評估一帶一路倡議對中國 — 東協經濟關係之影響 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. Evaluating the Influence of the Belt and Road Initiative on the Economic Relationship between China and ASEAN. 立. 政治大. 評估一帶一路倡議對中國—東協經濟關係之影響. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. David Yun Chung, Wang (王允中). n. al. er. Advisor: Dr. Chien-wu Alex Hsueh (薛健吾). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. January, 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(2) Abstract. In late 2013, the Chinese government has launched a regional economic cooperation strategy ― the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is featured by its Chinese historical linkage, attempting to shorten the distance with neighboring countries and thus enhance China’s leading position in South East Asia. In this research, the author tries to answer two major questions: First, what is the progress of the promotion of BRI in South East Asia? Second, to what extent is the promotion of BRI. 政治大 This article analyzes debates 立 of positive and negative perspectives and empirical. in Southeast Asia to replace the United States’ economic status in Southeast Asia.. ‧ 國. 學. data on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, and finds that: First, in general, Chinese investment in ASEAN is to promote bilateral economic relations between China and. ‧. Southeast Asia in certain aspects, making significant progress merely in some countries,. sit. y. Nat. such as Vietnam and Philippines. Second, China’s investment so far has not. n. al. er. io. significantly replaced the United States in the ASEAN countries.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, Maritime Silk Road Initiative, ASEAN, Sino-US Relations, South East Asia, US, China. i. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(3) 摘要. 近年來中國政府推行具中國特色的「一帶一路」，並試圖拉近與鄰邦的距離，進而提升中國在區域之領導地位。本文探討「一帶一路」的推動對中國和東協國家之間的經濟關係的影響，主要回答兩個問題：第一，「一帶一路」在東協國家推動之實際情形為何；第二，「一帶一路」在東協國家之推動在何種程度上取代美國在該處的經濟地位。本文分析關於「一帶一路」的各種正、負面觀點和經驗資料，並且發現：第一，整體而言，中國在東協的投資在促進中國與東協國家的. 政治大的投資截至目前為止並未明顯取代美國在東協國家的經濟地位。立. 雙邊經濟關係上，僅在某些國家，如越南及菲律賓取得明顯的進展；第二，中國. ‧ 國. 學. 關鍵字: 一帶一路、海上絲綢之路、東南亞國家協會、中美關係、東南亞、美國、. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 中國. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(4) Table of Contents Abstract ··························································· i List of Acronyms ···················································· iv List of Figures ······················································ v List of Tables ······················································· vi Chapter One: Introduction ············································ 1 1.1. BRI as National Apparatus to Maintain China’s Imploding Economy 1.2. The Potential Role of BRI in South East Asia. 治政大 1.4. Research Method and Thesis Structure 立 Chapter Two: Perspectives of China’s BRI in South East Asia ·············· 15 1.3. Main Debate and Two Questions. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1. Positive Perceptions of BRI in South East Asia 2.2. Criticisms on BRI in South East Asia. ‧. 2.3. How Might BRI Affect US’ Role in South East Asia?. y. Nat. 2.4. Conclusion. n. al. er. io. 35. sit. Chapter Three: The Development of China’s BRI in South East Asia ·········. i n U. 3.1. China’s BRI Investment in ASEAN, 2013~2018. Ch. engchi. v. 3.2. China’s Import and Export Statistics towards ASEAN 3.3. Conclusion Chapter Four: US Economic Presence in South East Asia after the BRI ······ 57 4.1. US Foreign Relations and Military Strategy from 2001 to 2018 4.2. US Import and Export Statistics in South East Asia 4.3. US Foreign Direct Investment Statistics in South East Asia 4.4. Conclusion Chapter Five: Conclusion ············································ 71 References. iii. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(5) List of Acronyms. 1MDB. 1Malaysia Development Berhad. AIIB. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. ASEAN. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. B/L. Bill of Lading. BRI. The Belt and Road Initiative. CCP. Chinese Communist Party. China EXIM. Export–Import Bank of China. South East Asia. y. sit. The Trans-Pacific Partnership. io. TPP. The Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Nat. SEA. ‧. BRI. Multinational Corporation. al. er. MNC. Gross Domestic Product. 學. GDP. ‧ 國. FDI. 政治大 Foreign立 direct investment. v. The Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline. NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. UNCLOS. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. USA. The United States of America. n. TSGP. Ch. engchi. i n U. iv. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(6) List of Figures. Figure 1. Photo of China’s BRI Rail Project in Indo-China Figure 2. Map of The China-Malaysia Port Alliance Figure 3. China’s Investments in ASEAN along Belt and Road Initiative Figure 4. Trade Value of the Import and Export between China and ASEAN (by USD) Figure 5. China’s Outward Oversea Direct Investment towards ASEAN, 2007~2017 Figure 6. China Export Census Record of Bill of Lading towards ASEAN, 2007~2017. 政治大 Figure 8. The GDP of China 立and USA. Figure 7. Total Export-Import Surplus between China and ASEAN. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 9. USA Military Expenditure 2000 ~ 2018. Figure 10. Trade Value of the Import and Export between US and ASEAN. ‧. Figure 11. USA FDI Net Inflow to ASEAN. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Figure 12. Total Trade Deficit between USA and ASEAN. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(7) List of Tables. Table 1. China’s BRI Investment under BRI in ASEAN Table 2. Sectors of China’s BRI Investment under BRI in ASEAN Table 3. China’s Construction Contracts under BRI in ASEAN (by USD million) Table 4. Sectors of China’s Construction Contracts under BRI in ASEAN (by USD Table 5. China’s Investments in ASEAN along Belt and Road Initiative Table 6. Troubled Transactions under BRI in ASEAN. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. vi. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(8) Chapter One Introduction. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21stcentury Maritime Silk Road is a state-directed policy proposed by the Chinese Communist Party to position China’s global presence via building infrastructure and granting investment in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The World Bank refers to The Belt and. 政治大 connectivity on a trans-continental scale with the initiative aims to strengthen 立 Road Initiative (BRI) as “an ambitious effort which improves regional cooperation and. infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China and some 65 other countries. ‧ 國. 學. that account collectively for over 30 percent of global GDP, 62 percent of population,. ‧. and 75 percent of known energy reserves (World Bank, 2018).” While the “Belt”. y. Nat. signifies a cross-continental route for inland transportation, which could trace back into. er. io. sit. Chinese history, known as “the Silk Road Economic Belt,” the “road” extends to the sea, indicating the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road Initiative. al. n. v i n C hthat, in a grand picture, (MSRI) was a global trade network connects China to Southeast engchi U Asia, Indonesian, passing Strait of Malacca, Indian, Arabian Peninsula, East Africa and crossing the Red Sea to Egypt and eventually Europe. In the past, merchants traveled over 15,000-kilometer trade route, which encompassed numbers of seas and ocean, including South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The maritime route overlaps with historic Southeast Asian maritime trade, Spice trade, Indian Ocean trade and then after 8th century it became the Arabian naval trade network. Historically speaking, The Maritime Silk Road was also known as the Spice Roads due to the commodity demanded by clients, supplying markets across the Asia to Europe 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(9) with cinnamon, pepper, ginger, cloves and nutmeg from the Moluccas Islands in Indonesia (known as the Spice Islands), as well as a wide range of other goods. Textiles, woodwork, precious stones, metalwork, incense, timber, and saffron. In this day and age, The Maritime Silk Road Initiative in the 21st century is believed not only to catalyze China’s international trade with countries along the route, but will also bring business opportunities and challenges to China’s maritime development and international trade (UNESCO, n.d.). In terms of an economic perspective, planned economy has always been the main. 政治大 former chairman of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Deng Xiaoping. In this day and 立. orientation no matter before or after the Chinese reform and opening policy initiated by. age, The Maritime Silk Road Initiative in the 21st century is believed not only to. ‧ 國. 學. catalyze China’s international trade with countries along the route, but will also bring. ‧. business opportunities and challenges to China’s maritime development and. y. Nat. international trade. Now that China has gained substantial amount of interest from its. er. io. sit. economic reform, the essential issue would be how to invest that money no matter to merely gain more economic interest or even an implication in exchange for regional. n. al. influence.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In regard to infrastructure, one of BRI’s aims claimed by CCP is to promote Chinese companies to “go global” in order to expand emerging markets and strengthen economic and trade links with neighboring countries, thereby propelling the continuous growth of the Chinese economy. In Southeast Asia, China plans to link some of the existing railways to further expand the network. As we could see in Figure 1, with Kunming (昆明) as the center, the project is divided into three lines via Vietnam, via Myanmar and via Laos, eventually converging in Bangkok and then extend into Malaysia and Singapore (Chang, 2016). Besides, the China-Thailand railway uses Chinese standards and Chinese equipment, which costs are relatively low among the 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(10) major countries with high-speed rail technology. China also boosts its sufficient foreign exchange reserves investing funds that it can provide long-term follow-up and maintenance services (Bo, 2015). From this, we could infer that China is building its network southward infrastructural basis for investment. As South East Asia plays an important role as a hub in such new connectivity game, cooperating with its neighbors across China’s border significantly influences China’s BRI project. For instance, according to Malik, “Myanmar is a very crucial part of a trade route stretching across Asia to Africa, as well as a vital link in its oil supply chain.. 政治大 is based on an assessment of China’s strategic needs as a global trading maritime power 立 China’s interest in staking out a presence in Myanmar, and thereby the Indian Ocean,. that is increasingly dependent upon overseas resources and markets. Beijing also sees. ‧ 國. 學. itself as being engaged in a long protracted competition with other major powers and. ‧. wants Myanmar (along with Cambodia and Pakistan) to remain within its orbit (Malik,. y. Nat. 2018).” As China’s intention of building a massive infrastructural basis in Asia is more. er. io. sit. than salient, which could be demonstrated in myriads of projects and contracts signed with cooperating states, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether it is out of the. al. n. v i n C hChina’s High Speed consent of consignee states. Taking Rail as an example project as engchi U. an example, Pavlićević and Kratz argues that “China, as well as to impact the regional geostrategic equilibrium is fairly low. Some of these projects might eventually prove to be unprofitable, but their value should be evaluated in a broader context of how they contribute to the development of local economies (Pavlićević & Kratz, 2018, p.164).” Consequently, resources are being poured into the SEA region as a driving force for the locomotive of economic development, and it is based on such catalysis that SEA would present the potentiality to move closer towards a more developed economic entity.. 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(11) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 y. Nat. er. io. sit. Source: Chang, J. (2016). Adding Variables to The Trans-Asian Railway? China’s Link to Southeast Asia’s Railway Plan is Blocked in Laos. ASEAN PLUS. Retrieved. al. n. v i n from https://aseanplusjournal.com/2016/06/06/泛亞鐵路添變數？中國連結東南亞 Ch engchi U 鐵路計畫在寮國/. Note: Kunming (昆明) as the center, the project connects multiple existing rails (in yellow) via Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos, eventually converging in Bangkok and then extend into Malaysia and then Singapore. Figure 1. Photo of China’s BRI Rail Project in Indo-China. 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(12) At sea, a Port Alliance between China and Malaysia was formed, which covers six ports in Malaysia and ten ports in China. Approximately 70% to 80% of the vessels sailing through the Straits of Malacca are destined for China (UFSOO.COM, 2016) as indicated in Figure 2. The members of The China-Malaysia Port Alliance include ten Chinese ports such as Dalian Port (大連港), Taicang Port (太倉港), Shanghai Port (上海港), Ningbo Port (寧波港), Zhoushan Port (中山港), Fuzhou Port (福州港), Xiamen Port (廈門港), Guangzhou Port (廣州港), Shenzhen Port (深圳港), Beibu Gulf Port (廣西北部灣國際港) and Haikou Port (海口港); as well as six Malaysian ports,. 政治大 Port (China Port Association, 2016). Aligning ports means increasing trade routes 立 including Port Klang, Bintulu Port, Johor Port, Kuantan Port, Malacca Port and Penang. among countries in which these ports are located. Not only will it benefit China but. ‧ 國. 學. ideally the whole alliance. In recent years, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative,. ‧. Southeast Asia is also carrying out a competition for port infrastructural upgrade, which. y. Nat. reflects the deepening of the division of labor and trade pattern in South East Asia and. n. al. er. io. sit. the launching of massive infrastructure while providing investment opportunities.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(13) 廣西北部灣國際港. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Source: China Port Association. (2016, November 3). Introduction to China-Malaysia. i n U. Port Alliance. China Port Association. Retrieved from. Ch. engchi. http://www.port.org.cn/info/2016/194838.htm. v. Figure 2. Map of The China-Malaysia Port Alliance. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(14) 1.1. BRI as National Apparatus to Maintain China’s Imploding Economy The Belt and Road Initiative is meant to maintain the continuation of China’s economic development via cooperation with SEA countries. Ever since China embarked upon the path of economic reform back in the days when Deng Xiaoping was in power, China has taken a new path to tackle foreign affairs and started bonding with neighboring countries seeking new investment opportunities for herself. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) concept could be considered a broader version compared to the economic reform in the 80s and a deeper relation is to be found towards the countries. 政治大 Some countries might consider China’s implementation of the “Belt and Road” is 立. with which China engages.. to expand its influence and attempt to challenge international financial and economic. ‧ 國. 學. order. It is also doubtful to many in terms of checks and balances of power in the scope. ‧. of BRI, and this strengthens the China Threat theory, hampering China’s diplomacy on. y. Nat. a regional scale. As a source of funding, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. er. io. sit. (AIIB) advocated by China had strong opposition among US allies such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, and other countries. It is publicly questioned that the level of. al. n. v i n C hfall heavily to China AIIB’s regional governance might and gives China the right to engchi U interfere with the domestic affairs of the countries joined.. US military involvement in the South China Sea dispute between China and some Southeast Asian countries illuminates their concerns over a rising China as a regional hegemon. It has brought a potential hindrance to the advancement of the new sea silk road, which has caused certain obstacles to China’s promotion of the Belt and Road. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea region. BRI route enters the South China Sea. Upon drafting and implementing cooperation programs, there is of high chance to trigger new rounds of sovereignty disputes affecting China’s diplomatic relations with these countries. The 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(15) local people would, therefore, have less confidence in the Chinese government because of the South China Sea issue. Anti-China demonstrations will also affect Chinese companies’ investment in the local area, as well as Chinese tourists visiting the area, which is not conducive to bilateral cooperation. Disputes and contradictions occur, but China has been finding its own way to bypass traditional concepts when hooking ties with countries that are contentious. Although China and the Philippines have territorial disputes and conflicts in the South China Sea region, since the end of 2016, the current President of the Philippines, Duterte has repeatedly expressed his willingness to. 政治大 that the two countries should “talk more about economic and trade cooperation, talk 立. cooperate closely with China in economic cooperation (Calonzo, 2019). He believes. less about differences, and signed several bilateral cooperation documents with China. ‧ 國. 學. during his visit to China.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry also publicly stated that China. ‧. is willing to actively cooperate with the Philippines in the areas of the economy, trade,. y. Nat. production capacity and infrastructure to support the social construction of the. er. io. sit. Philippines. This shows that China and the controversial countries can also work closely together to help reduce some countries’ doubts about China’s development.. al. n. v i n C h comparative advantage In traditional international trade, model focuses on relative engchi U. factor endowments and international specialization. The neoclassical model shows that. all countries gain from trade and the output of international market increases as long as trade is structured upon a well-functioning system in which all countries hold their comparative advantages and there are no barriers in between. However, if there is no governmental interference in trade, it is doubtful that the private sector would establish a mechanism by which industries fulfill self-help and flourish in the long-run. To make a contrast with the past, while imperialist countries back in the 19th century structured themselves upon exploitation and unfair international trade, even to this day and age, given to the Race to the Bottom conception adopted by many western 8. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(16) countries, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are still exploiting less developed countries in SEA for their cheap labor to maximize their revenue. In other words, while importing those low-priced laborers and not treating them equally is slavery, stationing them overseas simply justifies. China’s rising global presence skipped what was considered the necessary evil by western countries, such as Britain, France and other colonizers, and achieved economic success ever since the 1978 economic reform at an efficient speed. In a way, the Chinese have changed the characteristics of being a global power and a different manner to re-brand the nation. Maintaining reasonable tariffs to. 政治大 labor and resources, governments in developing countries sometimes build trade 立. protect infant industries in order to prevent foreign firms to exploit domestic low-cost. strategies including export promotion versus import substitution. Whether China’s. ‧ 國. 學. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which comes along with BRI will play a pivotal role. ‧. in the process is indeed crucial in observing the effectiveness of China’s modern. 1.2. The Potential Role of BRI in South East Asia. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. regional presence in SEA economically.. n. v i n C hby the successful economic The materialistic fruit brought reform indeed enhanced engchi U. China’s global GDP ranking and altered the way China is viewed by the world. Now, with the Belt and Road Initiative, the concept of regional connectivity highlights that. China is eager to build individual linkage respectively with the countries along with the project. Liu (2015) suggests that the Belt and Road Initiative serves as financing platforms and logistical hubs, which creates a new model of non-western mechanisms for cooperation. He also points out China’s determination to shift its geopolitical strategy over the control over developing and underdeveloped countries that used to fall under the category under the strong western colonial influence. Especially the targets of maritime deployment that scattered along the Maritime Silk Road are the countries 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(17) of developing and underdeveloped countries which have growing cargo import from China (Liu, 2015). The most salient impact brought by Maritime Silk Road Initiative will be the “spillover effect” in international trade. The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) would subsequently cause an increasing demand for international logistics, leading to a lucrative reliance in the shipping industry (Jiang, Li, & Gong, 2018). As western countries have accomplished in the 19th and 20th centuries, this offers opportunities for China to transform from a land-based nation to further project the country into a maritime regional hegemony.. 政治大 interpretations of globalization and to be more specific, cross-regional integration. 立 The deployment of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative is positioned upon multiple. While globalization triggers increasing openness of markets to international trade,. ‧ 國. 學. financial flows, and outward foreign direct investment, concerns such as inequality. ‧. occur systematically. Many developing countries rely heavily on exports of primary. y. Nat. products, namely agricultural raw materials, minerals, ore and metal at high risks and. er. io. sit. market uncertainty. Those countries, therefore, depend greatly on imports, especially on machinery, foreign capital, intermediate producer goods, and consumer products.. al. n. v i n Most of the countries scattered C along BRI are mostly U h e n g c h i developing and underdeveloped countries suffering from chronic deficits on current and capital accounts, many due to. their colonial past, which exhausts their reserves, causing currency instability, and economic slowdown. China, on the other hand, offers a potential alternative for them to de-link themselves from western powers and engage in long-term infrastructural development and economic reforms that they are open for collaboration. Compared with countries in Europe, before the falling of the Berlin wall and the cold war with the Soviet Union ended, the rest of the world aside from the West, namely now we refer to them as developing countries and underdeveloped countries, were still struggling economically. International aid structured upon the United Nations 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(18) framework offered other less-developed countries aid such as economic institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Even to this day and age, we could still figure that The Washington Consensus was basically set on a free market trade system in which a large proportion of dependency theory applies. As US foreign policy remains dominant in the international realm, the chain of hierarchy in the supply and demand of free-market trade is extremely hard to break. The consensus suggests that the privatization of state enterprises is necessary and typically, in developing countries, these industries include railway, oil, and gas. Based on free-market trade, the. 政治大 for developing and underdeveloped countries. Agarwal in his article points out that free 立 obliteration of trade barriers and unnecessary tariffs are all in the guideline of reforms. trade is not always in the best interest of developing economies. While underdeveloped. ‧ 國. 學. countries and developing countries open their market for FDI and engage in economic. ‧. deregulation, the potential risk would endanger the infant industries in their own. y. Nat. countries. What they need is proper protection and subsidies instead of solely relying. er. io. sit. on foreign investment (Agarwal, 2018). In the worst-case scenario, infant industries might not have the chance to engage in industrial transformation.. al. n. v i n C h“America First policy” As President Donald Trump’s directing the nation into an engchi U. isolationism-oriented way, the vacuum offers new opportunities in the previously. western-influenced regions. For countries as potential clients for China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Browne (2015) states that “The Silk Road Economic Belt represents the most significant economic proposal any country has put forward to help stabilize chaotic parts of the world. Moreover, it’s backed by hard cash: China is putting its $3.5 trillion of foreign exchange reserves behind the effort to kick-start growth and create jobs in Muslim areas (Browne, 2015, p.1-4).” In other words, China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative is a highly political strategy wrapped with the clothing of economic aid, which leads people to think of the gigantic Road and Belt Initiative more politically 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(19) manipulative than The Marshall Plan. Putting a potential impact on the existing, USestablished framework in SEA, Chen concludes that “the rebuilding of the transregional institutions definitely touches the concerned principles, norms, rules and decision-making arrangements that reflect the core elements of the status quo hegemony. China’s push for the OBOR initiative has triggered soft leadership competition in terms of the international institutional arrangements. The OBOR initiative has impacts that entangle the global institutional leadership (Chen, 2017, p.21).” That is to say, with the launching of BRI, it is both predicted and expected for. 政治大 all means for the involved to resolve such bilateral balance of power peacefully. 立. parties in SEA to face the collapse of two systems, and whether like it or not, it is by. As this notion of strong countries helping the poor out of humanitarian perception. ‧ 國. 學. narrates a good story, this somehow excuses the reality of predators preying on the weak.. ‧. The reason why SEA falls into the model for BRI’s effectiveness is that the less. y. Nat. developed context suits perfectly for China’s Robin Hood narrative. Overall, Southeast. er. io. sit. Asia is a potential market for the Belt and Road in that the region seeks more opportunities for business and lack infrastructure. Due to the fact of the poor political. al. n. v i n transparency, idling debts, in theClong run, may triggerU h e n g c h i the risk of China turning it into a bargaining chip. The investment flow of funds in SEA poured in by China is still opaque and China is still refusing to comply with international rules in its process of promoting BRI.. 1.3. Main Debate and Two Questions After acknowledging the importance of BRI, functioning as a way out to soothe China’s imploding economic development, we could further infer that the launching of BRI serves as key criteria to evaluate China’s regional influence in South East Asian. In terms of China’s launching BRI in South East Asia, I will first deal with the positive 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(20) perceptions as well as criticisms on BRI in ASEAN, and then further discuss the influence of BRI on US Role in South East Asia. Subsequently, this research attempts to respond to two critical questions regarding the development of China’s BRI in SEA. First, while there are positive and negative perspectives regarding China’s BRI, which perception is more suitable for explaining the progressiveness of BRI. Secondly, to further discuss the effectiveness of the development of BRI in ASEAN, this research will discuss whether the development of MRSI would affect the economic relations between the USA and ASEAN, and to what extent will China takes the US’ share in South East Asia?. 立. 政治大. 1.4. Research Method and Thesis Structure. ‧ 國. 學. To answer these two questions, this research includes five chapters to give an. ‧. overall picture of China’s massive BRI project in the sense that delineates China’s. y. Nat. ambition and result of economic influence in SEA. Chapter 1 introduces the blueprint. er. io. sit. of China’s BRI under the BRI framework and gives a brief picture of this grand project. Chapter 2 analyzes the different perspectives of BRI, a cultural linkage of China and. al. n. v i n C leverage SEA region and Sino-American region in both the positive and h e n gincSEA hi U negative perspectives. Then, in Chapter 3, an assessment of bilateral relations regarding trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries is performed to observe the development after China interacted economically through BRI with ASEAN countries. Based on this observation, I will answer the first question: while there are positive and negative perspectives regarding China’s BRI, which perception is more suitable for explaining the progressiveness of BRI In Chapter 4, this research will depict how the trend of such relations could affect Sino-American influence in SEA. Based on this observation, I will answer the second question: whether the development of MRSI would affect the economic relations between USA and ASEAN, and to what extent will 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(21) China takes the US’ share in South East Asia? Finally, in Chapter 5, I will discuss the role of US in South East Asia after the Belt and Road Initiative.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(22) Chapter Two Perspectives of China’s BRI in South East Asia. In this chapter, I will discuss the positive and negative opinions regarding whether China can successfully promote its Maritime Silk Road Initiative in SEA. In the first, research holding a positive standpoint on the launching of BRI believes that launching such project will serve their national interest and therefore support this massive project. On the other hand, in section two, those holding a pessimistic viewpoint regard BRI as. 政治大. a risky and dangerous act that harms the development of a country in the process of. 立. accepting aid from BRI. Subsequently, in sections 3 and 4, I will discuss whether a. ‧ 國. 學. relationship of competition exists between China and USA in SEA, and answers the above two questions to demonstrate the possibility and potential of BRI in SEA.. ‧ y. Nat. sit. 2.1. Positive Perceptions of BRI in South East Asia. n. al. er. io. China’s BRI investment towards South East Asia could be briefly categorized by. i n U. v. its nature, history and economy. First, we could briefly assume that there’s no such. Ch. engchi. thing as Chinese colonialism compared to western civilization. Second, Chine has few records to have actively posed a military threat to nearby sates. Thirdly, that is to say, China's rise as a giant economic entity, instead, proffers numerous trading opportunities in South East Asia. First of all, China and South East Asian countries are of geographic vicinity, which makes socialization of the two lucrative in order to achieve regional prosperity. Dittmer and Bing indicate that tactically, the key issues including the national identity discourse of China as a Great Power, and China’s civil-military interactions in the South China Sea dispute illuminates China’s eagerness to initiate trajectories of economic ties 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(23) between China and Southeast Asian countries saliently via a political implication of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative (Dittmer & Ngeow, 2017). As mentioned previously, China’s foreign relationship with South East Asia was stagnated due to occupation by western powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Given the international society of this day and age, China, from an isolated, contained 1 international actor to now a state to actively participate in myriads of international affairs, no matter economically, politically or culturally. Nonetheless, some forces remained in one form or another, by FDI and multinational conglomerates. According. 政治大 to 2016 suggests that FDI from China does not relate stronger support from SEA 立 to Gong’s research, the total FDI inflows to each SEA country from China from 2010. countries and many Chinese FDIs into SEA countries are routed through Singapore. ‧ 國. 學. (Gong, 2018).. ‧. Judging from a historical context, China was regarded as a less belligerent empire. y. Nat. and there was no such thing as Chinese Colonialism. The diaspora of Chinese people. er. io. sit. and the forming of sub-ethnic abroad ought not to be rendered as the colonialism interpreted in the west, though some of the consequences overlap and. al. n. v i n C hAside from western misunderstandings occur over time. powers, Imperial Japan was engchi U. the only non-western country to practice colonialism. Following the success of Meiji reformations in favor of a bigger scale in market trade, the spreading of Japanese settlers functioned as the very nutrition to sustain empires’ lifespan. The Japanese mirrored the western approach by invading the neighboring countries. However, rather than commerce, the Japanese attempted to convert the people in their colonies by. 1. Here, containment refers to the containment policy practiced by President Harry S. Truman after World. War II in the face of the threat from the communist regimes. China containment policy was a foreign policy conducted by U.S. in order to curtail the development of the People’s Republic of China during Cold War. 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(24) conforming to the locals. For instance, in Taiwan, they implemented “Japanization” to transform the local residents into pure Japanese who use Japanese surnames and were ready to be enlisted to the imperial army (Collins Dictionary of Sociology, 2000). Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” claiming to turn Asia into the extension of the glorification of Imperial Japan, was no less than an excuse to exploit resources to support their tight budget due to deteriorating situation in the Pacific War against the United States (Central Intelligence Agency, 1945). As history has proven, the Japanese then never knew their conquest in China, eventually superior to them in. 政治大 colonization could even be rendered as a reckless move and a futile imitation of the 立. population, territories and cultural “dragged” them to a bitter end. The Japanese. west. Patriotism was at the peak then, and it was used as a driving force to enlarge the. ‧ 國. 學. empire and glorify the existence of Imperial Japan per se. However, on the contrary, the. ‧. driving force for the emigration of Chinese and Chinese merchants has less to do with. y. sit. io. er. Imperialism.. Nat. patriotism, which gives China an innocent historical past compared with Western. Secondly, regarding China’s peaceful rise in the 21st century, Chang discusses. al. n. v i n C h to issues pertaining China’s naval projection that extends to maritime zone delimitation engchi U and divarication of explanation regarding United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The author claims that the Maritime Silk Road Initiative indicates China’s intention to create a “peaceful and harmonious environment,” to cooperate with neighboring states (Chang, 2018). The statement is quite similar to “China’s peaceful rise” or further referred to as “China’s peaceful development” which was proposed by former president Hu Jintao in refuting the “China Threat Theory.” According to Broomfield, The China Threat Theory interpreted as the emergence of an economic and aspiring military superpower, poses a potential threat to the national interests of the United States and Asian-Pacific security. This ideology has set China in a trajectory of 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(25) an intentionally designated enemy, mostly framed by western countries (Broomfield, 2003). In Yung’s article he states that according to the constructivist view, the relationship between China and the countries along the line is confronted with three aspects: the launching phase, the development phase, and the recession phase. The proposal and implementation of the “Belt and Road” development initiative provided a good environment for China to create a beneficial environment for all countries involved. What China should consider when confronting these countries involved in BRI is that it should establish ties with them respectively according to their features,. 政治大 is little intent for China a deliberately build a parallel international economic system to 立. which reflects China’s appeal for a peaceful regional governance (Yang, 2015). There. challenge that of the US. “China has been a key beneficiary of globalization in the past. ‧ 國. 學. several decades and has a great stake in continuing that open and integrated. ‧. international system. But, as widely recognized, the existing system needs to be. y. Nat. reformed to reflect the new economic weights and policy briefs of the emerging market. er. io. sit. economies. Advanced and emerging economies should work together to build a better system. And China and other major emerging market economies should have greater. al. n. v i n C h In this sense, theUintentional exclusion of China voices in the decision-making process. engchi from the TPP negotiation was an unfortunate development (Huang, 2016).”. Thirdly, in terms of trade, BRI eliminates investment and trade barriers and reduces customs clearance costs, which improves customs clearance capacity as well as promotes trade balance on the basis of expanding mutual investment between China and SEA that emerging industries could gain profits. For China, its domestic enterprises are encouraged to participate in infrastructure construction and industrial investment along the route. As of financial resources, by expanding the scope and scale of bilateral currency fluidity, it also serves as a promotional catalyst for the establishment of Asian. 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(26) Infrastructure Investment Banks and BRICS2 Development Banks. By accelerating the formation and operation of Silk Road Funds and supporting government, enterprises and financial institutions along the BRI, Chinese financial institutions and enterprises can issue RMB bonds and foreign currency bonds abroad. In other words, the Chinese government could encourage the use of funds raised in countries along the route and strengthen the fluidity of RMB (Zhuang, 2017). As Qiu discusses in her article, “Six major industries will benefit from the construction of the Belt and Road. The first industry is the oil and gas industry chain.. 政治大 outward. Fourth, the transportation and logistics industry, such as the development of 立 Second, tourism. Third, grid equipment companies can take the opportunity to expand. railways, ports, and shipping. Fifth, the infrastructure industry and equipment industry,. ‧ 國. 學. namely steel, cement, construction machinery, power equipment, communications. ‧. equipment, etc. Finally, the financial sector will definitely benefit by utilizing the Silk. y. Nat. Road Fund, which is an open-ended fund, and investors from Asia are welcome to. er. io. sit. participate actively. As of the Maritime Silk Road Bank, members along the route could participate using private capital (Qiu, 2015). ” In other words, the main focus of BRI. al. n. v i n C hto build long termUcooperation with the recipient lies in a heavy utilization of funds engchi. countries, encouraging businesses from the private sector to channel their target to the south. The Belt and Road Initiative has other benefits for China, such as exporting China’s excessive economic capacity. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s current utilization rate of industrial capacity is below 65% and it continues to decline. It is believed that by expanding the export from the Belt and Road, the thorny problem of over-capacity could be solved (Qiu, 2015). On the ladder of world. BRICS signifies five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 2. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(27) economic development, it can be divided into three layers. The first level is the economically advanced countries with higher incomes; the second level is the average middle-income country; the third level is the low-income countries whose economy is still developing and are in need to be developed. Over the past 20 years, the five BRICS countries that have emerged from economic development belong to the third layer. Among the BRICS countries, China’s economy has shown outstanding enhancement. After much improvement in infrastructure, China is seeking economic transformation into high-end production operations and is preparing to enter middle-income countries.. 政治大 help from China, many countries were able to withstand the impact and their economic 立. The Asian financial turmoil in 1998 severely hit many countries in Southeast Asia. With. situation has stabilized. Besides, most of their goals in economic policies in recent years. ‧ 國. 學. are in infrastructure construction, land resource development, construction of labor-. ‧. intensive industries and development of efficient fisheries and agricultural food. y. Nat. industries. The path they want to embark on is precisely the one that China. er. io. sit. accomplished earlier. China’s mature technology and high-yield industrial equipment are arranged or sold at a friendly price to ASEAN, which has created a win-win situation.. al. n. v i n Therefore, the complementarity C between China and ASEAN h e n g c h i U in the process of economic. transformation is quite obvious, and such a relationship of mutual benefit appears to be reasonable (Chen, 2018). In an interview by Xinhuanet, Japan’s former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has said that China’s rapid development today is enviable. In the past 20 years, Japan’s GDP stagnated due to the collapse of the bubble economy, while China has developed rapidly in a short period of time. China’s GDP has recently reached approximately three times that of Japan. In the future, both Japan and China confront the age of an aging society and a shortage of labor. The Prime Minister hopes that the two countries can strengthen cooperation in related fields. He also believes that the free flow of people, goods, money, and information across borders is an irresistible 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(28) trend. At present, the uncertainty of the world economy has augmented by rampant trade protectionism. China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative has provided new solutions to these problems (Hu, Zhang, &Shen, 2019). Cheng points out that “the Belt and Road regions do offer great potential for economic cooperation, as they offer benefits to be derived from complementary economic structures as well as specialization and division of labor.” In other words, BRI not only creates a platform for business opportunities but a linkage and integration of industries horizontally. Chen also mentions that public goods offered by China along. 政治大 make economic development of the country with which China cooperates more 立 the development of BRI could be a critical factor of creating a policy framework to. sustainable (Cheng, 2016). Compared with its western predecessors, China, with its. ‧ 國. 學. enormous economic strength it has the capability to lay a foundation for future regional. ‧. development, especially during the juncture of present US conservatism under. sit. y. Nat. President Trump. “While the US wants China to play a larger role as a responsible. io. er. stakeholder, China appears to have become not only a more influential stakeholder but also a potential rule-maker (Pu, 2016).”. al. n. v i n C hfacets regarding China’s Overall, there are three positive BRI investment towards engchi U. South East Asia. First, China has never been a pro-actor to invade any countries and there hasn’t been any assertion of Chinese colonialism. Second, unlike Japan in the early half of the 20th century, Chine has no direct military threat and promote regional peace. Last, China provides cash-poor countries in SEA with funds and experience for economic development.. 2.2. Criticisms on Maritime Silk Road Initiative in South East Asia Criticisms revolving China’s BRI towards SEA contain briefly three aspects. First, China’s BRI project in South East Asia is not unpredictable as CCP still maintains in 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(29) power, serving as a major force behind to propel its practice. Second, There is no doubt that China is planning something other than economic development, which is highly implicated in its efforts to step into infrastructural projects. Thirdly, although the infrastructure is extremely crucial to most countries in SEA, as far as countries in SEA are concerned, receiving financial aid from China unilaterally could be a precarious act. In this section, I’ll further review the negative impact this project brings to SEA region. The BRI is a highly political and infiltrative plan imposing challenges to the existing powers, usually foreign powers, in SEA region with China’s growing ambition to form. 政治大 the issue of transparency. Wrage (2017) specifies, “while we have seen China 立 a Sino-centric regional order. Chinese funding means Chinese rules but suspected on. crackdown on corruption under Xi, efforts have been focused within China, reaching. ‧ 國. 學. across borders only to nab Chinese citizens who have fled with their corrupt bounty.. ‧. The Chinese enforcement agencies have never brought an action against a Chinese. y. Nat. entity for bribery abroad in spite of rampant anecdotal evidence that many Chinese. er. io. sit. companies use bribery as a business strategy across Asia and Africa. That track record shows no signs of changing (Wrage, 2017).” There is no denying that sometimes the. al. n. v i n C h with a price, and effectiveness and efficiency comes oftentimes the prosperity is engchi U. sugarcoated with the deficiency of institutionalized mechanism of supervision and law. In terms of diplomatic strategy, it is an indispensable part of Chinese foreign policy in the promotion of maritime relations with its most adjacent countries in South East Asia (Wang, 2016). According to Klemensits, there are two main reasons why South East Asia becomes a key potential partner in China. First is that China is seeking a passage out into Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean, making Strait of Malacca and South China Sea extremely crucial for the expansion of naval forces. Second is that China has detected the possible energy sources that are capable of sustaining its military and economic 22. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(30) presence in this region (Klemensits, 2018, p.12-13). Thinking and behaving as a newrising sea power, the geopolitical position surrounded by ASEAN countries triggers China to conduct necessary measures to closely tie-up with countries within the strategical vicinity in SEA. The economy could be the first phase to enlarge future blueprints to promote Chinese naval expansion, literally military scheme and a potential increasing presence for PLA covered with an ambitious economic plot. For western powers that wielded their colonial influence across SEA, China’s militarily strategic threat is certainly not to be ignored.. 政治大 attempting to re-shape the very definition of it. An Asia that is manipulated via a 立. While global capitalism was invented in the west, the Belt and Road Initiative is. Sinocentric order is likely to be portrayed by megalopolises funded and politically. ‧ 國. 學. supported by the Chinese Communist Party whereas those who are not on board of this. ‧. initiative will be excluded from the profit it generates. As President Donald Trump is. y. Nat. directing the United States to a path of protectionism and isolationism, the country is. er. io. sit. likely to withdraw from free trade pacts, such as Trans-Pacific Partnership, and numerous bilateral trade agreements with ASEAN countries respectively (Nordin. al. n. v i n &Weissmann, 2018). This againC proves that joining China’s h e n g c h i U side would not necessarily signify a win-win situation when losing support from those previously cooperated. Up until now, if we count the number of projects in Southeast Asia, 240 infrastructure ventures have Japanese backing, and China only has 210 in all 10 Southeast Asian economies (Bloomberg, 2019). While there are countries willing to open doors to China, Japan, as a country having closer relations with western countries, has shown more achievements in infrastructure building. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) played a crucial part in China’s BRI project in SEA. Especially for less developed countries, such as Laos. The most convenient way to set up ties with these countries is though large amount of loans. However, on the other side of that means 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(31) debt. Another reason for Laos to receive loan from the Chinese government, as we could think of, would be the lack of transparency and supervision. In the short run, fastgrowing results could be in sight, but as heavily indebted as they can be, people still need to realize where these foreign investments in the dark is going (Knox, 2017). In the long run, over-lending funds without considering the consequences could lead to serious domestic economic regression, and China is the first to taste the bitter end. According to Kikuchi and Masutomo, “The Chinese authorities have begun to undo decades of financial repression, by reducing entry barriers and liberalizing interest and. 政治大 1980s, when following similar reforms Japan witnessed a sharp drop in asset prices. 立 exchange rates. The situation in China now resembles the Japanese economy in the late. Japan then struggled with accumulated non-performing loans for a decade, followed by. ‧ 國. 學. the ongoing battle with persistent deflationary pressures (Kikuchi &Masutomo, 2015).”. ‧. As far as idling loans are in no way to be remunerated, it could be possible that China. y. Nat. would utilize this debt and transform it into political leverage over its receiver, which. er. io. sit. makes the country vulnerable to uncredited capitals and foreign intervention inevitable. Fears of the infiltration of Chinese enterprise could be seen in BRI’s development in. al. n. v i n C h vital along the development South Asian region, which is similarly of China’s maritime engchi U blueprint. Chung also points out that “politically, reactions of South Asian states to the MSR are explained as: fear of expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean for India; and attempts by which Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh use China to counteract possible domination by India. Economically, two MSR (Maritime Silk Raod) pathways for South Asian states are analyzed: increases in Chinese infrastructure investments; and expansion in South Asia-China trade; both of which are reducible by loans owed to China, or “strings”/conditions attached (Chung, 2018).” How BRI is financed has become the most blurry that causes heated debates. “Thus far, China has largely favored loans over grants. It is not a member of the Paris Club of 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(32) major creditor nations, and it has shown little inclination to adhere to internationally recognized norms of debt sustainability, such as the sovereign lending principles issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,” suggested by Fontaine and Kliman (Fontaine &Kliman, 2018). There is no denying that not abiding by international regulation simply hollows out the very meaning of economic collaboration per se. This subsequently explains why those subjected to China’s foreign investment voluntarily turns out to be as unlawful as their sponsor is. Singh also argues that while there is much domestic support for China to expand the Belt and Road circle of friends. 政治大 slimming down” the initiative. Some Chinese strategists are of the opinion that the BRI 立. during the upcoming summit, there are also popular voices calling for “rationally. has become too expansive and the infrastructure investment by China too large, causing. ‧ 國. 學. the initiative to drift away from its original goals and objectives, become unnecessarily. y. Nat. 2019).. ‧. politicized, and result in excessive use of China’s foreign exchange reserves (Singh,. er. io. sit. Not only is profitability worrying, but the railway project is also financed by BRI, orders are mostly won by Chinese companies, workers are mainly Chinese, and the. al. n. v i n C h most of the construction locals have hardly benefited. Besides, labor source is from engchi U. China, and the building materials as well, so in the end, China would be the most beneficiary from this project (Lin, 2019). According to Tritto and Camba, inside the BRI, corruption is rampant and transparency is doubtful. Examples of such occur in Malaysia. “Under Najib Razak’s government (2009-2018), Chinese-backed projects thrived in what was later described as a corruption bonanza. The Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP) oil and gas pipeline connecting Borneo to peninsular Malaysia and the MPP Malacca-Johor pipeline were most likely used to siphon funds into the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) fund by overinflating project costs. Both projects were later canceled by the newly elected government of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(33) Even though less than 15 percent of the work was completed, the projects’ contractors were paid the sum of 8.3 billion Malaysian ringgit (around $2 billion), approximately 88 percent of the total value of both ventures, to allegedly pay off time-sensitive 1MDB debts (Tritto &Camba, 2019).” Apparently, the BRI is highly linked to 1MDB and the officials and bureaucracy that utilize those funds are doing nothing but making empty promises. Tritto and Camba also point out that “the contract to build the East Coast Rail Link connecting Kuala Lumpur with the eastern region of peninsular Malaysia proved more difficult to scrape. Mahathir has criticized the need for an exclusive Chinese. 政治大 used mostly to repay China Communications Construction Company, without the need 立. contractor, meaning the loan from China EXIM (Export–Import Bank of China) will be. of leaving China, and the project’s overly expensive cost, which according to estimates. ‧ 國. 學. should be in the range of 35 billion ringgits instead of 55 billion. After negotiations to. ‧. bring down to cost by roughly one-third, the project is now back on track (Tritto. y. Nat. &Camba, 2019). Liu and Lim argue that political elites in states like Malaysia interact. er. io. sit. with China in the sense that such ties would serve as stability for their sustainability of power. In their research, they point out that “interaction is dependent on three key. al. n. v i n C h longstanding pro-ethnic conditions: fulfillment of Malaysia’s Malay policy, a mutual engchi U vision between the state and federal authorities, and advancement of geopolitical. interests for both Malaysia and China (Liu &Lim, 2019).” Global Indicators Database also shows the Malaysia’s image of towards China presenting responding favorable in 2013 with 81%, 2014 with 74%, and 2015 with 78% while the percentage of responding favorable in the Philippines showing 48% in 2013, 38% in 2014, 54% in 2015, 55% in 2017 and 53% in 2017. Indonesia shows quote parallel with Malaysia, showing 70% in 2013, 66% in 2014, 63% in 2015, 55% in 20717 and 53% in 2018. The least countries showing favorable response towards China is Vietnam, presenting 16% in 2014, 19% in 2015 and 10% in 2017 (Pew Research Center, 2020). 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(34) In addition, Malaysia is even more concerned about falling into the so-called “debt trap.” In order to promote the Belt and Road, China has built roads, railways, and ports in various countries. However, huge loans have caused the problem of whether countries are able to repay. Subsequently, those unable to repay would hand over the rights of such infrastructure to China. The most well-known case is Hambantota in Sri Lanka port. The port developed under the financing of China’s BRI but was used by only one vessel per day, which makes it was impossible to pay off all the debts. The port’s ninety-nine-year ownership was then transferred to China (Lin, 2019). Another. 政治大 it is not proportionate to its scale. Report from The Diplomat has it that China Institute 立 view on BRI construction projects is that this massive initiative is moving too fast that. of International Studies (CIIS) contends that China is rather rushing through the. ‧ 國. 學. construction of the BRI. In the short term, that creates a global impression of being too. ‧. aggressive, and thereby raising too many eyebrows over the intention behind the. y. Nat. construction of this massive initiative. The CIIS report argues that the BRI is a “century. er. io. sit. project” and thus should be executed in a phased manner, through a step-by-step approach so that all that unnecessary public glare and “noise” around the initiative could. n. al. be averted (Singh, 2019).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Criticisms regarding the negative view upon China’s BRI investment towards South East Asia, in an overall picture, also revolves around three facets. First, China’s centralized power may catalyze policy promotion yet is not in line with modern democratic values. Second, China’s large-scale investment in Southeast Asia is laying the foundational strategic basis, paving the way for the existence of the People’s Liberation Army to extend from land-orientated power to ocean-oriented power. Third, for less-developed countries in SEA turning to the mainland for fast-paced economic collaboration, this could mean potential corruption and transparency as well as abandoning the dependent economic structure established along Western tradition. 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(35) 2.3. How Might BRI Affect US’ Role in South East Asia? The United States has dominated Asia Pacific ever since World War II, in order to strategically contain communism. The change of Sino-US relation through the lens of BRI could be observed in terms of its security dilemma, economic scale and regional investment. In terms of US regional involvement in SEA, while the Sino-US potential tension is highly speculated, such spark could be perceived through the lenses of proxies, namely the members of ASEAN. Chen suggests that US policy towards SEA serves as. 政治大 when facing China. In her research 立 viewing all aspects of responses from SEA countries, a crucial exogenous variable, meaning a stronger US involvement offers more leverage. ‧ 國. 學. she finds that those responses “are largely determined by their domestic politics. Specifically, ruling elites in countries prioritizing wealth creation are more supportive. ‧. relative to those in countries prioritizing security enhancement; SEA countries with a. sit. y. Nat. higher degree of trust in China are more supportive of China’s MSRI; their leaders’. al. n. impact (Chen, 2018).”. er. io. ideology and preference, power struggle and social reactions also have a pronounced. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In terms of security dilemma and economic capacity, neorealist emphasizes more on military preparedness instead of economic development. Unlikely, postclassical realism demonstrates more flexibility that states may “trade off” military preparedness if great economic loss is foreseeable. Notice the word “trade off,” being used. A security dilemma and economic concern are considered as balancing factors which are not attainable at the same time. In other words, as of degree, military strength and economic capacity are considered impartially important, which are both balancing leverages to the survival of states in the international system. Brooks’ argument circles around the re-assessment of realism diverging into different kinds based on assumptions about. 28. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(36) state behavior. In his article, he viewed many great works in the field of international relations, mainly around Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, trying to lay out the common features and differences to explain realism in various contexts. According to Brooks, realism could be separated into two categories, namely Waltz’s Neorealist theory and Postclassical realism. In brooks’ article, the author has inducted the similarities between neoclassicism and postclassical realism, which are systemic focus, state-centric, international politics as inherently competitive, material factors based, egoistic actors that pursue self-help (Brooks, 1997). These are the common features that. 政治大 re-gauge realism theory seems to make more sense without over-relying on the 立. occurred to most people when discussing classical realism. However, Brooks’ idea to. standards which are considered outdated and one-size-fits-all. In order to identify. ‧ 國. 學. branches of realism, Brooks focus on “how” states engage in self-help activities and. ‧. thus demonstrate different state behavior. Conditioned by the possibility of conflict,. y. Nat. neorealist, adopting worst-case perspective, tends to discount the future, favoring short-. er. io. sit. term military preparedness in order to survive in the international system. On the other hand, Postclassical realism is more inclined to make decisions based on the probability. al. n. v i n C h to see whetherUit is possible to reach a middle of aggression so as to make assessments engchi ground.. As time passes and the international situation changes constantly, the balance of power is not static but dynamic. The definition of “power” ought to be given new denotation and reshape people’s understanding of international relations in the modern world. When power is no longer limited to traditional military preparedness and states’ aggressive behavior for survival, many other criteria could be introduced regarding balancing the power. In Brooks’ article, the example of the future behavior of Germany and Japan in his implications for realist theory, really well demonstrates the diversity of the development of realism. Both as the defeated Axis countries of World War II, 29. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(37) though materially devastated, what was left and kept was techniques, experience and know-how, which later led to extremely fast recovery (Brooks, 1997). In the case of the United States and China, the power balance in SEA, both leverages for trade-off, military and economic strength could be considered another round of power transition that resembles the post World War II period. Apart from the benefit gained from BRI aid, the impact of the Belt and Road national strategy brings other countries failing to profit from this project to concern about the potential “China threat theory.” China has rapidly emerged in terms of economy and national strength in recent. 政治大 perturbed that China’s development will affect the interests of other countries and 立 years. The “China threat theory” has emerged internationally, many are speculating and. challenge the regional and thus international order. As a long-term and major initiative. ‧ 國. 學. involving many countries in the region, the “Belt and Road” has fueled impact on the. ‧. “China threat theory.” Ciovacco sheds light on the way how conflicts are inevitable. y. Nat. between China and USA and the destiny of America’s enemies could be traced to the. er. io. sit. same notion of similar cause. The author explained that “similar to how the anticommunist movement faded into the history books, the anti-China Lobby movement. al. n. v i n CAmericans today could face a similar future. in the 1960s that an ideological h e n g crealized hi U. witch hunt was not productive to American progress or its values. Similarly, the antiChina Lobby is experiencing some of the same pressures today with its members starting to feel the repercussions of painting China solely as a threat (Ciovacco, 2018).” Huang points out that in terms of the risk of coordination of BRI, there are three aspects that China would face. “First, there is no explicit coordination mechanism; second, there exist risks of clashes of political values across countries; third, there are already signs of tension around China’s export of its excess capacity (Huang, 2016).” To this day and Age, unlike the Cold War period, China has been attempting to showcase that the Belt and Road plan is not a plot of expansionism to benefit exclusive 30. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(38) groups of beneficiaries, but any country with the willingness to cooperate is welcome to join. It also emphasizes that it will not intervene in other countries’ politics and violate sovereignty through political and economic measures, such as the AIIB. Instead of posing hard power in SEA, China has chosen a more flexible way to wield its influence through money that guns. China claims loans from China signifies that no “policy clauses” are attached to other major international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The decision is made only to focus on economic factors and not to interfere with the internal affairs of recipient. 政治大 developing countries. In the final stage of the establishment of the AIIB, China declared 立 countries. For some political systems. It is more attractive for underdeveloped. that it did not pursue the right to veto, indicating that China is willing to restrict its own. ‧ 國. 學. power through the system, which will help increase the trust of other countries.. ‧. Subsequently, as many as 57 countries joined the founding members of the AIIB. y. Nat. (Huang, 2015) , including many developed countries, signifying a page of China’s. er. io. sit. diplomatic victory. Via BRI China has established partnerships with other countries financially and economically, marking a definitive foundation if to proceed to. al. n. v i n C henergy, and counter-terrorism cooperation regarding trade, policy, issues. engchi U. Nonetheless, on the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party may consider BRI as a. placebo to resolve the “China threat” argument. As far as their definition is concerned, the BRI is an expression of China’s active participation in international affairs in recent years, highlighting the image of an open and responsible country. China has taken the initiative to help “underdeveloped” and “developing” countries improve their infrastructure, share economic results, and create conditions for the common development of the world. It is also a good idea to release goodwill to the international community and to convey peaceful development, openness and tolerance, creating an image of mutual benefit and win-win situation with other countries. 31. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(39) 2.4. Conclusion This paper attempts to evaluate whether China will position itself in place of the United States as a potential leader in the development of the regional economy in South East Asia via BRI. In this case, while there are positive and negative perspectives regarding BRI, will China become a supportive role in assisting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to smoothen international trade and secure more business opportunities? Or the bilateral relations between China and ASEAN. 政治大 Belt and Road in ten ASEAN countries aiming to achieve its own economic profit, or 立. countries is not beneficial for regional economy? Moreover, is China’s promoting the. to obtain the regional influence among the ASEAN region at the cost of economic losses?. ‧ 國. 學. Ever since China opened its market in the 1980s, china has transformed from a. ‧. passive market actor to pro-actor yet chose another way rather than colonialism.. y. Nat. Countries in SEA, which used to be under the influence of western colonialism, found. er. io. sit. another partner, China. With funds and aid to boost new regional cooperation. However, China’s over-centralized power may cause problems along the way and poses threat. al. n. v i n C h as well as security towards modern democratic values issues in SEA. Moreover, engchi U. potential corruption and intransparency could also hamper long term development in terms of infrastructural investment. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, US argues that the “China threat” theory covered in China’s helping “underdeveloped” and “developing” countries to improve their infrastructure, creating an image of the winwin situation is no less than camouflage for China’s ambition to replace US as a regional leader. Culturally and geographically, China shares common grounds with South East Asian countries throughout history. Chinese people have been emigrating from southeastern part of China to South East Asian region for centuries, affecting regional 32. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(40) development via various channels. The United States has dominated Asia Pacific ever since World War Two, which poses a threat to China to this day and age. Based on various opinions, the purpose of this research is to further tackle the first question in chapter three and then the second question in chapter four, given two questions: the rising influence of China in SEA and the possibility of China’s replacing US regional dominance.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 33. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(41) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 34. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.

(42) Chapter Three The Development of China’s BRI in South East Asia. This chapter tries to extend the observation range from 2007 to 2017 to study the development and influence of China’s BRI wielded along its spanning route. Within the scope of ASEAN in BRI, countries spanning across the Maritime Silk Road consisting of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,. 政治大 Maritime Silk Road Initiative in the early 21 century. In the first section, I will observe 立. Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, in order to evaluate the performance of China’s BRI st. China’s investment and construction contracts under BRI in ASEAN. In section two, I. ‧ 國. 學. will then review china’s import and export statistics towards ASEAN. In the third. ‧. section, by observing China’s investment, and the trends of trade and FDI data, I. y. Nat. manage to categorize the trend into the countries having trade surplus and deficit with. er. io. sit. China and analyze the corresponding influence of BRI in South East Asian region. The One Belt One Road concept was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. al. n. v i n and then such concept began toCmature in late 2014,Uwith its official publication on hengchi February 1, 2015. To examine the result of trade value to find out whether the same. exploitation concept applies to China’s economic expansion in SEA, this chapter will observe several data sets, consisting of China’s BRI Investment and Construction Contracts under BRI in ASEAN (2013 - 2018) (American Enterprise Institute, 2019), China’s import-export value, Bill of Lading 3 record and FDI figure from China towards ASEAN countries. The import-export trade statistics towards ASEAN countries respectively are extracted from the Department Of Economic and Social A bill of lading (B/L) is a legal document issued by a carrier which is equivalent to the temporary ownership (when the cargo on board) of cargo usually from port of load to port of discharge. The number of B/L could be used as a reference when observing trade between countries or regions. 3. 35. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202000223.