An Empirical Study of the Relationships among the Ownership Structure, the Independent Director and the Operating Perfor 王麗芳、包冬意

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An Empirical Study of the Relationships among the Ownership Structure, the Independent Director and the Operating Perfor

王麗芳、包冬意

E-mail: 9511355@mail.dyu.edu.tw

ABSTRACT

Corporate Governance is not a new phenomenon, yet recently a focus on the topic has become more intense. In order to assist listed electronic companies to build better corporate governance systems, Securities and Futures Commission has requested that all public offering companies should set up the independent director systems in order to become listed electronic companies. This research examines the relationships among the ownership structure, the independent director and the operating performance of the electronic companies in Taiwan. 288 samples were selected from the listed electronic companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation in 2004. Main findings include the follwing: 1.The ratio of the stock held by the largest shareholder, the board and supervisors, and the ownership concentration have a positive relationship with the firm’s operating performance; the ratio of the stock held by the manager has no relationship with the firm’s operating performance; the ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors has a negative relationship with the firm’s operating performance. 2.The scale of the board has a positive relationship with the ROA and ROE, it has a negative relationship with the EPS; the ratio of the independent director number and the independent supervisor number have a positive relationship with firm’s operating performance. 3.The whole ownership structure system and independent director system have more explain total variation with firm’s operating performance than between individuals.

Keywords : corporate governance ; ownership structure ; independent director Table of Contents

第一章緒論………1 第一節研究背景與動機………1 第二節研究目的………5 第三節研究範圍與限制………6 第四節研究流程………7 第五節論文架構………9 第二章文獻探討………10 第一節公司治理………...………10 一、公司治理之意義……...………10 二、公司治理之架構………..………12 三、我國公司治理執行之相關規章與實施方向…..…18 第二節代理理論與資訊不對稱………...22 第三節股權結構與企業經營績效之關聯性………...27 一、股權結構與企業經營績效具正相關論…..………28 二、股權結構與企業經營績效具負相關論

…………..29 三、股權結構與企業經營績效無關論………..…30 第四節獨立董監事組成與企業經營績效之關聯性…

…...32 一、獨立董監事之定義………..…32 二、獨立董監事持股比率與席次………..34 三、

獨立董監事組成與企業經營績效……..…………35 第三章研究方法………38 第一節研究架構………...38 第二節變數操作型定義………...39 第三節研究假說………...…………43 第四節研究樣本………...51 第五節資料分析方法………...…………51 第四章實證結果與分析………55 第一節變數資料之敘述統計分析...………55 第二節企業經營績效變數資料之敘述統計分析………...59 第三節假說驗證與分析………...61 第五章結論與建議………94 第一節結論……

………...…94 第二節建議………...…96 參考文獻………

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