The Mechanisms of Corporate Control: the case of China Development Financial Holding Corporation
陳玠汶、
E-mail: 9314175@mail.dyu.edu.tw
ABSTRACT
“The contest of Corporate Control” is a common circumstance of business. “The Outsides’ strategy of Acquisitions and Mergers” and “the insides’ strategy of anti-taking over” are commonly discussed in the academic community. However, the procedure of Acquisitions and Mergers is rarely being discussed and announced. This dissertation is to investigate the characteristic of the competition for corporate control in Taiwan market based on the case of board of director election of China Development Financial Holding Corporation. In this case study, the mechanisms adapted by the both party for the achieving the corporate control position is analyzed and described in detail. The study concludes: 1.When the corporate is carrying on the activity of “Acquisitions and Mergers”, the potential controller does the action of “tender offer” through the institutional investors, not through the individual financial ability. 2.Under the circumstances of having no enough stocks, the competitors achieved the best benefit by forming an alliance with other competitors. 3.The block holders play the key role in this corporate control competition. However, the wills of individual traders did not make any effort for this competition. 4.Insiders can adapt the way of Cross Holdings to achieve the stable power of control. However, after the insiders get the power of control with fewer stocks, the situation will become the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. Furthermore, it is deems as against the spirit of corporate governance 5.Government-owned can influence the result of the contest of corporate control by stock and also by Law.
Keywords : Acquisitions and Mergers ; Corporate Control ; Tender Offer ; The block holders ; Government-owned Table of Contents
封面內頁 簽名頁 授權書...iii 中文摘要...iv 英文摘
要...v 誌謝...vii 目 錄...viii 圖目
錄...x 表目錄...xi 第一章 緒論...1 1.1 研究背 景...1 1.2 研究動機...2 1.3 研究目的...3 第二章 相關理論及 文獻探討...4 2.1 代理問題...4 2.2 國外與控制權爭奪相關的文獻...8 2.3 國內與 控制權爭奪議題相關之文獻...10 2.4 小結 ...11 第三章 研究方法...12 3.1 以開發金控為研究對象之因素...12 3.2 資料來源...15 3.3 開發金控簡介...15 3.4 資料分析...17 3.5 金融控股股權結構、及績效對公司控制權的影響...26 3.6 開發金控董監改選抗爭 事件...28 第四章 分析結果...33 4.1 混沌期...33 4.2 三方爭奪
期...40 4.3 協商期...42 4.4 協商破裂...43 4.5 委託書徵求 期...44 4.6 小結 ...47 第五章 台灣控制權爭奪現象...48 5.1 少數控制 型態依舊...48 5.2 官股的角色...49 5.3 公司派和中信集團的角色...54 5.4 市 場派控制權爭奪的機制...59 5.5 公司派防止控制權爭奪之機制...60 5.6 官股在控制權爭奪中所動用之 機制...60 第六章 結論及建議...62 6.1控制權的機制...62 6.2未來研究的方 向...62 參考文獻...65
REFERENCES
中文部分: 1.王鼎立，2002，「董事會結構與公司盈餘的傳遞效果」，東吳大學會計學系碩士未出版論文。 2.李心倩，1997，「董監事 改選抗爭決定因素之探討」，私立東海大學管理研究所未出版碩士論文。 3.林明謙，2001，「股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行 為影響之研究」，輔大金融研究所碩士未出版論文。 4.林詩韻，2002，「台灣上市公司股權結構與盈餘資訊內涵之關聯性研究」，淡江 大學會計學系碩士班碩士未出版論文。 5.翁淑育，2000，「台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究」，輔仁大學金融 研究所碩士未出版論文。 6.許武利，2002，「委託書爭奪戰對股東財富之影響」，國立中山大學財 管理學系碩士在職專班未出版論文
。 7.黃佩鈴，2001，「商業銀行的股權結構、核心代理問題與盈餘傳遞效果」，國立中央大學未出版論文。 8.楊淑清，1996，「委託書 收購事件與公司經營績效-以台灣地區上市公司為例」，中正大學會研所未出版碩士論文。 9.劉維新，林志遠2002，「「披著羊皮的狼
」？！－中實戶的投機世界」，2002年社會學年會會議論文。 10.蕭鋼柱，1996，「委託書收購對公司經營績效影響之研究」，中興大
學會研究未出版碩士論文。 11.?一卿，2003，「公司治理結構的控制問題」，東海大學東亞社會與經濟研究中心研究記錄月刊。 英文部 分: 1.Austin, Douglas V., “Proxy Contests and Corporate Reform,” Bureau of Business Research, University of Michigan, 1965. 2.Austin, Douglas V., “The Causes of Proxy contests: An Empirical Study,” 1956-1960, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation in Economics Indian University, 1964. 3.Berle, Adolf A., and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York : Macmillan, 1933. 4.Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang, 1999b, “Who control East Asian corporation,” Policy research working paper 2054, The World Bank. 5.Claessens, S., S.
Djankov, J. Fan, and H. P. Lang, 1999b, “Expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia,” Policy research working paper 2088, The World Bank. 6.DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, “Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests, “Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 10, No.1, 1988,pp.3-36. 7.DeAngelo, Harry &
Linda DeAngelo, “Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, ”Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.23, 1989, pp.29-59. 8.DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders, The Accounting Review, Vol. LXI, No. 3, July1986, pp.400-419. 9.Duvall, Richard M. & Douglas V. Austin, “Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests, “Journal of Finance, Vol .20, No.3,September 1965, pp.464-471. 10.Hancock, G. D. and M. Mougoue, “The Impact of Financial Factors on Proxy Contest Outcomes, “Journal of Business Finance& Accounting, Vol.18, No.4, June 1991, pp.541-551. 11.Ikenberry, David and Josef Lakonishok, “Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest : Evidence and Implications,” Journal of Business, Vol.66, No.3, 1993, pp.405-435. 12.Jensen, Michale C. and Richard S. Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.11,1983, pp.5-50. 13.La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1998,”Law and finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106,1113-1155. 14.La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1999,”Corporate ownership around the world,” Journal of Finance 54, 471-517. 15.Manne, Henery G., “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.73, No.2, April 1965, pp.110-120. 16.Mukherjee, Tarun K. and Oscar Varela, “Corporate Operating Performance around the Proxy Contest,” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.20, No.3, April 1993, pp.417-425. 17.Mukherjee, Tarun K., “Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Proxy Contests for Control : A Non-parametric Approach,”Review of Business and Economice Research, Vol.21, No.1, Fall 1985, pp.85-103. 18.Shleifer, A., and R.
Vishny, 1997,”A survey of corporate governance,” Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.
