五符合資格的教職員和百分之t十二的學生提供宿舍」。原本的建 築計創，的確只批准為百分之五十教職員和百分之三十的學生提供 宿舍。原來的設想是令百分之五十的教職員住在校園之外，讓他們 和社會融成一片，加強社會和大學的聯繫。 但是，繼於近年物業價格和租金迅遠上升，科大校董會經過漂 思熟虛，決定盡量利用校園內可以興建宿舍的地盤，希望將來可以 節的教職員的房屋津帖，從而簡省公款。攝間基礎設施工程額外動 用了三千零二十萬元﹔但是，但如科大日後要在校園外購置物業供 教職員住宿，在樓價上將會多 1t 足足四億元左右。如果大學繼續在 校園外為教職員租用樓字，以一九九二年價格計算，二十年內租金 飽和亦將接近三億八千萬元。 本校深﹛言，學生的校園生活是大學教育重要的一部告。一所科 技大學的學生，要比－做大學生花更多時間在實臨器和實習課上， 只有在校閏裡寄宿，才能積極吾吾與大學生活。因此，科大校董會經 多次和政府商護，最後得到政府同意，只要科大撞得足夠的私人捐 款興建學生宿舍，而學生撤付的宿費又足以支付經常性費用，大學 便可以興建超過百分之三十限額的學生宿舍。續在現階段興建的額 外基礎設施工程，就是為了將來興建宿舍而須進行的。 現在本人要說設為高級教研人員興建八所平排相連房屋的問題 。按原本批准的計創，的確只是興建大軍式多層寓所，供非最高級 教研人員居住的。後來，我們證覺原來的計創，忽略了一些最高級 教研人員的需要。本校器為，與其在校外祖質或者購買房屋供這些 最高級教研人員居住，不如在校內給他們興建八所平排相連房置， 和八個非最高級教研人員的住宅單位對換。值得一提的是，香港大 學目前已有三十多所同樣的平排相連房窟。 該數署署長又接到本校建~了一千一百一十六個停車位，而不 是原定的t 百個停車位。本人必讀指出：大學盟有多少停車位，取 決於校聞所在地點及其他獨特的因素，大學及理工教育資助委員會 並投有臨定種則。科大建築總體規創原本採用的計算辦法，是每十 個「合全日制學生」，便有一個停車位﹔預料校舍第二期工程落成 之後，會有t 千名學生，所以原本計創建t百個停車位。但是，本 校後來發現了另一個計算辦法，那就是香港大學所掃用的，效果相 當好。根讀這個辦法，所有副講師及同等或以上職級的值員，都可 以申請停車鐘，平均每－又二分之一個停車誼便有一個停車位。繼 於科大位於那區，會有較多人駕駛汽車，我們決定每－又四分之一 個停車證，便有一個停車位，假如日後蠶覺停車位過多，可在興建 第三期校舍的時候調整。 公共l價目委員會可以看到，興建道些所謂超標戀的額外設備， 都是很合理的﹔而造些設施的資用總共是五千萬元左右，佔整個三 十五億四千八百萬元財政預算的百分之一點五。 科大校董會把修改建築計創及加入上述設施的意見，知會了校 園建築管理委員會主席，并由他負責通知賽馬舍的工程管理經理。 於是，工程管理經理便把要修改的事項，列入三十五億四千八百萬 元財政預算建殼的附件之肉。根鐵－九八九年十二月布政司的指示 ，建築署署畏已經和賽馬會的工程管理經理共同審讀過各修故事項 ，而各修改事項最後也列入了科大建~計創之肉，那明晰地盤明， 政府對這－切完全知悉，完全同意。 按數署署長沒有詳細查察政府批准修改建~計創的來龍去脈， 便說那些設施「似乎」 （他自己用的字眼）超出政府原先批准的範 圈，最低限度是誤導了大眾，更不幸的是對科大和賽馬會都做成了 很大的揖害。 公共1悵自委員會向本人揖出的最後一個問題，涉及布政司、當 時的馬會主席和本人在一九九零年四月十－日闊的一次會直接。由於 布政司在那次會議中任主席，有關問題已經由他和前賽馬會主席作 答，本人并無任何楠充。 Q 所提供設施 為 300 個研究生宿舍單位安裝空氣調筋系統 為科大校畏的寓所興建游泳池 （為風僻的貴賓宿舍而興建） ＊為高級教研人員興建八間平排房居 ＊截至第二期工程為止提供 1116 個泊車位 預算費用 460 萬元 70 萬元 390 萬元 不詳 ＊進行基礎設施工程，以便為 75% 符合資格的職員 3,020 萬元 和72%的學生提供宿舍
一九九二年三月二日公共 l慎目委員會公開聆訊
