第五章 結論與建議
第二節 研究限制
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立 政 治 大 學
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N a tio na
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第二節 研究限制
本研究之首要限制為樣本之資料蒐集。由於樣本、自變數之資料來源為 TEJ 臺灣 地區銀行業財務資料庫與公司治理專區，本研究並未驗證各年度、銀行業之董監變數 之數值是否正確。其次，就各董監事背景變數而言，由於存在著數量不一之缺漏值，
且本研究按年底在職董監事背景或因年中改派任，因此可能對統計結果產生影響。再 者，公股股權管理可能受某些本文未納入考慮董監組成因素所影響，例如董事會與監 察人之報酬、董事任期、經驗等等，此部分實有待未來研究證實。另外，在探討公股 代表背景之關係時，股價波動可能受大盤局勢或其他消息等非理性事件所影響，且估 計期間之長短亦會對結果造成影響，因此，上述皆為本文研究之限制。
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附錄
附錄一 「公股股權管理及處分要點」
附錄二 財政部 2012 年 9 月 11 日臺財庫字第 10103703740 號有關「財政部派任公民 營事業機負責人經理人董監事管理要點」
附錄三 「財政部派任或推薦至公股民營事業及其轉投資事業之董事長、總經理薪資 標準表」