The Analysis of Optimal Tariff on the Consideration of Environment Protection and Different Preferential Trade Agreement
陳政良、楊維娟
E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT
High development of global economy causes the transboundary pollution. The regional trade agreement prevails at the moment, this paper extends north and south trade models of the two-country, various-good by Copeland and Taylor(1995), set up a oligopoly model of three-country, two-firm and adopt the trade structure of the third market. This thesis aims to examine the host country adopt the different alliance strategic(free to levy a tax, most favored nation treatment, free trade area) with a developed and undeveloped country on the consideration of environment protection, the influence of optimal tariff, level of output and social welfare, respectively. This paper adopt two kinds of extreme situations of pollution tax to tend to zero or infinite for the convenience of analysis that in the social welfare. We obtains the following conclusions: When pollution tax to tend to zero, the meaning of free to levy a tax and most favored nation, and the social welfare is the same. The meaning of free trade with B or C-country, and the social welfare is the same. When the host country’s government levies tax to two countries at the same time, the limited degree is
relatively little, so the host country’s social welfare is relatively high. When pollution tax to tend to infinite, the host country's policy is unrestricted and make the social welfare reach highest in the situation of free to levy a tax; Average while levying tax freely that the tariff will be ordered, the host country’s policy is restricted at present, and social welfare will be reduced gradually in the situation of most favored nation treatment. When host country adopt free trade with C country that the limited degree is the greatest, so the host country’s social welfare will reach the minimum level.
Keywords : transboundary pollution ; free trade area ; most favored nation ; trade policy Table of Contents
封面內頁 簽名頁 授權書 iii 中文摘要 iv 英文摘要 v 誌謝 vi 目 錄 vii 圖目錄 ix 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 4 第三節 研究架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 第一節 開放經濟下最適污染稅之相關文獻 6 第二節 南北貿易模型與污染之 相關文獻 10 第三章 模型設定 第一節 模型背景 13 第二節 基本模型 14 第三節 求解方法 16 第四章 模型分析 第一節 自由課 稅下最適關稅與社會福利分析 22 第二節 單一關稅制度下最適關稅與社會福利分析 26 第三節 與B國自由貿易下最適關稅與 社會福利分析 30 第四節 與C國自由貿易下最適關稅與社會福利分析 34 第五節 不同貿易政策下最適關稅與福利分析 38 第 五章 結論 參考文獻 45 圖1-1 A、B、C三國間之貿易關係圖 14
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