i
The Political Changes in Hong Kong Under
”One Country, Two Systems”
i
/
ii
The Political Changes in Hong Kong Under
”One Country, Two Systems”
Abstract
Many democratic theories implicit an assumption: the fierce electoral competition helps the formation of the democratic system. However, the experiment of Hong Kong's political development in recent years does not comply. In fact, "One country"
and "two systems" has produced conflicting political results. This article will answer these questions:
First, with regard to Hong Kong's political structure: how does "Basic law" form a system of restrictions? What is the main structure of the system? What kind of institutional control does it produce?
Second, on the “Executive Dominance” of the HK Government: what are the characteristics of the governance model? What are the changes occur on the relationship between the executive and the legislature? Hong Kong has many social conflicts, is “Executive Dominance " able to solve the problem?
Third, the role of political parties and party system: the periodic and frequent competitive elections have brought opportunities as well as conflicts for the political parties. What are the specific changes occur on the composition, ideology, and the number of political parties in Hong Kong, as well as their interaction?
Finally, the relationship between the government and the society: Since HK reunified to China, "one country" system has been gradually emerging contradictions. Due to Beijing repeatedly delayed elections, Hong Kong people gradually feel disappointment and anger, people hope democratic reforms. This conflict and confrontation will be more severe in the future.
In summary, the article would like to make an integrated theoretical perspective and provide a comprehensive analysis on the changes of the political system in Hong Kong.
Key word: One country, Two system, Political Parties in Hong Kong, the Basic Law, Institutionalism, Electoral Authoritarian.
iii
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... 15
... 17
Schedler ... 19
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... 33
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iv
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1920-1980 ... 56
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! ... 65
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vi
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1997~2003 ... 129
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2002 ... 143
1998 2000 ... 144
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vii
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2003 ... 155
... 155
2003 ... 156
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2003~2010) ... 163
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viii
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2005 2007 ... 188
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2012 ... 194
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2010~ ... 201
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689 ... 220
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2011 ... 225
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xi
1-1 EA ... 23
1-2 ... 27
1-3 Mahoney ... 31
1-4 ... 32
1-5 ... 35
2-1 ... 49
2-2 ... 52
3-1 ... 100
3-2 ... 118
3-3 ... 128
4-1 ... 133
4-2 ... 133
4-3 1997.7~2003.10 ... 158
4-4 1997~2002 ... 158
5-1 ... 171
6-1 ... 235
6-2 ... 236
6-3 ... 239
7-1 ... 250
xii
1-1 ... 18
1-2 ... 41
1-3 ... 44
1-4 ... 44
2-1 1841-2011 ... 73
2-2 ... 75
2-3 ... 79
2-4 1984 1995 ... 84
3-1 ... 108
3-2 ... 119
5-1 1998 2012 ... 175
5-2 1997-2012 ... 180
6-1 ... 209
6-2 2003-2012 ... 212
6-3 2008-2012 ... 212
6-4 2011 ... 215
6-5 2012 ... 219
6-6 (1) ... 228
6-6 (2) ... 229
6-7 ... 230
6-8 2001~2010 ... 234
xiii
6-9 ... 238 7-1 ... 246
7-2 ... 248
1
( ) 12
1842 1997 7 1
155 1
2
2010 64
3
1987 68-71
2
Lan
and Kuan, 2003:239 Tien, 2003 2010 68-9
4
5
6 3,500
2012
3
7
8
80 90
9
10
borrowed place, borrowed time 11
2003
2010
2012
4
2009
/
/
5
6
2001 2011
1993
2007 12
1997
2012
2001 1841-1997
1996
1990
2001
1997
1998
7
2012
2008 :
2012
8
James Bryce
Bryce, 1921:
119 Elmer Eric Schattschneider
Schattschneider, 1942:1
Ranny & Kendall, 1956: 8513 1996 9
Giovanni Sartori faction
Channels of expression
A party is a part of a whole attempting to serve the purposes of the whole, whereas a faction is only a part for itself. Sartori, 1976: 24-9
party system
Maurice Duverger
the one party system 14 the two-
party system the multiparty system Duverger, 1955
Douglas W. Rae
90 70
9
70
70% 90 Rae, 1971
Giovanni Sartori 1976 Parties
and Party System competitiveness
ideological distance
(predominant party system) (two-party systems)
(moderate multipartism) (polarized pluralism)
predominant party system
two-party systems
moderate multipartism 3-5
centripetal competition 15
polarized pluralism 5-8
anti-system party
10
ideological distance ideological intensity
2005
2010
2010
2012 17
Duverger Duverger's Law
Duverger, 1967
Sartori
11
Sartori, 1976: 57-8 Sartori
likely outcome frequent effect
tendency law 1.
2. Sartori, 1976: 64
Duverger
Duverger, 1986: 69-71
1986
1989 1994
1995 1980
97 1996
1997
12
1995
206 91
95 98
2003 1995 1998 2000
(1) (2)
95
2003 125
2003 212-6 2011
2011 124
97
13
2011 124
1999 1998
1999 126-7
16
2003
2003
14
180
50
2010 93 2012
17 18
15
(1)
(2)
19
Lau and Kuan, 2007: 716-8 20
invisible hand
21
Potter, 2003:18-20
Huntington 1968
16
Lipset 1960 R. Dahl 1992
Huntington
80
Philippe Schmitter transitology
the levels of analysis 22
generalization Schmitter, 1995:11-44
17
/
nondemocratic
regimes hybrid regimes Diamond, 2002
23 procedural democracy
18
24
Samuel Huntington Arend Lijphart Larry Diamond Steven Levitsky Lucan Way Andreas Schedler
Larry Diamond 2002
competitive authoritarian uncompetitive authoritarian
hegemonic electoral authoritarian) Diamond, 2002: 25
Steven Levitsky Lucan A. Way 2002 36 90
competitive authoritarianism Levitsky and Way, 2002: 51-65.
1-1
1 1
Levitsky and Way 2006: 81
halfway house
19
25
Schedler
Andreas Schedler
electoral authoritarianism EA Schedler
2002
illusion of multi-party democracy Schedler
Schedler, 2002b:
12
EA
”none of these institutions are meant to constitute countervailing powers, all of them represent potential sites of dissidence and conflict" Schedler, 2002b: 12
Schedler
2009: 324-5
20
1. institutional imperatives
2. institutional landscapes
3. institutional containment
4. institutional ambivalence
Schedler
1. institutional imperatives
Schedler, 2009:
325
Schedler
2. institutional landscapes
Schedler, 2009: 328-9
3. institutional containment Schedler, 2009: 331-6
21
1
a. disempowerment
b. agent control
c. fragmentation
2
a. disempowerment
b. supply restrictions
c. demand restrictions
22
d. suffrage restrictions
e. preference distortions
f. vote distortions
4. institutional ambivalence Schedler: 337-8
Schedler
23
EA 1-1
Schedler
Schedler
1 1 EA
macro micro
institution
(intervening variable) institutionalism
24
meso-theory
26
Douglass North
North, 1990: 3-4 Adam Przeworski 1986: 59-60
specific institutions
27
28
uncertainty
29
25
Hall & Taylor 1996 60-70
(1) rational choice institutionalism 30(2)
sociological institutionalism 31 (3) historical
institutionalism Hall Taylor 1996: 930-40 calculus approach
(cultural approach)
32
historical legacies
context
Pierson, 2000: 251-
67 Pierson Skocpol
Pierson & Skocpol, 2002
26
asymmetry
real-world puzzles
small-N
how
descriptive
casual process pattern
2010 147-51
1-2
27
/
1-2
2010 150
150
/
28
small-n
how why
path dependence
history matters
Levi, 1997: 19-41 Steinmo
Steinmo, 2008: 164-5
inertia Pierson
2000 increasing returns
sunk cost self-reinforcing positive
feedback
29
33Pierson
lock in
Pierson, 2000: 263
Stephen D. Krasner 1984: 240-2 punctuated
equilibrium
Krasner, 1984: 242
critical juncture Mahoney, 2001:
112-3
30
institutional reproduction Mahoney, 2001: 114
contingency
Mahoney
Mahoney, 2001: 113
34
unpredictability Mahoney, 2000: 20-1
contextualizing casual mechanisms 35
31
reactive sequence Mahoney
Mahoney, 2000: 526-7
Mahoney, 2001: 114-5
Mahoney
Mahoney 1-3
Mahoney 2001: 113
32
/
displacement
conversion layering drift
2010 166-7
(1) displacement
(2) conversion
(3) layering
(4) drift
1-4
1-4
2010 167
33
Schedler
34
Schedler
Schedler
Schedler Mahoney
1-5
35
1 5
Mahoney(2001: 113) Schedler EA
36
( ) initiative condition
institutional
imperatives institutional landscapes
historical legacies
1985-1997
( ) institutional inertia and containment
36
A.
37
B.
37
C.
a.
b.
c. 3
D.
E. 38
F.
G.
H
( ) reactive sequence
conflict sets
(1)
38
(2)
1999
392003
(3)
legitimacy 40
(4)
39
(5)
in-between
2003
(6) /
2002 SARS
( ) critical juncture
Mahoney
2001 111-2
16
40
1997~2013
(1) 1985-1997 (2)
1997-2003 (3) 2004-2010 (4)
2010- 1985
1997 2003
2010
1-2 1985-1997
1985 5 27
7 1
1997
1997 7 1
1997-2003
1997 150
2002
2002
2003 7 1 50
41
1 2
42
2003-2010 2003
2003
2012 2003
2007 2008
2010
2010 2012
2010-2012 2008
2010
( )
43
/
/
/
macro-level research approach
44
41
1-3
1 3
http://www.hmo.gov.cn/
http://www.locpg.hk/big5/default_310.asp http://www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/about/welcome.htm http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/tc/index/index.html
http://www.reo.gov.hk/ch/about/ceo_msg.htm
http://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/tc_chi/gazette/toc.php?Submit=accept http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/chinese/sec/reports/arpt.htm http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2013/chi/index.html
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2011/tc/index.html
Roundtable Institute and its Network http://www.roundtablecommunity.org.hk/about/index.html
http://www.octs.org.hk/
http://www.procommons.org.hk/about-us?lang=zh http://www.ncforum.org.hk/index.asp
http://www.synergynet.org.hk/b5_index.php http://www.hkpri.org.hk
http://www.savantas.org/b5_index.php http://www.lionrockinstitute.org/chinese/
Civic Exchange http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/
http://www.hkddn.org/index.htm http://hkupop.hku.hk/
NGO
http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/
http://forum2.hkgolden.com/topics.aspx?type=CA :http://news.discuss.com.hk/index.php?gid=150 http://hkreporter.loved.hk/
45
structured interviews semistructured
interviews unstructured interviews
information/data gathering
jack, 1998:137-40 moral language
meta-statement
(1) (2)
(3)
15 1-4
46
42
1-4
D001 45~50 2012.6.27
D002 40~45 2012.6.27
D003 20~25 2012.7.1
D004 30~35 2012.7.10
D005 15~20 2012.7.11
D006 15~20 2012.7.11
D007 30~35 2012.7.20
D008 30~35 2012.7.20
D009 40~45 2012.7.28
D010 45~50 2012.11.9
D011 55~60 2013.4.21
D012 45~50 2013.6.21
D013 55-60 2013.6.22
D014 40~45 2013.6.22
D015 55~60 2013.6.28
47
“The fundamental political problem of the British Colony of Hong Kong is its relationship with China and not the advancement to self-government and independence as is the case with most British colonies. ”
· Alexander Grantham
Richard Hughes
49
43
155
political landscape
48
1840
1841 1
1992 12-3
Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston a barren island with hardly a house upon it
44
1842 8 29
Sir Henry Pottinger
230
45 2-1
46
49
2 1
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hkcolonyprocess.jpg
1843
47
48 indirect
50
1865
1905
……1900
17,247,023
16,797,700 16,000,527 16,087,673 11,677,708
Ireland, 1905: 15
150 96%
2012
crown colonies
letters patent royal instructions
colonial regulations 2
51
legislative council
49
2001 19-22
governor 50 Her
Majesty’s representative 1971
51 52
1985 11 2-2
52
( )
2 2
Sir John Francis Davis 1844-1848
53
1848 1849 1
1985 11
Sir Samuel George Bonham 1848 1854
1850
1880 1888
1 19
53
1941 12 25
1993
1945 8 15
5 Sir Mark Aitchison
Young, 1886 6 30 1974 5 12
8 28
1997 1984 15-21
10
municipal council 48
32 16 16
30 20
1 30
1947 5
1949
7 25
Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong 1965
54
Grantham, 1965:105
1984 146 1950
1952 10
54
1997
25-8 300
government by
discussion administrative
absorption of politics
synarchy
1896
1926 55 1985
55
1940
1980 1947 1 1951 6
16 9 7 1951 7
1964 6 18 10 8
1964 7 13
1850
2001 31 1967
2012
70 25 Crawford Murray MacLehose, Baron
MacLehose of Beoch 1971 1982
ICAC
MacLehose Years
1972 11 30 15 15
56
1976 8 23
4 23
1977 25 1980 27 1983 29 1984
32 29
1980 155
1920-1980
150
57
1921 7 1 8
56
1925 57
1946
1949 2
58
58
1945
1996 278-82 1946 12
1996
1947 5 1
15
1950 1 6
1947 1984
1999 14-5 15 50
59
59
1950
……
60
1956
(1)
(2)
(3)
4 28
1984 353-5
1984 355
61
60
1967
1967
7
9 15
8 20
3000
400 1997
1997 37-42 1999
62
61 1977
62 1978 8 13
2004 56-7
631981 9 30
1981 12
63
1982 12 31
1983
(1)
(2)
(3) 1983 4 22
1988 6
1993 39
1987 1993 35
64
……
1993 36-7
65
1982
1984 6
22 23
66
1984 10 3
( 1993 13)
2011 —
living basic law
2009
67
1950
Wong, 1997
1983 7 1
68
1978 1981
1983
2010
1987 97
69
1997 7 1
97 7
1979 3
(1) 1982.9~1983.6
(2) 1983.7~1984.9
1984 12 19
22 1982.9~1983.6
1982 9 Margareta Thatcher
1898
1992 28 9
24 1997
70
1992 28-9
1983.7~1984.9
1983 7
1984 9 22
64
1983
1993a 83
1993a 83
65
1984 12 19
1997 6 30
71
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Chalmers Johnson 1984: 897-8 Asian Survey
72
(1) (2) (3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
2012
D011
73
1981 1986 2 1989
6 1841-2011
2-1
1841 5000-7,500
1848 24,000
1851 33,000
1855 72,000
1901 283,978
1912 467,777
1931 849,800
1941 1,600,000
1945 500,000
1950 2,200,000
1960 3,000,000
1970 3,995,400
1980 5,145,100
1984 1991 1996
5 397 900 5,674,114
6,270,000
1984 1997
54 1/12
2001 2012
6,864,346 7,173,900
2013 2 19
1982 7
74
1985
6
59
23 36
(1) (2) (3)
66 67
1991 36-7
2-2 12
180
75
2 2
36
15
11 10
23
1991 68-70
76
1986 8
600
1997
1988 4
1988 11 68
400 800
30%
2012
77
1989 1
4 15
4 20
5 23
1978
5 27
12 1,200
6
3 6 4
69
1997
2011
78
2011
6 22
8
97
1990
79
70
2- 3
1990 2
2 3
1986 1997
1986
1988
800 2012
1989 97
1989
2
80
1982
18 132 1984 7 18
Sir Edward Youde, 1982-1986
1997 1984 49-58
1984
1985 24
12
81
……
1985 6
97 2003
1995
1985 11
1993a 174-5
1988 91 1986
12 1988
1987 5 1987
1988
9
82
11 15
1988
1997 1989 5
1991
20 1995 2003
88
1990 1 2
1991
18 1997
20 1992 9 18
21 21 3
18
1991
1247 2000
1997
2012
1992 4
1995
83
71
(1)
(2)
(3) 21 18
(4) 21 30
270
(5)
1993 4 12 1994 95
17
1993
2 1994
1995 9 60
84
20 30 10
2-4
2 4 1984 1995
1984 1985 1988 1991 1995
16 10 10 3
30 22 20 18
12 14 21 30
18 20
12 12
10
* 46 56 56 60 60
1993 2
1997
1994 7
1994
85
/ /
72
1948
1923 1967
1980
1983 1 2
11 1985
73
86
74
1989
1978
5 21 100
75
6 3 6 4
1997
2011
87
76
D001
1991
D002
D002
88
1990 4 23
1991
18 12
1992
1993 1994 77
1994 The
89
Democratic Party
1949
50
in- between
90
78 1970
– 1971 1972
1973-1974 1978
91
1920
1956 1960
1966
1968
1967
1967 Public Order Ordinance 80 3
1980 30
20
1971 7 7
21 81
5
1980 30 20
92
1995
7
1991
1995
39 1991
1996
2 3 3 4 82
policy legacy initiative condition
150
initiative condition
93
49
Schedler institutional imperatives
83
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
83
94
1980
(1)
political tutelage
(2)
95
rule of law
(3)
96
97
……
1993 220)
historical legacies
98
(a) 160
(b) (c) (d)
1990 3 28
2004 79
2004 79
99
2008
70 80
2002 462
2013/4/5 A16
3-1
100
3-1
101
A
22
(1) (2)
(3) (4) (5)
(6) 84
158
102
159 B
22 85
( )
(1)
151
” ”
” ”
152 (2)
73
(3)
103
82 85
86 87
95 96
(4) 5
105
109 112 114 116
111
115 (5)
1 2
3 1 2
4
104
5 4
21
6 1 5
24
44
24 4
25 26 28
27 38
39
C
16
17 19
105
64
48
(1)
(2)
48 (3)
86
87
72 2
D
(1) 40 (2)
20 (3) (4)
44
106
31
88
45 (1).
(2) (3)
400 800 1600
107
E.
48
(1)
(2)
(3)
1/4
2/3
108
F
2-4
3-1
60 30
24 6
30 30
35 35
G
109
rule of law common law
presumed
innocence beyond reasonable doubt
(1)
(2)
(3)
17 49
110
H
45
68
1 7 2007
2 3 2007
89
(1) 2007
111
(2) 45
1990 29-63
70 80
1991
112
2010 85-9
90
(1) (2)
(3)
1985 80
1997 25
2004 4
2004
113
91
2005
92
93
1999 126-8 (1)
(2)
74
(3)
79 7
114
94
1996 216-9
Ghai, 1999 Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order
legitimacy
1999:292-302
2000 21
2000 9-27 constitutional hard power
political soft
115
power
95
political
body (1) (2)
116
151
31
31 (2) political party —
(a) (b)
political affiliation
2012
(1) (2) (3)
(4) 2012 4-
10
117
2012 11 2009
91
96 95
98
1991
118
97 1995
1995
42% 20 12
1996 1
largest remainder method
3-2 3-2
3 2
2 2012
119
3 2
1998 2000 2004
4 5 6
3 4 5
3 4 4
5 5 7
5 6 8
20 24 30
quota 98
1996
97
120
2011 124
121
opened list method closed list
method
1998
2004
3
122
1984 7 18
—
24 12
11
1995
2(1) 25
26 99
1992 1995
1991
123
1997
30 30
30
1 23
plurality voting system 1 3
3 3
4
preferential elimination system
1 1
124
50
270 115 2003
43 106
100
D001
125
2004 10 2005 11 2006 11
/
2008-09
126
3-3
127
mandate
128
3-3
129
1997~2003
1997 8
Schedler
130
1995
1995
1999 12 28 24 2000
1 18
2001 5 8
10
1 7 1 22
4-1
131
4-1
101 (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
132
102
1998 7 1
1998 1 4-1 4-2
1998 4 2 —
— 1998
133
(http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/)
(http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/)
1997
7 1
1994 95
103
134
94
1994 38- 41
1995
1995 25-8
20
18 14 2
1 21
104 95
96 1 26
(1) ;
(2)
(3)
135
150 56 94
1996 11 2 340
34 26 400
1996 12 11
1992
105
106
136
107
108
95
60
1996
1997 7 1
1997 1 6 13
1997-1998
1997
6 30
1997 6 23 1997 6 28 80 30
24
16 63
137
109 110
1997 7 2
1997
8 5 10
6 3
1997 10 19 1999
3 2003 8 24 5 10
138
111
16
139
Policy Group
2000
1999
1999 7
2000 4
2001
140
2001 4 30
2001 2
2003 10
2003/10/14
2003 SARS
2001 10 2002
141
2007 7 1
12
142
112
113
2002
800 714
100
143
1998
43 13
2000 60 12
1995
2 4 1996
1998
1998 9
2000 10
2002
1997 7 1 400
2002
2007 6 30
2005 3
6 21 6 24
144
1998 2000
1998 5 24
149 53.29
1998/5/27 43
1998/5/26
1998/5/27 1998/5/27
1998/5/28
1998 1995
proportional
representation PR Hare largest
remainder method 20 1998 175
60 10 16.7%
800
30 50%
3 ;
1998 174-5 20
33.3%
2000
60 6
145
10% 30 50%
24 40% 24 5
4 4 5 6
2007
20
30 10 800
24 30
2003
2007
146
1997 7 3 500
200
2002 2002/7/2
1997 7 24
1997 3
24 “
” “ ”
1999
147
114 1997
3 24
6 26
22 4 24 2 3
158
24 22
158
1999
158
148
1991 17
27
1151991
1997
50 500
116
149
117
118
2005 7 public order
right of interest of other
2007
1999
2002 16
1999
2000 4
150
5 31
1988 4
73,000
1989 2
151
1990 4 4
1192002
9 24 120
152
2002 3
3
27 39 39
(1)
153
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
154
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
155
121
122
2002
2003
1997 2002
7 1
800 2,300
156
4,000 3,000
2,000
2003
2002 12 15
7 1
50
123
6
124
22 8 1~2
157
9 5
1997
SARS 125
126
SARS
2003 6 44.1 100 4-3
4-4
158
4 3 1997.7~2003.10
http://hkupop.hku.hk/
4 4 1997~2002
http://hkupop.hku.hk/
159
11 23
2004 14
2004/8/23 2004
160
institutional landscapes
1997 2003 SARS
D010
161
2003
162
163
2003~2010)
……
OK K
50
OK OK
Feel Good
OK 2004
89 2003
50
127
2003
164
1978 8
2003
129
2004
2003
2003 9 12
2004
165
2003
2004/3/14
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
166
(5)
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5)
167
2004 2
2004
(1)
(2) (3)
(4)
130
2004
1994 2
(1) (2)
168
1997 7 1
1997 (3)
“
” (4)
104
2003
2004
2004
2003 50
1982
169
2003
2003
3000~5000
2012 2003
1970
1980
170
1970
78
1988 56% 1989 60.7%
1
2003 1
24 2003 6 29
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement CEPA
CEPA
SARS
CEPA CEPA
CEPA
2003 7
131 2003
171
2004 6
:
2004 6 1 3
10
2004 5-1
5 1
172
2006
2011
2009 12
2010 1 669
2011 2015
2008 157
2004 2005
2007
173
2011
2009 7 28
1988 11
2012
……
2004 12
2005 3 10
174
5 5
2005 4 27
53 2
46 5
2005 5 25
2005 6 16
2005
2007 3 25 800
649 123
175
2006 8
69 173 100%
6.14%
5-1
74
5 1 (1998 2012)
(1998 2005) (2005 2012) (1998 2012)
a. 298 142 440
b. 97 43 140
c. 201 99 300
d. 170 85 255
e. 31 0 31
f. 0 14 14
(b/a) 32.55% 30.28% 31.82%
(d/a) 57.05% 59.86% 57.98%
176
2008
80
semi-democratic regime
2004
The Link
177
2004 12 25
2004 12 30 30
2006 10 1
League of Social Democrats, LSD
178
132 2003
2010
126 0.53
07 08
2003
2005 2006
2007 3 18
179
2008 10 15
70
D003
1997-2012 5-2
180
5 2 1997 2012
1997 3,000 4,000
1998 40
1999 500
2000 3,700
2001 700
2002 350
2003133 23 >500,000 429,000 502,000 350,000
2004 07 08 530,000 180,000 207,000 200,000
2005 21,000 20,000 24,000 11,000
2006 58,000 33,000 39,000 28,000
2007 68,000 30,000 34,000 20,000
2008 47,000 16,000 19,000 15,500
2009 76,000 32,000 37,000 26,000
2010 52,000 22,000 26,000 20,000
2011 2012
218,000 59,000 67,000 54,000
2012 >400,000 98,000 112,000 63,000
2012/7/2
2006 D001
181
OK OK
OK ——
banner
OK OK
2004
OK
D001
182
2003
1342004
6 300
135
183
