第二節的實證研究，依公司之董監事持股比率和法人持股比率，將公司分為 較高組和較低組。由實證結果來看，顯著性雖然不高，但仍可看出正負向之關係，
董監事持股比率和法人持股比率較高組，幾乎都為正向影響。而董監事持股比率和 法人持股比率較低組，則都為負向影響。
第三節的實證研究，依據公司治理變數之定義將樣本分為兩組，董事長是否 兼任 CEO 和公司是否為家族企業。從實證結果發現，董事長沒有兼任 CEO 和公司為 家族企業對股價報酬有正向的影響。董事長兼任 CEO 則對股價報酬有負向的影響。
本節將以董監事持股比率、法人持股比率和控制股東持股比率之股權結構自 變數與董事長兼任 CEO 和家族企業兩公司治理變數公司對當期的股價報酬 RET 0-1mon、RET 0-3mon、RET 0-6mon、RET 0-9mon 和 RET 0-12mon 進行複迴歸分析，此 外加入成長機會、現金流量、負債比率變動和淨資產增加比率做為控制變數。
表 8 為董監事持股比率、法人持股比率和公司治理變數對重大資本支出後股 價報酬的影響。模型 1 發現，董監事持股比率和董事長兼任 CEO 係數為顯著，分別 為 0.111 和-2.761，結果同如前面所作之單變數檢定，董監事持股比率的上升會提 高當年度第一個月的股價報酬，董事長兼任 CEO 則為負向的影響。於模型 4 亦可發 現，董事長兼任 CEO 係數為顯著，其值為-8.629，顯示董事長兼任 CEO 對當年度的 一至九月的股價報酬有負向的影響。
表 9 同如表 8 之複迴歸模型，僅將董監事持股比率更換為控制股東持股比率，
觀察自變數對重大資本支出後股價報酬的影響。由模型 1 至模型 4 可以發現，董事 長兼任 CEO 之係數在四個模型都顯著，其值分別為-2.926、-4.643、-6.806 和-8.838，
同如單變數檢定的結果，董事長兼任 CEO 對重大資本支出後股價報酬影響為負向，
且隨著時間拉長，係數之絕對值也越大。
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第伍章 結論
投資決策會影響公司未來的成長性及獲利性，重大資本支出影響對公司影響 更為顯著。本文主要探討重大資本支出對於當期股價的影響，並且研究在不同公司 治理情形下股價的變化。本文實證結果發現 RET 0-9mon 事件年前九月個股報酬減 同期產業報酬為顯著的正值，代表經過重大資本支出後，股價報酬有提高的現象。
此外為了觀察是否在不同的公司治理情形下，重大資本支出後股價報酬有提高的現 象，解下來探討各公司治理情形重大資本支出對股價報酬的影響。研究結論如下：
第一節 股權結構對重大資本支出後股價的影響
由單變數檢定觀察不同期間重大資本支出後的相對股價報酬，發現董監事持股 比率較高和法人持股比率較高的公司，都有相對報酬較高的現象，此外董監事持股 比率較低的公司，有相對股價報酬較低的現象。在迴歸分析中，與單變數檢定結果 一致，董監事持股比率和法人持股比率有在不同的迴歸模型裡部分呈現顯著的正值，
雖然大部分結果不顯著，但都呈現正相關。此研究結果符合利益收斂假說，和 Kesner(1987)、Oswald and Jahera(1991)、 Mueller and Spitz-Oener(2006)、
McConnell and Servae(1990)、 Pound(1998)和 Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian(2007)發現相符，董監事持股比率和法人持股比率對公司的影響是正向。
第二節 董事會結構對重大支本支出後股價的影響
由單變數檢定觀察不同期間重大資本支出後的相對股價報酬，可以看出董事長 兼任 CEO 會降低相對股價報酬，且董事長沒有兼任 CEO 對相對股價報酬為政顯著，
顯示董事長沒有兼任 CEO 的公司相對股價報酬會較高。另外，公司若為家族企業亦 會有較佳的相對股價報酬。於迴歸分析中，董事長兼任 CEO 在各模型中幾乎都為負
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向顯著，同如單變數檢定之結果，但家族企業雖然係數都為正相關，但都不顯著。
此研究結果與 Lausten (2002)、 Rechner and Dalton (1989)和 Goyal and Park (2002)發現相同，董事長兼任 CEO 對公司而言影響為負向。
第三節 成長機會對重大資本支出後股價的影響
由單變數檢定觀察不同期間的相對股價報酬，發現成長機會較低的公司在重大 資本支出後股價會較高，且成長機會高和低兩組在一期間下有差異，顯示成長機會 較低組會有較佳的相對股價報酬。從迴歸分析亦可發現，成長機會在數個模型裡都 呈現負顯著。此結果和 Chung, Wright and Charoenwong(1998)、 Brailsford and Yeoh(2004)與黃旭輝、黃一祥和張志向(2011)不相同，其原因推測為投資人會對低 成長公司重大資本支出後的成長有所期待，另一原因可能為公司受到其他事件的影 響，使得結果與過去文獻並不相符，未來若有研究欲探討成長機會對重大資本支出 後的股價影響，可以加入其他重大事件做進一步探討。
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